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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the whistle-blowing decisions of government internal auditors in 
response to individual and collective corruption occurring within government internal 
audit units. An auditor is simultaneously a role-prescribed and non-role-prescribed 
whistle-blower that may behave hypocritically. On the one hand, auditors may be 
intolerant of and report any corruption taking place within their audit clients. On the 
other hand, they may display an unwillingness to blow the whistle on corruption 
committed by their fellow auditors in which they and the recipients of whistle-blowing 
information may be a part of or beneficiaries of the wrongdoing. To examine how, why 
and what factors influence their whistle-blowing decisions, we utilised two approaches: 
the whistle-blowing intentions through the use of case scenarios and actual whistle-
blowing relying on the self-reported cases. Mixed methods of surveys, interviews and 
focus group discussions were conducted in seven government internal audit units. 
Seeing whistle-blowing as a constructive behaviour for the benefit of the organisation 
involving an ethical dilemma, we integrated the prosocial organisational behaviour and 
ethical decision-making perspectives of whistle-blowing to develop a three-phases of 
whistle-blowing decision. In phase 1, the potential whistle-blowers evaluated the 
wrongfulness and the seriousness of the wrongdoing in accordance with their ethical 
sensitivity and evaluated the existence of responsibility to act to stop the wrongdoing. In 
phase 2, they evaluated the organisation responsiveness and the existence of the 
demoralising situation. In phase 3, they assessed their personal responsibility, identified 
alternative decisions according to his/her ethical competence, calculated the cost and the 
benefit of each alternative and decide to blow or not to blow the whistle depended on 
their ethical perseverance.  
The study demonstrates that ethical judgement, moderated by the perceived seriousness 
and organisational commitment, significantly influenced the whistle-blowing intentions. 
while taking the ethical climate, wrongdoer’s power status and whistle-blower’s job 
level into consideration. The study found the domination of informal hidden values 
instead of formal written values and the occurrence of the process of normalisation of 
corruption that led to the destructive act of silence. They reduced the ethical sensitivity 
towards the wrongfulness and the seriousness of the corruption, diffused the 
responsibility to blow the whistle and created the demoralising situation. The 
organisations were not responsive. The whistle-blowing information was ignored and 
leaders often promoted an attitude of silent acquiescence by rewarding silent observers. 
The risk of whistle-blowing appeared greater than the expected benefit of being a 
submissive silent observer. When whistle-blowing information was eventually received, 
leaders rectified the problem informally outside of official procedures. The rules were 
upheld only when there was external pressure on the leaders. Through this, the 
wrongdoer will feel secure and the whistle-blower will perceive that the act of whistle-
blowing is not acceptable. The combination of the unwillingness to blow the whistle 
and the process of the normalisation of organisational corruption may create a vicious 
cycle of corruption in and by organisations. 
On the contrary, whistle-blowing occurred when the potential whistle-blowers perceived 
that the act of whistle-blowing is a constructive behaviour supported by the 
organisation’s culture and leadership. Whistle-blowing legislation alone may not be 
sufficient to motivate employees to blow the whistle particularly in Indonesia where in-
group collectivism and power distance are relatively high.  
xvi 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
As summarised in Figure 1.1, Chapter 1 aims to provide the research background 
and its purposes, questions and rationale. The chapter also presents the ethical 
concern and thesis structure. Figure 1.1 demonstrates the linkages between the 
background, focuses, objectives and questions of the research to ensure that the 
study is relevant to the problems of corruption that Indonesia faces today. 
Figure 1.1: The background, focuses, objectives and questions of the research 
 
1.1 Background of the Study 
The main background of this research is the persistently high level of corruption 
in Indonesia and the growing awareness of the efficacy of a whistle-blowing 
system as part of anti-corruption reform in detecting and preventing corruption. 
Corruption is considered the main cause of problems in the governance of the 
nation and has weakened the nation’s capability to achieve its goals of national 
2 
development – to create wealth at all levels of society based on equity, justice and 
diversity. Corruption occurs in local and central government and state-owned 
enterprise during the planning, execution and control stages of development in 
executive, legislative and judicial functions. Multilevel and multi-approach 
strategies to eradicate corruption have been implemented, but the impacts of these 
remain in question mainly because of the quality and integrity of law enforcement 
officers, regulatory and legal constraints, the ineffectiveness of bureaucratic 
reform and lack of participation from the wider community. 
1.1.1 Corruption in Indonesia 
According to Corruption Eradication Commission (CEC), in the 12 years since 
anti-corruption reform was first enacted, 23 ministers, 16 governors, 49 mayors 
and regents, 13 judges, 89 members of the House of Representatives and 
hundreds, if not thousands, of top-level officials have been imprisoned for 
corruption (CEC, 2015). Indonesia’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) – 
published annually by Transparency International – has indicated an improvement 
in combating corruption over the last 5 years. The CPI scores countries on a scale 
from zero to 100, with a score of zero indicating high levels of perceived 
corruption and 100 indicating low levels of perceived corruption. Compared to the 
UK’s CPI scores of 76 in 2013, 78 in 2014, 81 in 2015, Indonesia’s CPI scores 
were 32, 34 and 36, respectively. 
The Attorney General Office of Indonesia reported 2011 figures of 1,624 
corruption cases investigated and 1,425 cases prosecuted. The respective figures 
for 2012 and 2013 were 1,401 vs 1,501, and 1,646 vs 1,964. The public money 
saved was IDR 198 billion in 2011, IDR 302 billion in 2012 and IDR 403 billion 
in 2013 (IAG, 2014). Considering the actual cases, the Indonesia Corruption 
Eradication Commission (CEC), which was established in 2003 and deals only 
with high-profile figures and major corruption cases, reported that 352 cases had 
been handled, 44.6% of which related to ministries and central government 
agencies, with a further 33.8% in local government. In 2013, the CEC reported 
that IDR 1.2 trillion had been saved. The main types of corruption cases were 
3 
bribery (47.2%) and corruption related to the procurement of goods and services 
(32.1%) (CEC, 2014). 
1.1.2 Whistle-blowing Laws in Indonesia 
Considering that corruption is the main cause of problems relating to governance 
in Indonesia (Hamilton-Hart, 2001), the government began to tackle the problem 
systematically. They enacted new anti-corruption law and established the CEC. 
The government are currently implementing the National Action Plan to Combat 
Corruption, which includes the development of a whistle-blowing system. But in 
Indonesia, a whistle-blowing system cannot be effectively implemented because 
of the country’s conflicting political interests (Luebke, 2010), cultural challenges 
and regulatory constraints (Semendawai et al., 2011; MacMillan, 2011). 
In the context of post-1998 crisis anti-corruption strategy, reform began in 1999 
following implementation of Law 28/1999 on Good Governance Free from 
Corruption, Collusion, and Neoptism. Keen to be a clean government, the 
government of Indonesia released President Regulation Number 81/2010 on the 
Grand Design of Bureaucratic Reform 2010–2025. The Grand Design is an 
instrument for the government of Indonesia to become more aligned and make a 
coordinated effort on reform. Considering those policies, the Ministry of State 
Apparatus Empowerment and Bureaucratic Reform published two main policies 
concerning the development of a whistle-blowing system: 1) Guidelines for the 
development of an island of integrity free from corruption and 2) The 
development of a whistle-blowing system in ministries, government agencies and 
local governments. Various whistle-blowing systems are now being developed 
throughout state institutions and government agencies. 
Indonesia passed Law Numbers 13 in 2006 and 31 in 2014 on Witness and Victim 
Protection and founded the Witness and Victim Protection Agency. The Witness 
and Victim Protection Agency is responsible for protecting witnesses and 
determining compensation and restitution for victims. However, MacMillan 
(2011) identified that the law excludes individuals who provide information in 
civil corruption cases, and there are no appropriate immunity and sentence-
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reduction mechanisms. Law Number 13 may provide physical protection for 
witnesses, but does not effectively shield whistle-blowers from retaliation in the 
workplace. MacMillan (2011) argued that this could act to impede the willingness 
of public servants to report corruption cases. 
1.2 Rationale of the Study 
The rationale for this study lies in three interrelated aspects of whistle-blowing, 
organisational corruption, the role of the internal auditor in an organisation and 
the contextual aspect of Indonesia. The study is based on the assumption that 
corruption in a culture that normalises wrongdoing is best dealt with via 
preventative rather than reactive measures, and whistle-blowing is one of the 
effective preventative measures (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Misangyi et al., 2008; 
Miceli et al., 2008). 
1.2.1 Why Whistle-blowing? 
The Indonesian public consciousness on the whistle-blowing phenomenon may be 
resurrected through popular cases involving top-level officials. In 2010, Susno 
Duadji, Commissioner General of the Police Department and Head of the 
Criminal Investigation Agency, was the first person to blow the whistle on a 
multimillion-dollar corruption and money-laundering case carried out collusively 
by a tax officer named Gayus Tambunan, a judge, a state attorney and an 
‘assistant’ of the Deputy Chief of Police Department. Susno Duadji actually had 
all the necessary formal power to handle the case but, according to Semendawai et 
al. (2011), stronger collusive power in the Police Department prevented him from 
actually resolving it.  
Another well-known whistle-blowing case is that of Agus Condro, a member of 
parliament from 1999 to 2004. He blew the whistle on the fact that he and his 
colleagues in parliament had received millions dollar of traveller’s cheques as 
bribes in the selection process for the position of Deputy Governor of the 
Indonesia Central Bank. He openly exposed all other 26 members of parliament 
who had been in receipt of the bribes (Kompas, 2011). Another prominent 
5 
whistle-blower is Vincentius Amin Sutanto, a former financial controller at the 
Asian Agri Group. He revealed to law enforcement authorities that Asian Agri 
had committed a USD 143 million tax evasion. These cases highlight how 
corruption can spread like an infectious disease that cannot be stopped because it 
has the ability to spiral downward to other people and other areas (Rose-
Ackerman, 1999; Heeks, 1998; Lambsdorff, 2006). 
Ashforth and Anand (2003) argued that organisational corruption can be 
embedded and perpetuated within the organisation. It occurs through the 
processes of institutionalisation, rationalisation and socialisation where an 
employee may participate in activities related to corruption. It may arise out of: 1) 
the perceived costs of not being involved in the corrupt activity, 2) the perceived 
costs of blowing the whistle or 3) the employee being induced to view corruption 
as permissible. In order to effect change within the culture of an organisation that 
supports the normalisation of wrongdoing, Misangyi et al. (2008) identified the 
need for institutional anti-corruption entrepreneurs, with the whistle-blower 
potentially being one of the most important types of anti-corruption entrepreneurs. 
A whistle-blower acts as an internal force within the organisation capable of 
exerting stronger influence on other employees and leaders in the organisation 
than external forces, such as government regulation, to terminate existing 
corruption practice or to dissuade employees from engaging in it in the first place. 
As part of anti-corruption reform strategy, the advantages of the whistle-blowing 
system is its ability to detect, prevent and rectify organisational corruption early. 
Although whistle-blowing is an ethical dilemma decision (Dandekar, 1991), as 
one type of response to wrongdoing (McLain & Keenan, 1999), whistle-blowers 
are an important source of information for identifying potential fraud. Whistle-
blower as an insider account of a corruption can create a potential link between 
the individual and the organisation  and have the potential to make visible the 
normalisation of unethical behaviour by revealing the routine strategies that is 
engaged either purposefully or in an unreflective manner by individual actors 
(Gray, 2013). 
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Moreover, whistle-blowing can be an effective mechanism to combat fraud 
(ACFE, 2012). During the period 2004 up to March 2016, there were 82,780 
pieces of information related to whistle-blowing reported to and analysed by the 
CEC and subsequently handled by either the CEC or other law enforcement 
agencies (CEC, 2016). Cases were handed over to other government agencies if 
they were categorised as small-scale corruption cases, non-corruption cases or just 
general public services complaints. Therefore, the government needs to identify 
factors that facilitate or impede employees’ decisions to blow the whistle on 
corruption in order to motivate and prevent them from participating in the 
wrongdoing. If these factors are correctly identified, then adequate policies and 
regulations might be developed to help employees address their ethical dilemmas. 
1.2.2 Why Organisational Corruption? 
Corruption has been chosen as the focus of the research, instead of other types of 
misconduct such as health and safety violations, sexual harassment or unfair 
discrimination, because corruption is currently a key problem that contributes to 
the creation of many other problems in Indonesia nowadays. It is important to 
narrow the focus to the study of corruption from an organisational perspective 
within government agencies, as opposed to political or state corruption, because 
the organisation is a basic unit of corruption practice. The organisation as a unit is 
part of the problem and part of the reason why corruption is difficult to eradicate. 
The organisation also acts as a window through which to view a nation’s wider 
climate of corruption (Luo, 2005). 
Another of the study’s rationales is that despite the richness of corruption research 
within the field of political science, Aguilera and Vadera (2008) noted that 
organisational scholars have only recently started to systematically explore the 
causes and consequences of corruption and to offer recommendations as to how it 
may be reduced. This is because of a lack of theory to guide empirical research 
and practice (Beugre, 2010). 
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1.2.3 Why Internal Auditors?  
Whether conducting an audit or in their daily office activities, internal auditors 
may find or indirectly observe incidences of corruption in both their audit clients 
or within their own internal audit units. They may thus be in one of three different 
positions at any one time: 1) as an auditor who observes his/her audit client 
committing wrongdoing, 2) as an auditor who observes his/her co-workers 
committing wrongdoing in an audit context or 3) as an employee who observes 
his/her co-workers or other employees committing wrongdoing external to the 
audit context.  
Figure 1.2. shows that the internal auditor may alternately be 1) a role-prescribed 
whistle-blower with a formal responsibility for the disclosure of any wrongdoing, 
as laid out in their job description, or 2) a non-role-prescribed whistle-blower.  
Figure 1.2: Internal auditor as role-prescribed and not role-prescribed 
whistle-blower 
 
The puzzle that motivates this research is why internal auditors tend to be highly 
sensitive to and intolerant of corruption occurring in their external audit clients 
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whilst simultaneously tending to be less willing to report wrongdoing committed 
by their fellow auditors internally, particularly if they and their immediate 
superiors or higher officials, as recipients of the information derived from acts of 
whistle-blowing are either part of, or beneficiaries of, the wrongdoing.  
Another rationale for utilising internal auditors is that they have the sense and 
knowledge required to objectively identify and understand organisational 
corruption within their organisations. Internal auditors also have expertise and 
experience conducting investigative or compliance audits in their organisations. 
Lastly, internal auditors also have a good understanding regarding the 
organisation and its business environment, obtained through their experience 
conducting audits across various organisations. 
It is hoped that studying the whistle-blowing decisions of members of an 
organisation occupying a unique position in terms of their ability to respond to 
organisational corruption may help reveal insights into both the process of 
observing the corruption activities as well as the decision-making process 
involved in whistle-blowing. Various situational and organisational factors 
influencing these decisions can be explored in more depth by studying those 
employees with an understanding of the situation surrounding corrupt activities as 
well as the condition of their organisations. An internal auditor in the two 
previously mentioned positions may experience greater and more real ethical 
dilemmas than those in other types of occupation, and this is certainly true of the 
internal auditors in Indonesia examined in this study. 
1.2.4 Why Indonesia?  
Whistle-blowing is a social construct that depends on the interaction of people 
within the organisation and its social setting (Vandekerckhove, 2011), and its 
perception in different cultures does not necessarily have to be the same 
(Arszulowicz, 2011). In contrast to attempts by Western countries to build 
theories of whistle-blowing, Miceli et al. (2008) claimed that the body of 
knowledge of whistle-blowing in organisations outside of North American 
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settings is in its infancy. They also suggested using samples outside the US for 
future research on whistle-blowing (Miceli, et al., 2012).  
One of the cultural and regulatory problems in the context of Indonesia is the 
frequent incorrect definition of whistle-blowing. We need to distinguish between 
whistle-blowing behaviour and other means of misconduct disclosure. For 
practical reasons, building a contextual understanding of whistle-blowing enables 
us to develop proper policies for the promotion of whistle-blowing behaviour. For 
empirical research, as put forward by Miceli et al. (2014), the use of a standard 
definition of whistle-blowing enables researchers to study whistle-blowing and 
other similar behaviours comparatively.  
Therefore, studying whistle-blowing within the Indonesian context may contribute 
to the body of empirical literature. There have been several studies of whistle-
blowing conducted in other Asian countries, including Hong Kong, India, Japan, 
The Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand (Miceli, et al., 2009), South 
Korea and Turkey (Park, et al., 2008), Taiwan (Su, et al., 2010), and Malaysia 
(Ahmad, 2011). 
1.3 Development of Research Objectives and Research Questions 
The study is primarily underpinned by the aim of finding ways to promote 
whistle-blowing behaviour and to develop more effective means of both detecting 
and preventing cases of organisational corruption. The focuses are on: 1) the 
decision-making process and justification behind whether or not to blow the 
whistle, and 2) the interplay of several factors influencing the whistle-blowing 
decision in responding to both individual and collective corruption occurring in 
internal audit units 
1.3.1 Research Question 1 
Derived from the study’s rationale that a government internal auditor can be a 
role-prescribed whistle-blower, that is, a whistle-blower with a formal 
responsibility to disclose wrongdoing when conducting audit, and also a non-role-
prescribed whistle-blower whilst conducting their daily office activities, the first 
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objective of the research is to examine the incidence and experience of internal 
auditors’ self-reported actual whistle-blowing in government agencies in 
Indonesia. To achieve the first research objective, the study intends to answer the 
following question:  
How do self-reported actual whistle-blowers decide whether or not to blow the 
whistle as a response to organisational corruption occurring within their internal 
audit units? 
1.3.2 Research Question 2 and Consideration in Choosing the Variables to 
be Examined 
Various authors have identified predictors for whistle-blowing. Near and Miceli 
(1995) argued that the characteristics of the whistle-blower, the recipient of the 
complaint, the wrongdoer, the act of wrongdoing and the organisation are all 
factors influencing the termination of wrongdoing. Miceli et al. (2008) roughly 
categorised the predictors into two primary variables: personal and situational, 
while Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005) classified the variables into three 
characteristics: personal, contextual and wrongdoing characteristics. 
The predictors of whistle-blowing to be further examined in the study are focused 
on variables that can either be ‘managed’ or where ‘intervention’ is possible via 
organisational policy and regulation. If the predictors, especially the ‘manageable’ 
predictors, within the organisation can be identified, the government can develop 
policies to promote ethical conduct among its employees. A better understanding 
of the how, when and why speaking out against corruption occurs will help the 
government develop an ethical system or training programmes with a view to 
changing employee behaviour. The predictors and considerations involved in 
selecting the variables were as follows.  
Personal variables  
a. Ethical judgement 
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Ethical judgement can be influenced by the perception of the intensity of an 
ethical issue and can indirectly be affected by the use of rewards and punishments 
and policies and values. The greater the likelihood of individuals perceiving an 
ethical issue as important, the less likely they are to engage in unethical behaviour 
(Ferrell, et al., 2011). 
b. Rank/job level 
Rank/job level is a proxy to reflect the relative power of the whistle-blower and 
the wrongdoer. Near and Miceli (1995) argued that whistle-blowing represents a 
power to influence the relationship between the two parties involved in whistle-
blowing – the wrongdoer and the whistle-blower. When the two sides are in 
conflict, one party attempts to use its position of power to change the behaviour of 
another party. 
c. Organisational commitment 
Organisational commitment can be managed through human resources practices 
such as training, promotion and compensation (Meyer & Allen, 1991). Examining 
organisational commitment is important since whistle-blowing can be construed 
as a measure of an employee’s loyalty to the maintenance of an organisation’s 
ethics or dignity or in protecting it from harm. However, it may also be regarded 
as a violation of the collegial bond between co-workers as well as to the 
organisation (Hoffman and McNulty, 2011; Grant, 2002). 
Situational variables 
d. Perceived seriousness of wrongdoing 
Perceived seriousness of wrongdoing was chosen to reflect the various incidences 
of organisational corruption. The seriousness of an act of wrongdoing may be 
reflected in its frequency, the length of time it has been taking place and also in 
the amount of money involved, amount of damage and the impact on society and 
individuals or on the particular parties involved. The seriousness of the 
wrongdoing can also be seen as the sum of the harm (or benefit) caused to the 
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victims (or beneficiaries) of the wrongdoing (Jones, 1991). In organisational 
corruption, the perceived seriousness is reflected in the intensity scale and 
hierarchical scale. The intensity scale comprises the multitude (quantity) and 
magnitude of the corrupt activities, whilst the hierarchical scale is the number of 
hierarchical levels directly involved in the corruption activities (Luo, 2005). 
Organisational variable 
e. Ethical climate  
Besides the fact that ethics can be institutionalised through the establishment of 
laws and compliance programmes (Ferrell, et al., 2011), Wimbush et al. (1997) 
found that ethical climate relates to the employees’ behaviour. Ethical climate 
refers to how people in an organisation typically decide what it is right or wrong 
(Victor & Cullen, 1988) and reflects a shared set of understandings about how 
ethical issues will be handled (Sims, 1992). Further, Wimbush et al. (1997) argued 
that both climate and ethical behaviour within the organisation can be diagnosed 
and managed by first understanding the different types of ethical climate. Because 
individual values and characteristics provide inadequate explanations for ethical 
behaviour, they advocated the importance of investigating ethical climate. 
Moreover, the organisational culture of the research sites was also examined to 
support the analysis. Besides being related to whistle-blowing behaviour per se 
(Miceli & Near, 1992; Miceli et al., 2008; King, 1999; Evans, 2008), 
organisational culture is also closely linked to organisational commitment (Lok & 
Crawford, 2004; Lok et al., 2005) and ethical climate (Victor & Cullen, 1988; 
Ferrell et al., 1988; Malloy & Agarwal, 2001). 
The interplay of these various factors influencing whistle-blowing decisions leads 
to the second research objective, that is, to explore the roles of perceived 
seriousness of wrongdoing and organisational commitment in the relationship 
between ethical judgement and whistle-blowing intention. The second research 
objective is achieved by answering the following questions: 
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Research question 2a:  
Using ethical climate, wrongdoer’s power status, whistle-blower’s job level and 
organisational commitment as the control variables, does the perceived 
seriousness of wrongdoing, as a moderator, strengthen or weaken the 
relationships between ethical judgement and whistle-blowing intention?  
Research question 2b:  
Using ethical climate, wrongdoer’s power status, whistle-blower’s job level and 
perceived seriousness as the control variables, does the organisational 
commitment, as a moderator, strengthen or weaken the relationships between 
ethical judgement and whistle-blowing intention? 
1.4 Ethical Consideration 
In accordance with Warwick Business School and University of Warwick ethical 
guidance procedures, ethical clearance was sought and acquired, and an official 
request letter for the collection of data was sent to, and approval was obtained 
from: 
- The Prime Secretary of Financial and Development Supervisory Agency, 
- The human resources unit in the office of general inspectorate of the Ministry 
of Finance, Ministry of Education and Culture, Ministry of Religious Affairs, 
Ministry of Public Works and Ministry of Health. 
Survey respondents and interview participants were provided with consent forms 
containing a description regarding the voluntarity of the procedure, a brief 
explanation of the questions to be asked and of their ability to withdraw at any 
time, in addition to the benefits to be gained from participating in this research. 
The names and job titles of interviewees and focus group discussion participants 
were coded and fully anonymised. Raw data was not given to any parties in the 
research sites or other parties other than the research supervisors. 
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1.5 Thesis Structure 
The research is presented in seven chapters. The first chapter, introduction, 
describes the background, purposes, questions and rationales of the research and 
ethical considerations. The theoretical framework, development of the hypotheses 
and of the conceptual model are presented in Chapter 2, including the concept of 
whistle-blowing and previous studies about whistle-blowing decisions. Chapter 3 
addresses the methodology applied in this research that discusses the 
methodological considerations, research design and the quantitative and 
qualitative methods that are adopted, adapted and developed to answer the 
research questions. Chapter 4 reports the results of the qualitative data analysis 
that emerged from the interviews and focus group discussions. Chapter 5 reports 
the results of the data analysis of whistle-blowing intentions and actual whistle-
blowing that include the descriptive and inferential statistical analyses to test the 
proposed hypotheses. Chapter 6 presents discussion of the quantitative and 
qualitative findings. Chapter 7 provides the conclusion, theoretical contribution 
and practical implication, and offers suggestions for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW, THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK AND DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
 
2.1 Introduction: Consideration in Selection of the Theories to be Used 
and Overall View of Literature Review 
As summarised in Figure 2.1, the aim of Chapter 2 is to propose the integrated 
frameworks of ethical decision-making and prosocial organisational behaviour 
perspectives of whistle-blowing decisions and moderation models of ethical 
judgement and whistle-blowing intention.  
Figure 2.1: Connecting research questions and development of whistle-
blowing decision model 
 
Figure 2.1 demonstrates the linkages between the research questions developed in 
Chapter 1 and the literature review in Chapter 2. The role of these linkages is to 
ensure that the conceptual framework and hypotheses developed from the 
literature review are able to guide the researcher in answering the research 
questions. 
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A theoretical framework was developed to organise the research by connecting the 
research purposes, research questions and existing literature to develop a 
conceptual model and set of hypotheses. To ensure that the study is sufficiently 
meaningful and fills a knowledge gap(s), the theoretical framework was 
developed based on the context that Indonesia is now in the process of carrying 
out anti-corruption reform and in agreement with the recommendations of 
prominent researchers in their most recent studies. The chapter structure follows 
this logic. 
Among various definitions, the most widely used definition of whistle-blowing in 
empirical research according to King (1997), Tavakoli et al. (2003), Brennan 
(2007) and Pricewaterhouse Coopers (PWC) (2011) is the one given by Near and 
Miceli (1985, p. 4), that whistle-blowing is: 
... the disclosure by organisation members (former or current) of illegal, 
immoral, or illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to 
persons or organisations that may be able to effect action. 
To capture the characteristics of whistle-blowing in greater detail, representative 
definitions of whistle-blowing containing various point of views and various 
emphasises were analysed. A definition of whistle-blowing according to Western 
literature is then compared with the concept of whistle-blowing in Indonesia in 
order to gain a better perspective of the various moral dimensions of whistle-
blowing.  
Whistle-blowing behaviour was studied using various approaches. They include 
1) whistle-blowing as a speaking truth to power behaviour and an act of resistance 
or an act of collective opposition to authority (O’Toole, 2008; Perrucci, et al., 
1980; Contu, 2014), 2) praxiological theory of struggle that the whistle-blower is 
seen as a person who is acting against the misbehaviour but not against the 
organisation itself (Gasparski, 2011), 3) social information processing perspective 
of whistle-blowing (Gundlach, et al., 2003; Keil, et al., 2010 ), 4) whistleblowing 
as planned behaviour (Park & Blenkinsopp, 2009; Winardi, 2013), 5) Behavioural 
reasoning theory perspective of whistle-blowing which consists of reasons for and 
reasons against the whistle-blowing behaviour (Oh & Teo, 2010), and 6) whistle-
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blowing as trust relationship between multiple actors (Vandekerckhove, et al., 
2016). 
Whistle-blowing can be seen also as an action to correct wrongdoing by persons 
lacking any direct authority to blow the whistle (Miceli & Near, 1992) and as 
social actors who use the resources available to them to actively disseminate anti-
corruption practices (Misangyi, et al., 2008), overcome scepticism and persuade 
other employees to believe in the benefits of their act of reporting (Miceli, et al., 
2008). The views lead to the use of two perspectives of whistle-blowing: prosocial 
organisational behaviour (POB) and ethical decision-making perspectives of 
whistle-blowing. These two perspectives and various definitions of whistle-
blowing were used to inform the researcher of existing knowledge, the themes to 
be explored and those factors involved in a whistle-blowing decision to be further 
measured, tested and examined.  
Miceli et al. (2008) believed that future research using the POB perspective would 
be very valuable. It is also believed that the theory of normalisation of corruption 
(Ashforth & Anand, 2003) may be able to offer potential insight and guide future 
research on whistle-blowing. The theory of normalisation of corruption was 
utilised in reflection of the notion that in trying to illuminate why people would 
reveal the truth (whistle-blowing), we must also uncover the reasons as to why 
people commit to wrongdoing in the first place (Arszulowicz, 2011). The theory 
was utilised also to illuminate the phenomenon of the institutional corruption. 
According to Lessig (2013), institutional corruption is manifest when there is a 
systemic and strategic influence which is legal, or even currently ethical, that 
undermines the institution’s effectiveness by diverting it from its purpose or 
weakening its ability to achieve its purpose. However, the theoretical frameworks 
focus on the process of a whistle-blowing decision. For reasons of space, this 
study does not cover events that take place after the decision, such as experiences 
of retaliation in the workplace, response from other employees and the efficacy of 
the act of whistle-blowing. 
Chapter 2 is organised as follows: first, there is an introduction containing a brief 
description of theory used in the research. The concept of whistle-blowing is 
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presented in Sections 2.2 and 2.3, which includes the previous model of whistle-
blowing decision and discussion about whistle-blowing behaviour. The ethical 
decision making and POB perspectives of whistle-blowing are given in Sections 
2.4 and 2.5. Previous studies regarding internal auditors’ whistle-blowing 
decisions are discussed in Section 2.6, whilst Section 2.7 contains a description of 
the variables used to develop the research hypotheses. The research context is 
presented in Section 2.8 include the Indonesian culture and the description of 
government internal audit units in Indonesia. The conceptual model developed 
from the literature review are presented in Section 2.9. 
2.2 Concept of Whistle-blowing 
The term whistle-blower may refer in Western countries to a referee in a game 
such as football using a whistle to call a foul, or else may refer to the practice of a 
police officer blowing his/her whistle to alert other law enforcement officers and 
the general public to danger and in an attempt to stop unlawful activity (Wilton, 
2007). It has been defined from various perspectives that may illustrate the 
existence of an iterative process of constructing, clarification and reclassification 
of the definition and examining cases of whistle-blowing. To capture the 
characteristics of whistle-blowing, representative definitions were compiled. As 
presented in Table 2.1, these definitions contain not only the common elements of 
the act of whistle-blowing along with the actor (whistle-blower), object and 
recipient of the whistle-blowing information, but also various different points of 
view and emphases. 
These emphases include voluntarity, the motive of whistle-blowing and public 
interest (Bok, 1980). Other emphases are a whistle-blower who may themselves 
be involved in the wrongdoing (Bowie, 1982), getting into the public record 
(Jubb, 1999), whistle-blowing as an act of moral protest (Boatright, 2000) and a 
person who can no longer tolerate a problem (Strack, 2011). Alford (2007) argued 
that an employee who speaks out becomes a whistle-blower if he/she is subjected 
to a form of retaliation from other parties. Without any form of retaliation, the 
person is just a responsible employee protecting the interest of his/her 
organisation as described in his/her job description. 
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Table 2.1: A representative selection of whistle-blowing definitions 
Definition Keywords 
Whistle-blower s sound an alarm from within the very organisation in 
which they work, aiming to spotlight neglect or abuses that threaten 
the public interest (Bok, 1980, p.277) 
 Neglect or abuses 
 Public interest 
a whistle-blower is an employee or officer of any institution, profit or 
non-profit, private of public, who believes either that he/she has been 
ordered to perform some act or he/she has obtained knowledge that the 
institution is engaged in activities which (a) are believed to cause 
unnecessary harm to third parties, (b) are in violation of human rights 
or (c) run counter to the defined purposes of the institution and who 
inform the public of this fact. (Bowie, 1982, p.142) 
 Ordered to perform 
or obtained 
knowledge about 
the wrongdoing 
 Inform the public 
The unauthorised disclosure in the public interest by internal auditors 
of audit results, findings, opinions, or information acquired in the 
course of performing their duties and relating to questionable 
practices. (Chambers, 1995, p.92) 
 In the course of 
performing their 
duties 
…a deliberate non-obligatory act of disclosure, which gets onto public 
record and is made by a person who has or had privileged access to 
data or information of an organisation, about non-trivial illegality or 
other wrongdoing whether actual, suspected or anticipated which 
implicates and is under the control of that organisation, to an external 
entity having potential to rectify the wrongdoing (Jubb, 1999, p.78) 
 Deliberate non-
obligatory 
 Privileged access 
 Non-trivial 
Whistle-blowing is the voluntary release of non-public information, as 
moral protest, by a member or former member of an organisation 
outside the normal channels of communication to an appropriate 
audience about illegal and/or immoral conduct in the organisation that 
is opposed in some significant way to the public interest (Boatright, 
2000) 
 Non-public 
information 
 Outside the normal 
channels of 
communication 
Many [definitions of whistle-blowing] include the following 
conditions: (1) An individual has some privileged status with regard to 
an organisation that permits knowledge inside, confidential, or private 
information regarding activities undertaken by individuals within the 
organisation;  (2) this individuals reports some activities that he or she 
considers to be illegal, immoral, or opposed to the basic values or 
purposes of the organisations (3) the reporting may be done internally 
or externally to person(s), not in the direct line of reporting, who is 
(are) capable and willing to stop or prevent such wrongdoing either 
directly or indirectly (4) The wrongdoing is of a substantive or serious 
nature (5) This wrongdoing affects the public interest, though not 
necessarily immediately or directly (Brenkert, 2010) 
 Internally or 
externally 
 Capable and 
willing to stop or 
prevent 
 Substantive or 
serious 
 Not necessarily 
immediately or 
directly 
Whistle-blowing occurs when an employee or former employee 
conveys information about a significant moral problem to someone in 
a position to take action on the problem, and does so outside approved 
organisational channels (or against strong pressure) (Marthin, 1996 in 
Nan, 2011) 
 Significant moral 
problem 
People who no longer silently tolerate illegal activities, 
maladministration or danger to humans, the environment and the 
economy, but reveal those abuses within or outside their business, their 
company, their organisation or their bureaucracy (Strack, 2011) 
 No longer silently 
tolerate 
 
20 
To further elaborate on elements of the whistle-blowing definition and the current 
various intersecting or contrasting concepts of whistle-blowing, the literature 
reviews were organised into four main elements: an act of disclosure, actor 
(whistle-blower), recipient of the information and object of whistle-blowing.  
2.2.1 Act of Disclosure 
Describing the act of disclosure, Miethe (1999) and Brenkert (2010) described 
two extreme positions of whistle-blowing that can occur within a work setting, 
whereby the whistle-blower may be viewed as either a snitch or saviour, hero or 
traitor, as a spy or even as an enemy of the business. The act of whistle-blowing 
may be motivated by greed, revenge and personal interest and may thus be viewed 
negatively or as a selfless and altruistic act may thus be viewed positively. 
Petersen and Farrell (1986) labelled whistle-blowers as disloyal employees or, in 
contrast, as courageous citizens, upholders of professional standards and 
protectors of the public interest.  
Amid growing awareness of the importance of whistle-blowing, Vinten (1994) 
reported arguments condemning whistle-blowing from individuals such as James 
Roche, Chair of General Motors, who argued that: 
Some of the enemies of business now encourage an employee to be disloyal 
to the enterprise. They want to create suspicion and disharmony and pry 
into the proprietary interests of the business. However this is labelled - 
industrial espionage, whistle-blowing or professional responsibility - it is 
another tactic for spreading disunity and creating conflict (Vinten, 1994)  
 
Peter Drucker also perceived whistle-blowing as an informer system set up by 
monarchs or dictators (Dworkin, 2002). Recently, The Humane Society reported 
that there is also an attempt to introduce an anti-whistle-blowers bill in the US. 
Despite the important role of whistle-blowing employees in exposing animal 
abuse, unsafe working conditions and environmental problems, the agribusiness 
industry has been working to prevent people from finding out about such 
problems by supporting anti-whistle-blower bills. Anti-whistle-blower bills 
effectively block anyone by way of the following: 
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Banning taking a photo or video of a factory farm without permission, 
essentially making it a crime for an investigator to get work at a factory 
farm, or requiring mandatory reporting with impossibly short timelines so 
that no pattern of abuse can be documented. (The HSUS, 2013) 
 A negative view of whistle-blowing is also put forward by Grant (2002), who 
sees whistle-blowing as a tactic for use by an incompetent employee or for an 
employee who feels victimised by his/her employer. 
The two extreme positions of the whistle-blower as hero or traitor can be analysed 
from the perspective of whistle-blowing as employee deviance (Grant, 2002). 
Employee deviance, defined as behavioural departures from the norms of a 
reference group, can be destructive, negative, undesirable and harmful, and may 
include things such as stealing from a company or sabotaging office equipment. It 
can also be constructive, positive, desirable or beneficial behaviour such as 
contributing significantly to organisational effectiveness, finding innovative 
methods or solving workplace problems (Vadera, et al., 2013). As a positive 
behaviour, deviant behaviour is defined as behaviour that deviates significantly 
from the norms of a group in honourable ways, such as altruistically exposing 
wrongdoing for the interest of the organisation in a way that is deserving of 
honour (Spreitzer & Sonenshein, 2004).  
To judge whether an act of deviance such as whistle-blowing is a destructive or 
constructive behaviour, instead of organisational and legal standards, Warren 
(2003) suggested the use of hyper-norms. Hyper-norms are globally held beliefs 
and values to guide behaviour or actions and judgement across situations 
(Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961), Rokeach (1973), in Stam et al., 2014)). 
Compared to organisational and legal standards, hyper-norms can be used because 
of their inclusiveness, pluralistic nature and ease of empirical application. Warren 
(2003) argues that: 
Hyper-norms are inclusive because they incorporate the values and beliefs 
belonging to multiple cultures as well as multiple ethical theories. They 
encompass globally held beliefs, which may involve endorsing or forbidding 
specific behaviours (e.g., do not physically harm others) or more 
complicated principles and entitlements (e.g., the right to freedom). Thus, 
hyper-norms are pluralistic because they capture multiple normative 
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approaches to ethical theory (rights, justice, utilitarianism, duties, virtue) 
(Warren, 2003). 
As depicted in Figure 2.2, Warren (2003) proposed a typology of employee 
deviance. Behaviour that falls outside both sets of norms (reference group and 
hyper-norms) is destructive deviance. Behaviour that falls within reference group 
norms but deviates from hyper-norms can be described as destructive conformity. 
Behaviour that falls within both sets of norms is constructive conformity. 
Behaviour that deviates from the reference group norms but conforms to hyper-
norms is constructive deviance.  
Figure 2.2: Typology of Employee Deviance (Warren, 2003) 
  Normative standard 
  Conform Deviate 
Reference  
group norms 
Conform Constructive  
conformity 
Destructive  
conformity 
Deviate Constructive  deviance 
Destructive  
deviance 
 
Warren (2003) sees whistle-blowing as a beneficial deviant behaviour for 
organisations and it can thus be categorised as constructive deviance. Vadera et al. 
(2013) also argue that constructive deviance encompasses several different 
behaviours, including voice and whistle-blowing. However, not all types of 
whistle-blowing can be categorised as constructive deviance. To be considered 
constructive deviance, an act of whistle-blowing should be voluntary, intentional 
and carried out in good faith. External whistle-blowing with the intent to retaliate 
or seek financial gain or other improper motives other than to protect the public, 
employees or investors may not be considered constructive deviance (Vadera, et 
al., 2009).  
In the context of bureaucratic and anti-corruption reform in Indonesia, besides 
seeing whistle-blowing as constructive employee deviance in general, whistle-
blowing can be considered an action to correct wrongdoing by a person who lacks 
direct authority to institute the anti-corruption reform (Miceli & Near, 1992). A 
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whistle-blower can also be perceived as an institutional entrepreneur. Misangyi et 
al. (2008) proposed that social actors who actively use the resources available to 
them to disseminate anti-corruption practices and mitigate corruption are 
institutional entrepreneurs. Miceli et al. (2008) asserted that a whistle-blower may 
be one of the most important types of anti-corruption entrepreneur. Furthermore, 
whistle-blowers use their ability to overcome scepticism and persuade other 
employees to believe in the benefits of their act of reporting. 
2.2.2 Actor (whistle-blower) 
It may be concluded that current and former members of an organisation are 
classified as whistle-blowers. However, the definitions of whistle-blowing 
presented in Table 2.1 show various perspectives that would not restrict the 
definition of a whistle-blower only as a member of an organisation. Jubb’s 
definition emphasises a whistle-blower as someone who has or has had privileged 
access to data or information about an organisation (Jubb, 1999, p. 78), while 
Brenkert (2010) put forward that a whistle-blower is a privileged individual in 
terms of his/her ability to obtain inside, confidential or private information. He 
also argued that any potential whistle-blower must be bound by the norms of 
confidentiality, privacy and loyalty that govern the operations of that organisation 
(Brenkert, 2010, p. 565). 
The preceding discussion brings to the fore the importance of defining who may 
be classified as a whistle-blower, which became one of the topics in the European 
Parliament’s report on the effectiveness of whistle-blowers. In an analysis of 
whistle-blowing rules applied within European institutions, PWC (2011) 
concluded there was a need to develop clear criteria of a bona fide whistle-blower. 
Trainees, temporary staff, contractors and auxiliary agents may or may not be 
included as whistle-blowers.  
Miethe (1999) put forward views about persons whose role and responsibility 
involves reporting misconduct, such as quality control personnel, security officers 
or internal auditors. She argued that these employees may be considered whistle-
blowers only if they report misconduct outside of the proper channels. If reporting 
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occurs internally, these employees may not be considered whistle-blowers 
because their role-prescribed behaviour is expected or mandated as part of their 
job description and they do not experience the same antagonism and 
condemnation.   
In relation to role-prescribed whistle-blowing, Miceli et al. (2008) proposed that 
when whistle-blowing becomes part of employee’s job, it should be more 
effective because rational organisational leaders would support the act of 
disclosure. The Chartered Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) suggests that an 
internal auditor can act as a whistle-blower. In the context of conducting an audit, 
whistle-blowing is defined as: 
“The unauthorised dissemination by internal auditors of audit results, 
findings, opinions, or information acquired in the course of performing their 
duties to anyone outside the organisation or to the general public” (IIA, 
2012). 
Moreover, the IIA suggests that the first channel for whistle-blowing by an 
internal auditor would be to senior management. The IIA does not see an internal 
channel of communication as whistle-blowing but rather as a normal internal audit 
activity. The internal auditor may blow the whistle externally if concerns are not 
taken seriously. In its Practice Advisory regarding ‘Communicating Sensitive 
Information Within and Outside the Chain of Command’, the IIA emphasises the 
quality of evidence and that the motivation for whistle-blowing is to stop the 
wrongdoing. The decision to blow the whistle must therefore be taken within the 
context of adhering to a legal or regulatory imperative or a professional or ethical 
obligation (IIA, 2004). 
The preceding discussion suggests the importance of the internal auditor as a 
potential whistle-blower. Unlike many other members of an organisation, an 
internal auditor may be in possession of sensitive information concerning 
misconduct. The internal auditor is thus a special type of whistle-blower since 
he/she: 1) has access to and the authority to gather, evaluate and communicate 
information, 2) has the ability to identify wrongdoing and 3) has the ability to 
assess the seriousness of any wrongdoing. An internal auditor has the role and 
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responsibility to blow the whistle and their role-prescribed behaviour is expected 
or mandated. However, this does not mean that an internal auditor does not 
experience the same antagonism and condemnation or does not face a real ethical 
dilemma. As a whistle-blower, an internal auditor may also be confronted with 
conflicting values, obligations, loyalties and with the need to weigh up the costs 
and benefits of blowing the whistle. 
2.2.3 Recipient of Information/Channels of Whistle-blowing  
It may also be concluded that the recipient(s) of whistle-blowing information must 
be person(s) or organisation(s) who is/are capable of preventing, stopping or 
rectifying the wrongdoing either directly or indirectly (Brenkert, 2010; Near & 
Miceli, 1985; Jubb, 1999). However, whether internal reporting is included in the 
definition of whistle-blowing is still debatable. 
It can be inferred that the definition proposed by Near and Miceli (1985) includes 
both internal and external channels. Brenkert (2010) also argued that the notion of 
an individual reporting internally does not constitute whistle-blowing, but is 
instead merely following standard procedure, is mistaken. Reporting internally 
through a chain of command is an act that fulfils the employee’s responsibility. 
However, it becomes a situation of whistle-blowing if it is reported that the 
recipient of the information does not do anything to stop and correct the 
wrongdoing.  
Furthermore, both internal and external channels have several similarities. They 
represent the use of voice rather than exit from the organisation or violence to stop 
the perceived wrongdoing or impose a change in their organisation (Miceli & 
Near, 1992). Both channels also share some of the same elements of whistle-
blowing, namely, dissent, an accusation of wrongdoing and breach of loyalty to 
the organisation. Moreover, including both channels in the definition of whistle-
blowing is consistent with legal usage of the term (Miceli, et al., 2008). Miethe 
(1999) also put forward a similar notion, stating that the inclusion of both 
channels enables the researcher to gain a better understanding of the factors 
behind the intention to blow the whistle. 
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Emphasising that a whistle-blower is an insider who raises a voice in public, Jubb 
(2000) argued that, to be classified as whistle-blowing, the act of disclosure must 
represent a real ethical dilemma. Internal disclosure, whether it is authorised or 
unauthorised, may breach loyalty to peers or superiors but it fails to create this 
crucial ethical dilemma and so may not be classified as whistle-blowing. Other 
researchers also argue that the term whistle-blowing applies exclusively to 
external reporting and that there needs to be an explicit separation of internal and 
external channels. MacNab et al. (2007) argued that whistle-blowing is an act that 
is unauthorised by the organisation, on contrast to ‘reporting’ that is authorised. 
Jubb (2000) argued that the ethical dilemma is missing from internal disclosure. 
An internal disclosure does not breach an organisation’s trust and there is no 
confidentiality violation or loss of information privacy. Internal disclosure may 
protect the organisation from outside scrutiny. Jubb (1999) and Johnson (2002) 
emphasised that whistle-blowing is defined as an act with the intention of making 
the information public. 
The whistle-blowing channel can also be regarded as a level of reporting from 
immediate superiors to higher supervisor up to the highest leadership, suggesting 
that internal channels must be used before any external disclosure takes place and 
that the media are used as a last resort. With the exception of sensitive 
information on intelligence and security, an ombudsman must be used first. 
Whistle-blowing directly to the public, such as via the media, may be done in 
cases where the information in question reveals a serious, clear and present danger 
to the public (Vandekerckhove, 2006).  
In their analysis of whistle-blowing policies in European companies, Hassink et 
al. (2007) identified several internal officials or bodies to which wrongdoing 
should be reported. In a survey of Australian public sector whistle-blowing, 
Donkin et al. (2008) highlighted broad patterns of whistle-blowing and placed 
them into three categories: solely internal, solely external and mixed (see Table 
2.2). 
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Table 2.2: Channels used in whistle-blowing policies and practices 
Channels used in European companies  
whistle-blowing policies  
 (Hassink, et al., 2007) 
Channels used in Australian Public  
Sector whistle-blowing 
 (Donkin, et al., 2008 ) 
Direct or indirect supervisor  
Compliance or Ethics officer  
Contact details for specific contacts are given  
Special hotline  
(Chairman of) Supervisory Board or Board of 
Directors or Board of Management or Executive Board 
Separate contact for financial reporting matters  
Human Resources department  
Legal department  
(Chairman of) Audit Committee  
Corporate Governance department  
Internal Audit department / Internal works council 
Company Secretary  
Risk Management department  
Confidential Advisor or Trusted Representative  
Chief Executive Officer /Chief Financial Officer  
Complaints Committee  
Supervisor  
Senior manager  
Human resources/equity and merit unit  
CEO   
Union  
Internal audit/fraud unit  
Government watchdog agency  
Internal ethical standards unit  
Internal ombudsman/complaints unit  
Member of parliament  
Internal hotline/counselling service  
External hotline/counselling service  
Peer support officer  
Journalist  
 
 
2.2.4 Object of Whistle-blowing: Wrongdoing and Organisational 
Corruption 
The definitions of whistle-blowing that have been offered by scholars confirm that 
the object of whistle-blowing must be non-trivial (Jubb, 1999), substantive and 
serious (Brenkert, 2010). As previously presented in Table 2.1, the objects of 
whistle-blowing vary. They include neglect or abuse that threatens the public 
interest (Bok, 1980), activities causing unnecessary harm and violation of human 
right or against the defined purposes of an organisation (Bowie, 1982). They also 
include acts opposed to the public interest or the basic values or purposes of the 
organisations (Boatright, 2000), although not necessarily immediately or directly. 
In her study, Miethe (1999) used ‘misconduct’ and ‘deviance’ as the objects of 
whistle-blowing, whilst Miceli et al. (2008) used ‘wrongdoing’ and Martin (1996) 
used ‘moral problem’ in their definitions of whistle-blowing. 
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Miceli et al. (2008) defined wrongdoing as illegal, immoral or illegitimate 
practices. Illegal acts are all actions that are considered an offence in the eyes of 
the law, while ‘immoral’ concerns what is good and right for people and society 
(Skiveness & Trygstad, 2014). From the ethical perspective, Leys and 
Vandekerchokve (2014) argued that wrongdoing consists either of a violation of 
applicable norms, neglect of purpose or the negligent or intentional causing of 
unpermitted consequences.  
In examining wrongdoing in the organisation, Miethe (1999) applied two general 
types: organisational and occupational misconduct, while Rehg et al. (2008) 
differentiated any form of wrongdoing in an organisation into wrongdoing that 
harms the organisation or individuals in the organisation. As described in Table 
2.3, in its survey about whistle-blowing and the federal employee, the U.S. Merit 
System Protection Board differentiated three types of wrongdoing: fraud, waste 
and mismanagement (MSPB, 1981), and further broke these down into ten 
activities.  
Instead of studying general wrongdoing or misconduct, some researchers have 
focused on investigating the intention to blow the whistle in relation to particular 
types of wrongdoing. These include financial fraud or theft and financial 
statement fraud (Robinson, et al., 2012), fraudulent financial reporting (Kaplan, et 
al., 2009), the process of preparing financial reporting (Xu & Ziegenfuss, 2008) 
and workplace corruption (Zipparo, 1999).  
Table 2.3: Types of wrongdoings as object of whistle-blowing 
Wrongdoing: fraud, waste, and mismanagement (MSPB, 1981) 
 Stealing Federal funds  
 Stealing Federal property. 
 Accepting bribes or kickbacks. 
 Waste caused by ineligible people receiving funds, goods or service 
 Waste caused by unnecessary or deficient goods or services. 
 Waste caused by a badly managed program. 
 Use of an official position for personal benefits. 
 Unfair advantage given to a contractor, consultant, or vendor. 
 Tolerating a situation or practice which poses a danger to public health or safety. 
 Serious violation of law or regulation.  
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The myriad types of wrongdoing described above reflect various concepts of the 
object of whistle-blowing. This point to the need for them to be placed within one 
defined construct, that is, organisational corruption. As previously described in 
Section 1.2.2, studying corruption from the organisational perspective is important 
because the organisation is a basic unit of corruption practice. Moreover, 
organisational corruption as a construct captures both individual and collusive 
corrupt behaviour as well as organisational corrupt behaviour. 
Definitions of corruption vary in their scope and cover many areas of study: 
politics, economics and social studies. Some of these definitions emphasise 
behaviour, for example, Nye (1967) and Klitgaard (1991), who define corruption 
as a behaviour deviating from the formal duties of a public role or one in which 
personal interest is put above the public interest. In the organisational context, 
organisational corruption can be defined as an illegitimate exchange of resources. 
Organisational corruption might be performed by executives or employees at 
various levels, partially or entirely, on behalf of the organisation, involving the 
use or abuse of public or collective responsibility for private objectives (Luo, 
2005). Organisational corruption is only one of numerous other types of 
wrongdoing that may potentially occur within an organisation that may 
encompass and intersect with the concepts of white-collar crime, corporate 
criminal behaviour, illegal corporate behaviour (Miceli, et al., 2008), abuse of 
power, violation of organisational rules (McLain & Keenan, 1999), organisational 
occupational misconduct, occupational misconduct (Miethe, 1999), fraud, waste 
and mismanagement (MSPB, 1981) or workplace corruption (Zipparo, 1999). 
Other similar terms used are: morally wrong, illegal, unethical, wasteful, 
inefficient, neglectful, an abuse of power, or violates organisational rules or 
professional standards (McLain & Keenan, 1999). However, people in different 
cultures seem to have a very similar notion of what should count as corruption. 
Corruption is a phenomenon that is universally understood in a similar manner 
across different cultures (Rothstein & Torsello, 2013) 
Looking at the parties who benefit, organisational corruption can be divided into 
two distinct phenomena: an organisation of corrupt individuals (OCI) and a 
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corrupt organisation (CO). An OCI is defined as a significant proportion of the 
members of an organisation acting in a corrupt manner primarily for their personal 
benefit. In contrast, a CO is a group that collectively acts in a corrupt manner for 
the benefit of the organisation (Pinto, et al., 2008). 
2.3  The Concept of Whistle-blowing in Indonesia 
One of the cultural and regulatory problems in the context of Indonesia is that 
media and government regulations often incorrectly refer to all incidences of 
individuals disclosing wrongdoing as whistle-blowing. It is necessary to 
differentiate whistle-blowing behaviour from other similar phenomena. Miceli et 
al. (2014) proposed the term ‘bell-ringing’ for the phenomenon of disclosing 
wrongdoing that is conducted by individuals other than members of the 
organisation. It refers to the traditional method of ringing the church bell to warn 
people of danger.   
In Indonesia, the bell-ringer can be paired with the slit drum beater (pemukul 
kentongan). This has its roots in traditional means of communication. A 
kentongan is a hollow percussion instrument constructed from bamboo or wood 
and used in traditional musical performance, or to provide an emergency warning. 
As shown in Figure 2.3, the sound is produced by hitting the instrument with a 
stick to produce various rhythms to indicate different types of danger.  
Figure 2.3: Slit drum beating, Indonesian “whistle-blowing” on public 
danger 
 Types of danger Rhythms of the slit drum 
 
Murder 
 
Burglary or robbery 
Fire 
Flood 
Livestock theft, cattle riding 
Safe and secure 
Public danger 
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By hitting the slit drum in a specific rhythm, such as three rapid hits followed by a 
pause, over and over, to indicate fire, people will recognise the sound and be alert 
to the danger. Individuals have a moral responsibility to report (hit the slit drum) 
and prevent or stop the danger if he/she has the knowledge or abilities to do so. 
Literally, whistle-blowing in the Indonesian language translates as meniup 
(blowing) peluit (whistle). The closest common translated terms of whistle-
blowing are: pengaduan (complaint) (MENPAN, 2012), pengungkapan 
kecurangan (fraud disclosure), pengungkapan rahasia (confidential information 
disclosure) (Sulistomo, 2012) and pelaporan pelanggaran (wrongdoing reporting) 
(KNKG, 2008). The term whistle-blower has also been translated into various 
Indonesian terms such as pelapor tindak pidana (a person who filed a report of a 
crime) (MARI, 2011). To differentiate a whistle-blower and a justice collaborator, 
the Indonesian Supreme Court emphasised that to be considered a whistle-blower, 
the person blowing the whistle should not be one of the wrongdoers. Other 
translated terms are a witness, pengungkap fakta (fact informer) and saksi pelapor 
(a witness who also files a report).  
The National Committee for Governance Policy of Indonesia (KNKG) argued that 
the act of disclosure must performed in good faith and not as a personal complaint 
towards a particular organisation’s policy (grievance) or as an act of defamation. 
Semendawai et al. (2011) argued that two criteria must be met in order for a 
person to be acknowledged as a whistle-blower, Firstly, the person should provide 
the information regarding the wrongdoing to the authorities, who can then act to 
solve the problem, or to the media, who can publicise it. Secondly, the person who 
discloses a wrongdoing that occurs within their organisation must be an insider 
who works for the organisation in question. They also defined the whistle-blower 
as a person who provides information or testimony to law enforcement officials 
regarding an act of crime as part of a judicial process. The CEC also emphasised 
that a whistle-blower is an employee of an organisation where alleged corrupt 
activities may occur who has access to information regarding those corrupt 
activities (CEC, 2014). 
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The whistle-blowing systems applied in government agencies contain various 
definitions of whistle-blowing and whistle-blower. In the whistle-blowing system 
developed by the Ministry of Finance, the definition of whistle-blower covers 
both employees and the organisation’s customers or the public at large 
(Kemenkeu, 2014). The definition of whistle-blower according to the Ministry of 
State Apparatus Empowerment also covers both employees and other parties who 
have relevant information regarding the alleged corruption (MENPAN, 2012). 
Manao (2010) provided a justification for including the public at large in the 
definition of a whistle-blower. He argued that every transaction or government 
activity is always related to, and cannot be detached from, the public as the 
government’s partner, customer or as a provider of goods and services. Therefore, 
the public should be included in the definition of a whistle-blower. 
Dissimilarity in the definition of whistle-blowing behaviour in a non-Western 
context is also found in other contexts. Examining whistle-blowing in the 
transitionally communist country of China, Gong (2000) concluded that China’s 
definition of whistle-blowing is also broader in terms of who blows the whistle, 
but is also slightly narrower in terms of the whistle-blowing channels than most 
definitions encountered in the West. The Chinese definition of a whistle-blower 
includes ordinary citizens, in consideration of the fact that whistle-blowing in 
China works as a mechanism of social control. A report, usually about a corrupt 
official’s malfeasance, is preferably submitted to the Supervision Ministry, the 
party’s Central Discipline Committee and their respective local branches. Whistle-
blowing in China is defined as a report made by ordinary citizens to supervisory 
organs regarding the illegal, illegitimate and immoral behaviour of government 
officials and managerial personnel (Gong, 2000).  
Comparing the perceptions of whistle-blowing behaviour in both Western (see 
Section 2.2) and Indonesian contexts (see Section 2.3) enables researchers to 
acquire a better perspective on the various moral dimensions of whistle-blowing. 
Those in Indonesia differ from those common in the West since the concept of 
ethical whistle-blowing can vary on a cultural level, moral values are dependent 
on culture and cultures are plural (Torsello & Venard, 2016).  
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2.4 Ethical Perspectives of Whistle-blowing 
Having defined what is meant by whistle-blowing, the following section will 
discuss how whistle-blowing (or silence) may be justified. Hersh (2002) described 
that main ethical dilemma in whistle-blowing as lying in the conflict associated 
with balancing values, multiple loyalties and obligations to the organisation, 
general public, professional associations, family and friends and also to oneself. 
Discussion of the dilemma incorporates themes such as priority of internal 
resolution (Audi, 2010), motivation, the severity and likelihood of consequences, 
anonymity, rewards and the degree of protection afforded to the whistle-blower. 
Beyond that, the main dilemma comprises the values to be applied, which, 
according to Velasquez et al. (2014), serve as a standard of right and wrong and 
guide people in what they should do regarding rights, obligations, fairness or 
specific virtues. 
Kantian, virtue and utilitarian ethics theories can be utilised to justify whistle-
blowing. Kantian or deontological theory is concerned with what people do, what 
is the right thing to do and how not do the wrong thing. According to Kantian, 
people have to stand firm in telling the truth, regardless of personal outcome (self-
sacrifice), whereas virtue theory requires the integrity and courage found in an 
individual’s character. Lachman (2008) argued that consequentialist (utilitarian) 
ethics provide a convincing justification for whistle-blowing. 
According to utilitarianism, whistle-blowing is morally required for the greater 
good of society that maximises benefit to humans whilst at the same time 
minimising harm. Grant (2002), in contrast, argues that what a whistle-blower 
demonstrates is not a universal morality of a Kantian or utilitarian ideal, but rather 
an individual moral sensitivity that has its place in virtue ethics. Virtues are not 
rules but personal characteristics. Judgement is always required in ethical 
decision-making and it is a virtue (Campbell & Kitson, 2008). While 
consequentialism evaluates the results of behaviour and deontological ethics 
evaluate themselves, virtue ethics evaluate the intentions behind someone’s 
behaviour (Kaptein, 1998). 
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Brenkert (2010) identified three major theories of whistle-blowing: De George’s 
(2006) Harm Theory, Davis’ (1996) Complicity Theory and Bok’s (1980) Good 
Reason Theory. Brenkert (2010) analysed these three theories prior to forming his 
own Integrity Theory. Moreover, Hoffman and McNulty (2011) examined De 
George’s theory and proposed a Universal Dignity Theory of Whistle-blowing. 
They mainly discussed the moral position that whistle-blowing may take: whistle-
blowing as morally not required, morally permitted, morally required and morally 
praiseworthy. 
2.4.1 The Harm, Complicity, Good Reason, Dignity and Integrity Theories 
of Whistle-blowing 
De George (2006) proposed that in order to be classified as morally permitted, 
whistle-blowing should meet three criteria: 
 The firm, through its product or policy, will do serious and considerable 
harm to the public, whether in the person of the user of it product, an 
innocent bystander, or the general public 
 Once an employee identifies a serious threat to the user of a product or 
to general public, he or she should report it to his immediate supervisor 
and make his or her moral concern. Unless he or she does so, the act of 
whistle-blowing is not clearly justifiable 
 If one’s immediate supervisor does nothing effective about the concern or 
complaint, the employee should exhaust the internal procedures and 
possibilities within the firm. This usually will involve taking the matter up 
the managerial ladder, and if necessary – and possible – to the board of 
directors. 
In addition to these three criteria, to be classified as morally required the whistle-
blowing should also meet the following two additional criteria: 
 The whistle-blower must have, or have accessible, documented evidence 
that would convince a reasonable, impartial observer that one’s view of 
that situation is correct, and that the company’s product or practice 
poses a serious and likely danger to the public or to the user of the 
product. 
 The employee must have good reason to believe that by going public the 
necessary changes will be brought about. The chance of being successful 
must be worth the risk one takes and the danger to which one is exposed 
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De George’s five criteria were seen as so precise that many acts of wrongdoing 
would go unchallenged by virtue of failing to meet/fulfil them. This suggests that 
even if someone believes that an organisation will do serious harm, that person is 
not required to blow the whistle. James (1990, in Brenkert (2010)) argued that it is 
false to take the view that one does not have an obligation to put oneself at serious 
risk without the possibility of gaining some compensatory advantage (p. 569). 
Moreover, De George’s reporting hierarchy – from immediate supervisor up to 
public disclosure – seems to focus on the secondary issue of the effects of public 
disclosure rather than on the primary issue of identifying the problem and finding 
a solution (Hoffman & McNulty, 2011).  
On the Complicity Theory of whistle-blowing, Davis (1996) emphasised: 1) the 
involvement of the potential whistle-blower in the wrongdoing in question and 2) 
moral wrong, not harm, as justification for blowing the whistle. He proposed that: 
You are morally required to reveal what you know to the public (or to a 
suitable agent or representative of it) when: (C1) what you will reveal 
derives from your work for an organisation; (C2) you are a voluntary 
member of that organisation; (C3) you believe that the organisation, though 
legitimate, is engaged in serious moral wrongdoing; (C4) you believe that 
your work for that organisation will contribute (more or less directly) to the 
wrong if (but not only if) you do not publicly reveal what you know; (C5) 
you are justified in beliefs C3 and C4; and (C6) beliefs C3 and C4 are true. 
Unlike De George’s Harm Theory, where the goal of whistle-blowing is to 
prevent harm, the goal of whistle-blowing in Complicity Theory is to avoid being 
involved in or being part of any serious wrongdoing. The weakness of the 
Complicity Theory is that it is an overly narrow view of whistle-blowing since the 
information to be revealed must derive from the whistle-blower’s work. An 
employee who only learns about or observes a wrongdoing occurring within 
his/her organisation but to whom the information regarding the wrongdoing has 
not been entrusted may not be classified as whistle-blowing (Brenkert, 2010). 
Moreover, by contrasting the Harm Theory and the Complicity Theory, Kline 
(2006) put forward another weakness of the theory in that it does not explain why 
the whistle-blowing behaviour is encouraged and the whistle-blower is protected 
despite the act of whistle-blowing bringing harm to the organisation. 
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The third major theory of whistle-blowing is Bok’s (1980) Good Reasons Theory. 
The Good Reasons Theory consists of three elements: dissent, breach of loyalty 
and accusation. The dissent part of the theory comprises what Bok (1980) argued 
is the process whereby a potential whistle-blower must decide whether whistle-
blowing is in fact in the public interest and where a whistle-blower has to choose 
to serve the public interest. A whistle-blower then needs to determine his/her 
responsibilities towards his/her co-workers or his/her organisation and weigh 
these against his/her responsibility to the public. To be sure that the motivation is 
morally right, any accusation that a whistle-blower brings must be fair and 
accurate. Bok’s theory emphasises the correctness, accuracy and objectivity of the 
information and also broadly refers to the public interest that may be neglected, 
abused or put at risk (Brenkert, 2010). 
Brenkert’s Integrity Theory of whistle-blowing consists of two parts: The 
Principle of Position Responsibility (PPR) and consideration of the integrity of a 
potential whistle-blower to remain faithful to the principle. The PPR is based on 
the legal and moral aspect of the employer-employee relationship that an 
employee has a duty towards his/her employer to uphold confidentiality, loyalty, 
obedience and provide information/report to authorities. Under this principle, 
Brenkert (2010) argues that: 
This principle morally obliges people to report wrongdoings to those who 
might prevent or rectify them, when the wrongdoings are a significant 
nature (either individually or collectively), when one has special knowledge 
due to one’s circumstances that others lack, when one has privileged 
relationship with the organisation through which the wrongdoing is 
occurring (or has occurred) and when other are not attempting to correct 
the wrongdoing (Brenkert, 2010). 
Moreover, Brenkert (2010) recognised the need to put the principle into the 
context of other values and other norms so that a potential whistle-blower may 
assess the situation and then consider his/her own integrity in relation to it. A 
potential whistle-blower may question his/her integrity and must be prepared to 
uncompromisingly and consistently defend his/her moral, ethical and spiritual 
values and principles in any inconvenient and difficult whistle-blowing situation.  
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In dealing with conflicting principles that may occur in relation to employees’ 
obligation to report and other principles, a potential whistle-blower will integrate 
these principles into a wider coherent set of principles. A potential whistle-blower 
may have to choose between his/her responsibility to the organisation or other 
stakeholders (such as a client or the public) or between their own personal (such 
as being compassionate) and professional integrity (such as honesty). Depending 
on the situation and how tightly bound a potential whistle-blower is to these 
principles, he/she may make a selection of which principle is more important than 
others and then prioritise those principles to be applied. Brenkert (2010) proposed 
that scope and the weight of the responsibility to report wrongdoing is such that 
the more serious the wrongdoing, and the greater the chance that reporting will 
correct the situation, the stronger one’s obligation to report it (p. 586). 
Another theory was offered by Hoffman and McNulty (2011), who argued that a 
good theory of whistle-blowing should provide guidance in how to minimise harm 
to any of an organisation’s stakeholders (p. 50). They argued that the common 
reason for not blowing the whistle was loyalty and cultural resistance against 
whistle-blowing. Therefore, Hoffman and McNulty (2011) proposed a Universal 
Dignity Theory of Whistle-blowing, in which whistle-blowing is both permissible 
and a duty for the reason that whistle-blowing is the most effective means to 
maintain the dignity of all relevant stakeholders (p. 51). They then proposed 
conditions for ethical whistle-blowing as follows: 
1. compelling evidence of nontrivial illegal or unethical actions done by an 
organisation or its employees that are deemed to violate the dignity of 
one or more of its stakeholders 
2. A lack of knowledge within the organisation of the wrongdoing or failure 
by the organisation to take corrective measures. 
If the above justificatory conditions are met, whistle-blowing is ethically 
called for unless the following exempting condition from whistle-blowing 
prevailed: 
3. One is conditionally exempted from the duty to blow the whistle if one 
has credible grounds for believing that by doing so one would put oneself 
or others at risk of serious retaliation. (Hoffman & McNulty, 2011)  
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Under the Universal Dignity Theory of Whistle-blowing, if an employee has 
convincing evidence of wrongdoing and has to deal with competing values 
between, for example, their loyalty to the organisation and loyalty to ethical 
conduct, the employee has a duty to choose the ethics of whistle-blowing unless 
his/her dignity would be seriously harmed. 
Considering the development of whistle-blowing legislation, Hoffman and 
Schwartz (2015) re-examined De George’s theory of whistle-blowing. They 
proposed criteria for internal or external whistle-blowing to be morally obligatory:  
Misconduct has taken place or is expected to take place that seriously 
violates the law or involves serious physical harm, serious psychological 
harm, serious financial harm, serious infringement of basic moral rights, or 
a serious injustice. 
Reasonable evidence or belief of misconduct based on first-hand knowledge 
can be provided. 
Misconduct must first be reported internally whenever feasible to one’s 
direct supervisor and, if no action is taken, all the way up to the board of 
directors or through the designated reporting channel if one exists (e.g., 
compliance or ethics officer). 
For internal whistle-blowing to be morally obligatory, in addition to previous 
three criteria, the following criterion is required: 
Unless one is a professional, an effective written anti-retaliation policy must 
exist at the firm. 
For external whistle-blowing to be morally obligatory, in addition to the previous 
four criteria, the following criterion is required: 
Unless one is a professional, effective legal protections for employees must 
exist. 
These theories of whistle-blowing demonstrate the moral position that whistle-
blowing may take: whistle-blowing as either morally not required, morally 
permitted, morally required and morally praiseworthy (see Table 2.4). 
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Table 2.4: The morality of whistle-blowing based on the Harm, Complicity, 
Good Reason, Dignity and Integrity Theory of Whistle-blowing 
 Internal whistle-blowing External whistle-blowing 
Morally not required if no formal anti-retaliation policy 
exists or effectively implemented 
if no legal protection exists or 
effectively implemented 
Morally permitted  Internal reporting principle: 
exhaust internal managerial 
level or through the designated 
reporting channel 
 Principles of procedural justice: 
warning one’s colleagues of 
their improper misconduct or 
of one’s intention to blow the 
whistle  
 Harm principle: serious and 
considerable physical, 
financial and psychological 
harm  
 Violating moral laws 
 Serious injustice  
 
Morally required 
(obligatory) 
An effective written anti-retaliation 
policy must exist (Unless the 
whistle-blower is a professional) 
 Evidentiary principle: clear, 
substantiated, and reasonably 
evidences 
 First-hand knowledge 
 Make a Difference Principle: 
blowing the whistle will lead 
to successful changes  
Morally praiseworthy 
(supererogatory) 
Whistle-blowing without 
guaranteed protections from the 
organisation against reprisals 
Whistle-blowing without the 
existence of legal protection  
 
In brief, it can be inferred that whistle-blowing contains several important 
debatable issues. These include the level of reporting from immediate supervisor 
up to the public, a potential whistle-blower also being a potential wrongdoer and 
the quality (correctness, accuracy and objectivity) of whistle-blowing information. 
The debatable issues also include exceptions to or justification for not blowing the 
whistle. The debatable issues in whistle-blowing theories, along with the 
competing definition of whistle-blowing described in the previous section in this 
literature review, will be further examined to answer the research questions and 
reported on in the research findings section in Chapter 6. 
2.4.2 Ethical Decision-Making Perspective of Whistle-blowing 
Model of Ethical Decision-Making 
Utilising the virtue ethics theory, Thorne (1998, in Armstrong et al. (2003)) 
developed a model of ethical decision-making comprising four parts: moral 
sensitivity, moral judgement (reasoning), moral motivation and moral character. 
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As described in Table 2.5, moral sensitivity describes how the individual 
interprets the situation and considers the consequences of his/her decision or 
actions. Moral judgement or reasoning describes the processes of selecting the 
‘best’ ethical choice. After a decision has been made, the individual must then be 
motivated to execute that choice. The individual later assigns ‘moral value’ to 
their decision, among other non-moral values (such as career success, economic 
gain or power). 
Table 2.5: Ethical decision-making that integrates ethical behaviour with the 
virtue ethics theory based on Armstrong, et al. (2003) 
Component of 
decision Description Ethical process 
Moral development   
Sensitivity  Interpreting the situation, identifying how various 
actions would affect the parties involved, imagining 
cause–effect chains of events, and being aware that 
there is a moral problem when it exists 
Identification of 
dilemma 
Prescriptive 
reasoning 
Judging which action would be most justifiable in a 
moral sense 
Ethical 
judgement 
Virtue   
Ethical motivation the degree of commitment to taking the moral course 
of action, valuing moral values over other values, and 
taking personal responsibility for moral outcomes 
Ethical intention 
Ethical character persisting in a moral task, having courage, over-
coming fatigue and temptation, and implementing 
subroutines that serve a moral goal 
Ethical 
behaviour 
Moral character is the level of perseverance which shows the process, by which an 
individual executes the decision, overcomes obstacles and resists distractions. It is 
presumed in this sequential model that awareness is needed for a decision to have 
moral implication, reasoning is necessary to determine moral judgement and an 
intention is required to understand a moral action (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 
2011). These four components provide a mechanism for integrating the process of 
ethical reasoning with the ethical decision to analyse the whistle-blowing process 
within the organisational setting. 
In the context of whistle-blowing, Ponemon (1994) provided a model of a whistle-
blower’s ethical decision-making (see Figure 2.4). He argued that three conditions 
need to be met in order for someone to blow the whistle. The first condition is the 
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sensitivity needed to identify the problem and to derive a measure of the 
seriousness of the wrongdoing. 
Figure 2.4: Three Components of the Whistle-blower’s Decision-making 
Process according to Ponemon (1994) 
 
The second condition is the competence that is the ability to develop a strategy for 
dealing with the problem. The third is the perseverance that is having the moral 
principle to follow through on a decision. Whistle-blowing then occurs when the 
individual satisfies all three characteristics that exist at the intersection of ethical 
sensitivity, competence and perseverance. 
Some procedural and substantive ethical tension points (see Table 2.6) can be 
applied to identify where a whistle-blower may face an ethical struggle (Jensen, 
1987). This reflects the whistle-blower’s dilemma in term of: 
- conflict between personal and organisational values and conflict between their 
obligations to an organisation and to parties beyond it, divided loyalty to the 
accused organisation and another constituency (Jubb, 1999), and  
- weighing up of the costs (negative consequences) and benefits (positive 
consequences) of blowing the whistle for the whistle-blower, organisation and 
other parties.  
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Table 2.6: Procedural and substantive ethical tension points (Jensen, 1987) 
Procedural 
ethical 
tension 
Am I properly depicting the seriousness of the problem?  
Have I secured the information properly, analysed it appropriately, and presented 
it fairly?  
Are my motives appropriate? 
Have I tried fully enough to have the problem corrected within the organisation?  
Should I blow the whistle while still a member of the organisation or after having 
left it?  
Should I keep anonymity?  
How ethical is it to assume the role of a judge? 
How ethical is it to set in motion an act which will likely be very costly to many 
people?  
Substantive 
tension 
points 
How fully am I living up to my moral obligations to my organisation and my 
colleagues?  
Am I appropriately upholding the ethical standards of my profession?  
How adversely will my action affect my family and other primary groups?  
Am I being true to myself?  
How will my action affect the health of such basic values as freedom of 
expression, independent judgement, courage, fairness, cooperativeness, and 
loyalty? 
 
Positive and Negative Consequences 
Regarding the ethical dilemma arising from the positive and negative 
consequences, the observer (potential whistle-blower) is confronted with two 
situations. The first is that the wrongdoing contradicts and violates the 
organisation’s values. On the other hand, in the second situation, persons with 
authority in the organisation refuse to admit there is a violation. The observer will 
weigh up the personal and organisational values and then either challenge or 
comply with to the authority. Both courses of action carry associated risk. Jubb 
(1999) proposed that the risks of a challenge are more immediate and appear to be 
much greater, although complying with the authority can make the individual part 
of the wrongdoing. To evaluate the situation, the potential whistle-blower 
considers several factors, such as the severity of the possible consequences, the 
probability that they will occur and whether they are reversible or ameliorable. 
The cost or negative consequences for the whistle-blower may take various forms. 
They may include being fired, denied salary increases, promotions and tenure, 
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suffering damage to their professional reputation and being barred from future 
opportunities (Malek, 2010) or intimidation, harassment, heavy scrutiny of their 
work, isolation and unsafe or humiliating work (Smith & Brown, 2008). 
Moreover, any decision by the whistle-blower to not report may result in a feeling 
of them having compromised their integrity. 
As an instrument to detect and prevent corruption and other wrongdoing, whistle-
blowing can avert harm, protect human rights, help to save lives and safeguard the 
rule of law (Transparency International, 2010). It can increase the quality of 
service, safety and well-being of societal members and lead to a reduction of taxes 
and support for codes of ethics (Miceli & Near, 1992). It also can stop the 
problematic behaviour from continuing, uncover additional incidents of 
misconduct and promote the fair and efficient use of resources (Malek, 2010), 
change in agency procedure, policies or management (Smith & Brown, 2008) and 
is recognised as a key factor in fraud deterrence (Guthrie, 2008).  
This section has reviewed the whistle-blowing theories and ethical decision-
making perspective of whistle-blowing. The key points that will be utilised to 
answer the research question are that the main dilemma of whistle-blowing relates 
to the conflict of balancing values, multiple loyalties and obligations and to 
evaluation of the positive and negative consequences of the whistle-blowing 
decision. The decision as to whether or not to blow the whistle is manifested in 
the point when ethical sensitivity, ethical competence and ethical perseverance 
combine then the decision can be evaluated as whether it is morally not required, 
morally permitted, morally required or morally praiseworthy 
In the next section, the POB perspective of whistle-blowing is presented. 
2.5 Prosocial Organisational Behaviour Perspective of Whistle-blowing 
Decision  
2.5.1 Prosocial Behaviour and Prosocial Organisational Behaviour 
As an effort to prevent the substantial negative consequences of wrongdoing, 
whistle-blowing can be seen as a prosocial behaviour. Prosocial behaviour is 
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defined as positive social acts conducted to produce and maintain the well-being 
and integrity of others (Brief & Motowidlo, 1986). It is intended to benefit one or 
more people other than oneself (Batson, 1998 in Clarke, 2003), and may be 
motivated by self-interest (egoism) as well as altruism (Clarke, 2003). Positive 
social acts here may refer to the definition offered by Penner et al. (2005) that the 
behaviour is defined by society and perceived as generally beneficial to other 
people. It includes helping, sharing, donating, co-operating and volunteering. In 
the organisational context, prosocial behaviour is directed towards colleagues, 
customers or the organisation, such as an employee who goes beyond the 
requirements of his/her formal job description. 
The definition of POB offered by Brief and Motowidlo (1986) comprises two 
dimensions: the person and the consequence of the act. POB is defined as:   
(a) Performed by a member of an organisation, (b) directed toward an 
individual, group, or organisation with whom he or she interacts while 
carrying out his or her organisational role, and (c) performed with the 
intention of promoting the welfare of the individual, group, or organisation 
toward which it is directed (Brief and Motowidlo, 1986, p.711) 
Clarke (2003) identified three models explaining prosocial behaviour: norm 
theories, emphatic arousal and cognitive models. In norm theories, prosocial 
behaviour such as helping is motivated by the need to act according to the norm to 
help those in need. Someone helps because he/she feels morally obliged to help 
those who have helped him/her (reciprocity) or they may help those in need 
because they depend on him/her (social responsibility). In emphatic arousal, 
someone imagines that he/she is in the position of the one needing help. This 
emphatic feeling produces emotional arousal. A cognitive model of prosocial 
behaviour sees helping as a logical decision-making process: perceiving a 
situation, assessing the available factors and making a decision. In a more detailed 
process, the cognitive theory also includes a cost-benefit analysis in which the 
decision depends on the outcome of a weighing up of social rewards (benefits) 
and the social cost of helping. 
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2.5.2 Whistle-blowing as Prosocial Organisational Behaviour  
Whistle-blowing Decision Framework 
Gundlach et al. (2003) proposed that the body of literature on the prosocial 
behaviour perspective of whistle-blowing consists of two factors: the perceived 
seriousness of the act of wrongdoing and the whistle-blower’s weighing up of the 
costs and benefits of their decision. Near and Miceli (1985) proposed whistle-
blowing as a process comprising four decisions. The first decision is that the 
observer must decide whether or not the observed activity is wrong. Secondly, the 
decision to report the activity depends on several factors. The third and fourth 
decisions relate to whether the organisation takes action and may decide to ignore 
any whistle-blower(s) or takes steps to silence him/her if the report is invalid. 
Examining whistle-blowing as prosocial behaviour, Dozier and Miceli (1985) 
developed a whistle-blowing decision framework (see Table 2.7). Greenberger et 
al. (1987) utilised this framework to present a preliminary model of whistle-
blowing as an act of nonconformity to group norms. The models of whistle-
blowing can be traced back to the five-stages decision framework developed by 
Latane and Darley (1970). The first stage in the framework is an awareness of the 
seriousness of the wrongdoing and its harmful consequences to others. The second 
is determining whether the wrongdoing requires any action. The third and fourth 
involve the decision to bear responsibility for taking action and the choice of an 
appropriate action, made after consideration of all possible alternatives and 
outcomes. The fifth stage is taking the required action. The simplified earlier 
models of whistle-blowing are described comparatively in Table 2.7. 
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Table 2.7: Earlier models of whistle-blowing decisions 
Five stage decision 
framework (Latane & 
Darley, 1970) 
Decision framework 
adapted from Dozier 
and Miceli (1985) 
The sequence of 
events associated 
with whistle-
blowing 
(Greenberger, et 
al., 1987) 
A Model predicting 
responses to 
perceived 
wrongdoing 
(Miceli, et al., 2001) 
1) awareness by the 
observer of the 
seriousness of the 
wrongdoing and its 
potential harmful 
consequences to others 
Is organisation member 
aware of wrongdoing? 
Step 1: Is focal 
activity wrong 
 
Do I believe 
wrongdoing is 
occurring  
2) determine whether 
the wrongdoing 
requires any action 
such as whistle-
blowing 
Does organisation 
member consider 
wrongdoing deserving 
of action? 
Step 2: Is focal 
activity deserving 
of action? 
Is action warranted? 
3) decision to bear 
responsibility for 
taking action such as 
reporting 
Does organisation 
member consider self-
responsible for action? 
Step 3: Do I have 
the responsibility  
to act on focal 
activity? 
Am I responsible for 
action? 
4) choice of an 
appropriate action, 
after weighing all 
possible alternatives 
and likely outcomes 
from reporting 
5) taking the required 
action such as whistle-
blowing 
Is at least one behaviour 
alternatives available 
Step 4: Are 
efficacious actions 
available? 
Is an action that may 
stop the wrongdoing 
available to me? 
Does organisation 
member believe the 
whistle-blowing is more 
appropriate than other 
alternatives? 
Step 5: Is 
considered action 
appropriate? 
Will the benefits (of 
a considered action) 
outweigh the costs? 
Does organisation 
member believe the 
benefits of engaging in 
the whistle-blowing 
outweigh the cost? 
Step 6: Do benefits 
outweigh costs? 
Are the net expected 
benefits of whistle-
blowing greater? 
Are results satisfactory 
to organisation member? 
 Are results 
satisfactory? 
Miceli and Near (1992) refined this model and proposed four stages of decisions. 
In stage 1, the occurrence of wrongdoing, an activity that is observed by at least 
one member of the organisation, must occur before any whistle-blowing takes 
place. Stage 2, the process preceding the decision to blow the whistle, comprises 
four steps. In step 1 (recognition of wrongdoing), the potential whistle-blower is 
aware of the wrongdoing. In step 2 (assessment), the potential whistle-blower 
considers whether the event is deserving of an action. Step 3 (responsibility) is 
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when the potential whistle-blower considers whether she/he is responsible for 
taking action. Step 4 (choice of action) is when the potential whistle-blower 
determines whether there are any alternative actions available. In stage 3, the 
whistle-blower takes action by reporting the wrongdoing to at least one party. In 
stage 4 – the reactions of others – the recipient of the complaint and other parties 
within or outside the organisation may react to the whistle-blowing. 
Miceli and Near (2005) condensed these decisions into three general phases and 
then Miceli et al. (2008) further refined the model (see Figure 2.5).  
Figure 2.5: Phases in the POB model of Whistle-blowing (Miceli, et al., 2008) 
 
Phase 1 yields a conclusion as to whether or not the focal activity is wrong and 
whether anyone has a responsibility to stop it. Phase 2 comprises the process of 
signalling or demoralising. Miceli et al. (2008) argued that unreported or 
uncorrected wrongdoing may signal to employees that the organisation tolerates 
wrongdoing and may therefore demoralise the employees. If the wrongdoing has 
been corrected, employees are less likely to become demoralised. In Phase 3, 
employees who observe the wrongdoing make a decision as to whether or not it is 
their responsibility to act upon the wrongdoing and whether any action is 
available.   
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Perceived Cost and Expected Benefit 
The decision to blow the whistle constitutes a cost-benefit analysis that is 
influenced by perceptions of causality, judgements of responsibility and emotions, 
as well as perceptions of consequences (Graham, 1986; Gundlach et al., 2003). 
Employee perception of causality refers to internal, controllable, stable and 
intentional causes compared with external, uncontrollable, unstable and 
unintentional causes of wrongdoing. The perception of causality influences two 
other factors: emotions, which include anger, resentment and fear and judgement 
of responsibility that is the employee’s view of the wrongdoer’s responsibility for 
the wrongdoing. 
Cost-benefit analysis and personal responsibility were found to be important 
factors influencing auditors’ reporting intentions. Kaplan and Whitecotton (2001) 
found that intention was stronger when the personal costs of reporting were 
perceived to be lower. It was also stronger when personal responsibility for 
reporting was perceived to be higher. Responsibility for reporting can be explicit 
in an employee’s job description, or it can be implicit arising out of a personal 
sense of social responsibility or moral obligation (Curtis, 2006) or from a sense of 
commitment and loyalty to the organisation (Alleyne, et al., 2012). On the 
contrary, diffusion of personal responsibility (the bystander effect) can occur 
when many individuals observe the wrongdoing and choose to remain silent. 
Duska (2010) argued that obligation exists when there is need, capability to 
report, proximity, last resort and the probability of success. When wrongdoing 
occurs, there will be a need to stop it. The observer is aware of the activity; thus 
he/she is in close proximity to it. The observer may not be the one with initial 
responsibility to report the wrongdoing but if none of the people in authority 
respond to the activity, then the observer becomes the last resort and has some 
responsibility to report it. If the observer thinks that there is little probability of 
success in preventing harm or a significant probability of damaging the observer’s 
interest, then their sense of obligation diminishes. 
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The key points that will be utilised to answer the research question are that from a 
prosocial organisational perspective, a whistle-blower, as a member of an 
organisation, feels morally obliged to blow the whistle to prevent wrongdoing. 
However, the whistle-blower also contextualises their decision concerning the 
perceived cost and expected benefit.  
The notions described above illustrate the intersection of the prosocial 
organisational perspective of whistle-blowing and the ethical decision-making 
perspective of a whistle-blowing decision. Both perspectives emphasise 
recognition of the wrongdoing, personal responsibility to report it and the 
weighing up of the cost and benefit arising from it. Examining the moral 
principles that govern a person’s behaviour and viewing whistle-blowing as a 
piece of ethical decision-making and as prosocial behaviour may illuminate how 
an employee makes the decision and what factors influence their decision.  
2.6 Previous Studies of Internal Auditor Whistle-blowing Decisions  
There are only a handful of studies that have focused mainly on the factors 
influencing internal auditors’ whistle-blowing decisions. Many more studies can 
be found in the area of external/public accountants’ whistle-blowing decisions or 
on auditors’ ethical decision-making in general.  
Recognising the uniqueness of the internal auditor position in the organisation, 
Arnold and Ponemon (1991) examined the level of moral reasoning and found 
that internal auditors with relatively low levels of moral reasoning were unlikely 
to predict whistle-blowing. Examining reward systems and moral reasoning, Xu 
and Ziegenfuss (2008) found that auditors with lower levels of moral reasoning 
were more sensitive to cash incentives. Internal auditors were more likely to 
report wrongdoing to higher authorities when incentives were provided. In a 
survey of directors of internal auditing, Miceli et al. (1991) also found that they 
were less likely to report when they did not feel morally compelled to do so or 
when they were employed by highly bureaucratic organisations.  
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Among more recent studies, Seifert et al. (2010) examined the influence of 
organisational justice on internal auditors’ and management accountants’ whistle-
blowing and found that employee whistle-blowing was likely to increase when the 
procedures, outcomes and related exchanges with superiors were perceived as fair. 
Focusing on internal auditors and internal whistle-blowing intention, Ahmad 
(2011) argued that members of organisations had different reactions to different 
types of wrongdoing and that the main predictors were the principle dimension of 
ethical climate, relativism dimensions of ethical judgement, the seriousness of 
wrongdoing and gender.  
In general, internal auditors’ whistle-blowing behaviour has been studied through 
the application of a survey of directors of internal auditing (Miceli, et al., 1991), 
experimental methods (Arnold and Ponemon, 1991; Seifert et al., 2010; Xu and 
Ziegenfuss, 2008) and surveys using vignettes (Larkin, 2000; Ahmad, 2011). 
Detailed previous studies of internal auditor whistle-blowing decisions are 
described in Table 2.8. 
 
Table 2.8: Previous studies of internal auditor whistle-blowing decision 
Type of Study and 
methods 
Main Concepts / theory 
utilised Major Findings 
1. Internal Auditors’ Perceptions of Whistle-blowing and the Influence of Moral Reasoning: 
An Experiment (Arnold & Ponemon, 1991) 
This experiment 
required 106 internal 
auditors to predict 
whether or not another 
person would engage 
in a whistle-blowing 
act under different sets 
of conditions.  
This paper examines the 
internal auditor’s 
perceptions of whistle-
blowing within the context 
of his or her level of moral 
reasoning as measured by 
the Defining Issues Test 
(DIT) 
- internal auditors with relatively low 
levels of moral reasoning were 
unlikely to predict whistle-blowing  
- the organisational position of the 
individual contemplating the whistle-
blowing act influences internal 
auditors’ predictions.  
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Type of Study and 
methods 
Main Concepts / theory 
utilised Major Findings 
2. Who blows the whistle and why? (Miceli, et al., 1991) 
Survey of 653 
Directors of Internal 
Auditing 
This study examines the 
effects of a number of 
perceptual variables on 
internal auditors’ reporting 
of wrongdoing by 
employees and managers 
in their organisations 
- Directors of Internal Auditing were 
less likely to report when they did 
not feel compelled morally or by role 
prescription to do so, when they 
evaluated their job performance as 
below average, or when they were 
employed by highly bureaucratic 
organisations.  
- Auditors were more likely to report 
incidents to external agencies when 
they felt that the public or their co-
workers were harmed by the 
wrongdoing, the wrongdoing 
involved theft by relatively low-level 
workers, there were few other 
observers, or the organisation was 
highly regulated. 
3. The Ability of Internal Auditors to Identify Ethical Dilemmas (Larkin, 2000) 
Surveys the internal 
audit department of a 
large financial services 
organisation using 
vignettes 
Four key demographic 
variables were 
investigated: gender, age, 
years of employment and 
peer group influence 
- Respondents view themselves as 
more ethical than their peers.  
- Females’ ability to identify ethical 
behaviour better than their male 
counterparts. . 
4. Reward Systems, Moral Reasoning, and Internal Auditors’ Reporting Wrongdoing (Xu & 
Ziegenfuss, 2008) 
Experiment was 
conducted to examine 
whether rewards 
systems such as cash 
incentives or 
employment contracts 
have an impact on 
auditors disclosing 
wrongdoing behaviour 
This study investigates the 
issue of whistle-blowing 
behaviour that results 
from internal auditors 
discovering company 
wrongdoing in the process 
of preparing financial 
information 
- Internal auditors are more likely to 
report wrongdoing to higher 
authorities when incentives are 
provided suggesting reward systems 
have a positive effect on disclosing 
company’s wrongdoing or even 
fraud 
- Internal auditors with lower levels of 
moral reasoning are more sensitive 
to cash incentives 
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Type of Study and 
methods 
Main Concepts / theory 
utilised Major Findings 
5. The influence of organisational justice on accountant whistle-blowing (Seifert, et al., 2010) 
An experiment 
involving 447 internal 
auditors and 
management 
accountants.  
 
The theory of 
organisational justice to 
the design of whistle-
blowing policies and 
procedures 
- Employee whistle-blowing is likely 
to increase when organisational 
whistle-blowing procedures, 
outcomes, and related exchanges 
with superiors are perceived as fair.  
- Whistle-blowing policies and 
mechanisms incorporating higher 
levels of procedural justice, 
distributive justice, and interactional 
justice were perceived to increase the 
likelihood that an organisational 
accountant would internally report 
financial statement fraud. 
6. Internal auditors and internal whistle-blowing intentions: A study of organisational, 
individual, situational and demographic factors (Ahmad, 2011) 
A total of 180 internal 
auditors who were 
members of the 
Institute of Internal 
Auditors Malaysia 
participated in an 
experimental design 
employing four 
vignettes  
The study explored 
individual’s prosocial 
behaviour theory and 
organisational ethical 
climate theory to provide 
the general framework for 
predicting internal 
auditors’ internal whistle-
blowing intentions. 
- Organisational members have 
different reactions to different types 
of wrongdoings.  
- Depending on the type of 
wrongdoings, the main predictors of 
internal auditors’ internal whistle-
blowing intentions were the principle 
ethical climate, relativism 
dimensions of ethical judgement, 
seriousness of wrongdoing and 
gender.  
2.7 Factors Influencing Whistle-blowing Decisions and Hypotheses 
Development 
As previously described in Section 1.3, the variables to be further examined are: 
1) ethical judgement (main effect), 2) perceived seriousness of wrongdoing and 
organisational commitment (moderating effect) and 3) ethical climate, 
wrongdoer’s power status and whistle-blower’s job level (control variables).  
Factors influencing the whistle-blowing decision in the POB perspective of 
whistle-blowing were represented by organisational commitment, perceived 
seriousness of wrongdoing, wrongdoer’s(s’) power status and whistle-blower’s 
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job status. To be a whistle-blower, a member of an organisation needs to have a 
good intention to promote the welfare of others and the organisation. As shown 
later in development of the hypotheses, organisational commitment is related to 
the intention and level of an employee’s responsibility for the promotion of 
welfare to the organisation. Perceived seriousness was chosen because of the fact 
that different acts of wrongdoing have different levels of perceived seriousness 
and responsibility for blowing the whistle is related to the perceived seriousness 
of the wrongdoing (Duska, 2010). 
Factors influencing a whistle-blowing decision within the ethical decision-making 
perspective of whistle-blowing were represented by ethical judgement and ethical 
climate. These were chosen because the potential whistle-blower must be aware 
that the current wrongdoing is unacceptable and that he/she is responsible for 
taking action. As shown later in the development of the hypotheses, ethical 
judgement and ethical climate are related to the level of an employee’s sensitivity 
to the degree of wrongfulness of the misconduct in question. 
2.7.1 Hypotheses Development of Main Effect and Moderating Effect 
2.7.1.1 Ethical Judgement 
Although there is a lack of a single accepted definition of ethical judgement in the 
business ethics literature, Sparks and Pan (2010) reported the two most often cited 
definitions. Ethical judgement may refer to the belief that a particular alternative 
decision is the most ethical alternative (Hunt & Vitell, 1986). It may also refer to 
the process in which an individual determines that in a particular situation, one 
action is morally right and another action is morally wrong (Rest, 1986). They 
also proposed that ethical judgement can be defined as an individual’s personal 
evaluation of the degree to which a behaviour or an action is either ethical or 
unethical. Referring to these three definitions, Sparks and Pan (2010) argued that 
ethical judgement is a process of evaluation of one or more options based on a 
specific set of evidence or goals. It can be made into either a singular process 
(isolated from other options) or a comparative process (in comparison to sets of 
standards).  
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Ethical judgement can be seen as a binary decision such as right or wrong, ethical 
or unethical and good or bad, or as a continuum of intensity. Seeing it as a 
continuum of intensity, Reidenbach and Robin (1990) developed the 
Multidimensional Ethics Scale (MES) to measure how a respondent evaluates an 
ethical decision. The MES instrument comprises three ethical dimensions: moral 
equity, relativism and contractualism. 
The moral-equity dimension is about justice, fairness and morality or goodness 
and the rightness of the issue in question. The relativism dimension refers to the 
culture and traditions that are concerned with the social guidelines or 
requirements that define a society’s ethical beliefs. These beliefs are relativistic in 
the sense that a person evaluates whether an issue is right or wrong based on 
social guidelines rather than individual consideration. The third dimension, 
contractualism, concerns the unwritten and unspoken social contract that an 
individual’s evaluation of the rightness or wrongness of an issue is based on an 
agreement/contract that exists in society (Reidenbach & Robin, 1990).  
In identifying the characteristics of whistle-blowers in relation to ethics, Greene 
and Latting (2004) found that whistle-blowers are altruistic, utilitarian, driven by 
their sense of integrity and have a social responsibility to speak out and allow 
their attitudes and beliefs to guide them. Chiu (2003) found that ethical 
judgement, moderated by a locus of control, was related to the intention to blow 
the whistle among Chinese managers. According to Rotter (1966, cited in Miceli 
and Near, 1992), an individual with an internal locus of control believes 
themselves to be largely in control of their outcomes, whilst an individual with an 
external locus of control believes that fate, luck or chance determines much of 
what happens to them. 
Ayers and Kaplan (2005) found that moral-equity judgements were significantly 
associated with reporting intentions for a non-anonymous reporting channel. They 
concluded that the relativism and contractualism dimensions may not be 
associated with reporting intentions under both conditions of anonymity and 
normal reporting channels. In a study involving Chinese employees at ten banks 
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in China, Zhang et al. (2009) also found that whistle-blowing judgement 
explained a high variance in whistle-blowing intentions.  
Ahmad (2011) reported that previous studies utilised the dimensions of ethical 
judgement in examining the association with whistle-blowing or reporting 
intentions. He reported that all the dimensions of ethical judgement – moral 
equity, relativism and contractualism – are significantly positively associated with 
behavioural intentions in the various types of vignettes that he examined. 
However, Ahmad (2011) also found that the relativism dimension was the only 
significant predictor of ethical judgement for internal whistle-blowing intentions 
and that neither the moral equity or contractualism dimensions appeared to 
influence internal whistle-blowing intentions in any of the vignettes applied in his 
research. 
In light of these previous findings outlined above, it can be proposed that an 
observer of wrongdoing may evaluate an ongoing act of wrongdoing as either 
ethical or unethical based on: 1) his/her perception of its fairness, justice and 
morality, 2) social and cultural guidelines, 3) the presence (or not) of an 
agreement/contract existing in society. Therefore, the hypotheses are as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: 
Government internal auditors with higher ethical judgement will be more likely to 
blow the whistle in responding to organisational corruption than those who have 
lower ethical judgement. 
2.7.1.2 The Moderating Effect of the Seriousness of Wrongdoing  
Jones (1991) argued that the magnitude of consequences, which is the sum of the 
harm or benefit brought upon the victims (or beneficiaries) of the moral act in 
question, will be positively related to decision-making and behaviour. The results 
of studies conducted by Near et al. (2004) and Miceli and Near (1992) indicated 
that rates of whistle-blowing varied significantly by type of wrongdoing and 
perceptions about the seriousness of a wrongdoing. Near et al. (2004) found that 
mismanagement, sexual harassment or unspecified legal violation were 
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significantly more likely to be reported than stealing, waste, safety problems or 
discrimination. Lee et al. (2004) also argued that whistle-blowing was directly and 
positively associated with both felonious and non-felonious sexual harassment, 
the frequency and length of sexual harassment and multiple harassers. Moreover, 
employees are less likely to report financial statement fraud than theft and 
immaterial financial statement fraud than serious financial statement fraud 
(Robinson, et al., 2012).  
Examining employees’ reporting intentions after their discovery of wrongdoing 
by a consultant, Ayers and Kaplan (2005) also concluded that the seriousness of 
an act of wrongdoing is related to the reporting of the wrongdoing, particularly 
when this is conducted via an anonymous reporting channel. Serious wrongdoing 
is less ambiguous and so giving the observer more power to report. It increases 
their sense of responsibility for reporting. Regarding the victims of the act of 
wrongdoing, Ming et al. (1998) argued that empathy for potential victims 
predicted the likelihood of whistle-blowing behaviour. 
Referring to the ethical decision-making perspective of whistle-blowing, this can 
infer that after deciding whether or not the act of misconduct is wrong, the 
potential whistle-blower will proceed to assess the seriousness of the wrongdoing 
in question. Besides determining the frequency, length of time, amount of money 
involved, amount of damage and the magnitude of the consequences of the 
wrongdoing, the potential whistle-blower may identify and consider the various 
parties involved in the wrongdoing and the various parties that would be affected 
by a decision to blow the whistle. An employee may have a similar perception of 
wrongfulness but may have a different perception of the seriousness of the 
wrongdoing (Strack, 2011; Armstrong et al., 2003; Ponemon, 1994; Jensen 1987; 
Winardi, 2013). 
Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
Hypothesis 2: 
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The effect of ethical judgement on whistle-blowing intention will be moderated by 
the seriousness of the wrongdoing. The more serious the organisational 
corruption perceived by a government internal auditor, the higher the influence of 
ethical judgement on the government internal auditor’s intention to blow the 
whistle. 
Figure 2.6 comprises a conceptual diagram of the perceived seriousness of 
wrongdoing, as a moderator of the relationship between ethical judgement and 
whistle-blowing intention. 
Figure 2.6: Conceptual diagram of the moderating effect of seriousness of 
wrongdoing 
 
2.7.1.3 The Moderating Effect of Organisational Commitment 
Mowday et al. (1979) defined organisational commitment as the relative strength 
of an individual’s identification with and involvement in a particular organisation. 
It can be characterised by: (1) a strong belief in and acceptance of the 
organisation’s goals and values; (2) a willingness to make a considerable effort on 
behalf of the organisation; and (3) a strong desire to remain in the organisation. 
An employee may be locally committed (to co-workers), globally committed (to 
upper management and the organisation), committed to both local and global foci 
or uncommitted to either the organisation or his/her co-workers (Becker & 
Billings, 1993). 
Organisational commitment has at least three separate components reflecting a 
desire, need and obligation. Desire means an affective commitment that refers to a 
personal characteristic, structural characteristic and work experience. Need refers 
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to a continuance commitment that reflects the recognition of cost associated with 
leaving the organisation, while obligation refers to a normative commitment that 
may result from familiar or cultural socialisation or advance reward given to the 
employees. It causes a feeling of obligation (Meyer & Allen, 1991). 
Street (1995) argued that if individuals have a high organisational commitment, 
they are more likely to display prosocial behaviour of whistle-blowing. Miceli et 
al. (2008) reported that some studies demonstrated that whistle-blowers have 
higher organisational commitment than inactive observers since they are more 
invested in remaining with rather than exiting the organisation. Examining 
professional commitment, organisational commitment and colleague commitment, 
Taylor and Curtis (2010) found that an auditor’s organisational commitment 
drives their perseverance in reporting an observed violation. 
Somers and Casal (1994) found that whistle-blowing was influenced by 
commitment only to a moderate level. Moreover, analysing eight studies, 
Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005) found no essential correlation between 
organisational commitment and whistle-blowing intent. Focusing on external 
whistle-blowing, Sims and Keenan (1998) also did not find a significant 
relationship between organisational commitment and whistle-blowing. Ahmad 
(2011) found the inability of organisational commitment to explain whistle-
blowing behaviour among internal auditors in Malaysia. He argued that the 
organisational commitment of the internal auditors appeared to be hampered by 
the status of the wrongdoers. On the other hand, Chen and Lai (2014) found that 
organisational commitment has a moderated mediation effect between moral 
intensity, whistle-blowing intention and behaviour. 
Chen and Lai (2014) argued that employees with low organisational commitment 
as well as high organisational commitment may have different levels of 
willingness in terms of their intention to blow the whistle. Less committed 
employees may be unwilling to blow the whistle or may even be unaware of any 
ongoing wrongdoing that may bring harm to their organisation or, on the other 
hand, they may readily blow the whistle externally without concern for any 
damage to the organisation that may arise from their whistle-blowing decision. 
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More committed employees may cautiously blow the whistle in an attempt to stop 
the wrongdoing and minimise any loss to the organisation. However, employees 
with excessive organisational commitment who want to protect their organisations 
and demonstrate their loyalty to their organisations may have higher 
unwillingness to blow the whistle. 
In light of the previous findings outlined above, a proposition can be offered that 
the three forms of organisational commitment – affective commitment, 
continuance commitment and normative commitment (Allen & Meyer, 1990) – 
will be found in government internal auditors in Indonesia. Therefore, the 
hypotheses are stated as follows: 
Hypotheses 3a, 3b and 3c: 
The effect of ethical judgement on whistle-blowing intention is moderated by 
organisational commitment. It will be stronger for government internal auditors 
with higher organisational commitment in (a) affective commitment, (b) 
continuance commitment or (c) normative commitment.  
Figure 2.7 illustrates a conceptual diagram of organisational commitment as a 
moderator of the relationships between ethical judgement and whistle-blowing 
intention. 
 
Figure 2.7: Conceptual diagram of the moderating effect of organisational 
commitment 
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2.7.2 Relationship between Control Variables and Whistle-blowing Decision 
The control variables to be further examined are ethical climate, the wrongdoer’s 
power status that is reflected in the wrongdoer’s job level and the potential 
whistle-blower’s job level.  
2.7.2.1 Job Level  
Job rank, job level, professional status, supervisory status or managerial role all 
reflect power distance. This is a relative measure of the distance in position 
between two parties: the observer of the wrongdoing and the wrongdoer 
themselves. Taylor and Curtis (2013) argued that this power distance may 
influence the observer’s decision to report the observed wrongdoing and Miceli et 
al. (2008) found that an employee’s position is likely to be positively correlated 
with their decision to blow the whistle. It is because upper-level employees 
possess greater opportunity to observe wrongdoing and also have a prescribed role 
to report misconduct and enforce standards and regulation to subordinates 
(Rothwell & Baldwin, 2006). Focusing on the less serious form of fraud, Keenan 
(1990) provided a slightly different justification whereby an upper-level manager 
is less threatened by fear of retaliation and is therefore more willing to blow the 
whistle. 
Investigating predictors of police willingness to blow the whistle and the 
frequency with which police blow the whistle in relation to various forms of 
minor and major violations, Rothwell and Baldwin (2007) confirmed this positive 
correlation. Supervisory status was one of the most consistent predictors of 
whistle-blowing. Keenan (2002) also confirmed that whistle-blowing occurs at all 
levels of management but found significant differences across different 
managerial levels. Upper-level managers were more positive and more likely to 
blow the whistle on various kinds of wrongdoing than their middle-level and first-
level-manager counterparts. Miethe (1999) identified whether or not misconduct 
reported by a supervisor or higher official depended on the particular position of 
the violator in the organisational hierarchy. 
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On the other side, based on nationwide data on whistle-blowers and silent 
observers, Rothschild and Miethe (1999) reported that there were no substantial 
differences across the four groups of non-observers, silent observers, internal 
whistle-blowers and external whistle-blowers regarding their supervisory position 
within the organisation. Miceli et al. (2008) also reported that the relationship 
between observer and violator was mixed and conflicting. Lee et al. (2004) found 
that supervisory status was unrelated to whistle-blowing in cases of whistle-
blowing of sexual harassment. 
2.7.2.2 Ethical Climate  
The ethical climate is the ethical dimensions of organisational culture and a subset 
of organisational work climates. Schneider and Barbera (2014) concluded that 
climate and culture are two conceptually distinct but connected constructs, 
mutually reinforcing and reciprocally related. Culture refers to the beliefs, 
ideologies and basic values of an organisation, while organisational culture refers 
to (i) the taken-for-granted values, underlying assumption, expectations and their 
members and (ii) the socially constructed attribute of organisations that serve as 
social glue (Cameron & Quinn, 2011).  
Organisational climate refers to the employees’ perception of what constitutes 
appropriate behaviour (Ployhart, et al., 2014), employees’ attitude and the feeling 
of organisational behaviours and characteristics (Keyton, 2014) and employees’ 
views of their organisation’s policies, procedures and practices. Values and beliefs 
cause climates to emerge through the policies, practices and procedures that, 
reciprocally, can be seen as vehicles for the commencement of changes in culture 
(Schneider & Barbera, 2014; Burke, 2014).  
Definition and Theoretical Types of Ethical Climate  
Ethical climate refers to how people in an organisation typically decide whether 
something is right or wrong. It also refers to the information basis for 
organisational members to decide what one can do and what one ought to do 
regarding the treatment of others (Victor & Cullen, 1988). It reflects a shared set 
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of understandings about what correct behaviour is and how ethical issues will be 
handled. This climate sets the tone for decision-making at all levels and in all 
circumstances (Sims, 1992). 
Considering the ethical philosophy of egoism, utilitarianism and deontology and 
the sociological theory of reference groups of cosmopolitan, local and individual, 
Victor and Cullen (1988) developed a model of ethical climate. It consists of nine 
theoretical types of ethical climate (see Figure 2.8): personal self-interest, 
friendship, personal morality, company profit, team interest, rules and standard 
operating procedures, efficiency, social responsibility and laws and professional 
codes. 
Figure 2.8: Theoretical types of ethical climate (Victor & Cullen, 1988) 
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Victor and Cullen (1988) described how the personal self-interest climate 
(individual-egoism dimension) can be found in an organisation where people use 
maximisation of self-interest with no other consideration as their criteria for 
decision-making or in their treatment others. In the company profit climate, 
consideration shifts to the interests of the company, while in the efficiency 
climate, the criteria used for decision-making or in regard to the treatment of 
others are larger social interests. In the benevolence dimension, the criteria of 
friendship, team interest and social responsibility climates are, in order, 
consideration given to: 1) others without any preference shown to any particular 
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organisational member, 2) a fellow member of an organisation collectively, such 
as esprit de corps, and 3) communities at large outside the organisation. In the 
principle dimension, the guidance used by an individual in the personal morality, 
rules and standard operating procedure and laws and professional codes climates 
are reflected in the source of principle which, consecutively, come from 1) 
individual personal ethics, 2) organisational policies such as codes of conduct and 
3) outside the organisation, such as from a professional code of ethics or religious 
values.  
As seen in Figure 2.9, among the nine theoretical types of ethical climate, Victor 
and Cullen (1988) found only five empirically ethical climate types, named as (i) 
independence, (ii) instrumental, (iii) caring, (iv) rules and (v) law and code. 
Focusing on not-for-profit organisations, Agarwal and Malloy (1999) also found 
only five types of ethical climate: (i) Individual Caring, (ii) Machiavellianism, 
(iii) Independence, (iv) Social Caring, (v) and Law and Code. Putranta (2008) and 
Ahmad (2011) reported that none of the prior studies were able to validate all of 
the nine theoretical climates and that the number of types of ethical climate 
empirically confirmed in previous studies ranged from five to eight. 
Figure 2.9: Empirical Types of Ethical Climate for Profit Organisation  
(Victor & Cullen, 1988) and Not For Profit Organisation*) (Agarwal & 
Malloy, 1999) 
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The Relationship between Ethical Climate and Ethical Decision-Making 
The relationship between ethical climate and ethical decision-making has been 
reported in several studies in various different contexts. Loe et al. (2000) reviewed 
numerous empirical studies assessing ethical decision-making and reported that 
ethical climate is significantly related to ethical decision-making. Schwepker et al. 
(1997) found that in the context of a salesperson, the positive ethical climate was 
negatively associated with ethical conflict with sales managers. Similarly, 
Verbeke et al. (1996) found that ethical climate and personality traits affect ethical 
decision-making. Another piece of ethical decision-making literature, reviewed by 
O’Fallon and Butterfield (2005), also found an increase in support for the idea that 
the dimensions of ethical climates have a significant relationship with ethical 
decision-making.  
In a study of the general managers of lodging operations, Upchurch (1998) found 
that benevolence was the primary ethical guidance impacting ethical decision-
making. Examining the direct and indirect effects of individuals’ perceptions of 
work climate on their ethical judgements and behavioural intentions regarding an 
ethical dilemma, Barnett and Vaicys (2000) found that the strength of the ethical 
judgement-behavioural intentions relationship varied depending on the 
individual’s perception of ethical climate. Furthermore, they argued that, in the 
social responsibility and rules/codes climates, individuals were less likely to 
engage in a questionable act. In a team/friendship climate, individuals were 
somewhat more likely to form intentions consistent with their judgement. 
In more recent studies, Shafer (2008) found that the type of ethical climate did not 
significantly affect moral-equity judgements but did find that perceptions of an 
egoistic/local climate had a highly significant effect on relativism judgements 
(judgements of what is traditionally or culturally acceptable). Exploring the 
impact of individual ethics and organisational ethics on ethical intention, Elango 
et al. (2010) found that both individual ethics (experiences and values) and 
organisational ethics (ethical standards and practices) in the workplace guide 
managers in making ethical choices. Studying accountants’ ethical decision-
making, Musbah (2010) found only very limited significant relationships between 
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ethical climate types and the stages of ethical decision-making. However, in 
general, individuals’ ethical decision-making processes can be significantly 
different depending on the working environment in place, such as the ethical 
climate, code of ethics (Musbah, 2010) or ethical norms (Craft, 2013). 
Theoretical Types of Ethical Climate and Their Association with Whistle-blowing  
Defined as a set of principles (Wimbush & Shepard, 1994), individuals in an 
independence climate have a moral obligation to do what is right regardless of 
the consequences. Simha and Cullen (2012) argued that personal moral beliefs 
with minimal external influences are emphasised in the independence climate. As 
a form of ethical behaviour, whistle-blowing is therefore expected to have a 
positive association with the independence climate.  
On the contrary, persons in an instrumental climate may have no conformity 
with ethical or moral principles and are instead driven by the maximisation of 
self-interest and situational benefits. Organisations with instrumental climates 
may encourage employees to make decisions in accordance with their egoistic 
interest (Simha & Cullen, 2012). Therefore, this climate is expected to have a 
negative association with whistle-blowing.  
Guided by utilitarian principles of seeking the greatest good, individuals in a 
caring climate are primarily concerned with the well-being of others within or 
outside their organisation who might be affected by their ethical decisions. This 
climate is expected to be positively related to whistle-blowing.   
In rules climates, employees strictly obey the rules of the organisation and use 
these as a basis for resolving ethical dilemmas. Decision-making is guided by a 
set of local rules or standards such as codes of ethics (Simha & Cullen, 2012). 
This climate is expected to be positively related to whistle-blowing. Employees in 
law and code climates are governed by external codes, legal and professional 
standards and use these both within and outside their environments. A positive 
relationship can be predicted between the law and code climate and whistle-
blowing (Wimbush, et al. (1997), Rothwell and Baldwin (2006)).  
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Focusing on three facets of bureaucracy: formalisation, centralisation and 
controls, Ferrel and Skinner (1988) proposed that more a formalised organisation 
(i.e. an organisation that enacts and enforces its written code of ethics, written 
rules and regulation) should have more control over the ethical behaviour of its 
employees. A highly centralised organisation in which authority is retained at the 
top level should have more opportunity to control ethical decisions. Subordinates 
obey authority and comply with orders even when they do not agree with a 
superior. Regarding control in the bureaucracy, they argued that rules, standards 
and internal procedures as means of control could influence ethical behaviour. 
Weber (1990) suggested that organisations characterised by complex 
bureaucracies and layers of divisions and organisations may isolate employees 
whose worlds they may perceive to be limited to their divisions and thus separated 
from the rest of organisation. In facing a moral dilemma, they may tend to rely on 
the approval and support of interpersonal relations with their peers or immediate 
superiors. In a smaller organisation, employees may be more concerned with 
adhering to laws resulting from their interactions with other parts of their 
organisations and their stakeholders and be more in tune with formal norms 
(Malloy & Agarwal, 2001). 
Miceli and Near (1992) argued that whistle-blowing is less open and frequent in 
hierarchical, bureaucratic or authoritarian organisations where voices expressed 
by employees that differ from those of upper management are suppressed. Miceli 
et al. (2008) proposed that bureaucracy, where compliance with rules requiring 
ethical behaviour may result in the discouragement of wrongdoing, results in a 
pre-empting of the need for whistle-blowing. But emphasising compliance may 
hinder the development of ethical values. They reported a positive relationship 
between the supportiveness of the organisational climate for whistle-blowing and 
employees’ intention to blow the whistle. 
Comparing internal and external disclosure, King (1999) proposed that whistle-
blowers may be less likely to use internal disclosure channels within a vertical 
(bureaucratic, top-down) organisational structure. Examining the phenomenon of 
whistle-blowing in the hierarchical cultures of a firm, Evans (2008) argued that 
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whistle-blowing, defined as an unauthorised revelation of wrongdoing, is a form 
of organisational dissent and that organisations with hierarchical cultures suppress 
dissent. Moreover, independent thinking and freedom of speech are suppressed in 
bureaucratic organisations. 
Organisational Leadership and Whistle-blowing 
Organisational leadership was also found to be an important factor in the whistle-
blowing decision. Caillier (2013) found that employees were more comfortable 
blowing the whistle when they perceived organisational leaders to be practising 
transformational leadership. Leaders who share their vision, act as role models, 
inspire employees, stimulate and challenge the status quo are an important 
predictor of any whistle-blowing decision. Seeing whistle-blowing as an 
employee’s extra role, Bhal and Dadhich (2011) argued that subordinates with 
high-quality interactions with their superiors beyond those required by their job 
description were positively related to whistle-blowing by the subordinates. 
Examining whistle-blowing in a health care organisation, Azhari (2014) showed 
that management support is critical to the development of trust and open 
communication. Nurses struggling with reporting wrongdoing need responsive 
and sensitive leadership to overcome their fears (Azhari, 2014).  
On the contrary, avoidant leadership can suppress dissent and avoid bringing 
attention to matters of concern. In an organisation with avoidant leadership, 
leaders may ignore or cover up mistakes and errors to protect organisational 
interest or other employees’ personal interest. Examining the whistle-blowing 
experience of nurses in a health care organisation, Jackson et al. (2013) found that 
in such a situation, the raising of concerns about wrongdoing that are not in the 
best interests of the organisation can be viewed as a counterproductive act. 
2.8  Research Context: Integration of the Micro-Individual and Macro-
Organisational Levels 
The need to develop an organisational context in this research is triggered by the 
fact that whistle-blowing is a social construct that depends on the interaction of 
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people within an organisation in conjuction with its social setting 
(Vandekerckhove, 2011). The research context is also important in studying 
multilevel of analysis. Kozlowski and Klein (2000) put forward a consideration 
that micro phenomena are embedded at the macro level whilst macro phenomena 
emerge through the interaction of lower-level elements. The macro level focuses 
on aggregate or collective response while the micro level focuses on variations in 
individual characteristics. House et al. (1995) defined this as the meso level that 
can be a bridge connecting variables in both individual and organisational level to 
synthesise the process of the micro and macro levels. 
As described in the previous section, the research examined both the micro level, 
that is, the individual factors contributing to a whistle-blowing decision, and the 
macro level, the situational and organisational factors of a whistle-blowing 
decision. Micro-macro level interaction is also reflected in the use of both an OCI 
(micro level) and CO (macro level) as a framework for developing a case scenario 
of whistle-blowing intention. To develop meso-level theories and capture 
interactions between the person and situation, Johns (2001) suggested that 
scholars should study and report organisational context in their research. 
Referring to the background and rationale of the research given in Chapter 1, the 
organisational contexts – the surroundings associated with whistle-blowing 
phenomena – sits within three constructs: Indonesian culture, the government 
internal audit unit where the research was conducted and internal auditing as the 
profession of the participants in this research. 
2.8.1 Indonesian Culture  
A description of Indonesian culture in comparison with other national cultures can 
be found in the Global Leadership and Organisational Behavior Effectiveness 
study that expanded Hofstede’s five culture dimensions and proposed nine 
dimensions of national culture. Hofstede’s five dimensions of culture are power 
distance, individualism-collectivism, masculinity-femininity, uncertainty 
avoidance and short- and long-term orientation (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005). As 
will shortly be described in Table 2.9, the nine culture dimensions of the Globe 
are: group/family collectivism, power distance, humane orientation, uncertainty 
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avoidance, institutional collectivism, future orientation, performance orientation, 
assertiveness, gender egalitarianism (House, et al., 2004). Irawanto (2011) 
summarised that Indonesian culture is: 
- relatively high in in-group collectivism, power distance, humane orientation, 
performance orientation, institutional collectivism, and  
- places medium value on uncertainty avoidance, future orientation, 
assertiveness and gender egalitarianism dimensions. 
Although considered a multi-ethnic and multicultural country, Indonesian culture 
is dominated by Javanese culture, which accounts for half of the total population 
of Indonesia. Javanese culture influences the Indonesian way of life and 
dominates the social arena (Irawanto, 2011) as well as the formal life of an 
organisation and bureaucracy (Sarsito, 2006). In comparing British and 
Indonesian culture, Suryani (2012) also put forward that Javanese culture is 
commonly accepted as a representation of Indonesian culture. 
The discussion regarding Javanese culture mainly referred to Geertz’s perspective 
that Javanese culture consists of two pillars: 1) halus (pure, civilised) and kasar 
(rough, uncivilised) and 2) lahir (physical, material, an outer realm of human 
behaviour) and batin (spiritual, inner realm). To be an ideal person, one has to get 
closer to halus and get more batin experience in one’s life. This combination of 
halus-kasar and lahir-batin produces three clusters of cultural values: social 
order, social harmony and mysticism (Geertz, 1960, in Efferin and Hopper, 2007). 
Deriving from this perspective, Suryani (2012), who compared Indonesian to 
British culture, emphasised three constructs of Indonesian culture in the 
organisational context: view of life, hierarchy and collectivism.  
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Table 2.9: Dimensions of culture measurement in GLOBE model  
Hofstede Dimensions The Globe Study Dimensions 
Score of 
Indonesian 
Culture 
Power distance Power Distance  
The extent to which the less 
powerful members of organisations 
accept and expect that power to be 
distributed equally 
The degree to which members of a collective 
expect power to be distributed equally High 
Uncertainty avoidance Uncertainty Avoidance  
The degree to which people prefer 
structured over Long term 
orientation and Short term 
orientation unstructured situations 
The extent to which members of collectives seek 
orderliness, consistency, structure, formalized 
procedures, and laws to cover situations in their 
daily lives 
Medium 
Individualism and collectivism Institutional Collectivism  
The extent to which individuals 
prefer to act as individual rather 
than as members of groups 
Level at which a society values and rewards 
collective action and resource distribution 
High 
In-Group Collectivism  
Level at which a society values cohesiveness, 
loyalty, and pride, in their families and 
organisations 
High 
Masculinity and Femininity Humane Orientation  
The degree of assertiveness and 
comprehensiveness versus modesty 
and caring 
Ideas and values and prescriptions for behaviour 
associated with the dimension of culture at which 
a society values and rewards altruism, caring, 
fairness, friendliness, generosity, and kindness 
High 
Long term orientation and Short 
term orientation 
Future Orientation  
Thrift and perseverance versus 
(short term) respect to tradition, 
fulfilment of social obligations, and 
protection of one’s “face” 
The extent to which members of a society or an 
organisation believe that their current actions 
will influence their future, focus on investment in 
their future, believe that they will have a future 
that matters, believe in planning for developing 
their future, and look far into the future for 
assessing the effects of their current actions. 
Medium 
 Performance Orientation  
 Level at which a society values and rewards 
individual performance and excellence 
High 
 Assertiveness  
 A set of social skills or a style of responding 
amenable to training or as a facet of personality 
Medium 
 Gender Egalitarianism  
 Level at which a society values gender equality 
and lessens role differences based gender 
Medium 
Source: House, et al. (2004) 
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Indonesian culture is characterised by a high degree of in-group collectivism 
whereby people are strongly integrated and related in cohesive groups such as 
family or circles of close friends. In the organisational context, this may be 
manifested in the form of employer-employee relationships that can be similar to 
those found in a family. Indonesia is described as a collective society in which 
individuals are expected to conform to the ideals of society. Pekerti and Sendjaya 
(2010) argued that the idea of social and interpersonal harmony as a result of 
mutual respect is the most obvious value. 
In terms of power distance, power distribution is relatively unequal and people 
place a strong emphasis on seniority and recognise the existence of privileges that 
come from hierarchical power status. Subordinates always need their superior’s 
direction and wait for them to make the final decision. Important decisions have to 
be consulted on with superiors. The Hofstede Centre describes Indonesian culture 
as being dependent on a hierarchy in which a manager counts on the obedience of 
their team members and indirect communication. No one wishes to transmit bad 
or negative news or feedback. When there is a conflict, direct communication is 
seen as an uncomfortable and threatening situation. Moreover, under the Javanese 
philosophy of mikul dhuwur mendhem jero (carry high, bury deep), a subordinate 
(child) is not expected to talk about any bad deed by his/her leader (bury deep) but 
rather to only expose his/her goodness (carry high).  
In terms of the human orientation dimension, Indonesian people are perceived as 
fair, altruistic and caring towards other and expect religious morality to be 
practised in the workplace. Moreover, Indonesians are not assertive but rather 
work in a cooperative and harmonious way. Indonesian culture is described as 
separating the internal self and external self that is important for maintaining a 
harmonious relationship in the workplace. Moreover, the Hofstede Centre (2014) 
put forward: 
Perhaps one very key phrase in Indonesia that describes how this 
[uncertainty avoidance (UAI)] works is “Asal Bapak Senang” (Keep the 
Boss Happy). The reason is multifold; but if you extrapolate to UAI 
dimension you can see that keeping the boss happy means you will be 
rewarded and if you are rewarded you have no economic or status 
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uncertainty as you will keep being a valuable member of the company 
(Hofstede, 2014). 
Indonesians moderately tend to avoid uncertainty and seek ways to mitigate the 
unpredictability of future events by relying on social norms, rituals and formalised 
policies and procedures but do, on the other hand, accept informality. In 
institutional collectivism, Indonesians have a high willingness to integrate broader 
entities, such as extended family, into their circle. This results in dependency on 
the group’s decision and, consequently, people make personal sacrifices in order 
to meet group obligations. A group or society also encourages and rewards its 
members for performance improvement and achievement (House, et al., 2004, in 
Irawanto, 2011). 
2.8.2 Description of Government Internal Audit Agency in Indonesia 
The internal auditor is responsible for evaluating and improving the effectiveness 
of governance, risk management and control processes (IIA, 2011). In the 
government context, internal auditors examine, assess, evaluate and enhance how 
the state budget is earned and spent, with the aim of improving the efficiency and 
effectiveness of government programmes (IIA, 2006a). In assurance and 
consulting services provided by internal auditors, independence and objectivity 
are important values for an auditor so that stakeholders’ trust in the internal audits 
functions can be maintained.   
As shown in Figure 2.10, state audit institutions in Indonesia consist of two main 
categories. They are external audit units that is Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan (The 
Supreme Audit Board of Republic of Indonesia) that is independent from the 
government of Indonesia and the Government Internal Audit Units (GIAUs) that 
are part of the government and falls within the structure of the executive power of 
the president. The GIAU in Indonesia is present in national, ministerial, provincial 
and regency/city levels of government. 
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Figure 2.10: Government Internal Audit Units in Indonesia 
 
The Financial and Development Supervisory Agency (Badan Pengawasan 
Keuangan dan Pembangunan) is the GIAU at a national level that reports directly 
to the president and is responsible for conducting internal audits on state finance 
accountability, reviews of financial statements, development of the internal audit 
profession and building capacity for implementation of the government’s internal 
control system. The Inspectorate General/Prime Inspectorate is the GIAU at 
ministerial level that reports directly to the minister and is responsible for 
conducting audit in the organisation units within the ministry. The Provincial 
Inspectorate and regency/city inspectorate are two GIAUs within local 
government that report directly to the governor and major, respectively. 
Employees in a government agency can be separated into various categories. They 
are labelled Jabatan Pimpinan Tinggi (chief/senior/higher executive officer), 
Jabatan Administrator (administrative officer) and Jabatan Pengawas 
(supervisory officer), previously labelled as structural officer of echelons I, II, III 
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and IV and functional officer. An executive officer is mainly responsible for 
managing the office, unit or subunit while a functional officer is responsible for 
conducting the job assigned to them. In the GIAU, executive officers may be 
composed of two or three levels commonly termed Inspector General, Inspector 
and Assistant Inspector. The functional officer in the GIAU is referred to as a 
certified government internal auditor. However, non-certified employees, such as 
provisional auditors or apprentice employees, may also conduct an audit. 
The typical structure of an audit team comprises six layers of positions: inspector 
general, inspector in a specific field, managing auditor, supervising auditor, team 
leader and team member. The role of the inspector general is mainly in macro 
planning, coordinating the audit and compiling the audit result for reporting to the 
ministry. The inspector is the official responsible for the effectiveness and 
efficiency of resource utilisation within the government internal audit unit. The 
managing auditor has a duty to maintain the quality of the audit report. The 
supervising auditor has to make sure that audit procedures have been followed and 
that suitable audit techniques have been used by the team leader and team 
members.  
The job status of the certified government internal auditor consists of seven 
professional levels – three sub-levels at the junior auditor level and four sub-levels 
at the senior auditor level. The professional level is differentiated according to the 
level of education and professional certification and performance score that 
reflects the tenure and professional development achieved by the auditor. The 
professional levels for junior auditors are practitioner, advanced practitioner and 
supervisory practitioner. Professional levels for senior auditors are first auditor, 
lead auditor, associate auditor and principal auditor.  
An audit team, in general, consists of five hierarchical levels of professional 
status. The lowest level in an audit team is the junior auditor and first senior 
auditor that act as team members, while the lead auditor acts as team leader. The 
supervising auditor and prime auditor have the managerial role. The role of the 
supervising auditor involves mainly organisation and the day-to-day control and 
technical supervision of the audit team. The prime auditor’s role is focused on 
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planning the audit, evaluation of the audit team and controlling the overall quality 
of the audit. The highest level is the executive officer who, as head of the internal 
audit unit, has overall responsibility for the audit. 
 
2.9 Concluding Notes, Conceptual Model and Research Approaches 
As depicted in Figure 2.11, a conceptual model was developed to apply the 
theoretical framework and guide development of the research methods. The model 
was developed based on the following concluding notes: 
Figure 2.11: Conceptual Model 
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1. Whistle-blowing is an act of revealing information regarding activities or 
incidents that:  
a. can be perceived as deviance from laws, regulations, procedures, codes of 
conduct, illegal, immoral or illegitimate practices, improper or unethical 
conduct,  
b. can occur in the organisation in which the whistle-blower works, in daily 
working activities or in the conducting of an audit,  
c. are provided in the form of a filed report, an anonymous letter, an email, 
texting/short messages or other means of communication, verbally or in 
writing, 
d. are given to a person, officer or organisational unit that may be able to 
handle the wrongdoing. 
2. In ethical decision-making perspectives of whistle-blowing, the whistle-blower 
uses an internal channel first instead of an external channel, which is 
considered as constructive rather than destructive deviance. This leads to the 
need to examine the channel chosen by the whistle-blower. Channels for 
whistle-blowing include: 
a. Internal whistle-blowing, defined as whistle-blowing within the scope of 
the government agency where the respondent works.  
b. External whistle-blowing, defined as whistle-blowing to government 
agencies outside the government agency where the respondent works. 
c. Public whistle-blowing, defined as whistle-blowing to the media, non-
government organisation or a member of the House of Representatives. 
3. Organisational corruption is: 
a. A significant proportion of an organisation’s members acting in a corrupt 
manner primarily for their personal benefit motivated by individual needs 
and not supported by the organisation (organisation of corrupt 
individuals/OCI). 
b. A group acting collectively to engage in corrupt behaviour for the benefit 
of the organisation in terms of the organisation’s position, power and/or 
financial resources (corrupt organisation/CO). 
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4. Whistle-blowing decision process 
As a form of ethical decision-making, the main dilemma of whistle-blowing 
relates to: (1) the conflict of balancing values, multiple loyalties and 
obligations (Hersh, 2002) and (2) the moral position of whistle-blowing that is 
either morally not required, morally permitted, morally required or morally 
praiseworthy. From the POB perspective, whistle-blowers see themselves as 
members of an organisation who conduct their organisational roles to prevent 
wrongdoing and to maintain the integrity of people other than oneself (Brief & 
Motowidlo, 1986; Clarke, 2003). Whistle-blowers may feel they are morally 
obliged to blow the whistle. But they also contextualise their decision in 
relation to other values. They also evaluate evidence of the wrongdoing that 
they have to support their decision. They then assess the situation and consider 
how those factors impact upon their integrity and dignity (Brenkert, 2010; 
Hoffman and McNulty, 2011). 
5. Previous models of whistle-blowing decisions developed from the POB 
perspective and whistle-blowing as ethical decision-making were integrated to 
develop a model of the whistle-blowing decision. 
This integration is illustrated through the combination of: 1) the three 
necessary ethical conditions for whistle-blowing to be manifested – sensitivity, 
competence and perseverance and 2) the three phases in the POB perspective 
of the whistle-blowing decision (Thorne, 1998; Armstrong, et al., 2003; 
Ponemon, 1994, Miceli, et al., 2008; Warren, 2003; Gundlach, et al., 2003). 
The three phases of the model are: 
a. In Phase 1 of the integrative framework, ethical sensitivity determines 
whether or not the activity is wrongful and whether anyone has a 
responsibility to stop it. The potential whistle-blower assesses whether the 
incident is an act of corruption. The potential whistle-blower evaluates 
whether the incident of corruption is the result of internal or external, 
controllable or uncontrollable or stable or unstable causes. In this phase, 
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there may be ethical sensitivity to identification of the problem and to 
distinguish the seriousness of the wrongdoing.  
b. In Phase 2, the process of signalling or demoralising occurs.  
c. In Phase 3, the potential whistle-blowers will see whistle-blowing as 
ethical decision-making that is different from an ordinary decision. Ethical 
competence – the ability to develop a strategy, gather and evaluate all of 
the information available for dealing with the problem – may occur in this 
phase. The potential whistle-blower processes the available information 
and analyses the ethical dilemma and the costs and benefits of blowing the 
whistle.  
In this phase, employees make a decision by evaluating whether it is their 
responsibility to speak up and evaluate the cost and benefit of each 
alternative. Ethical perseverance to follow through with the decision was 
integrated into this phase. The potential whistle-blower will then either 
proceed with blowing the whistle or not. 
6. The factors influencing the whistle-blowing decision to be examined are: 
a. Main effect: ethical judgement,  
b. Moderating effect: perceived seriousness of wrongdoing and 
organisational commitment, and  
c. Control variables: ethical climate, wrongdoer’s power status and whistle-
blower’s job level. 
7. The hypotheses relating to the factors influencing the whistle-blowing 
decision are: 
a. individuals having higher ethical judgement will be more likely to blow 
the whistle,  
b. the more serious the organisational corruption, the higher the influence of 
ethical judgement on the intention to blow the whistle,  
c. the effect of ethical judgement on the whistle-blowing intention will be 
stronger in individuals with higher organisational commitment. 
8. Whistle-blowing is expected to have a positive association with the 
independence climate and caring climate while the instrumental climate 
(egoistic) is expected to have a negative association with whistle-blowing. The 
79 
rules climate and law and code climate are expected to have a positive 
association with whistle-blowing. 
9. Whistle-blowing is expected to have a positive association with 
transformational leadership, open communication and high interactions 
between superiors and subordinates while avoidant leadership is expected to 
have a negative association with whistle-blowing. 
10. GIAU in national level includes the Financial and Development Supervisory 
Agency and the Inspectorate General/Prime Inspectorate. 
11. The typical structure of an audit team comprises six layers of positions: 
inspector general, inspector in a specific field, managing auditor, supervising 
auditor, team leader and team member. 
12. Indonesian culture is relatively high in in-group collectivism, power distance, 
human orientation and medium in uncertainty avoidance. 
13. As previously depicted in Figure 2.11, the central element of the conceptual 
model is the whistle-blowing decision that is derived from both perspectives 
of ethical decision-making and POB. In attempting to answer the research 
questions, the whistle-blowing decisions were examined using two 
approaches: 1) whistle-blowing intentions and 2) actual self-reported whistle-
blowing.  
a. Whistle-blowing intention is defined as a plan or an aim to blow the 
whistle which is a likelihood that a person (the potential whistle-blower) 
will engage in the whistle-blowing behaviour.  
b. Actual whistle-blowing is defined as a real experience of whistle-blowing. 
An actual whistle-blower is a person who actually observed and reported 
the wrongdoing. 
c. The first approach – whistle-blowing intentions – was applied to test the 
hypotheses of factors influencing the whistle-blowing decision in relation 
to the organisational corruption described in the case scenarios.  
d. The second approach – actual whistle-blowing– was applied to examine 
the incidence and experiences of the actual self-reported whistle-blowing. 
Respondents were asked whether they had observed any act of 
wrongdoing before being asked to identify the wrongdoing, wrongdoer, 
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their justification for blowing the whistle or not blowing the whistle, the 
channels, organisational support (if any) and the risk(s) and outcome(s) of 
their whistle-blowing.  
e. Respondents were divided into three categories: 1) non-observer of 
wrongdoing, 2) silent observer and 3) whistle-blower. They were further 
divided into three subcategories based on the whistle-blowing channels 
used: internal, external and public whistle-blowing channels. 
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CHAPTER 3  
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
As depicted in Figure 3.1, the purpose of this chapter is to describe the 
methodological consideration, research design and the quantitative and qualitative 
methods that are adopted, adapted and developed. The study utilised individual 
interviews, focus group discussions (FGDs) and survey questionnaires to answer 
the research questions. The qualitative data were analysed using the Gioia method 
while the quantitative data were analysed using descriptive and inferential 
statistics methods. 
 
Figure 3.1: Connecting the questions and the methods 
 
The chapter is divided into six sections. The first section contains a philosophical 
assumption and a consideration of and justification for choosing the methods 
(Section 3.1). Section 3.2 contains a description of the overall research process 
and research design, with the procedures for collecting and analysing the 
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qualitative and quantitative data given in Sections 3.3 and 3.4. The fifth and sixth 
sections comprise the procedures for employed to minimise error and bias 
(Section 3.5) and the approach for combining the qualitative and quantitative 
results as a concluding notes (Section 3.6). 
3.1.1 Philosophical Assumption: Realism 
The purpose of this research is not merely to explain the association of a pattern 
of events but rather to explain the particular mechanisms (causal powers) of 
whistle-blowing behaviour. Realism assumes that causal powers are independent 
of the events they generate and that causal power needs to be activated (Tsoukas, 
2000). The study has attempted to discover the observable and non-observable 
mechanisms of the whistle-blowing decision. Within a realism framework, both 
qualitative and quantitative methodologies are seen as appropriate for researching 
the underlying mechanisms that drive whistle-blowing behaviour (Healy & Perry, 
2000). This leads to the rationale for using a mixture of quantitative and 
qualitative research. 
In utilising quantitative methods, the researcher was aware that statistical 
correlational studies, as a product of positivism, provide only limited information 
about causation between variables because they lack contextual realism. The 
researcher was also aware that the use of qualitative methods may lead to 
important data from participants being either overlooked or not noticed at all, 
even after the researcher provides an explicit and transparent description of the 
techniques used (Curral & Towler, 2003). Therefore, the study used the 
assumption that whistle-blowing behaviour is a single reality but multiple 
perceptions since they are built and developed by individuals or societies in 
specific contexts.  
By using the assumption that whistle-blowing behaviour is a single reality that 
exists externally outside of the human mind and apart from the beliefs of an 
individual, the study is able explain and predict the whistle-blowing decision by 
searching for regularities between its properties (variables) (Bergman, 2008; Chen 
and Hirschheim, 2004). The variables were measured through objective methods 
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by collecting data on a large number of whistle-blowing (or silent) events, people 
(internal auditors) and organisations (the government internal audit units) and 
calculating and interpreting correlations between the variables to construct a 
model (Swanborn, 2010). In doing so, the study has adopted and developed 
instruments to observe, measure and assess the variables and then use the result to 
develop the findings and either confirm or disconfirm theories (Bergman, 2008; 
Curral and Towler, 2003). Moreover, this quantitative research was conducted 
using theory deductively as a framework for developing the research questions, 
hypotheses and data collection procedures. 
In utilising the assumption that the realities concerning a whistle-blowing decision 
lie inside the human mind, the research findings must be within the research 
contexts such as the time, place and situation during the period of data collection, 
interpretation and presentation. This is because the reality is constructed and 
cannot be objectively interpreted due to the nature of interdependence between the 
knower and the known. To reveal the reality behind this constructed mind, the 
researcher engaged and interactively linked with the participants. Individual 
constructions were dialectically compared, contrasted and interpreted to build 
consensus construction (Guba and Lincoln, 1994; Healy and Perry, 2000). The 
researcher interpreted the phenomena being studied and thus the results were 
influenced by the researcher’s perspectives and values (Saunders et al., 2009; 
Swanborn, 2010). The findings were constructed using the procedure of inductive 
logic to discover and understand the causal mechanism of the whistle-blowing 
decision within its social context of Government internal audit units (GIAUs) in 
Indonesia. Therefore, the findings may not be generalised beyond the research 
context. 
3.1.2 Methodological Consideration in Studying Whistle-blowing and 
Justification for Applying Mixed Methods 
The main challenge in studying whistle-blowing decisions in response to 
organisational corruption is finding respondents or participants who meet certain 
criteria. They should be the observer of corrupt activities, the potential whistle-
blower or, preferably, the actual whistle-blower. Moreover, they should be willing 
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to describe the incidence of corruption that they observed and reveal their 
experiences in reporting the wrongdoing or the retaliation they may have 
experienced. Miceli et al. (2008) described several alternative methods on how to 
study whistle-blowing. They identified methodological dilemmas and suggested 
that the researcher needs to disclose the trade-off of choosing a particular method 
and also the consequences and limitations of the methods chosen. 
In choosing the methods applied in the research, several alternatives have been 
considered. The first alternative is a field experiment or true laboratory study. In 
field experiments, examination is conducted within participants’ real-life 
environment, thus, the influencing variables cannot be fully controlled. In a 
laboratory experiment, the environment can be controlled. Therefore, the variables 
can be measured more precisely. A laboratory study allows a cause-and-effect 
relationship to be established (McLeod, 2012). The hypotheses may not be 
confirmed because of the need to weaken the condition regarding the experiment 
in retaliation testing to avoid the ethical problem. Research in whistle-blowing 
and organisational corruption is sensitive, meaning that the field experiment 
design will not be sufficiently realistic to create significant variance across 
various conditions or create a sufficiently complex set of relationship in which 
employee may be involved in the act of whistle-blowing or corruption (Miceli, et 
al., 2008). 
A quasi-experiment using a hypothetical case scenario is the next alternative that 
is commonly used in studying whistle-blowing behaviour because of the 
advantages it offers, including enabling anonymity and focusing on certain issues 
to test a theory (Miceli, et al., 2008). The main threats to the validity of using a 
hypothetical case scenario are common method bias and social desirability bias. 
Knowing they are not faced with real conditions, respondents may provide 
answers that support the researcher’s hypothesis or else give what they perceive to 
be a ‘good’ answer in place of a ‘real’ answer that reflects their true perception. 
An in-depth case study offers rich qualitative data. However, it may also contain 
bias. This bias can be reduced by applying legal case studies whereby data can be 
taken from public and external sources. But the issue of non-random sampling 
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applying to the case study or legal case study may lead to the representativeness 
of the population being called into question. Another disadvantage is that the 
selected cases may not be suited to the particular variables in which the researcher 
is interested. 
A longitudinal non-experimental field survey is capable of overcoming same-
sources method problems by separating the times of data collection, but the 
wrongdoer and respondent must be willing to be identified in order for the data to 
be traced. This research design is impossible because it sacrifices anonymity and 
confidentiality. Cross-sectional questionnaires pose a similar problem to a 
longitudinal non-experimental field survey in terms of validating the data obtained 
by cross-checking with other observers of the whistle-blowing. But combining 
cross-sectional questionnaires with other sources of data, such as asking co-
workers, may reduce some potential same-sources problems (Miceli, et al., 2008). 
Considering the advantages and disadvantages of each alternative, the decision 
was made to apply mixed methods, research that integrates quantitative and 
qualitative research within a single project (Bryman, 2012), to the research. Three 
methods – survey, individual interview and focus group interview – were utilised.  
A survey using a hypothetical case scenario enabled the researcher to focus on 
particular predictors of the whistle-blowing decision whilst at the same time 
maintaining confidentiality. The use of interviews in both individual and group 
contexts enriched the data and enabled the researcher to gain more insight into the 
phenomena under study in terms of detailed perceptions, opinions, beliefs and 
attitudes. Moreover, because of: 
In social research, there is no guarantee that informants would always 
know and tell the complete truth. Informants may be aware of certain 
issues; besides, they may also lie, evade, and otherwise deceive the 
researcher (Tiainen & Koivunen, 2006); 
 
and  
The informant cannot offer more than a single, embedded perspective on 
the complexities of the world, his or her account will be situated, limited 
and motivated, and it will always have to be qualified by conditions as yet 
unimagined.... One must search out others for a qualifying perspective. 
(Rock, 2001 in Tiainen and Koivunen, 2006); 
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FGDs were utilised to gain and accommodate divergent viewpoints and to cross-
check the tentative findings that emerged during the field study. 
Lund (2012) reported that mixed methods enable the researcher to simultaneously 
answer a combination of exploratory and confirmatory questions. The qualitative 
and quantitative results that may be found during the research can be 
complementary to each other and provide more valid inferences. In the case of 
contradiction between qualitative and quantitative results, the findings can lead to 
extra reflection and the generation of new theoretical insights. Moreover, mixed 
methods are able to provide answers to the research questions that other 
methodologies cannot. They can also provide stronger inferences and the 
opportunity to present a diversity of views (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2003).  
3.1.3 Justification in Selecting the Research Sites 
The research was conducted in the offices of seven GIAUs in six 
ministries/government agencies. These are the Jakarta Representative Office of 
the Financial and Development Supervisory Agency (FDSA), the FDSA’s 
Supervisory Directorate of Foreign Loan and the offices of the inspectorate 
general in five ministries. The latter are the Ministry of Finance (MoF), Ministry 
of Education and Culture (MoE), Ministry of Religion (MoR), Ministry of Health 
(MoH) and Ministry of Public Works (MoPW).  
The FDSA was chosen because it is the largest of the GIAUs, with 33 local 
offices in 33 provinces. The MoF was chosen because it covers various areas of 
financial management and is perceived to be the most reformed organisation. The 
MoF is also one of several government agencies to have initiated the development 
of a system for whistle-blowing. The MoE, MoH, MoR and MoPW are 
government agencies in receipt of a large budget allocation. The risk of any 
wrongdoing occurring may be higher in organisations that undertake large-scale 
spending and thus, the act of whistle-blowing may also be higher. Other 
considerations are that all seven of the internal audit units have a similar 
organisational structure and have all implemented the same standard of certified 
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government internal auditor system. Auditors in these seven internal audit units 
operate under the same standard of internal audit and the same code of ethics. For 
confidentiality reasons, the names of the government agencies in which research 
was conducted were disguised and coded. 
 
3.2 Overall Research Process and Research Design 
After conducting a pilot study with 39 auditors who were trainees at the Internal 
Audit Training Center, a total of 816 questionnaires were distributed to seven 
GIAUs, 365 of which were returned and used for further analysis. Five FGDs 
were conducted for a total of 460 minutes and attended by 112 participants. 
Thirteen individual interviews were conducted for a total of 715 minutes. The 
interviewees and FGD participants were auditors, middle and lower managers in 
the government internal audit units and officials in the human resources 
department.  
The first full-scale field study was conducted from October 2013 to January 2014 
and comprised two FGDs, six interviews and survey questionnaires in four 
government audit units. The qualitative and quantitative data from the first field 
study were collected and analysed, and the tentative findings discussed with the 
research supervisors. Several missing links were identified between the 
quantitative and qualitative findings and it was decided that more empirical 
evidence was needed. The second field study was conducted from July to October 
2014, comprising three FGDs, seven interviews and survey questionnaires in three 
additional government audit units. The specific research phases and steps taken 
are described in detail in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1: Research Phases and Steps 
 
Phases Steps 
1. Qualitative Data Collection Phase 
a. Individual 
Interview 
1. Participants selection 
2. Interview guide development 
3. Pilot Study 
4. Organising and conducting interview 
b. Focus group 
interview 
1. Participants selection 
2. Focus group guide development 
3. Pilot Study 
4. Organising and conducting interview 
2. Quantitative Data Collection Phase 
a. Questionnaires 
development 
1. Adaptation the questionnaires on factors influencing whistle-
blowing 
2. Development of a measure of organisational corruption 
3. Hypothetical case scenario development 
4. Translation  
b. Pilot Study 1. General pre-testing 
2. Pre-tested questionnaire distribution 
3. Data input 
4. Data analysis  
5. Questionnaire Finalisation 
c.. Survey 1. Participants selection 
2. Survey administration 
3. Questionnaire distribution and collection 
4. Data input 
3. Qualitative Data 
Analysis 
1. Data transcription and translation  
2. Gioia method analysis 
4. Quantitative Data 
Analysis 
1. Descriptive statistics analysis 
2. Inferential statistics analysis 
 
3.3 Qualitative Data Collection and Analysis  
As Alvesson and Ashcraft (2012) suggested, the data were collected using 
interview guides – a respondent approach to ensure flexibility in composing 
additional questions during the interview, providing an opportunity for the 
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interviewees to inform the researcher of new issues regarding whistle-blowing 
whilst, at the same time, maintaining the main structures of data collection. The 
interview and FGD guides were composed specifically for each respondent based 
on the detailed research questions and literature that had been reviewed.  
To ensure that all necessary themes were covered, the following steps were taken 
to compose the interview guides: definition of all aspects of the topic, 
determination of the type of questions, formulation of the questions and 
establishment of a logical question order. The interview and FGD guide are 
shown in Appendix 1. The interview questions were revised on an ongoing basis 
to accommodate different themes that emerged. 
3.3.1 Piloting the Interview Guide 
The interview guides were piloted to elicit responses to the questions being asked 
and to obtain various possible answers. The interview guide was piloted by 
conducting two discussions about whistle-blowing behaviour, organisational 
corruption and bureaucratic reform (see Table 3.2, items 1, 2 and 3). Based on 
participants’ views towards the content and the way questions were delivered, the 
wording of questions was revised and alternative questions were formulated in 
anticipation of the various possible answers that participants may give. Several 
difficulties in formulating the interview questions were also identified when 
participants gave unexpected answers. It was necessary to modify subsequent 
questions so as not to potentially disorder the initial structure of questions.  
3.3.2 Selection of Interviewees and Focus Group Discussion Participants  
Individual interviews were conducted to collect data mainly concerning 
participants’ experience of actual whistle-blowing and specific organisational 
aspects of the internal audit unit. The interviewees were auditors and government 
officers who were chosen based on their capacity to describe the topics relevant to 
the research. Due to the ethical sensitivity of the research and the difficulty in 
identifying potential and actual whistle-blowers, participants in the FGDs were 
recruited using a non-probability purposive sampling method on a voluntary basis 
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using a self-selection method. The researcher offered a general invitation and 
participants identified themselves. Participants had to meet the following criteria 
to qualify for inclusion in the sample: they had to be auditors, be willing to take 
part in an interview and must have observed wrongdoing that could be considered 
organisational corruption. In reality, the heads of the internal audit units under 
research helped to gather participants by issuing a letter of assignment for auditors 
to attend the FGDs. The researcher did not have the authority to appoint the FGD 
participants. 
3.3.3 Organising and Conducting Individual Interviews and Focus Group 
Discussions 
As shown in Table 3.2, the topics discussed with the interviewees were whistle-
blowing behaviour as the central topic and various other aspects including codes 
of ethics, professional development and organisational culture. For confidentiality 
purposes, interviewees’ real names were not used when presenting the research 
findings. Interviews were conducted at the interviewees’ offices at times 
convenient to the participants. The interviews were recorded and no gift in any 
form was given to participants. Considering the homogenous nature of the 
population, the size of the sample required was around 4–12 auditors (Saunders, 
2012), however 13 individual interviews were conducted for a total of 715 
minutes. 
Five FGDs were conducted for a total of 460 minutes and attended by 112 
participants. There was no direct financial benefit for participants in four out of 
the five FGDs. Meals, lunch  and drinks were provided in all group discussions as 
a courtesy. A financial incentive was offered to participants at one out of the five 
FGDs in the form of gift vouchers with a value of approximately GBP 80 in total. 
As shown in Table 3.3, participants in the FGDs were auditors, middle and lower 
managers in internal audit units and officials from the human resources 
department. The topics discussed in the FGDs are shown in detail in Table 3.3. 
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Table 3.2: Individual Interview  
Initial F/M; Position 
Age / 
tenure 
(years) 
Date of 
Interview Topics 
Length 
of time 
(minute) 
Luc F; Senior Auditor 33/7 5 July 2013 Whistle-blowing 
behaviour, 
organisational 
corruption and 
bureaucratic / anti-
corruption reform 
(pilot study) 
70 
Teg M; Senior Auditor 40/20 7  July 2013 65 
Fir M; Senior Auditor 37/17 7 July 2013 
65 
And M; Lecturer in 
Internal Audit 
Training Centre, 
Former Auditor 
49/27 15 
September 
2013 
Whistle-blowing 
behaviour and internal 
audit code of ethics 55 
Rin F; Senior Auditor, 
middle manager in 
Internal Auditor 
Development Centre 
44/23 20 
September 
2013 
Whistle-blowing 
behaviour and internal 
auditor professional 
development 
45 
Nyo M; Senior Auditor, 
middle manager  
53/31 07 January 
2014 
Whistle-blowing 
behaviour and 
organisational culture 
65 
Sab M; Senior Auditor 39/16 14 August 
2014 
Actual whistle-
blowing experience 75 
Rath F; Senior Auditor, 
middle manager  
55/32 14 August 
2014 
Actual whistle-
blowing experience 
and Managing 
whistle-blowing 
information 
40 
Lad F; Senior Auditor 38/18 15 August 
2014 
Actual whistle-
blowing experience 50 
Har (Not 
willing to 
be 
recorded) 
M; Top manager at 
FDSA 
59/36 15 August 
2014 
Managing whistle-
blowing information 30 
Sum M; Senior Auditor, 
middle manager in 
human resources 
department  
47/26 23 
September 
2014 
Managing whistle-
blowing information 
50 
Bam M; Senior Auditor, 
lower manager in 
human resources 
department  
46/25 24 
September 
2014 
Actual whistle-
blowing experience 65 
Evag F; Senior Auditor 38/18 03 October 
2014 
Actual whistle-
blowing experience 40 
      Total   715 
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Table 3.3: Focus Group Discussions  
Topics and Date of FGD 
Length 
of time 
(minute) 
Audience Attendance Place 
Whistle-blowing system as 
anti-corruption instrument 
in government agencies;  
01 November 2013 
90 Auditor  30 Directorate of 
Investigative Audit 
Whistle-blowing behaviour 
and Islamic values;  
18 November 2013 
100 Auditor and 
officials in 
HRM Unit 
18 Sub Division of 
Human Resources 
Development 
Inside the mind of whistle-
blowers;   
01 July 2014 
100 Auditor and 
Assessor of 
MAC 
7 Management 
Assessment Centre 
Internal Auditor Decision 
to Blow the whistle in 
Supervisory Directorate of 
Foreign Loan;  
08 September 2014 
90 Auditor 32 Directorate at Deputy 
of Supervisory of 
Government Agency 
in field of Economic 
Internal Auditor Decision 
to Blow the whistle in 
Jakarta Office of FDSA;  
05 September 2014 
80 Auditor 25 Investigative Audit 
Division 
Total 460   112  
 
In FGD numbers 1, 4 and 5 (see Table 3.3), respondents were asked to share their 
experiences of when they themselves had or had not blown the whistle, had 
intended to blow the whistle or share their actual stories about a co-worker’s 
whistle-blowing experience. The respondents were also asked to give their 
perceptions as to why their co-workers chose to blow the whistle or remain silent 
in response to organisational corruption. After respondents had shared their 
experiences, the researcher provided comments and asked other relevant questions 
regarding the personal, situational and organisational factors influencing their 
decisions. The researcher then invited comments from the other participants. The 
researcher also tried to separate respondents’ own experiences of whistle-blowing 
from their opinions or perceptions of their co-workers’ experiences.  
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In FGD numbers 2 and 3, the researcher focused more on testing his own 
perception about the process of making a decision to blow the whistle in various 
situations in addition to his own perceptions of the leadership, ethical climate and 
organisational culture within the organisations. Participants also put forward their 
own informal and unwritten values that influenced their decisions. 
Although the FGDs were structured and directed, the researcher encouraged open 
participation so that the participants could contribute. This provided the researcher 
with opportunities to learn about other topics, such as the effectiveness of whistle-
blowing arrangements and the role(s) played by emotion in the whistle-blowing 
decision. 
3.3.4 Qualitative Data Analysis Procedures: Gioia Method 
Participants in the individual interviews and FGDs reported eleven notable cases 
of whistle-blowing. These cases were further analysed according to the themes 
that emerged. The cases are summarised in Table 3.4.  
The initial stage of the analysis included transcribing and translating the 
interviews into English, reading and re-reading the transcript, noting down initial 
ideas and composing an outline to understand the raw information. The qualitative 
analyses followed the established technique and procedure of the Gioia method 
(Corley and Gioia, 2004; Gioia and Pitre, 1990), comprising three main steps: 
formulating first-order concepts, building second-order themes and developing 
aggregate dimensions. The detailed steps taken in composing first-order concepts 
were as follows:  
a. Reviewing the outline and identifying the concepts contained in the transcript, 
b. Examining and comparing the key ideas discussed by the informants, 
c. Identifying initial concepts in the data and grouping them into categories, 
d. Formulating first-order concepts. 
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Table 3.4: Summary of self-reported whistle-blowing cases 
Participant 
Code 
Role of the 
participant Wrongdoing Wrongdoer(s) Decision 
T33.9 (Lily) Observer and 
beneficiary of 
wrongdoing 
Covering up audit 
finding and 
receiving money 
from audit client 
Audit team 
collectively 
Silent  
Observer Falsifying travel 
expenses  
Co-worker in 
audit team 
Blow the whistle 
to superior   
T33.12 
(Barley) 
Observer  Certified internal 
government auditor 
examination 
Superior(s) Blow the whistle 
to higher superior   
T33.13  
(Eve) 
Observer Falsifying travel 
expenses 
Superior Silent and refuse 
to be involved 
Observer Leave during audit 
assignment 
Superior Blow the whistle 
to higher superior   
T33.11 
(Sonny) 
Whistle-
blowing 
information 
recipient 
Unfair distribution 
of corrupt money 
Collective 
employee 
Informal talk 
T33.8  
(Rena) 
Whistle-
blowing 
information 
recipient 
Extortion to audit 
client 
Fellow Auditor Ask the 
wrongdoer to 
return back the 
money 
Observer Acting against 
organisational 
policy 
Higher superior Silent 
T33.7 
(Barry) 
Observer Covering up audit 
finding and 
receiving money 
from audit client 
Audit team 
collectively 
Silent 
FGD1.Harley Observer Covering up audit 
finding 
Immediate 
superior 
Informal talk to 
supervisor and 
then silent 
FGD3.Nickie Observer and 
beneficiary of 
wrongdoing 
Covering up audit 
finding and 
receiving money 
from audit client 
Audit team 
collectively 
Direct reprimand 
to the 
wrongdoer(s) and 
gave the money to 
the needy 
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To build second-order themes, the steps taken included engaging in axial coding – 
the process of relating codes to each other by combining inductive and deductive 
thinking, seeking similarities among and differences between categories and 
searching for relationships between and among the categories and then giving 
those categories labels. Similar themes were gathered into several overarching 
dimensions to develop a framework and build second-order themes. The 
aggregate dimensions were developed by distilling the second-order themes to 
develop a data structure to represent progression of the analysis from raw data to 
terms and themes.  
Furthermore, as recommended by the Gioia method (Corley and Gioia, 2004; 
Gioia and Pitre, 1990), the following steps were taken:  
a. cycling between emergent data, themes, concepts and dimensions and the 
relevant literature to see whether new concepts can be discovered, 
b. capturing informants’ experience in theoretical terms, 
c. showing the dynamic relationships between the emergent concepts that 
describe or explain the phenomenon of interest and one that makes clear all 
relevant data-to-theory connections. 
As depicted in Figure 3.2, 106 first-order concepts, 13 second-order themes and 
three aggregate dimensions were identified: 1) aspects of the whistle-blowing 
decision, 2) motivation and justification for the whistle-blowing decision and 3) 
improving the effectiveness of the whistle-blowing policy. Detailed results of the 
Gioia method are given in Appendix 3. 
The first aggregate dimension (aspects of the whistle-blowing decision) and the 
second aggregate dimension (motivation and justification for whistle-blowing) 
were built from second-order themes related to the whistle-blowing decision-
making process. The first dimension focuses more on the general process of the 
whistle-blowing decision such as the respondents’ perceptions of the whistle-
blower and the act of whistle-blowing. The first aggregate dimension also 
contains respondents’ perceptions of how they found themselves in the dilemma 
whereby they were faced with the whistle-blowing situation.  
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Figure 3.2: Qualitative data structure from the interviews and FGDs 
 
The second aggregate dimension focuses more on specific features of the whistle-
blowing decision, the personal, situational and organisational factors that either 
motivate or impede the respondents from blowing the whistle. The second-order 
themes related to personal factors include the perceived motive, responsibility and 
obligation to blow the whistle. The second-order theme related to the situational 
factors is the quality of the evidence, whereas the second-order themes related to 
the organisational factors are informal solution and external pressure, perceived 
leadership style and organisational unresponsiveness. 
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The third aggregate dimension (improving the effectiveness of whistle-blowing 
policy) was developed from the second-order themes related to the respondents’ 
suggestions of how the organisations should develop their whistle-blowing 
systems. 
3.4 Quantitative Data Collection and Analysis 
3.4.1 Questionnaire Development  
The questionnaire consists of six sections. Section 1 contains demographic data. 
Section 2, measuring whistle-blowing intentions, contains six case scenarios and 
measurement of the seriousness of the wrongdoing, the power status of the 
wrongdoer and the ethical judgement. Measurements for the organisational 
culture, ethical climate and organisational commitment are in Section 3. Sections 
4 and 5 present questions about the experiences of whistle-blowing in responding 
to the organisational corruption that may be observed during an audit assignment 
or observed during respondents’ daily working activities. Whistle-blowing 
channels, the threat of retaliation and justification of whether or not to blow the 
whistle are also contained in both sections. Section 6 is a blank space for 
respondents to provide additional comments. The questionnaire is in Appendix 2. 
3.4.1.1 Questionnaire Section 1: Demographic data 
Section 1 of the questionnaire asks for the respondent’s age, gender, tenure as a 
civil servant, tenure as an auditor, education, job level and religion. Gender was 
measured as a dichotomous variable, male or female, while age, tenure, education 
and job level were measured at an ordinal level. Religion was measured at a 
nominal level. Since respondents may have previously worked at offices other 
than the internal audit unit, tenure of the respondent was divided into two 
categories: tenure as a government officer and tenure as an auditor.  
3.4.1.2 Questionnaire Section 2: Whistle-blowing intention 
Section 2 contains the six case scenarios, the measurement of the seriousness of 
wrongdoing, the power status of the wrongdoer and the ethical judgement. 
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Case Scenario Development  
A case scenario is a short description of a person or social situation which 
contains particular factors related to the decision-making or judgement-making 
processes of respondents (Alexander and Becker, 1978) that simulate elements of 
the research topics under study (Hughes and Huby, 2002). Even though a case 
scenario can never completely reflect the complexity of the reality, it can be 
standardised to describe a situation (Finch, 1987). The use of case scenarios in the 
study of sensitive topics can also help to desensitise the issue and so reduce the 
influence of socially desirable responses. 
As shown in Table 3.5, the research utilised six case scenarios to measure the 
whistle-blowing intentions in responding to two types of organisational 
corruption: organisation of corrupt individuals (OCI) and corrupt organisation 
(CO). These were combined with three levels of wrongdoer: 
supervisor/managerial level, co-worker and collusive employees, and two types of 
wrongdoing: financial and non-financial wrongdoing. The case scenarios were 
developed based on the researcher’s own observations and experience as an 
auditor. 
Table 3.5: Whistle-blowing Case Scenario 
Type Wrongdoer Financially related Non-Financially related 
Organisation 
of corrupt 
individuals 
(OCI) 
Supervisor/ 
managerial 
level 
Case Scenario 1:  
Destroying Audit Evidence 
Case Scenario 2:  
Undisclosed Audit Finding 
Co-worker Case Scenario 3:  
Fictitious official travel expense 
Case Scenario 4:  
Falsifying Individual 
Performance Report 
Corrupt 
organisation 
(CO) 
Collusive 
employees 
Case Scenario 5:  
Raising illegal fund from travel 
allowance for off-budget office 
expenses 
Case Scenario 6:  
Falsifying organisation 
performance report 
 
Case Scenario 1 is about a financially related OCI type of organisational 
corruption committed by an auditor at managerial level. The case scenario was 
initially titled ‘Destroying Audit Evidence to Cover up Bribery/Extortion’ and 
was about the conducting of an audit in a state-owned enterprise (SOE). However, 
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following feedback from the pilot study (see Section 3.4.2), the case scenario was 
altered slightly, as follows: 
 The phrase ‘to Cover up Bribery/Extortion’ was omitted from the title due to 
the potential for it to encourage respondents to reach a conclusion prior to 
having fully read the case scenario. 
 The setting of the scenario was changed from an SOE to a government agency 
in order to make it more realistic. A government internal auditor can only 
conduct an audit in a government agency, not in an SOE. 
 
The revised Case Scenario 1 is as follows: 
‘Destroying Audit Evidence’ 
You are conducting an operational audit of a multi-year construction contract. 
Based on your tentative audit finding conclusion, you have found financial 
irregularities that result in a loss of government funding. You have confirmed 
your finding to the contractor and they have verbally admitted it. They then 
inform you, however, that they spent a huge amount of cash on government 
officials related to the construction project that included a government project 
manager, a member of the government procurement committee and officials from 
the government audit unit in your organisation. 
You decide to consult your direct supervisor on this finding. You take the working 
papers and all related documents with you. Your supervisor listens to you and 
then asks you to ‘Leave the papers with me. I will discuss this matter with our 
bosses.’ A few days later, you learn that your supervisor has destroyed the papers 
and has taken no further action. You now no longer have the audit working 
papers. 
 
Case Scenario 2 is about a non-financially related OCI type of organisational 
corruption committed by a supervisor. The case scenario was initially titled 
‘Destroying Audit Evidence to Cover up a Procurement Procedure Violation’. 
However, this case scenario was also altered slightly following feedback from the 
pilot study, as follows: 
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- ‘Procurement procedure violation’ was retained as the context of a non-
financial wrongdoing but the actual wrongdoing was amended from 
‘destroying audit evidence’ to ‘undisclosed audit finding’.  
- The wrongdoer in the scenario was altered from direct supervisor to head of 
internal audit unit, as someone at a higher level, in order to make it more 
realistic. 
- The phrase ‘to cover up a procurement procedure violation’ in the title was 
also eliminated for the same reason as in Case Scenario 1. 
The revised Case Scenario 2 is as follows: 
‘Undisclosed Audit Finding’ 
You are conducting an annual operational audit of a construction project. During 
the audit, you discover that the project manager, procurement committee and 
contractor and other bidders have manipulated the contract documents and 
conducted procurement procedures for the sake of procedures (pro forma). You 
conduct further audit procedures to identify any financial loss that has occurred 
but because of time limitations you are unable to obtain sufficient evidence. You 
try asking for a time extension but the Head of Audit Unit (the official responsible 
for the audit) does not approve it without any explanation. In the review meeting, 
the Head of Audit Unit reads your finding and then tells you, ‘It is not important, 
there is no financial loss, no need to report it’. The Head of Audit Unit does not 
write anything in the audit working papers or in the audit quality management 
forms. The Head of Audit Unit then tells the audit team to omit the finding and 
alter the audit report. 
 
Case Scenario 3 is about a financially related OCI type of organisational 
corruption carried out by a co-worker. The case scenario was initially titled 
‘Claim More Expenses than Actually Spent’. However, also after receiving 
feedback in the pilot study stage, the case scenario was altered slightly to include: 
- Eliminating the status of the whistle-blower as a junior auditor to neutralise 
the different job levels between the respondent and the actors in the scenario, 
- Eliminating the nominal value of the expense to prevent misperception about 
the materiality of the wrongdoing. 
The revised Case Scenario 3 is as follows: 
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‘Fictitious official travel expense’ 
You and your team are working on an audit that requires travelling. The office of 
the audit unit pays for your travel and subsistence expenses. Instead of staying in 
the hotel, a fellow auditor decides to stay with his/her relatives. When you and 
your team return to your own office, you find out that your fellow auditor asked 
the hotel staff to provide him/her with a fake cash receipt and hotel invoice. A few 
days later, you find out that your fellow auditor has used the fake documents to 
claim his/her accommodation expenses. 
 
Case Scenario 4 is about a non-financially related OCI type of organisational 
corruption carried out by a co-worker. The case scenario was altered slightly to 
change the status of the whistle-blower from that of senior auditor, for the same 
reason as in Case Scenario 3. The revised Case Scenario 4 is as follows: 
‘Falsifying Individual Performance Report’ 
As part of auditor performance assessment, you compile documents related to 
your individual performance report that have to be submitted at the end of the year 
for assessment by your immediate supervisor. You discover that some of your 
fellow auditors have falsified several documents, including certificates of 
attendance for several in-house training courses or seminars. Their immediate 
supervisors responsible for assessing their performance seem to ignore this and 
continue with validating the performance report. 
 
Case Scenario 5 is about a financially related CO type of organisational corruption 
carried out collusively by a group of employees. The case scenario was initially 
titled ‘Raising Illegal Funds for Wedding Gifts’. The case scenario was altered 
slightly to change the motive of the wrongdoing from ‘wedding gifts’ to ‘cover 
off-budget office expenses’ in an attempt to make it a more current and realistic 
wrongdoing. This change was made to prevent the misconception that the 
employees are the victims in the case, whereas, in fact, the intention is for them to 
be both the wrongdoers and beneficiaries of the collusive corrupt activities. The 
revised Case Scenario 5 is as follows: 
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‘Raising illegal funds from travel allowances  
for off-budget office expenses’ 
Your immediate supervisor and colleague auditors agree to take approximately 
10% of the travel allowances to be collected for off-budget office expenses such 
as buying meals and snacks for social meetings, social contributions and 
additional salary payments for office staff and other incidental off-budget office 
expenses. However, in order to ensure that the auditors still obtain the full amount 
of their daily travel allowances when undertaking official travel, one of the 
auditors assigned to managing the travel allowances manipulates cash receipts, 
hotel invoices and other accommodation expenses to cover the 10% of the 
deductible allowances. 
Case Scenario 6 is about a non-financially related CO type of organisational 
corruption carried out collusively by a group of employees. The case scenario was 
again altered slightly to include changing the type of wrongdoing from 
‘manipulate some supporting documents to cover problems of unfinished projects’ 
to ‘back-dating the audit report and altering the audit working papers’. The 
revised wrongdoing is audit-related and contextual in terms of normal working 
activities in an internal audit unit. The revised Case Scenario 6 is as follows: 
‘Falsifying organisation performance report’ 
At the end of the year, you and your team are conducting an evaluation of your 
Internal Audit Unit organisation performance report before submitting it to the 
Minister. The performance report may affect the organisation’s reputation and 
may also negatively affect the budget allocation for the next fiscal year. A low 
score for your organisation’s performance will influence the decision as to 
whether your Internal Audit Unit will be chosen as a pilot project unit and receive 
new computer equipment and international training for auditors. During the data 
collection and report preparation process, you discover that some audit reports 
have been predated/backdated. The head of the operational division responsible 
for the performance report instructs the entire audit team to alter the supporting 
documents and audit working papers in order to cover up the data manipulation 
contained in the performance report. 
 
Measuring the perceived seriousness of the wrongdoing  
Luo (2005) argued that the intensity and hierarchical scales jointly reflect the 
seriousness of organisational corruption. Intensity is measured using a scale 
comprising the multitude (quantity) and magnitude of the corrupt activities. The 
hierarchical scale is the number of hierarchical levels directly involved in the 
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corrupt activities. The ‘seriousness of wrongdoing’ was manipulated in each case 
scenario. The level of seriousness in the scenarios was reflected through the type 
of organisational corruption – an OCI or CO – and two types of wrongdoing – 
financial or non-financial wrongdoing. The respondents were asked to evaluate 
the degree of seriousness for each case scenario. Four-point Likert-types scales 
were provided for each scenario containing the possible responses ‘not at all 
serious’, ‘less serious’, ‘somewhat serious’ and ‘very serious’. 
Measuring the power level of the wrongdoer 
Respondents were asked to evaluate the degree of power of the wrongdoer(s) in 
each case scenario by comparing their job level and degrees of power status. 
These are an immediate supervisor in Case Scenario 1, top-level manager 
responsible for the audit assignment in Case Scenario 2, a co-worker in Case 
Scenario 3, more than one co-worker in Case Scenario 4 and co-workers and 
managerial-level officers operating collusively in Case Scenarios 5 and 6. Four-
point of Likert-type scales were provided for each scenario comprising ‘not at all 
powerful’, ‘less powerful’, ‘somewhat powerful’ and ‘very powerful’. 
Ethical judgement  
Ethical judgements were measured using the Multidimensional Ethics Scale 
(MES) (Reidenbach & Robin, 1990) comprising three ethical dimensions: moral 
equity, relativism and contractualism. Adapting the MES, eight items were 
applied as a template: just/unjust, fair/unfair, morally right/not morally right, 
culturally acceptable/unacceptable, traditionally acceptable/unacceptable, 
acceptable/ unacceptable to my family, violates/does not violate an unwritten 
contract and violates/does not violate an unspoken promise. The respondents were 
asked, in each case scenario, to indicate their degree of agreement or disagreement 
with each statement on a four-point scale.  
Measuring whistle-blowing intention 
A four-point Likert-type scale was used and labelled ‘not likely’, ‘less likely’, 
‘somewhat likely’ and ‘very likely’ to determine the respondents’ willingness to 
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blow the whistle. After respondents had read the case scenarios, evaluated the 
seriousness of the wrongdoing and the power status of wrongdoer and indicated 
their ethical judgement of the scenarios, they were asked, for each given 
hypothetical situation, to indicate how likely they would be to decide to either 
blow or not blow the whistle through the three possible channels: 
 Internal whistle-blowing: whistle-blowing within the scope of the government 
agency in which the respondent works. 
 External whistle-blowing: whistle-blowing outside the scope of the 
government agency in which the respondent works but still within other 
government agencies. 
 Public whistle-blowing: whistle-blowing to the media, a non-government 
organisation or member of the House of Representatives. 
 
3.4.1.3 Questionnaire Section 3 
Section 3 of the questionnaire consists of three measurements: organisational 
commitment, organisational culture and ethical climate. 
Organisational Commitment Questionnaire (OCQ) 
To assess the extent of auditors’ commitment to their organisations, the OCQ 
originally developed by Allen (1990) was applied. The initial OCQ consisted of 
24 items – eight items for each of three scales: affective commitment (AC), 
continuance commitment (CC) and normative commitment (NC). In 1993, the 
original version was revised to include a total of 18 items – 6 items for each scale 
(Meyer, et al., 1993). The respondents were asked to indicate their degree of 
agreement or disagreement with each statement on a seven-point scale: strongly 
disagree, disagree, slightly disagree, undecided, slightly agree, agree and strongly 
agree. The detailed OCQ responses were coded and are described in Appendix 2. 
Organisational Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI) 
Organisational culture types at the research sites were identified and measured 
using the OCAI (Cameron and Quinn, 2011). The OCAI was derived from the 
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competing value framework of the organisational culture model, composed of two 
dimensions. The first dimension consists of two opposite sides: 1) flexibility, 
discretion and dynamism, and 2) stable, predictable and mechanistic. The second 
dimension also consists of two opposite sides: 1) internal orientation, integration 
and unity, and 2) external orientation, differentiation and rivalry. As illustrated in 
Figure 3.3, these two dimensions create four quadrants labelled Clan, Adhocracy, 
Market and Hierarchy.  
Figure 3.3: The Competing Value Framework Model of Organisational 
Culture (Cameron & Quinn, 2011) 
 
Cameron and Quinn (2011) describe six dimensions that serve as the basis for 
measurement of organisational culture and which reflect key values in the 
organisation. The six dimensions are dominant characteristics, leadership style, 
management of employees, organisational glue, strategic emphases and criteria of 
success. As shown in Appendix 2, each of these six dimensions has four 
alternatives: A, B, C and D. Respondents were asked to share 100 points between 
these four alternatives, awarding the highest number of points to the alternative 
with the most similarities to the respondent’s organisation.  
Ethical Climate Questionnaire (ECQ) 
Developed by Victor and Cullen (1988), the ECQ was designed to capture 
organisation members’ perceptions of how they would deal with an ethics-related 
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issue in their organisation. These perceptions may influence what issues are 
considered as ethical within the work context and also influence the type of ethics 
applied in responding to the issue.  
The 36 questions in the ECQ were applied as a template. The ECQ was modified 
to measure ethical climate in government agencies in an Indonesian context, 
including replacing the generic terms of ‘company’, ‘people’ and ‘citizen’ with 
the more specific terms ‘Internal Audit Unit’, ‘employees’ and ‘stakeholders’. 
Following Laratta’s (2010) suggestion, some specific items were changed, 
replaced or left out due to there being too many repetitive, similar and ambiguous 
questions. The modified ECQ was then reduced to 26 items, with every item 
having a six-point rating scale from ‘completely false’ to ‘completely true’. This 
modified version of the ECQ was then translated into Indonesian. As proposed by 
Laratta (2010), the 26 ECQ items were classified into nine theoretical types of 
ethical climate. As shown in Figure 3.4, there are two dimensions: 1) ethical 
criterion, comprising egoism (E), benevolence (B) and principle (P); and 2) the 
level of analysis, comprising individual (I), local (L) and cosmopolitan (C). 
Figure 3.4: Nine Types of Ethical Climate in Government Sector Based on 
Victor and Cullen (1988) and Laratta (2010) 
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Combining the dimensions generates the nine theoretical types of ethical climate: 
1) Personal Self-Interest, 2) Organisational Interest, 3) Efficiency, 4) Friendship, 
5) Team Interest, 6) Social Responsibility, 7) Personal Morality, 8) Company 
Rules and Procedure and 9) Laws and Professional Codes. 
3.4.1.4 Questionnaire Sections 4 and 5: Actual whistle-blowing experience 
To examine actual incidences and experiences of whistle-blowing in the internal 
audit units, Sections 4 and 5 were dedicated to identifying respondents’ 
experiences of the organisational corruption that they may have observed. Section 
4 captured the respondents’ experiences in the context of conducting an audit, 
meaning that the wrongdoer committed the act of wrongdoing during the time that 
the respondent was conducting an audit assignment. Section 5 captured 
wrongdoing that occurred as part of daily office activities and, thus, outside of the 
audit context. 
In this research, the identification of cases of actual organisational corruption 
relied on respondents’ self-reporting. Andvig et al. (2000) argued that one of the 
major difficulties in measuring corruption is the lack of a solid empirical basis. 
Corruption is a hidden crime and is almost always covert. Direct and first-hand 
observation of the perpetrator committing the incidence of corruption or 
fraudulent transaction is ideal but almost impossible (Andvig et al., 2000; Kurer, 
2005). Respondents were asked to report if they had observed a wrongdoing. They 
were provided with eight types of wrongdoing and had to either select a 
description corresponding to their experience or else describe their experience in 
their own words. The list of the eight type of wrongdoing is presented in Chapter 
4 along with the result and findings. Respondents who claimed to have observed 
the wrongdoing taking place were asked if they identified the wrongdoer and 
whether or not they elected to blow the whistle. 
As depicted in Figure 3.5, respondents were provided with a list of seven possible 
wrongdoers reflecting the structure of an audit team as well as the organisational 
structure of an internal audit unit. Regardless of the respondent’s job position 
within the audit team at the time that he/she observed the wrongdoing, the 
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wrongdoer and the whistle-blower may be in one of three positions relative to the 
respondent. They may be in a lower, equal or higher position than the respondent. 
Respondents who decided to blow the whistle, labelled whistle-blowers, were 
asked to identify the channels they used, the officers/unit/other parties to whom 
they provided the information and their perceived risk of blowing the whistle. 
Figure 3.5: Flow of questions to identify self-reported actual whistle-blowing 
decisions  
 
Respondents who decided not to blow the whistle, labelled silent observers, were 
asked to describe their justifications for not doing so and the risk they perceived 
associated with whistle-blowing. The list of acts of wrongdoing, wrongdoer(s), 
justifications and risks of whistle-blowing are presented in Chapter 4 along with 
the results and findings. 
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3.4.2 Piloting the Questionnaire 
The questionnaire was evaluated and pretested prior to being used in the survey. 
Testing is a way of ensuring that the survey questions do indeed communicate to 
respondents as intended (Campanelli, 2008). The questionnaires were adapted 
from those used in previous studies where the reliability and validity of the 
original questionnaire had been proven. However, it was necessary to pilot the 
translated questionnaire to identify any problems with the data collection 
strategies and proposed methods (Hertzog, 2008) and to determine its reliability 
and the validity (DeVellis, 2012). 
The pilot testing was conducted through two main stages comprising general 
pretesting and piloting of the questionnaire. The first stage, general pretesting, 
was conducted to increase the understandability of the questionnaire by 
government internal auditors in Indonesia. The first draft was self-evaluated to 
ensure that each question met all the criteria for good questionnaire design needed 
to avoid any unfamiliar, technical or ambiguous terms. This was also to prevent 
the questionnaire lacking a time frame and to give attention to the introduction, 
vocabulary, context and range of response (Fowler and Cosenza, 2008). Prior to 
conducting pretesting, the questionnaires were translated into Indonesian. The 
translation procedures used are further described in Section 3.5.1. 
The first stage involved interviewing three auditors, as described earlier, to 
explore the factors influencing auditors’ decisions to blow the whistle. Factors 
emerging during the interviews along with factors previously found in the 
literature were discussed, compared and analysed. The initial draft of the 
questionnaire was subsequently developed and revisions made accordingly, 
including: 
a. Lengthening the period captured in the question regarding whistle-blowing 
experience from ‘in the last 12 months’ to ‘in the last 24 months’, 
b. Removing four options of corruption/wrongdoing incidences – ‘Misuse of 
confidential information’, ‘Covering up poor performance’, ‘Covering up 
corruption’ and ‘hindering an official investigation’ – because of their lack of 
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clarity and replacing them with two more commonly occurring incidences of 
wrongdoing in an audit process, as follows: 
- The covering up of an audit finding in which an incidence of corruption is 
indicated (financially related audit finding), 
- The covering up of an audit finding that does not indicate an incidence of 
corruption (non-financially related audit finding), 
c. Emphasising the relative position of the wrongdoer as either lower, higher or 
equal in comparison to that of the respondent, 
d. Adding ‘several co-workers act together/collusion’ as an option for the 
wrongdoer of the corrupt incidences, 
e. Adding an option of ‘anonymity or mentioning the whistle-blower’s identity’ 
to the question relating to whether the whistle-blower reported the 
activity/incidence to any individual or group, 
f. Restricting the number of possible answers to the question about the 
perception of the risk of reprisal to three answers only, 
g. Broadening the possibility of the whistle-blowing channels by separating the 
external channel into two groups: ‘government agencies outside your 
organisation’ and ‘media, non-government organisation, a member of 
parliament’. 
In the second stage, the initial draft of the questionnaire was distributed to 60 
auditors attending internal audit training sessions at the Internal Audit Training 
Centre during the period September–October 2013. A total of 39 questionnaires 
were returned (65% response rate). A majority of respondents in the pilot study 
were male, with 69% males and 31% females. Regarding formal education, 77% 
of the total respondents had undergraduate degrees. Based on their job status, 44% 
of respondents were junior auditors. A majority of respondents (38%) had been in 
their positions as government auditors for between 15 and 25 years.  
Respondents in the pilot study also provided comments on and critiques of the 
questionnaire. Following consideration of respondents’ input to the pilot 
questionnaire, the following revisions were made: 
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a. In Section 2 of the questionnaire, ‘whistle-blowing intention’, the ‘seriousness 
of the wrongdoing’, ‘power status of the wrongdoer’ and ‘ethical judgement’ 
scales were reduced from five- to four-point Likert-type scales to prevent 
central tendency bias and to simplify the questionnaire, 
b. The relativism and contractualism dimensions of ethical judgement were 
added to the moral equity dimension already contained within the 
questionnaire, 
c. An operational definition was added to the questionnaire. 
The second draft was then finalised, printed and distributed for the full-scale 
survey. 
3.4.3 Sampling Procedures and Distribution of the Questionnaire 
In consideration of the fact that the research was about a confidential matter and 
sensitive subject, respondents were required to meet certain capability and 
credibility criteria and had to be able to provide unbiased perceptions (Andvig, et 
al., 2000). The respondents were internal auditors who were certified government 
audit professionals working in the government agencies under research.  
A self-administered drop-off/pick-up method was applied in this survey. The 
questionnaires were delivered to respondents by the researcher and left with them, 
to be completed and picked up at a later date. This method provides higher 
response rates than postal surveys and is less costly than either face-to face or 
telephone interviews (NSS, nd). The choice of this method was also affected by 
the complexity of the topic, the types of data and respondent preference. The 
nature and form of the questionnaire is a complex subject. A self-administered 
questionnaire may give the respondent sufficient time to think about the answers 
and the opportunity to provide more detailed explanatory notes. The data acquired 
is also a sensitive topic. The self-administered method may give respondents 
privacy and the opportunity to check and re-check the information they need prior 
to filling out the questionnaire. An auditor’s work schedule is characterised by 
travelling to other cities for several days during the fieldwork stage and then 
working at their office during the reporting stage. This schedule fits in well with 
the self-administered drop-off/pick-up method that requires a flexible time and 
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place for the respondents. As described in Table 3.6, a total of 816 questionnaires 
were distributed, with 365 questionnaires returned and usable for further analysis. 
The response rate was 45%. 
Table 3.6: Sampling Frame and Response Rate 
Research Sites Sent Returned 
and usable 
Response 
Rate 
Ministry of Religious Affair 150 81 54% 
Financial and Development Supervisory Agency – Jakarta 
Office 100 58 58% 
Ministry of Education and Culture 150 64 43% 
Ministry of Finance 180 50 28% 
Financial and Development Supervisory Agency – 
Supervisory Directorate of Foreign Loan 36 33 92% 
Ministry of Public Works 100 45 45% 
Ministry of Health 100 34 34% 
Total 816 365 45% 
3.4.4 Procedures in Conducting Quantitative Data Analysis 
Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) statistical analysis software was 
employed for both descriptive and inferential statistics. 
3.4.4.1 Data Preparation  
The analyses commenced with preparation of the data to ensure that the quality of 
the data was suitable for further statistical analysis. These analyses include 
examining the adequacy of the sample size, data coding procedure, missing 
values, social desirability bias and diagnosing the normality of data distribution. 
As a rule of thumb for determining the adequate sample size required for 
regression analysis, Green (1991) suggested that minimum sample size 
requirements may be calculated using the formula 50 + 8m or 104 + m, where ‘m’ 
is the number of predictors. In this study, there are seven predictors (see Table 
3.9), thus giving a sample size of 106 or 111. Other recommendations are 
benchmarks of 10 and 15 cases of data per predictor in the model, which would 
result in a range of 70 to 105 cases (Field, 2009), with samples containing more 
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than 200 cases deemed large (Hair, et al., 1998). The sample for this research was 
365 respondents across seven internal audit units. It was therefore considered 
sufficient and appropriate. 
All questionnaires sent to and returned by respondents were coded. Each 
questionnaire contained 190 questions and was coded, with all reverse-coded 
items subsequently re-coded. This study utilised the approach of listwise deletion 
or complete case analysis. This entails omitting those cases with missing data and 
running analyses using the remaining data. Of the total of 365 respondents, the 
number of respondents after missing data screening is 362 to 353 respondents, as 
shown in Table 3.7. 
Table 3.7: Missing Data  
Case 
scenario 
Dependent Variable: Whistle-blowing 
Intention 
Number of 
Respondent 
containing missing 
value 
Number of 
screened 
respondent 
Case 
Scenario 1 
Internal whistle-blowing  3 362 
External government agency whistle-blowing   11 354 
Public whistle-blowing   12 353 
Case 
Scenario 2 
Internal whistle-blowing  8 357 
External government agency whistle-blowing   8 357 
Public whistle-blowing   12 353 
Case 
Scenario 3 
Internal whistle-blowing  5 360 
External government agency whistle-blowing   6 359 
Public whistle-blowing   7 358 
Case 
Scenario 4 
Internal whistle-blowing  8 357 
External government agency whistle-blowing   9 356 
Public whistle-blowing   11 354 
Case 
Scenario 5 
Internal whistle-blowing  7 358 
External government agency whistle-blowing   8 357 
Public whistle-blowing   9 356 
Case 
Scenario 6 
Internal whistle-blowing  9 356 
External government agency whistle-blowing   10 355 
Public whistle-blowing   11 354 
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To test of normality distribution of data, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic test is 
less than the required value of 0.05. The significance value of the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov Test was below 0.05. Therefore, the data significantly deviated from a 
normal distribution. This study failed to satisfy the assumptions for the required 
parametric statistics. Therefore, the study abandoned parametric analysis and used 
non-parametric alternatives instead.  
3.4.4.2 Descriptive Analysis 
Descriptive statistics consisting of mean and percentage were firstly applied to 
indicate the proportion of respondents in terms of gender, age, tenure, and 
education level and job status. In studying whistle-blowing intention, descriptive 
statistics were applied to analyse responses across the different case scenarios. 
The proportions and mean scores of each variable were explored to indicate the 
seriousness of each case scenario, the power level of the wrongdoer, the 
respondent’s evaluation of the case scenario and the respondents’ and their co-
workers’ likelihood of blowing the whistle. The analysis was also applied to 
investigate the difference of whistle-blowing intentions across respondents’ 
profiles. In studying actual whistle-blowers, descriptive statistics were applied to 
compare the profiles of silent observers and whistle-blowers. 
3.4.4.3 Exploratory Factor Analysis: Principal Component Analysis 
Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was used to identify the latent factors or 
constructs from observed variables in the questionnaire items to build ‘proposed 
measurement models’. Finch and West (1997) argued that EFA can be used when 
the researcher has no a priori hypothesis on factors of measured variables. In the 
context of conducting research in Indonesia using pre-existing measures 
developed in Western countries, EFA was employed due to the absence of 
validated Indonesian versions of the measures combined with possible contextual 
differences between Western countries and Indonesia (Putranta, 2008). EFA was 
used to test the existence of: 1) the ethical judgement dimension, 2) types of 
organisational commitment and 3) types of ethical climates. A series of statistical 
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procedures and tools applied in EFA is presented in Table 3.8. The factor scores 
identified and tested were applied in the regression analysis. 
Table 3.8: Statistical Tools Applied in Exploratory Factor Analysis 
No Purposes Statistical Tools Description 
1. The variables needed to be 
sufficiently correlated 
Bartlett’s test of 
sphericity 
 
A significant relationship between 
the items is indicated by a Chi-square 
value which is Chi-square value with 
p < 0.05 
2. Measuring sampling 
adequacy 
The Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin (KMO)  
The index ranges from 0 to 1.00. The 
threshold of this index for the 
appropriateness of EFA is greater 
than 0.50.  
3. Determining number of 
factors that should be 
extracted 
Principal component 
analysis extraction 
method  
The eigenvalue, indicating the total 
variance in all variables explained by 
the factor, > 1.00 is used as the 
criterion for retaining the number of 
factors. 
4. Examining variables to 
identify how much of the 
variance in each of the 
original variables is 
explained by the extracted 
factors 
Communalities An item with a low communality 
coefficient (less than 0.50) indicates 
the variance for the variable is not 
explained by its underlying factor. 
5. Minimising the number of 
variables that loaded on a 
factor to make the factor 
simple 
Orthogonal rotation 
with Varimax 
method 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) point to 
a loading coefficient of 0.32 as the 
minimum threshold for a variable to 
load on a factor 
6. Assessing reliabilities Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficient 
Cronbach’s alpha value of 0.70 
indicates a good reliability and 
greater that 0.60 up to 0.7 indicates 
an acceptable reliability of a 
construct 
7. Naming each reliable 
identified construct 
according to the common 
theme 
  
 
3.4.4.4 Non-Parametric Tests 
Because of the non-normal distribution of the data, non-parametric tests were used 
to test for group differences and to explore the relationship between two variables. 
The non-parametric test used was the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test. The test was 
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utilised to identify whether social desirability response bias existed. The purpose 
of the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test is to test differences between two conditions or 
two sets of scores (respondents’ whistle-blowing intention and respondents’ co-
workers’ intention) that come from the same participants (Field, 2009) 
3.4.4.5 Moderated Multiple Regression Analysis 
Moderated multiple regression statistical techniques were used to test the research 
hypotheses of factors influencing whistle-blowing intention. In general, multiple 
regression is a way of determining the relationship between each member of a set 
of predictors (independent variables) and a criterion (dependent variable) while 
taking into account the fact that the predictors are related to each other as well as 
to the criterion (Howitt & Cramer, 2011). Specifically, moderated multiple 
regression analysis was conducted to test the main effect of ethical judgement, the 
interaction effect of ethical judgement and seriousness of wrongdoing and the 
interaction effect of ethical judgement and organisational commitment. 
Referring to the development of hypotheses described in Chapter 2, two models of 
whistle-blowing decision were developed and tested: 
1. Model 1: the effect of ethical judgement on whistle-blowing intention using 
perception of seriousness of wrongdoing as the moderating effect, and 
2. Model 2: the effect of ethical judgement on whistle-blowing intention using 
organisational commitment as the moderating effect. 
The dependent variables in both models are internal whistle-blowing intention 
(IW), external whistle-blowing intention (EW) and public whistle-blowing (PW). 
The independent variables and control variables that include personal, situational 
and organisational in both models are presented in Table 3.9. 
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Table 3.9: Variables in Model 1 and Model 2  
 
 Model 1  Model 2 
Dependent variables 1 Whistle-blowing intention 1 Whistle-blowing intention 
Independent 
variables 
2 Ethical judgement 2 Ethical judgement 
Moderating variables 3 Perception toward seriousness 
of wrongdoing 
3 Organisational 
commitment 
Control variables     
- Personal factors 4 Respondent's job level 4 Respondent's job level 
 5 Organisational commitment 
- Situational 
factors 
6 Wrongdoer(s)' power status 5 Wrongdoer(s)' power status 
6 Seriousness of wrongdoing 
- Organisational 
factors 
7 Ethical climate 7 Ethical climate 
 
Four steps were taken to test the hypotheses. The control variables were entered in 
step 1, the independent variable in step 2 (main effect), moderator variables in 
step 3 and interactions between the independent variable and moderator variables 
in step 4 (moderating effect). Changes in the multiple squared coefficients (R2; 
delta R-squared) were evaluated to determine whether the independent and 
moderator variables influenced the dependent variables. Procedures for 
conducting moderated multiple regressions are described, along with the results, 
in Chapter 5. 
Before performing the regression analysis, the independent, moderating and 
control variables were zero centred, except categorical data, to reduce 
multicollinearity. This also renders the tests of hypotheses more meaningful and 
substantively interpretable (Hayes, 2013). After analysing the data output from 
SPSS, the unstandardised regression coefficients, constants, means and standard 
deviations of the centred predictor and moderator variables were extracted and 
inputted to Jose’s (2013) ModGraph-1 programme to develop graphs to reflect the 
interaction in Models 1 and 2. Jose’s (2013) ModGraph-1 programme was also 
used to test if the simple slope of moderating variables that includes the high, 
medium and low levels of perceived seriousness of wrongdoing and 
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organisational commitment differs significantly from zero. The simple slopes 
were calculated by inputting the standard errors, t-values, p-values and the data 
from the covariance matrix in the SPSS output to ModGraph-1. 
3.5 Minimising Error and Bias 
3.5.1 Questionnaire Translation and Back-Translation to Minimise 
Measurement Error 
Su and Parham (2002) identified several problems that may be found during 
translation processes, including difficulties in finding an equivalent idiomatic 
expression or words or grammatical structures in the original language that are not 
translatable into the target language. In order to build a valid translated 
questionnaire, they suggested that a cross-cultural researcher conduct back-
translation, that is, using at least two bilingual translators, one performs an initial 
translation from the source version to the target version and then another 
translates it back into the source language. The second English version needs to be 
compared with the original English version, with any discrepancies discussed and 
resolved. If the meanings of the two versions are not similar, the back-translation 
process is repeated iteratively (Cascio, 2012). However, given that the three 
instruments of the ethical climate, organisational commitment and organisational 
culture questionnaires used in this research have already been applied by various 
researchers in the Indonesian language, the steps recommended above were 
altered.  
The translation processes were started with the researcher first translating the 
original version into Indonesian (first Indonesian version). The Indonesian 
versions of the ethical climate, organisational commitment and organisational 
culture questionnaires used by other researchers were searched for and found. 
They are Victor and Cullen’s (1988) ECQ applied by Putranta (2008), Allen’s 
(1990) OCQ applied by Putranta (2008) and Setiawan (2011) and Cameron and 
Quinn’s (2011) OCAI applied by Hidayat (2012). These translated questionnaires 
served in the development of the second Indonesian version. 
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In translating the organisational commitment and ethical climate questionnaires 
into Indonesian, Putranta (2008) conducted translation and back-translation 
procedures utilising bilinguists. Therefore, Putranta’s (2008) versions of the 
organisational commitment and ethical climate questionnaires were used as the 
main reference for this research. The researcher compared the first Indonesian 
version (translated by the researcher) and the second Indonesian version 
(translated by other researchers) and evaluated the differences. Various difficult 
terms or words were discussed with different colleagues to find the closest 
meaning of the words in the Indonesian context. The researcher revised the first 
Indonesian version and finalised the questionnaire before conducting the pilot 
study. 
3.5.2 Minimising Coverage Error and Non-Response Error 
Coverage error is avoided when every member of the population has a known and 
non-zero chance of being selected for the survey (Leeuw, et al., 2008). To prevent 
under- or over-coverage, the researcher requested a list of auditors provided by the 
Internal Auditor Development Centre. Non-response is an inability to obtain data 
for all eligible sampled units (unit non-response) on all questions (item non-
response) (Leeuw, et al., 2008). Steps taken to minimise non-response error 
included making contact, obtaining cooperation and ensuring that the respondent 
received all of the information necessary to complete the questionnaire (Leeuw & 
Hox, 2008). 
3.5.3 Minimising Social Desirability Bias 
Despite the advantages of anonymity and enabling a focus on certain issues to test 
a theory presented by the use of hypothetical case scenarios, the main threat in 
their use lies in the potential for social desirability response bias. Knowing that 
they were not faced with a real situation, respondents may tend to provide an 
answer that supports the researcher’s hypothesis or else they give a ‘good’ answer 
rather than a ‘real’ answer that reflects their true perception. Due to the sensitive 
nature of ethics research, the presence of a social desirability response bias may 
pose a severe threat to the validity of the findings and social desirability response 
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bias can significantly influence responses in ethics research (Fernandes & 
Randall, 1992). 
A second question was asked to control for this bias in relation to the likelihood 
that the respondents’ co-worker would undertake the action (Cohen, et al., 1996). 
The questions were: (1) ‘Rate the likelihood you would do the whistle-blowing’, 
and (2) ‘Rate the likelihood that your co-worker would do the whistle-blowing’. 
As shown in Table 3.10, compared to the ‘You’ question, the mean scores were 
slightly higher than for the ‘Your co-workers’’ whistle-blowing intentions in each 
of the six case scenarios, except for the public whistle-blowing intention in cases 
1, 2, 3 and 4. Respondents in this study indicated that their co-workers were 
slightly less likely to perform internal and external government agency whistle-
blowing in comparison to their intentions. 
The Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test was utilised, with the result showing that there 
were no statistically significant differences between the scores of the ‘You’ and 
‘Your co-workers’ questions in 16 out of 18 whistle-blowing intentions in six case 
scenarios (2-tailed, p<.001). These results reveal the non-existence of social 
desirability response bias among internal auditors in those 16 models of whistle-
blowing intention. Social desirability response bias was present in only 2 out of 18 
whistle-blowing intention models and occurred only in the internal whistle-
blowing intention in case 1 (destroying audit evidence) and case 5 (raising illegal 
funds from travel allowances for off-budget office expenses). 
Previous ethics studies demonstrated that social desirability response bias was not 
a salient threat to the internal validity of the findings (Nguyen et al., (2008) and 
Ahmad (2011)) and social desirability was not related to ethics perception (Loo, 
2001). However, Fernandes and Randall (1992) stated that researchers seeking to 
measure ethical attitudes or behaviour using self-reported questionnaires need to 
be concerned that their findings have the potential to be contaminated with a 
social desirability bias and that the prevalence of a social desirability bias should 
not be underestimated. 
 
121 
Table 3.10: Social desirability response bias (SDRB) analysis 
Whistle-
blowing 
Intention 
Co-worker's 
response 
Respondent's 
response Mean 
Difference Z 
Asymptotic  
Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean SD Mean SD 
Destroying Audit Evidence  
Internal   3.03 .767 3.17 .823 -0.14 -3.439 0.001 SDRB 
External    2.68 .778 2.75 .894 -0.07 -1.952 0.051 
Public 2.41 .905 2.36 .976 0.05 -1.362 0.173 
Undisclosed Audit Finding  
Internal   2.91 .796 2.99 .838 -0.08 -2.529 0.011 
External    2.57 .860 2.60 .902 -0.03 -1.011 0.312 
Public 2.32 .929 2.30 .995 0.02 -0.726 0.468 
Fictitious official travel expense  
Internal   2.90 .823 2.98 .832 -0.08 -2.736 0.006 
External    2.48 .942 2.51 .960 -0.03 -1.094 0.274 
Public 2.29 1.003 2.27 1.004 0.02 -0.755 0.450 
Falsifying Individual Performance Report  
Internal   2.83 .830 2.90 .871 -0.07 -2.435 0.015 
External    2.43 .937 2.44 .995 -0.01 -0.526 0.599 
Public 2.23 1.000 2.22 1.030 0.01 -0.12 0.904 
Raising illegal fund  
Internal   2.65 .878 2.75 .886 -0.11 -4.231 0.000 SDRB 
External    2.30 .920 2.33 .958 -0.03 -1.383 0.167 
Public 2.11 .980 2.12 1.001 -0.01 -0.51 0.610 
Falsifying organisation performance report  
Internal   2.70 .872 2.72 .890 -0.03 -0.972 0.331 
External    2.33 .949 2.34 .952 -0.01 -0.61 0.542 
Public 2.17 .979 2.17 1.007 -0.00 -0.284 0.776 
They also argued that the condition of anonymity has relatively little effect on the 
level of social desirability. Since the anonymity of the respondents in this study 
has been assured and social desirability bias was found in only two out of eighteen 
whistle-blowing intentions, the level of social desirability response bias in this 
study is therefore considered minimal. 
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3.6 Approach in Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Data: 
Triangulation and Complementarities 
Bryman (2012) identified various methods of combining quantitative and 
qualitative research, such as triangulation, offset and completeness. Of those 
methods, this research focused on the triangulation and complementarity 
approaches. Triangulation refers to the use of qualitative and quantitative methods 
in studying the same phenomenon with the purpose of increasing credibility and 
validity by cancelling out the weaknesses of the methods used to enhance the 
validity of the findings (Modell, 2005). Complementarities refer to an effort to 
gain a complete answer to the research questions. The gaps left by one method 
can be filled by another (Bryman, 2012). 
Tobin and Begley (2004) outlined various types of triangulation, including 
theoretical, methodological, analysis and data triangulation. As shown in Table 
3.11, Briller et al. (2008) provided brief definitions of these types of triangulation.  
Table 3.11: Triangulation types and its application in the research 
Triangulation 
Types Brief Definition Application in the Research 
Methodological Multiple data collection 
strategies 
Survey using self-completed questionnaire  
Individual interview 
Focus group interview 
Data Different sources of information Auditor 
Manager in internal audit unit 
Theoretical the use of multiple theories in 
the same study for the purpose 
of supporting or refuting 
findings 
Prosocial Organisational Behaviour  
Ethical perspective of whistle-blowing 
Analysis the use of more than two 
methods of analysing the same 
set of data for validation 
purposes 
Gioia Method  
Descriptive statistical analysis 
Inferential statistical analysis 
 
In this research, methodological triangulation was applied by collecting 
qualitative data using interviews and FGDs, and collecting quantitative data using 
surveys. Data triangulation was achieved by using different sources of 
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information – auditors and managers in internal audit units. Theoretical 
triangulation is reflected in the use of multiple theories that are prosocial 
organisational behaviour and the ethical decision-making perspective. 
In triangulating the data, the aggregate dimensions of the qualitative data (see 
Section 3.3.4) and variables that were statistically examined (see Table 3.9) were 
re-grouped according to the research questions. The findings were clustered into 
relevant themes that were used to build a structure for discussing the findings and 
developing theoretical implications. 
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CHAPTER 4  
FINDINGS: WHISTLE-BLOWING DECISIONS  
 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter describes the research findings regarding research question 1 on how 
(potential) whistle-blowers decide whether or not to blow the whistle. The 
findings emerged particularly from the eleven notable actual cases of whistle-
blowing reported by the participants of the individual interviews and FGDs (see 
Chapter 3 Section 3.3.4) and the 129 observed wrongdoings reported by the 
respondents in the survey questionnaires (see Chapter 3 Section 3.4.1.4). The 
structure of the data is presented in the following sections after an overview of the 
findings. 
4.1.1 Overview of the Findings 
For actual whistle-blowing, most of the respondents who observed wrongdoing 
decided NOT to blow the whistle, whereas the level of whistle-blowing intention 
across the six case scenarios was high. The findings show that the internal channel 
was the preferred choice. The respondents were more likely to blow the whistle 
internally than through external government agency channels or to the public. To 
justify their decision to stay silent, respondents put forward reasons that the 
wrongdoing was not actually illegal or that it was permitted, understandable or 
authorised. However, when they perceived wrongdoing that constituted actual 
wrongful behaviour, this on its own was not enough to prompt the observers to 
actually blow the whistle. They faced multiple loyalties and conflicts in choosing 
between personal and organisational values.  
Their unwillingness to blow the whistle was driven by a domination of informal 
values such as tolerance of collective corruption. The organisations’ leaders often 
promoted an attitude of silent acquiescence of wrongdoing through various reward 
and punishment systems, including misusing decision of human resources 
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management. The risk of broken social relationships in the office was feared more 
than any risk relating to human resources management. When whistle-blowing did 
occur, the superior would typically quietly address the wrongdoing outside formal 
procedures. It was found that rules and procedures were upheld only in the face of 
external pressure or when personal self-interest of the organisations’ leaders did 
not stand to be affected by the act of whistle-blowing. 
4.1.2 Data Structure of Qualitative and Quantitative Results to Answer 
Research Question 1 
Performing the Gioia method (see Section 3.3.4), three aggregate dimensions 
were identified. Along with data about the actual whistle-blowing decision, 
perceived risk and justification of silence collected from the survey questionnaire 
(see Section 3.4.1.4), these three aggregate dimensions are used to build the 
structure of the findings presented in this chapter (see Figure 4.1).  
Figure 4.1: Data structure of qualitative and quantitative results to answer 
research question 1 
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Findings related to aspects of the whistle-blowing decision are presented in 
Section 4.2, findings related to the motivation and justification behind the whistle-
blowing decision are in Section 4.3 and findings related to the effectiveness of the 
whistle-blowing policy are in Section 4.4. Concluding notes to the chapter are in 
Section 4.5. 
4.2 Aspects of the Whistle-blowing Decision 
4.2.1 Whistle-blowing intentions and Actual Whistle-blowing Decisions in 
Responding to Individual and Collective Corruption 
Regarding actual whistle-blowing decisions, the data from the survey show that a 
substantial minority of auditors have observed organisational corruption. In 
responding to any observed wrongdoing, auditors’ decisions to blow the whistle 
on the wrongdoings committed by an individual in an equal and higher position 
were fewer compared to those for blowing the whistle on wrongdoing committed 
collusively by auditors. Decisions to blow the whistle were relatively greater for 
wrongdoing committed by lower-level auditors. Observers of wrongdoing mostly 
blew the whistle to co-workers and their immediate and higher superiors. 
Regarding whistle-blowing intentions, the study found that across six case 
scenarios, the level of respondents’ whistle-blowing intention was mostly high. 
Similar to actual whistle-blowing, the respondents were more likely to blow the 
whistle via internal channels than via external government agency channels or to 
the public. 
In the questionnaire, respondents were asked to identify one case of organisational 
corruption that they had observed during the preceding 24 months and were asked 
to indicate the best description of the observed wrongdoing from a list of eight 
different types of organisational corruption. As shown in Table 4.1, 129 out of 
365 respondents (35%) observed at least one case of organisational corruption 
being committed by auditors or other officials in the internal audit unit. ‘Abuse of 
power’, ‘fictitious payment’ and ‘acting against organisational policy’ were the 
acts of wrongdoing most commonly observed by respondents. Other acts of 
wrongdoing that may typically be expected within an internal audit unit – bribery, 
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extortion and covering up of audit findings, for example – were also observed by 
respondents. This finding indicates that employees have a significant potential 
role in detecting wrongdoing in their organisations. 
Respondents who claimed to have observed incidents of corruption were then 
asked if they had reported these either verbally or by sending a letter, e-mail or 
text message or by any other channel for blowing the whistle. Of 129 observed 
incidents, 38 were reported (29%), with silence maintained for the remaining 91 
(71%).  
Table 4.1: Actual whistle-blowing decisions in responding to organisational 
corruption that occurred in and committed by fellow auditors in the 
Government Internal Audit Units that observed by respondents  
Description 
Number of 
incidence 
observed 
Decision 
Blow the 
whistle % Silent % 
Covering up audit finding that were not 
resulted in financial loss to government 8 5 63% 3 38% 
Extortion to audit client 7 3 43% 4 57% 
Abused of power or use of an official 
position for personal benefits, personal 
services or favours 24 8 33% 16 67% 
Abuse of office facilities, improper use of 
facilities or resources for private purposes 18 5 28% 13 72% 
Covering up audit finding that resulted in 
financial loss to government 15 4 27% 11 73% 
Acting against organisational policy, 
regulations or laws or work not in 
accordance with the provisions and 
procedures 23 6 26% 17 74% 
Fictitious payment, making false or inflated 
claims for reimbursement 23 5 22% 18 78% 
Bribes (Taking and giving bribes), accepting 
illegal gifts / donations/ gratifications 11 2 18% 9 82% 
Total 129 38 29% 91 71% 
Of the reasons for making the decision to blow the whistle, ‘covering up audit 
findings that did not result in financial loss to government’ was the most reported 
wrongdoing (5 out of 8; 63%). This was followed by ‘extortion to audit client’ (3 
out of 7; 43%). ‘Taking bribes’ was the least reported wrongdoing (2 out of 11; 
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18%). Other types of organisational corruption, including ‘abuse of power’, 
‘covering up audit findings that resulted in financial loss to government’, ‘acting 
against organisational policy’ and ‘fictitious payment’ were all at a similar level in 
the range of 22%–33%.  
The study asked respondents to indicate the relative position of wrongdoers to the 
respondent in order to examine the organisational relationship between 
wrongdoers, whistle-blowers and silent observers. As shown in Figure 4.2, 
approximately 45% of all incidents were committed by an auditor in a higher 
position than that of the respondent.  
Figure 4.2: Position of respondents relative to the wrongdoer(s) and their 
decision to blow or not to blow the whistle 
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Collusive auditors were perceived as the wrongdoers in 29% of all incidents, 
followed by auditors in an equal position (20%) and auditors in a lower position 
than the respondent (6%). Organisational corruption committed by wrongdoers 
acting collusively was reported in only six incidents (16%). The remaining 38 
incidents (84%) remained unexposed. This low level of whistle-blowing was also 
found in cases where wrongdoing was committed by the auditor in higher and 
equal positions, with reported levels of 35% and 29%, respectively. In contrast, 
75% of incidents of wrongdoing committed by auditors in lower positions were 
reported.  
The whistle-blowers were asked to indicate to whom they had given their 
information. Respondents were provided with a list of 10 whistle-blowing 
channels – six internal and four external. Respondents could choose more than 
one channel. Based on the 38 cases of whistle-blowing, respondents preferred to 
blow the whistle internally. As shown in Table 4.2, 26 out of 38 whistle-blowing 
cases (68%) were reported to fellow auditors only or to fellow auditors and other 
channels combined. Whistle-blowers also utilised their immediate superiors in the 
audit team (50%), their immediate superiors in the human resources function 
(18%) and their higher superiors (37%) as either the sole or combined channels 
for blowing the whistle. 
The special unit that has responsibility for managing the whistle-blowing system 
was selected in only 3 out of 38 whistle-blowing incidents (8%). External 
channels including a law enforcement official, the news media, a member of a 
people’s representatives’ council and a non-government organisation were chosen 
in two whistle-blowing cases. 
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Table 4.2: Whistle-blowing channels chosen in the thirty-eight  
whistle-blowing cases  
Report to Frequency 
% of 38 whistle-
blowing 
incidences 
Internal channels 
- Fellow auditor 26 68% 
- Immediate supervisor in audit team 19 50% 
- Echelon II in your office 14 37% 
- Immediate HRM supervisor  7 18% 
- Special unit that has responsibility in managing whistle-
blowing system 3 8% 
- Echelon I in your office or minister or head of 
government agency 2 5% 
External channels 
 
- Law enforcement official 2 5% 
- News media 2 5% 
- Member of people representatives’ council 0 0% 
- Non-government organisation 0 0% 
- Others 1 3% 
 
4.2.2 Perception of the Whistle-blower and the Act of Whistle-blowing 
Similar to the perception of whistle-blowing typified in Western literature, in 
Indonesia, whistle-blowing is also depicted by two extreme positions, such as 
‘hero–traitor’, ‘snitch–saviour’ or ‘disloyal employee–protectors of the public 
interest’. Between these two opposing positions, there is a neutral position that 
can be expressed as ‘I won’t blow the whistle but if someone else were to do it, I 
wouldn’t denounce him/her either’. The perception of a whistle-blower as a hero 
or traitor depended on the perceived motive of the whistle-blower. Participants in 
the interviews and FGDs suggested that the whistle-blower was perceived as a 
traitor, troublemaker and hypocrite when the act of whistle-blowing was 
motivated by either revenge or personal interest. When motivated by a selfless or 
altruistic motive, then the whistle-blower was labelled a hero or agent of change 
for good. Some respondents agreed that it was wrong to remain silent and that this 
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did not constitute good behaviour. Remaining silent was perceived as neglectful 
and as ignoring the ongoing wrongdoing. However, being a silent observer was 
also perceived as being a realistic choice. 
The perception of the whistle-blower tended to be negative when it concerned 
petty corruption commonly occurring among low-level civil servants. Employees 
who blew the whistle on cases of petty corruption was seen as traitors among 
other employees.  
The [lower-level] employees always think about how to get ‘other income’ 
to fulfil their basic need. Most employees have not been able to afford to live 
within a reasonable standard of living decently. In this kind of situation, a 
whistle-blower may be seen as a traitor among other employees. (Rainy, 
interview, 2013) 
Whistle-blowing was perceived as a hypocritical and judgemental act if the 
whistle-blower was not seen to be a better person than the wrongdoer. Whistle-
blowers should understand the mistakes that had been made prior to accusing 
someone. Whistle-blowers must themselves be cleaner and holier than the 
wrongdoer or they may receive a sarcastic comment such as ‘The pot calling the 
kettle black’ (Adele, interview, 2013). When the whistle-blower was perceived as 
a cleaner and better person, he/she earned the respect of his/her co-workers. 
It means that if we are clean, and just in case there is a counter-attack 
against us, it will be bounced off. We will be skinned and criticised. If we 
are not a really good person or just as bad as them, we will lose the courage 
to be a whistle-blower. (Iris, interview, 2013) 
Other respondents emphasised that the character of the whistle-blower must be 
better than that of the wrongdoer (Adele, interview, 2013) and that they should be 
cleaner, have courage and be a God-fearing person (Iris, interview, 2013). These 
were qualities required to face the negative consequences of their whistle-
blowing. 
We will lose the courage to be a whistle-blower if we are not really good 
persons or just as bad as the wrongdoer. We should be ready with the 
consequences. If we have the faith to be in line with our beliefs to tell the 
truth, we dare to deal with a greater power. (Iris, interview, 2013) 
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The positive side of whistle-blowing was shown by the perception that whistle-
blowing was seen as an assertion of family values and religious duty. Whistle-
blowers related their decisions to their religious teaching. Their fear of retaliation 
was outweighed by the expression of sentiments such as ‘God does not sleep’ and 
‘let us pray’. 
Whistle-blowing, in my opinion, is a demand for us, we have a religious 
duty to do goodness and prevent misguidance. Whistle-blowing is one of the 
implementations of those teachings. It is how we in daily life can blow the 
whistle for goodness and remind [others] in a case of badness. Ethically 
and morally, Islam teaches us to be a whistle-blower and become the agent 
of change in goodness. It is obligatory. We should cooperate in goodness 
and not cooperate in crime. We must put ourselves aside from collective 
corruption. (Lee, interview, 2013) 
A whistle-blower dares to take the risk. I’ve found many people who take 
risks but someone [a whistle-blower] who also dares to take the risk may 
have a good understanding of his religion. (Nico, interview, 2014)  
It was impossible for me to argue and oppose to my boss. Threatening me? 
Alright then, let us pray. All I could do was I did not follow his order. For 
one or two cases, I followed him but not for the most part. (Barley, 
interview, 2014) 
Moreover, whistle-blowers related their decisions to the values they had been 
taught by their families. 
My parents planted those values and gave us examples of the behaviour. 
And I saw my parents fight for their integrity. (Nickie, interview, 2014) 
Respondents had equally positive and negative views of the consequences of 
whistle-blowing. Some of the common negative consequences of whistle-blowing 
expressed by the interviewees were risk of prejudice, backbiting and defamation.  
It can bring down the spirit of people to perform well if that happens 
[backbiting and prejudice]. Because of bad management of whistle-blowing, 
they may not want to take responsibility of a high-risk job only because they 
are afraid of being accused of something that they do not do. (Rianna, 
interview, 20 September 2013) 
Some positive consequences were that most respondents viewed the whistle-
blowing system as a way of detecting and preventing wrongdoing. It carries with 
it the potential to create an atmosphere of deterrence. It also makes anyone aware 
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that they would always be supervised by one another, and also aware of the fact 
that anyone may be concerned and able to respond to any wrongdoing that may 
occur.  
The system also creates a feeling of always being careful when doing 
anything and builds a deterrence atmosphere. People will always provide a 
response to any personnel who commit violations. All the government 
apparatus would be terrified when thinking to do any wrongdoing. (Rianna, 
interview, 20 September 2013) 
In brief, the concepts of whistle-blowing and whistle-blower that emerged from 
the interviews can be categorised into three groups of themes (see Table 4.3). 
Positive themes of whistle-blowing show that whistle-blowing is perceived as 
prosocial organisational behaviour that is an altruistic behaviour to promote the 
welfare of the organisation. Negative themes of whistle-blowing indicate that an 
act of whistle-blowing can be perceived as egoistic behaviour that jeopardises the 
welfare of the organisation. 
Table 4.3: Perception of whistle-blowing 
Positive Themes Negative Themes Neutral Themes 
 Hero 
 Agent of change in 
goodness 
 Personal obligation by 
law 
 Religious duty 
 
 Traitor 
 Act of fools 
 Trouble maker 
 Crazy 
 Hypocrite 
 Judging 
 Intervening other business 
 Seeking public attention  
 Defaming 
 The pot calling the kettle 
black 
 “Not my business” 
 As long as it is done 
within the whistle-
blower’s authority 
 As long as it is done in 
secret 
4.2.3 Personal Dilemma with Various Parties to Be Considered  
Whistle-blowing was perceived as a tough, personal and situational decision. Each 
person has his/her own personal boundaries in assessing which incidents of 
wrongdoing are unacceptable to him/her so that he/she will or will not blow the 
whistle. The boundaries were described as a grey area where the wrongdoing was 
deemed wrongful but respondents put forward justifications in order to make the 
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wrongdoing appear permitted, understandable or ‘authorised’. The difficulties 
associated with the decision were described as ‘crazy’ and ‘professional suicide’, 
particularly when whistle-blowing was committed by junior auditors. Whistle-
blowing without having power in the office was perceived as suicide or as a 
reckless and foolish decision. 
If I, as a junior auditor, vigorously and passionately did the whistle-
blowing, I might be considered as crazy. (Harley, interview, 2013) 
I did not have the courage to prevent that wrongdoing. It is my own 
experience. When I was a junior auditor, I did not have the power. If I did it 
[whistle-blowing] while the [working] condition here was not conducive, it 
means suicide for me. It would be good if the wrongdoing can be rectified 
completely. But if it does not happen, we will get the damage. If we have the 
power, then we can prevent the wrongdoing from occurring. (Sab, 
interview, 2014) 
This dilemma was reflected in the way respondents identified the various parties 
that they took into consideration as part of their decision-making process. They 
were aware that they would not be dealing with only one or two persons, but 
instead many more employees acting in collusion. The wrongdoer’s position in 
the office was also considered. However, the important parties to be considered 
may be their families.  
Having the courage to do whistle-blowing is not enough. For example, I do 
the whistle-blowing on something and then all of sudden, I got transferred 
[to another office, perceived as an unfavourable position]. The effect is not 
on ourselves solely but also on our families. That is part of our 
consideration. (Rudolph, interviews, 2013) 
I did once try to blow the whistle in the KPK online whistle-blowing system. 
I got a response from them but then they wanted my identity, my name, my 
phone number and other personal data. And then I started to think deeply if 
so, it was quite likely I would become the one to blame [by my family]. 
Instead of the wrongdoing being proven, I would become the highlighted 
person. I decided not to carry on with the whistle-blowing and so be it. 
(Rudolph, interviews, 2013) 
The wrongdoer’s family was also considered as part of the decision on whether or 
not to blow the whistle. In deciding to carry out internal or external whistle-
blowing, a recipient of whistle-blowing information was afraid that the 
wrongdoer’s family would get into financial trouble if she blew the whistle 
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externally and the wrongdoer ended up with a severe punishment. The superior of 
the wrongdoer who extorted money from an audit client preferred to rectify the 
issue outside formal procedures. After receiving the information from the whistle-
blower (the wrongdoer’s co-worker), instead of reporting it to the internal 
compliance unit, she instructed the wrongdoer to return the money to the audit 
client using an off-budget office fund. She then asked the wrongdoer to refund it. 
She did not want her subordinate (the wrongdoer) to receive a formal punishment 
that may have taken the form of a dishonourable discharge. 
We have discussed it with the leaders here and there was an option to report 
it to our inspectorate. Because it should be so. But we felt pity if we reported 
it and then he got punished severely. He has several children and his wife 
does not work. How could they live? It was decided to punish him [in a 
way] that would not endanger his family. They were not the ones who had 
committed it. (Rena, interviews, 2014) 
In an incident, I observed someone [in my audit team] accept an envelope 
[bribe money from audit client]. It was not that much money. Then I saw 
that he was the single breadwinner of his family, he had many kids and he 
did not have anything [luxurious]. I do not justify the wrongdoing but I can 
understand why he did it. I guessed that he/she did it because he/she needed 
it so bad. (Nickie, interviews, 2014) 
Aware of the dilemma, respondents suggested that the decision to blow the 
whistle should be on a voluntary basis according to the whistle-blower’s ability to 
overcome the risk. The costs and benefits of the decision were considered. 
Because of the difficulties involved, whistle-blowing was perceived as a last 
resort after having talked informally to the wrongdoer as their friend. 
It is up to us whether we want to report it or not. We should not be forced to 
be a whistle-blower. (Lily, interview, 2014) 
In an employment relationship, whistle-blowing is the last step. Say it 
directly that it is unlawful. If it is not addressed, then [try again for] a 
second time. If it is still not considered, so be it. We are the subordinates 
right. Thus, maybe we could take the final steps which is whistle-blowing. 
(Nico, interview, 2013) 
Whistle-blowers felt a sense of accomplishment when they decided to blow the 
whistle. It was perceived as a personal battle that they had won. 
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In fact, I’m glad that they finally realised their mistakes. So, maybe at that 
point God does not sleep, there must be a lesson to be learnt. There will be 
a time when we win and I have done it. (Eve, interview, 2014) 
Whistle-blowers were described as brave, risk takers and employees who dared to 
disagree. The whistle-blowers knew the consequences of their action and they 
consistently accepted these consequences.  
Yes, that was the consequence. I felt like I was isolated in my environment. 
What we thought was that we needed to be brave and make a stand. After 
that, we did receive some unfavourable consequences. We accepted these. It 
was difficult but fortunately, we can show that we were consistent with our 
attitude and it did not affect our performance. Whatever their manoeuvre 
that has been done to us, it does not matter. The basic of our attitude is 
good intention. (Eve, interview, 2014) 
On the other side, the silent observers knew that the wrongdoing was wrong. But 
they chose to ignore the ongoing incidents occurring around them. The most 
important thing for them was that they were not complicit in the wrongdoing and 
that they would be the one who would end up being victimised. 
People are apathetic. The words they used that make me feel sick are ‘never 
mind, as long as it does not bother me’. Once they interfere me, I will be the 
one who take them apart. I heard this frequently. It happens many times. It 
may be permissive attitudes and habits that are not good. (Sonny, interview, 
2014) 
I think if it happens, the tendency was,‘I am not conducting an audit here, 
don’t trouble yourself, and never mind.’ (Andrew, interview, 2013) 
Other alternatives taken by silent observers were that they either accepted the 
money or became a beneficiary of the corrupt activities. But to escape from the 
dilemma and to ease their feeling of guilt, they then gave the money to the needy, 
charities or religious events. 
Finally, I said to them [audit team], ‘It is up to you, you were the one who 
take it while I was not here. But I would not take it and I wanted to return it 
back.’ I just wanted to know that I could not accept that. (Nickie, interview, 
2014) 
My co-worker did receive something from the audit client. [I received it 
also] but I did not want it. Alright then, secretly I returned it back. Or I gave 
it to the needy. I know it was not right, it was a wrongdoing but I did not 
speak up. Let it be. I might be permissive but almost everybody did it. I 
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could do something, speak up. But frankly speaking, I did not do it. Even if 
my heart tells me not to do it [the wrongdoing]. (Sonny, interview, 2014) 
4.2.4 Anonymity 
Anonymous whistle-blowing was seen as an unethical and irresponsible way to 
speak up. Sending an anonymous letter was perceived as taking the easy way out. 
Anonymous whistle-blowers were seen as neglectful and lazy and that they 
performed the act anonymously to avoid being accused as a wrongdoer or co-
conspirator.  
They take the easy way. They prefer to write a letter. They do not want to 
take the hard and tiring way. They are fearful of being blamed for what they 
say. So there is a sense of laziness, reluctance in communicating. The first is 
neglect, laziness is the second and the third is avoiding being blamed. They 
prefer to take the easiest way in which can keep their identity unknown. 
(Nico, interview, 2013) 
Anonymous whistle-blowing may lead to backbiting and prejudice among 
employees. It can affect the working atmosphere in the office and also employees’ 
performance. However, in the case of collective organisational wrongdoing, 
anonymous whistle-blowing was seen as a compromise solution for a silent 
observer too afraid to openly blow the whistle but also too angry to remain silent.  
Yes, I will report it [organisational wrongdoing] with a variety of 
considerations if it is really and truly detrimental to the organisation. It 
seems that, in general, the consequences of being a whistle-blower are still 
very hard to take. In many cases, we see that the whistle-blower is not fully 
protected. It is better to choose the anonymous unofficial channel. 
(Augustine, interview, 2013) 
4.3 Motivation and Justification for Whistle-blowing Decision 
This section presents the results of the survey questionnaire and the aggregate 
dimension of the interviews and FGDs regarding silent observers’ justifications 
for not blowing the whistle and the risk they perceived associated with whistle-
blowing. It also describes the aggregate dimension on the personal, situational and 
organisational factors that either motivate or impede the respondents from 
blowing the whistle.  
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4.3.1 General Justification for not Blowing the Whistle and the Perceived 
Risk of Whistle-blowing  
Respondents in the survey who claimed to have observed wrongdoing but who 
then chose not to blow the whistle – the silent observers – were asked to indicate 
their justifications. Eight different descriptions were provided in the questionnaire 
and respondents could make up to three choices. Not wishing to get anyone into 
trouble (17%), lack of evidence (16%), scepticism as to whether the whistle-
blowing information would be acted upon (15%) and avoidance of risk (13%) 
were the dominant justifications for not acting upon the identified wrongdoing. 
However, in terms of wrongdoing committed by auditors acting collusively, the 
majority choice was ‘I did not want to embarrass my organisation’. More detailed 
descriptions are shown in Table 4.4. 
Table 4.4: Justification of silent on wrongdoing committed by lower, equal 
and higher position than respondents and collusive auditors 
Justification 
Wrongdoing committed by auditor in 
Total % Lower 
position 
Equal 
position 
Higher 
position 
Collusive 
auditors 
I did not want to get anyone in 
trouble  1 6 14 9 30 17% 
I indeed know the incidence by 
myself but I did not have enough 
evidence to report 1 7 15 5 28 16% 
I did not think that anything 
would be done to correct the 
activity 0 4 15 6 25 15% 
I decided that reporting this 
matter was too great a negative 
risk for me 1 5 9 8 23 13% 
I did not want to embarrass my 
organisation 0 0 9 11 20 12% 
I did not think the activity was 
important enough to report 1 4 6 7 18 10% 
The activity had already been 
reported by someone else 1 3 5 7 16 9% 
I was not really sure to whom I 
should report the matter 0 1 5 3 9 5% 
Others 1 0 1 1 3 2% 
172 100% 
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The whistle-blowers and silent observers were asked to indicate those risks that 
they were most afraid of. Respondents were provided with a list of 13 risks 
associated with whistle-blowing and were able to select up to three risks. As 
described in Table 4.5, most of the respondents perceived that the risk of damage 
to social relationships in the office was greater than the risk relating to decisions 
by human resources management (65% vs 35%). Respondents perceived that their 
relationships with co-workers, supervisors and officials above their supervisor 
(14%) could be broken as a result of their act of whistle-blowing.  
Table 4.5: The risk of whistle-blowing perceived by respondents 
Risk of whistle-blowing According to the 
whistle-blowers 
According to the 
Silent observers Total 
Social relationship in the office 
Causing your co-worker unhappy with 
you  14 23% 49 29% 63 27% 
Causing your supervisor unhappy with 
you  8 13% 26 15% 34 15% 
Causing someone above your 
supervisor unhappy with you  8 13% 27 16% 35 15% 
Verbal harassment or intimidation 2 3% 15 9% 17 7% 
Sub Total 32 53% 117 69% 149 65% 
HRM decision 
Poor performance appraisal 2 3% 7 4% 9 4% 
Denial of promotion 6 10% 8 5% 14 6% 
Denial of training opportunities 5 8% 1 1% 6 3% 
Assigned less desirable or less 
important duties in my current job 1 2% 14 8% 15 7% 
Transfer or reassignment to a different 
job with less desirable duties 4 7% 5 3% 9 4% 
Reassignment to different geographic 
location 6 10% 7 4% 13 6% 
Suspension from your job 1 2% 3 2% 4 2% 
Fired from your job 1 2% 3 2% 4 2% 
Grade level demotion 0 0% 1 1% 1 0% 
other 2 3% 4 2% 6 3% 
Sub Total 28 47% 53 31% 81 35% 
Total 60 100% 170 100% 230 100% 
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They were also afraid of verbal harassment or intimidation. HRM decision-related 
risks, such as being assigned less desirable duties, job reassignment, denial of 
promotion and poor performance appraisal, were less feared. However, comparing 
the perceptions of whistle-blowers and silent observers, HRM-related risks and 
social relationship risks were equally feared by the whistle-blowers (53% vs 
47%). In contrast, the silent observers placed greater emphasis on the social 
relationship risks (69% vs 31%). 
The risks of ‘broken social relationships in the office’ and ‘job reassignment to a 
less favourable working unit’ were the most feared risks associated with blowing 
the whistle. Being excluded from daily official and social activities and feeling 
lonely were the results of employees’ perception that the whistle-blower would be 
seen as a traitor and as a disloyal and unfaithful friend. The whistle-blowers were 
physically present in the office but they felt that they were not there. They were 
excluded not only from social but also from official activities. In terms of 
establishing an audit team, the whistle-blower was not considered a good 
employee to have as part of the team.  
They could be considered as a traitor. It happens many times. Clean 
auditors do not have many friends. They are lonely because they cannot be 
with other friends. They are excluded from their environment and their co-
workers, although they are not necessarily removed from them. It was like ‘I 
do not want to be with him, he is [too] clean’. That is what I experienced 
during my work here if we want to be a better [organisation] we should 
become whistle-blower but should also be careful. (Sonny, interview, 2013) 
In social activity in the office, it was like, we were together, we were there 
but we felt we did not exist. (Eve, interview, 2014) 
Sometimes they would have been excommunicated by other co-workers or 
excluded from an audit assignment. (Andy, interview, 2013) 
The whistle-blowing system may be reliable but it can still be leaked. A 
whistle-blower is a good man but he/she can be discriminated against and 
labelled as a disloyal and unfaithful friend. Being excluded from social 
activities is the most severe punishment for a human being. (Barry, 
interview, 2013) 
The risks of job reassignment to less desirable duties or to a less favourable 
working unit were also emphasised. 
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Some words such as ‘Do you still want to be here or do you want me to 
transfer you to an “unfavourable” organisation’ will come out. It makes the 
decision more difficult for them. (Andrew, interview, 2013) 
My obligation is ended at my immediate supervisor. I did not do anything 
further. I chose to keep silent, follow the bureaucratic procedures and did 
not want to put my supervisor in the opposite position to his supervisor. 
Here in this organisation, the transfer policy [to unfavourable place] is 
used as a punishment tool. (Harley, interview, 2013) 
 
4.3.2 Personal Factors 
This section presents the second-order themes of the interviews and FGDs related 
to the personal factors that include 1) the responsibility and obligation to blow the 
whistle, 2) the tolerance of corruption and the wrongdoer’s motive and 3) the 
whistle-blower’s motive. 
4.3.2.1 Responsibility and Obligation to Blow the Whistle 
According to Article 3 of Government Regulation Number 53/2010 on Civil 
Service Discipline, each government employee has duties regarding 
confidentiality, loyalty, obedience and reporting to superiors. Government 
employees promise to be faithful and obedient to the government and to uphold 
the dignity of the government and prioritise the national interests above their own, 
those of other people and the interests of a group of individuals. On 
confidentiality, they promise to keep confidential official information or other 
information instructed to be kept secret and secure. On the duty of reporting, they 
promise to report immediately to superiors when they know something may be 
harmful or detrimental to the state or government, particularly in the areas of 
security, finance and material. The study found that observers of wrongdoing 
were not always able to exercise their legal responsibility to report. They were 
often faced with other competing obligations and values. 
A senior audit manager who blew the whistle on an extortion case committed by a 
subordinate wanted all of her employees to be following laws and codes of 
conduct. She argued that the trust shown by an audit client is important in 
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conducting the internal audit function and that whistle-blowing is a necessary part 
of maintaining that trust (Rena, interview, 2014). The perception that wrongdoers 
did not perform their jobs professionally and in a responsible way triggered the 
observer to blow the whistle. A senior auditor who blew the whistle on a series of 
fictitious travel expenses by her superior expected her co-workers and superiors to 
perform their jobs responsibly, in the same way that she performed her job. 
In my opinion, employees should be fully responsible for doing their job 
whether they are a team member, team leader and especially supervisor. 
But at that time, for example, she did not do her duty to supervise my audit 
team. I do not see whether she is a team member or my superior. But it is 
clear that we must work professionally and prioritise our job. If, for 
example, they could not be professional, they should resign from the 
assignment. So it motivates me to expose the problem of my audit team. In 
my opinion, each member, whether he is a supervisor or the CEO, they have 
an equal responsibility. (Eve, interview, 2014) 
Previously, a whistle-blower did not want to exercise her formal obligation to 
report wrongdoing. But she felt resentment towards the wrongdoer for being 
greedy and money-grabbing. She discovered that her fellow auditor, when they 
had travelled out of town for work, repeatedly inflated the accommodation cost to 
gain some extra money by falsifying hotel invoices. He also told her to do the 
same so that the financial officer in their office would not be suspicious. At some 
point, she felt that enough was enough and that she could no longer tolerate the 
situation. Her formal obligation turned into a personal obligation. She reported the 
wrongdoing to her superior. Considering that the wrongdoer did not have any 
HRM-related authority towards her, she convinced herself to blow the whistle. 
She did not consider retaliation to be a risk for herself. 
It was just a small thing. What I mean is that it happened in the audit team 
internally. For example, official travel allowance and accommodation cost. 
I knew my co-worker marked up the cost of an airline ticket and hotel. I 
reported it to my immediate superior because I was resentful of him. He 
actively did it. He was greedy [and] money-grabbing. (Lily, interviews, 
2014) 
The formal obligation to blow the whistle was also postponed due to the need to 
prioritise the values of friendship and togetherness. A potential whistle-blower 
saw the wrongdoer(s) as their friend(s) and attempted to talk to them on a personal 
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level about their behaviour prior to making the decision to formally blow the 
whistle. The wrongdoer(s), particularly in cases of collective corruption, were not 
always the pure perpetrators as a result of their own will but they may have been 
the victims of a corrupt system. The potential whistle-blowers felt the need to 
communicate with the wrongdoer on a personal level first. This personal approach 
was part of their willingness to change their organisation (Nico, interviews, 2014) 
without ‘making the water muddy’ (Sonny, interviews, 2014). 
It depends on our intention. If we have a definite love for our organisation, 
we will try our best to tell him [the wrongdoer], and so there will be no 
victims, and that person [the wrongdoer] will not be a victim either. If we 
do the whistle-blowing, there must be some casualties. It means that if we 
can stop then, we should stop it and find how we communicate it. It comes 
back to you; how strong your intention is. (Nico, interviews, 2014) 
The formal obligation to blow the whistle was finally exercised when personal 
approaches had no effect in stopping the wrongdoing. A respondent was aware 
that the personal approach had its limitations. When the wrongdoer became 
ignorant and his/her behaviour negatively affected the organisational performance 
or working condition in the office, the potential whistle-blower finally blew the 
whistle. 
I always feel challenged to use humanistic approach. My intention was to 
change the organisation. High performance can be achieved through 
togetherness and teamwork. This culture must be built. Togetherness is 
important. We may write a letter to do whistle-blowing when he/she cannot 
be told anymore, when he/she becomes ignorant and does not want to 
change his behaviour. He/she clearly have the intention to corrupt. When 
we speak to him and he does not want to hear, so be it. It means we have an 
obligation to inform it using another way. (Nico, interviews, 2014) 
Feeling pity and compassion towards the wrongdoer and their family were also 
part of the justification for not resorting to any formal obligation to blow the 
whistle. Considering that they (the wrongdoer and potential whistle-blower) 
worked in the same unit or even within the same audit team, the potential whistle-
blower usually knew the wrongdoer’s family very well.  
I did not report it to our superior because I was a close friend of my team 
leader. (Nickie, interview, 2014) 
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The wrongdoers’ families were perceived as people who should not have to suffer 
the consequences of the whistle-blowing. The wrongdoer’s family situation and 
wrongdoer’s lifestyle influenced the decision of whether to blow the whistle or 
remain silent.  
I felt pity for him too. He has a kid with special needs. I understood that he 
needed money, not that much, but enough for his daily life. (Lily, interview, 
2014) 
When the decision was made to blow the whistle, they, the interviewees, did it 
informally and internally. Public whistle-blowing was seen as unfair and as an act 
to humiliate the wrongdoer. 
Because we were close in the same office room, in term of amount of money, 
it was petty. If we blew it up and all of our office mate would know, it might 
be unfair. (Lily, interview, 2014) 
Humiliating people publicly somewhat is not our culture. We, three of us 
[top and middle managers in the organisation], agreed not to do that 
[external whistle-blowing]. (Rena, interview, 2014) 
The act of whistle-blowing, although conducted informally and internally, 
impacted the social relationship in the office. In the case of ‘Lily’, after blowing 
the whistle informally and internally, she no longer wished to remain part of the 
same audit team as the wrongdoer. In the case of ‘Rena’, the wrongdoer separated 
himself from the whistle-blower and from his other co-workers.  
4.3.2.2 Tolerance of corruption and the wrongdoer’s motive  
Respondents determined their level of tolerance by evaluating the incidents of 
corruption from various points of view. Some interviewees emphasised the impact 
of the wrongdoing on their organisation, the amount of money involved and the 
wrongdoer’s motive. In the case of repeated wrongdoing, a respondent blew the 
whistle when the wrongdoer went on to commit the same act of wrongdoing 
again, but this time for money. As instructed by his superior, a respondent marked 
up several examinees’ scores so that they passed an exam and qualified for 
promotion to a higher-level auditor. He felt compassionate, did it and remained 
silent.  
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For one or two cases, I followed him but not for the most part. (Barley, 
interview, 2014) 
Respondents were reluctant to speak up when the wrongdoing was carried out in 
the best interest of the organisation and not in someone’s own personal self-
interest.  
I find it normal if our travel allowance is cut for non-budget office expenses. 
(GIAU_E, 30)  
They also tried to understand the difficulties faced by the manager. They were 
aware that managers sometimes have to do something illegal or unethical in order 
to get the job done. 
If the wrongdoing is necessary for the best interest of the organisation, I 
think it is ok. It is not for us personally. However, if money involved in the 
wrongdoing, it cannot be tolerated. (Augustine, interview, 2013) 
But if it is an organisational wrongdoing, I try to understand the difficulties 
faced by the management. (Andrew, interviews, 2013) 
Wrongdoing occurring in the context of getting a decent life or for charity or 
social purposes was seen as tolerable wrongdoing and was not going to be 
reported. In contrast, greedy wrongdoers seeking to excessively enrich themselves 
deserved to be reported.  
One time, I observed someone [in my audit team] accepted an envelope 
[bribe money from audit client]. It was not that much money. Then I saw 
that he was a single breadwinner of his family, he had many kids and he did 
not have anything [luxurious]. I do not justify the wrongdoing but I can 
understand why he did it. I guessed that he/she did it because he/she needed 
it so bad. (Nickie, interviews, 2014) 
Yes, I think we still have some level of tolerance to corruption. The 
tolerance here is not because of the nature of greed or enrich themselves or 
excessive, no, but in the context of getting a decent life. (Rainy, interviews, 
2013) 
We need to look at the social aspect, perhaps. I do not know. Maybe I was 
influenced by the opinion that it is not corruption if the money goes to 
charity or for social purposes. (Andrew, interviews, 2013) 
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4.3.2.3 Whistle-blower’s motive 
Some respondents who were recipients of whistle-blowing information 
emphasised the importance of a whistle-blower’s pure and sincere motives when 
deciding what to do with the information they held. They made attempts to verify 
the information and seek additional evidence. The whistle-blower, also one of the 
wrongdoers or a beneficiary of the corrupt activities, was seen as an untrustworthy 
person. In contrast, a whistle-blower who perceived themselves to be the victim of 
wrongdoing can be regarded as an employee who is jealous of other employees 
who gain benefit from the wrongdoing. 
The [potential] whistle-blowers should not take the beneficiary [of 
corruption] as the consideration of the decision to blow the whistle or not. 
There is no need to look to whose interest it is. If we do consider it, then, I 
think, our intention will not be pure again. It means you will silent when you 
get the benefit but when you are not one of the beneficiaries you will do 
whistle-blowing. That is just not right. (Sonny, interviews, 2014) 
For example, a job promotion is not by the procedures. It is against the 
rules; it is a non-compliance. But if I report it then they will think ‘you are 
envious’. It seems that because I am not the one who get promoted and then 
I get jealous. I think to myself what exactly the reason I report it. That is 
why I do not care much to our organisation. It is their problem, not mine. I 
have doubt on my justification. (Rena, interviews, 2014) 
However, another respondent put forward different views that the whistle-
blower’s motive may be difficult to assess. Handling and responding to the 
information are substantially more important than questioning the motive or 
identity of the whistle-blower. 
The important things are getting the content of what they said. We do not 
need to know who did that. Then we need to analyse and validate it. Is the 
substance of the information true or false? If it is true, then we do something 
to solve the problems. If it is false information, it does not matter. [There is] 
no need to know who said it. (Sonny, interviews, 2014) 
4.3.3 Situational Factors 
This section presents the second-order themes of the interviews and FGDs related 
to the situational factors which is the quality of evidences. 
147 
4.3.3.1 Quality of evidences 
In deciding whether or not to blow the whistle, respondents placed a strong 
emphasis on the quality of the evidence of the wrongdoing that they had observed. 
Strong evidence gave them confidence in their ability to defend themselves if they 
were criticised or accused by other parties. Verbal information or wrongdoing 
based on hearsay was not reported. When there was a clear, present and actual 
case of corruption, then they felt blowing the whistle to be an obligation rather 
than an option. In one reported case of repeated wrongdoing, the wrongdoer 
(whistle-blower’s superior) told the whistle-blower via text message to do the 
same wrongdoing for other clients. He was suspicious that this time his superior 
was doing it for money. He did not do it and then blew the whistle to his higher 
superior and showed him a note and text message.  
I went to my CEO [official higher that the wrongdoer] and met him in his 
office. I showed him the text messaging and the wrongdoer’s handwriting on 
the notes. ‘These persons had to pass the exam’. (Barley, interview, 2014) 
However, his superior did nothing. Within several months, he had been 
transferred to a less favourable unit. 
The quality of evidence was also emphasised by a recipient of whistle-blowing 
information. This recipient of whistle-blowing information asked the whistle-
blower to provide some evidence in support of the ongoing incidents. The 
recipient of the whistle-blowing information also attempted to find additional 
evidence by questioning other wrongdoers’ co-workers.  
We heard from the audit team that the wrongdoer asked something to our 
audit client, we continued to explore the extent to which the wrongdoing 
occurred. The audit team provided me the evidence that it is true that he has 
accepted ‘something’. We, ourselves, looked at the evidence. We reported it 
to our director and we were told to trace his similar behaviour in another 
audit client. I asked his previous audit team to clarify and it was positive 
that he committed similar wrongdoing in previous audit clients. But his co-
workers did not report to us. There was someone did report but it was 
considered a vague case. We continued to trace him when he was at another 
directorate. It turned out that he was famous for doing so. (Rena, 
interviews, 2014) 
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A silent observer also justified her decision to remain silent due to a lack of hard 
evidence. 
If I kept arguing then [I was afraid] he might insistently be questioning me, 
‘how do you know, do you have evidence of this?’ … I did not have direct 
and authentic evidence showing someone had received money and then the 
audit findings were gone. (Lily, interview, 2014) 
4.3.4 Organisational Factors 
This section presents the second-order themes of the interviews and FGDs related 
to the organisational factors that include 1) perceived leadership style, 2) 
organisational unresponsiveness and 3) informal solution and external pressure. 
4.3.4.1 Perceived Leadership Style  
Whistle-blowers’ or silent observers’ superiors played important roles in the 
whistle-blowing decision process. Leaders were seen by both whistle-blowers and 
silent observers as offering guidance on how to behave and their behaviour 
reflected their commitment to anti-corruption reform, along with their integrity. 
Whistle-blowing decisions were somewhat influenced by leadership style. One 
respondent decided to blow the whistle after learning that she was able to trust her 
supervisor. She described her superior as being as close to her as a friend and as 
an idealist.  
I did it [whistle-blowing] because it was an internal issue and I know my 
superior’s character… So I convinced myself to do it. She [whistle-blowing 
information recipient] was quite idealistic person, she did not want to get 
her tickets and hotels paid or receive gift [from audit clients]. (Lily, 
interviews, 2014) 
One open-minded and receptive superior also helped a potential whistle-blower to 
speak up.  
My supervisor talks and discusses openly to me. His openness provided me 
with the opportunity for giving him some input or feedback. (Nico, 
interviews, 2014) 
Sure, I am happy. It is okay for me. I do emphasise to my subordinates that 
if I am wrong, please correct me. They can speak it up carefully and wisely. 
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If it is true, we can be a clean person and our employees will not do 
something wrong. (Sonny, interviews, 2014) 
It should start from the top, from the top leaders. They should be more open 
and willing to listen. It may change the environment a little bit. When people 
are willing to speak up then, the whistle-blowing may come out. (Eve, 
interviews, 2014) 
 
On the contrary, ‘talk the talk’ leadership and angry and spiteful superiors served 
to suppress employees’ willingness to speak up. Respondents were afraid that 
these kinds of superiors would seek to use their power to retaliate. 
It [exemplary leadership] does not exist but ‘talk only’ leadership. When 
someone do the whistle-blowing but then he got retaliated, it is all the same, 
it is better to keep quiet. (Andrew, interviews, 2014) 
In our culture, people whose evil deeds get exposed, tend to be angry. If he 
has power, he will use the power to retaliate or take action that can be 
harmful to the whistle-blower. (Iris, interviews, 2014) 
CEOs with whom their employees were not able to argue were described as little 
tyrants. They used their authority to get rid of their unfavourable subordinates by 
transferring them to an unfavourable office.  
There was a case when an official was transferred. He got punished. But it 
was not because of something that he did was wrong or that he was not 
performing well. It was because he spoke up and argued against our CEO. 
Our CEO banged the desk while he was arguing with him. So some 
employees think that our CEO is a little tyranny. (Barley, interviews, 2014) 
Respondents were mainly concerned that a feudalistic culture, bureaucratic 
environment and unresponsive leaders demotivated them to blow the whistle.  
The culture here was very feudalistic. We would get punished for only 
putting some words out. (Harley, interviews, 2013) 
In terms of our culture which is developed in our bureaucratic environment, 
whistle-blowing is difficult to apply. We, especially someone who has higher 
position, tend not to appreciate when someone reminds us of our bad 
behaviour. (Harley, interviews, 2013) 
My supervisor did not respond to my report and I stopped there. Maybe, if I 
continued to blow the whistle to the higher manager, I would have 
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transferred somewhere around Indonesia. As a result, I have worked here in 
Jakarta for 30 years now. (Harley, interviews, 2013) 
If the subordinates reported [the wrongdoing] to the superiors but they do 
not do the follow-up action, it [the whistle-blowing intention] can be gone. 
Actual and firm action is needed. It can motivate us to do more whistle-
blowing. (Eve, interviews, 2014) 
I did the whistle-blowing but there was no response at all. Should it be 
responded right? And their actions should be informed to us. (Barry, 
interviews, 2013) 
A feudalistic culture was perceived as being overly bureaucratic and could be 
related back to the leaders’ negative behaviour, always wishing to be respected 
and exert old-fashioned, undemocratic and non-participative leadership. 
Describing how (bad) the situation was, a silent observer was grateful and 
thankful to God that his co-workers had respect for him when he refused to take 
bribe money and do nothing to him. He did not feel isolated from daily social 
activities despite the fact that he had failed to comply with the collective decision 
of his audit team. Wrongdoers who shared their money with other employees 
were seen as good and generous people. The attitude of ‘get more or less, do not 
eat it by yourself, share it and enjoy it together’ was a commonly shared attitude.  
When I came to this office, compared to other organisations, this 
organisation is cleaner and better. The atmosphere for us to do the right 
thing is more supportive. No one will challenge or threaten you for doing 
the right thing. Therefore, I will not try to do this and that. I once refused to 
receive some offering [of money from audit clients]. Nothing has happened. 
I was not isolated. (Barry, interviews, 2014) 
The culture of cooperation and solidarity is strong. If you get it [money] 
even a little, let us eat together, do not eat by yourself, right? Some portion 
of that should be trickled down. But the worst is that the wrongdoer is seen 
as a good and generous person. Whereas, they never questioned where the 
money comes from. They [the wrongdoers] were frequently seen as a hero. 
(Lily, interviews, 2013) 
A whistle-blower also felt fortunate that her immediate superior also had respect 
for her when she said she did not want to get involved in the wrongdoing. This 
was despite the fact that she also felt her superior may not wish to hear it and 
would label her a rebellious employee.  
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Fortunately, my immediate superior could accept my attitude although he 
might not like to hear it from me. But he respected my views not to get 
involved in the wrongdoing. However, he might take note of me for being 
rebellious. We were seen as ‘too late to be the hero’. What is it good for? [It 
was] like you never did it. (Eve, interviews, 2014) 
Giving ‘reward’ to wrongdoer(s) was also part of the leaders’ policy to suppress 
the whistle-blowers’ willingness to blow the whistle. Auditors who can generate 
revenue in the form of money from audit clients for their superiors were assigned 
to ‘nice’ audit clients instead of ‘ordinary’ audit clients. Nice audit clients were 
described as high-spending government agencies or big state-owned enterprises 
with off-budget funds for unofficial expenses.  
It has become an open secret for us all. We all know that he was the player. 
Giving money to the superiors was common practice and even made him 
proud. He was the player and he was the favourite employee. He was like a 
[revenue generator]. He became a legend. (Lily, interviews, 2013) 
It [corrupt behaviour] was systemic, what I mean is it was rooted. And 
usually, those who can produce something like that [money from audit 
client] they got nice audit client. However, it depends on the team leader. 
There were also some idealist auditors. But they usually got ordinary audit 
client. (Lily, interviews, 2013) 
In order to avoid the whistle-blowing dilemma, respondents preferred not to get 
too close to their superiors personally. They worked by the rule. In doing so, they 
felt free to refuse becoming involved in any wrongdoing initiated by their 
superior. They could also blow the whistle without being perceived as a disloyal 
employee. 
I do not underlie my work on likes or dislikes basis but rather on what my 
obligation is. I do not see who my boss is. I do the job following the rules. 
With such an approach, I do not need to get close to or stay away from my 
supervisor. (Nico, Interview, 2014) 
4.3.4.2 Organisational Unresponsiveness  
Lack of organisational support was also evident in the respondents’ perceptions 
and in their comments on how their organisation managed the whistle-blowing 
information. The respondents perceived that the whistle-blowing policies 
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developed as part of anti-corruption reform may merely be ‘lip service’, ‘talk 
only’ or ‘image building’.  
Internal control is built by the manager to control the organisation’s 
activities. However, according to my experience, they violated it. Just like 
this whistle-blowing system. They built it as its best but the information 
gained from the system may be used only as image building to secure their 
interest. (Barry, interviews, 2014) 
I see it as lip service only, plans, dreams and ideals. It should be a 
measurable commitment and used as an indicator of success. It must be 
embedded, measurable and clear accountability. If there is no evaluation 
and monitoring, let us forget it. Whistle-blowing was built not to denounce, 
but to provide positive and corrective impact. (Rena, interviews, 2014) 
Some respondents put forward the risk of misuse of the whistle-blowing 
information.  
It is only to appease the public without any intention to act upon. (Adele, 
Interview, 2013)  
Can they guarantee that the whistle-blowing information will not be leaked 
and the whistle-blower will not be known? (Barry, interviews, 2013) 
Potential whistle-blowers perceived that openly blowing the whistle meant they 
would be putting themselves in the trouble and aggravating situation. By 
becoming involving in a legal issue in the office, they were ready to be 
questioned, exposed and spiritually tortured. 
There is a belief not to interfere in other people’s business. Moreover, 
exposure of corruption here is also still rather difficult. The one who 
exposes the incidence tends to be the one who gets the problem. That’s why 
most auditors do not want to be involved if it is out of the audit context. 
(Andrew, interviews, 2013) 
They may be afraid of getting involving in troublesome issues, being 
questioned and exposed. (Lily, interviews, 2014)  
Afraid to involve in an annoying situation, I have experienced being a 
witness of a fraud. I helped in preventing the fraud so that it did not happen. 
At the time, the fraud was occurred it was beyond our control. I was the 
witness but it seemed I was the wrongdoer. It cost me money and time and I 
felt spiritually tortured. I felt like by participating in something to uphold 
the truth we even felt discomfort. (Rena, interviews, 2014) 
153 
Some respondents believed that, just like any other system built by the manager, 
there was potential for the whistle-blowing information system to be breached and 
violated by them in order to serve their own interests.  
We are not sure whether our report will arrive [at the authorities]. There is 
someone who filters the information. We once conducted an audit and found 
a corruption case. An official of regional office [of Ministry of Education] 
illegally took fees on school fund. I reported to my superior but it stopped 
there. And then I knew that the information never arrived at our CEO. 
(Barley, interviews, 2014) 
Do people who manage this whistle-blowing information never conduct an 
audit? They have conducted an audit. There is a saying of ‘Pot Calling the 
Kettle Black’. You used to do it anyway, how come you pretend to be mister 
clean. We are just worried that there is a conflict of interest, ‘you know it, I 
know it’, ‘you know that I know what you have done wrong in the past’. You 
expose mine, I expose yours. (Iris, interviews, 2014) 
The unsupportive environment may create a feeling of powerless among 
employees, who then to choose to either remain silent or to gossip. 
I did not have the courage to prevent that wrongdoing. It is my own 
experience. When I was a junior auditor, I did not have the power. If we 
have the power, as team leader, then we can prevent the wrongdoing from 
occurring. (Barry, interview, 2013) 
I will choose to do gossiping, or if I feel the need to report it. Because of the 
fear of getting identified [as the one who blow the whistle], I prefer to use 
the informal channel. I have no courage yet to openly blow the whistle. In a 
case of organisational wrongdoing, we may be somewhat reluctant to 
formally blow the whistle. (Augustine, interview, 2014) 
This may also serve to reduce employees’ self-confidence since they knew that 
the wrongdoing they observed was wrong but they tried to convince themselves 
that they might be wrong. The wrongdoer(s) was(were) perceived as someone 
who knew everything and the silent observer saw themselves as someone who 
knew nothing. 
I am still afraid to blow the whistle, I should look into myself and until now I 
am no one here. (Princess, interview, 2013) 
We can keep in silence but it does not mean that we agree with it [the 
wrongdoing]. If we are in lack of power position, and we feel that whistle-
blowing will be in vain, and we do not have the ability, it is better not to 
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blow the whistle. If we are confident [that whistle-blowing will be effective], 
yes we can do it. We need to see ‘who we are’. (Harry, interview, 2014) 
I felt junior, yes [powerless]. At that time, I did not quite understand. (Lily, 
interview, 2014) 
4.3.4.3 Informal solution and external pressure 
In handling issues of whistle-blowing, CEOs saw the superior of the whistle-
blower as an incompetent manager for not being able to control both the 
wrongdoer and the whistle-blower as their subordinates. This motivated superiors, 
as the recipients of whistle-blowing information, to suppress their subordinates to 
not blow the whistle externally and to quietly rectify the wrongdoing outside 
formal procedures. In a case of extortion carried out by an auditor upon their audit 
client, the CEO did not want to go to the internal compliance unit and the 
wrongdoer’s superior asked the wrongdoer to quietly return the money. 
He [her CEO] did not believe that it still happens today. [He] though my 
report was not true. I assured him that this was the risk. But still he said 
‘no’ [to formally report it to internal compliance unit] repeatedly. That was 
it, and then I stopped arguing and kept silent. We solved it by returning the 
money to the audit client using ‘organisation fund’. Then we ask him to 
replace the funds. We were confused that time, how we treat him regarding 
his status as the government officer. We have talked to the CEO. But there 
has been no progress. (Rena, interviews, 2014) 
Handling the issue of whistle-blowing through the use of formal procedures was 
seen as an ‘explosive’ solution that was described as bad publicity and as 
‘get[ting] the fish but making the water muddy’. Respondents were aware that the 
wrongdoer may not learn a lesson and may thus reduce the deterrence effect of the 
punishment. 
Wrongdoers who are handled by informal punishment may not learn the 
lesson. It is not an ‘explosive’ solution. But everything has been considered. 
If it involves a substantive amount of money or repeated wrongdoing, it 
should be approached differently. Therefore, the challenge is how we can 
resolve the wrongdoing without making the water muddy. (Sonny, 
interviews, 2014) 
However, the informal and quiet solution was preferred for both the whistle-
blowing information recipient and the wrongdoer. The wrongdoer’s superior 
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wanted to help the wrongdoer personally so that his/her wrongdoing did not harm 
either the organisation’s or the CEO’s reputation. The wrongdoer, on the other 
hand, would not be severely punished by either the human resources or internal 
compliance units.  
As his superior, we wanted to help him solve his problems so this 
organisation would not be affected. We asked some evidence. We reported it 
to our CEO and he told us to return the money back to audit client. (Rena, 
interviews, 2014) 
I prefer informal resolution; I will ask the wrongdoer to return the money 
quietly. He/she is my subordinate; he/she is my friend. I would try my best to 
resolve it as such we all are his/her family. It is like solving the problem but 
not letting the water muddy. Get the fish but do not let the water muddy. 
(Sonny, interviews, 2014) 
Formal procedures were used when there was external pressure on CEOs or when 
the wrongdoer or the whistle-blower did not align with their interest. Whistle-
blowing information discussed in the CEO’s meeting was not resolved until a 
similar act of wrongdoing was found by either the Supreme Audit Institution 
(SAI) or the Corruption Eradication Commission (CEC). When wrongdoing was 
exposed by the CEC, the CEO’s capability as head of the government agency who 
was supposed to be able to control their subordinates was called into questioned. 
Only then would the CEO introduce new policies or regulation to prevent the 
wrongdoing from reoccurring.  
Was the case that has been exposed and publicly known resolved? It was 
repeatedly exposed in the CEOs meeting but is there any decisive action 
from CEOs to make deterrence effect for us? I don’t think so. Is it an 
indication that our CEOs want to quietly get rid of the problem? I do not 
think so. It is because the wrongdoing has not been known by external 
parties. When CEC or SAI found it, then the CEOs will do something about 
it. So, our CEO may have the intention to solve the problem but they are 
passive. I see our CEOs will not act as long as their self-interests will not be 
disturbed. (Barley, interviews, 2014) 
CEOs should be proactively eager to improve things that went wrong even if 
they do it informally and quietly. But that does not happen here. Our CEOs 
knew that the wrongdoing was occurring, but they wait. If CEC or SAI do 
not put it in their report, then they are silent and do nothing. (Barley, 
interviews, 2014) 
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When their subordinates [the wrongdoer] were ‘handled’ by external 
parties, which they think it can affect their reputation, they then act 
something about it. (Barley, interviews, 2014) 
Moreover, a respondent put forward the importance of external pressure in 
developing anti-corruption awareness among employees. 
Before 2009, many employees marked their travel expenses up. The 
fictitious business trip occurred for employees’ welfare. But after a team 
from the Corruption Eradication Commission supervised us, thank God, 
many employees were aware [that it was wrong] and back to the right path. 
However, there are still some employees trying to commit the unethical act 
secretly. (GIAU_C, 19) 
 
4.4 Improving the Effectiveness of Whistle-blowing Policy 
The study found that committed leadership is a prerequisite for the promotion of 
whistle-blowing behaviour. Furthermore, the respondents recommended that the 
implementation of a whistle-blowing system should carry with it a protection 
mechanism (Iris, interview, 18 November 2013) ‘so that people having good 
intentions can blow the whistle safely’ (Nico, interview, 7 January 2014). It needs 
online facilities for the whistle-blower to track the progression of the case (Iris, 
interview, 18 November 2013) and also legal aid for the whistle-blower (Michael, 
interview, 1 November 2013). In general, the themes that emerged from the 
interviews were on ethical climate, organisational culture, human resources 
management and reward for the whistle-blower. 
In offering a reward for the whistle-blower, it was suggested that this should not 
be in the form of money, goods or benefits because ‘It may be used only [as a 
motive] to gain money’ (Kurt, interview, 18 November 2013). From another 
perspective, ‘If it is a financial reward, it did not mean that much’ (Andy, 
interview, 15 September 2013). The whistle-blowers’ own safety and a guarantee 
that there would be no retaliation were preferred to any form of reward being 
offered.  
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Safety is the first I think. It means that there would be no negative impact on 
the whistle-blower and their family and their prosperity. It has to be built 
first. Through the reward, even non-financial reward, the appreciation and 
the commitment of the leaders can be shown. The employees need to see 
some positive sign that can encourage people to blow the whistle. The sign 
should truly exist in the policies and actions. (Andy, interview, 15 
September 2013) 
Promotion and employee development could also be applied as rewards for the 
whistle-blower. 
To avoid backbiting and prejudice, Rianna (interview, 20 September 2013) 
stressed the importance of balancing the protection of identity and of being a 
responsible whistle-blower in order to maintain a good working environment. 
In my opinion anyway, if we want to implement the whistle-blowing system 
it is better to develop a good and wise mechanism that includes legal 
protection for the witnessing whistle-blower. It is also needed to maintain 
good and conducive working atmosphere in the government agencies, 
avoiding backbiting and prejudice. The whistle-blower’s identity must be 
given along with the information provided. Principally, protection is 
guaranteed, but the whistle-blower should be responsible also. When we 
implement the control environment, we should continue doing the daily 
activities smoothly. Do not let the business process be halted because the 
control is set too tight. Anyone can give input or complaint but with no 
identity, it is irresponsible. (Rianna, interview, 20 September 2013) 
To encourage employees to be responsible whistle-blowers, the respondents 
suggested that: 
the criteria of information that will be acted upon should be mentioned 
which the facts or documents showing the facts (Rianna, interview, 20 
September 2013). 
They further suggested improvements to the ethical climate and culture in the 
organisation through ‘instilling ethical values and improving recruitment process’, 
‘instilling people with a “dare to disagree” and “speak it out politely and 
respectfully” attitude’ and creating a ‘good work ambience, sufficient facilities, 
good inter-personal relationships, particularly among subordinates and superiors’ 
(Nico, interview, 7 January 2014).  
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Aside from a formal reporting procedure, a special integrity pact in managing 
whistle-blowing information was also suggested. The information must be 
managed by a designated person to ensure the confidentiality and anonymity of 
the whistle-blower.  
The important thing is getting the content of what they said. We do not need 
to know who did that [whistle-blowing]. Then we can analyse and validate 
it. Is the substance of the information true or false? If it is true, then we do 
something to solve the problems. If it is false information, it does not matter, 
no need to know who said it. What is important is the substance of the 
information whether it is right or wrong. (Nico, Interview, 7 January 2014) 
The importance of external parties in managing the whistle-blowing information 
was also emphasised. 
If the wrongdoing occurred in lower-level management, there is no 
problem, the higher manager in the headquarters will do something. 
However, how to cope with fraud involving top managers in the 
headquarters? It is important to ask external parties to manage the whistle-
blowing system. (Barry, interview, 1 November 2013) 
The purpose of having an external party involved in managing the system is to 
ensure that: 
The case to be handled is not subjectively selected by the internal manager 
to serve their interest’ (Barry, interview, 1 November 2013).  
It is also to prevent the manager from: 
Filter[ing] [the information] and then no single action will be taken’ 
(Rachel, interview, 1 November 2013). 
 
4.5 Concluding Notes 
The findings show that the decision to blow the whistle is a personal and 
situational decision. Participants in the interviews and FGDs seem to have their 
own criteria in evaluating the situation. Both the motivations for blowing the 
whistle and the justifications for not blowing the whistle seem to be unique to 
each case. The whistle-blowers appeared to be willing to blow the whistle. They 
wanted to contribute and help their organisation by preventing wrongdoing. 
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However, it seems that they did not want to take the risk and become the victim of 
retaliation. They may have had a strong intention but they might not have had 
sufficient perseverance to actually blow the whistle. 
In addition to the process of the normalisation of corruption such as low level of 
responsibility (Sections 4.3.2.1) and tolerance of corruption (Section 4.3.2.2), it 
can also be concluded that the whistle-blowing decisions were influenced by two 
main factors: the quality of the evidence of wrongdoing and the leadership in the 
organisation. The findings show that the quality of evidence was related to the 
justification not to blow the whistle (Section 4.3.3.1). By having evidence, the 
potential whistle-blowers perceived the wrongdoing to be less ambiguous and that 
they would be perceived by others as constructive whistle-blowers (Section 
4.3.2.3). The existence of evidence also provided the recipients of whistle-
blowing information with a basis upon which to act.  
The findings also show how the perceived leadership style (Section 4.3.4.1) and 
the organisational unresponsiveness (Section 4.3.4.2) greatly influenced the 
decision. Participants in the interviews and FGDs seemed to perceive that their 
leaders sought to suppress their potential acts of blowing the whistle formally and 
externally. The act of formal whistle-blowing was perceived as a threat to their 
superiors (Section 4.3.4.3). For the whistle-blower, it was only the wrongdoing 
that was the problem, but for their leaders, the issue was both the wrongdoing and 
the whistle-blowing.  
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CHAPTER 5 
FINDINGS: FACTORS INFLUENCING WHISTLE-BLOWING 
INTENTIONS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the research findings with regard to research question 2, 
which concerns testing the role of ethical judgement, perceived seriousness of the 
wrongdoing, organisational commitment, respondents’ job level, the wrongdoer’s 
power status and ethical climate in cases of whistle-blowing intentions. Referring 
to the analysis procedures described in Section 3.4, the quantitative data were 
analysed using statistical analysis software for both descriptive and inferential 
statistics. The findings described in this chapter complement the findings 
described earlier in Chapter 4. The qualitative findings in Chapter 4 were used to 
contextualise the quantitative findings described in Chapter 5 to gain a more 
comprehensive answer to the research questions. The structure of the data and an 
overview of the findings are presented in the following sections. 
5.1.1 Data structure of quantitative results to answer research question 2 
As depicted in Figure 5.1, this chapter describes the quantitative research findings 
regarding research question two, which mainly aims to explore the effect of the 
perceived seriousness of wrongdoing and organisational commitment in the 
relationship between ethical judgement and whistle-blowing intention using 
ethical climate, power status and job level as the control variables. Descriptive 
analysis of dependent, independent moderating and control variables are presented 
in Sections 5.2, 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5. Section 5.5 also contains factor analysis to 
identify constructs in the ECQ. Results of the moderated regression analysis are in 
Section 5.6. Section 5.7 contains supporting analysis on the organisation culture in 
research sites. Section 5.8 presents the concluding notes of Chapter 5. Most of the 
statistical results are reported in tables, footnotes and appendices to facilitate 
readability. 
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Figure 5.1: Data structure of quantitative results to answer research  
question 2 
 
5.1.2 Overview of the findings 
Results of the descriptive statistics analysis and factor analysis of the dependent 
and independent variables 
In all six case scenarios, the survey respondents in the research were more likely 
to use internal than external whistle-blowing channels within government 
agencies. They were also more likely to use external channels provided by other 
government agencies than to blow the whistle in public. The respondents’ ethical 
judgement towards the case scenarios showed that they perceived an organisation 
of corrupt individuals (OCI) to be more unethical than a corrupt organisation 
(CO). In term of the wrongdoer, acts of wrongdoing committed collusively by 
employees were seen as less unethical compared with those committed by a co-
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worker or supervisor. Moreover, they perceived that the OCI was more serious 
than the CO. 
Of the three types of organisational commitment, affective commitment seems to 
be more salient than normative commitment and continuance commitment. The 
respondents felt more emotionally attached, part of the family and a strong sense 
of belonging. They seemed to be more ‘wanting to’ be in the organisation rather 
than ‘needing to be’ or ‘having to be’. 
Factor analysis of the Ethical Climate Questionnaire shows the existence of an 
ethical climate characterised by: 1) adherence to rules, professional ethics and 
upholding teamwork 2) working in efficient ways and maintaining the best service 
for the stakeholders, 3) personal self-interest and 4) unity, cohesiveness, 
togetherness and caring. 
Results of the inferential statistics analysis  
The study found that whistle-blowing intention became higher when ethical 
judgement rose. The seriousness of the wrongdoing significantly moderated the 
effects of ethical judgement on whistle-blowing intentions. These results indicate 
that the relationships between ethical judgement and whistle-blowing intention 
were positive and stronger in employees who were intolerant of corruption, 
sensitive and who had a higher perception of the seriousness of wrongdoing.  
The study also found that continuance commitment significantly moderated the 
effect of ethical judgement on internal, external and public whistle-blowing 
intentions. The relationship between ethical judgement and whistle-blowing 
intention was stronger and positive for employees with a higher level of 
continuance commitment.  
5.2 Dependent Variables: Descriptive Analysis of the Whistle-blowing 
Intentions in Case Scenarios 1 to 6 
The whistle-blowing intentions were measured across three channels: internal 
whistle-blowing within the government agencies at which respondents work, 
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external whistle-blowing to other government agencies and external whistle-
blowing to the public (see Section 3.4.1.2.5). As shown in Table 5.1, in general, in 
all six case scenarios, respondents were more likely to use internal than external 
channels within government agencies. They were also more likely to use external 
channels within government agencies than to blow the whistle in public. 
Table 5.1: Whistle-blowing intention on Case Scenario 1 to 6 
Case Scenario/ 
Channels 
Whistle-blowing intention 
Not likely Less likely Somewhat likely Very likely Total 
Destroying audit evidence 
Internal 14 4% 55 15% 149 41% 144 40% 362 
External 38 10% 82 23% 164 45% 70 19% 354 
Public 80 22% 113 31% 113 31% 47 13% 353 
Undisclosed audit finding 
Internal 22 6% 61 17% 173 48% 101 28% 357 
External 53 15% 87 24% 168 46% 49 14% 357 
Public 95 26% 99 27% 117 32% 42 12% 353 
Fictitious official travel expense 
Internal 21 6% 66 18% 174 48% 99 27% 360 
External 61 17% 113 31% 126 35% 59 16% 359 
Public 103 28% 99 27% 114 31% 42 12% 358 
Falsifying individual performance report 
Internal 26 7% 77 21% 161 44% 93 26% 357 
External 79 22% 95 26% 129 36% 53 15% 356 
Public 114 31% 91 25% 106 29% 43 12% 354 
Raising illegal fund from travel allowance for off-budget office expenses 
Internal 36 10% 87 24% 164 45% 71 20% 358 
External 87 24% 103 28% 130 36% 37 10% 357 
Public 126 35% 91 25% 106 29% 32 9% 355 
Falsifying organisational performance report 
Internal 39 11% 87 24% 164 45% 66 18% 356 
External 82 23% 111 31% 123 34% 39 11% 355 
Public 117 32% 97 27% 103 28% 37 10% 354 
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Respondents were more likely to blow the whistle in cases of an OCI (Case 
Scenarios 1, 2, 3 and 4) than for a CO (Case Scenarios 5 and 6). Respondents 
were also more likely to blow the whistle in cases of financial wrongdoings (Case 
Scenarios 1, 3 and 5) than non-financial wrongdoings (Case Scenarios 2, 4 and 6). 
In terms of the wrongdoers, respondents were more likely to blow the whistle on 
wrongdoing committed by a supervisor (Case Scenarios 1 and 2) than wrongdoing 
committed by their co-workers (Case Scenarios 3 and 4) or on auditors acting 
collusively (Case Scenarios 5 and 6).  
5.3 Independent Variables: Descriptive Analysis of Respondents’ Ethical 
Judgement Towards the Wrongdoing in the Case Scenarios 
Using the Multidimensional Ethics Scale (MES) instrument (Reidenbach & 
Robin, 1990), as summarised in Table 5.2, the respondents perceived Case 
Scenario 1 (destroying audit evidence) as the most unethical wrongdoing. This 
was followed by Case Scenario 3 (fictitious official travel expenses), Case 
Scenario 4 (falsifying individual performance reports), Case Scenario 2 
(undisclosed audit findings) and Case Scenario 6 (falsifying organisational 
performance reports). Case Scenario 5 (raising illegal funds from travel 
allowances for off-budget office expenses) was perceived as the least unethical 
wrongdoing.  
Table 5.2: Mean scores of respondents’ ethical judgement toward six case 
scenarios according to the type and the wrongdoer(s) 
Type Wrongdoer Financially related Non-Financially related 
Organisation 
of corrupt 
individuals 
(OCI) 
Supervisor/ 
managerial 
level 
Case Scenario 1: 
Destroying Audit 
Evidence 
3.75 
Case Scenario 2: 
Undisclosed Audit 
Finding 
3.42 
Co-worker Case Scenario 3: 
Fictitious official 
travel expense 
3.46 
Case Scenario 4: 
Falsifying Individual 
Performance Report 
3.46 
Corrupt 
organisation 
(CO) 
Collusive 
employees 
Case Scenario 5: 
Raising illegal fund 
from travel allowance 
for off-budget office 
expenses 
3.26 
Case Scenario 6: 
Falsifying 
organisation 
performance report 
3.32 
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This demonstrates that an OCI was seen in a more unethical light than a CO. In 
terms of the wrongdoer, acts of wrongdoing committed by employees acting 
collusively were seen as less unethical in comparison to wrongdoing committed 
by either co-workers or supervisors. 
5.4 Moderating Variables 
5.4.1 Descriptive Analysis of Perceived Seriousness of Wrongdoing in the 
Case Scenarios 
Seriousness of the wrongdoing in the case scenarios was measured by asking 
respondents to evaluate the six case scenarios and then select from the following 
levels of seriousness given as four-point Likert-type scales: ‘not at all serious’, 
‘less serious’, ‘somewhat serious’ and ‘very serious’. As shown in Table 5.3, Case 
Scenario 1 was the most serious of the six case scenarios. In general, an OCI was 
more serious than a CO.  
Table 5.3: Mean scores of seriousness of six case scenarios according to the 
type and the wrongdoer  
Type Wrongdoer Financially Related Wrongdoing 
Non-Financially Related 
Wrongdoing 
Organisation 
of corrupt 
individuals 
(OCI) 
Supervisor/ 
managerial 
level 
Case Scenario 1: 
Destroying Audit 
Evidence 
3.60 
(.691) 
Case Scenario 2: 
Undisclosed Audit 
Finding 
3.29 
(.685) 
Co-worker Case Scenario 3: 
Fictitious official 
travel expense 
3.18 
(.736) 
Case Scenario 4: 
Falsifying Individual 
Performance Report 
3.03 
(.740) 
Corrupt 
organisation 
(CO) 
Collusive 
employees 
Case Scenario 5: 
Raising illegal fund 
from travel allowance 
for off-budget office 
expenses 
3.10 
(.776) 
Case Scenario 6: 
Falsifying 
organisation 
performance report 
3.06 
(.743) 
 
In term of the wrongdoers, respondents perceived wrongdoing committed by their 
supervisor (Case Scenarios 1 and 2) as more serious than wrongdoing committed 
by their co-workers (Case Scenarios 3 and 4) or other employees acting 
collusively (Case Scenarios 5 and 6). The seriousness of financial wrongdoings 
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(Case Scenarios 1, 3, and 5) was also higher than non-financial wrongdoings 
(Case Scenarios 2, 4 and 6). 
5.4.2 Factor Analysis and Descriptive Analysis of Organisational 
Commitment 
Organisational commitment was measured using the organisational commitment 
questionnaire developed by Allen (1990) and Meyer et al. (1993). Three types of 
organisational commitment – affective, continuance and normative commitment –
emerged following the conducting of factor analysis. Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA) was used to extract factors (latent variables) from 18 
questionnaire items (observed variables). The steps taken in conducting PCA are 
given in Section 3.4.4.3. 
Procedures of Principal Component Analysis 
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy revealed a value 
of 0.841, greater than 0.50. This meant that the sample size was adequate for 
further analysis. Bartlett’s test revealed a Chi-square value of 2779.836 with 153 
degrees of freedom and a significance value of 0.000, which is less than 0.001. 
This means that the organisational commitment variables are sufficiently 
correlated. Factor analysis could therefore be conducted.  
However, not all individual communality coefficients, showing the percentage of 
the variance associated with each item, fell within the acceptable level (greater 
than 0.50). The communality coefficients of items AC2 (Affective Commitment 
item number 2) and NC1 (Normative Commitment item number 1) were 0.414 
and 0.471, respectively. The analysis yielded a four-factor solution with 
eigenvalues greater than 1.00, which together explained 62.28% of the variance in 
the data. However, the individual loading factor of item CC3 (Continuance 
Commitment item number 3) was 0.462, which is below the value of 0.50 
necessary for items to be considered sufficiently loaded. Thus, AC2, NC1 and 
CC3 were omitted and a second principle component analysis was conducted for 
the remaining 15 items. 
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In the second analysis, the individual communality coefficient of NC2 was 0.486 
which is below the acceptable level of 0.5. Moreover, the individual loading 
factor of AC1 was 0.454, also below the value of 0.50 required for items to be 
considered sufficiently loaded. Therefore, NC2 and AC1 were also omitted from 
the subsequent analysis. In the third analysis, the individual communality 
coefficient of CC1 was 0.306, which is below the acceptable level of 0.5. 
Therefore, CC1 was also omitted from the next analysis and a fourth principle 
component analysis was conducted on the remaining 12 items. 
In the fourth analysis, the KMO measure of sampling adequacy revealed a value 
of 0.805, with Bartlett’s test revealing a Chi-square value of 1887.821 with 66 
degrees of freedom and a significance value of 0.000. The analysis revealed a 
three-factor solution with eigenvalues of each factor greater than 1.00, loading 
factor exceeding the value of 0.5 and all three factors combined explaining 
67.78% of the variance in the data. The Cronbach’s alpha for all factors was 
0.000. The communalities were in the range of 0.512–0.840.  
Of the 12 items, four items loaded on Factor 1, four items on Factor 2 and four 
items on Factor 3. The first factor, consisting of normative commitment item 
numbers 3, 4, 5 and 6, had an eigenvalue of 3.630 and explained 30.250% of the 
variance. In line with the taxonomy of the originators, Factor 1 was named 
‘normative commitment’. The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of Factor 1 was 
0.836, considered good reliability. The second factor consisted of affective 
commitment item numbers 3, 4, 5 and 6. The eigenvalue of the second factor was 
3.019, explaining 25.160% of the variance. Factor 2 was named ‘affective 
commitment’. The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of Factor 2 was 0.837, considered 
good reliability. The third factor consisted of the four continuance commitment 
items of CC2, CC4, CC5 and CC6, with an eigenvalue of 1.484 and accounting 
for 12.369% of the variance in the data. In line with the taxonomy of the 
originators, Factor 3 was named ‘continuance commitment’. The Cronbach’s 
alpha coefficient of Factor 3 was 0.793, which is considered good reliability. 
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Table 5.4 displays the identified factors and their respective items, factor loadings, 
eigenvalues, percentages of variance explained, Cronbach’s alpha coefficients and 
communality coefficients. 
Table 5.4: Factor Structure of the Organisational Commitment 
No Question 
Factor 
Comm. 
1 2 3 
 Factor 1: Normative Commitment    
 
NC5 I would not leave my organisation right now 
because I have a sense of obligation to the 
people in it. 
.848   
.735 
NC4 This organisation deserves my loyalty. .800   .675 
NC3 I would feel guilty if I left my organisation 
now. 
.793   
.650 
NC6 I owe a great deal to my organisation. .752   .632 
 Factor 2: Affective Commitment    
 
AC4 I do not feel "emotionally attached" to this 
organisation 
 .908  
.839 
AC3 I do not feel like "part of the family" at my 
organisation. 
 .864  
.777 
AC6 I do not feel a strong sense of "belonging" to 
my organisation. 
 .830  
.716 
AC5 This organisation has a great deal of personal 
meaning for me 
 .600  
.538 
 Factor 3: Continuance Commitment    
 
CC4 I feel that I have too few options to consider 
leaving this organisation. 
  .867 .774 
CC5 One of the few negative consequences of 
leaving this organisation would be the scarcity 
of available alternatives 
  .849 .793 
CC6 If I had not already put so much of myself into 
this organisation, I might consider working 
elsewhere. 
  .720 .591 
CC2 Too much of my life would be disrupted if I 
decided I wanted to leave my organisation 
now 
  .637  
  Eigenvalues 3.630 3.019 1.484 
 
  Variance explained (%) 30.250 25.160 12.369 67.779 
  Cronbach alpha 0.834 0.837 0.793 0.764 
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Results of the Principal Component Analysis 
As shown in Table 5.5, of the three types of organisational commitment, 
‘Affective Commitment’ seems to be more salient as the reason for why 
respondents felt a bonding between them and their organisation and the perception 
of how they and the organisation linked together.  
Table 5.5: Mean Scores of Organisational Commitment 
Dimensions of Organisational Commitment Mean 
Factor 1: Normative Commitment  
4.61 Committed to organisation  due to feeling of guilty if  respondent leave the 
organisation, sense of obligation, owing to the organisation and because of their 
loyalty 
Factor 2: Affective Commitment 
5.19 Committed to organisation  due to the feeling of "emotionally attached", "part of 
the family" and strong sense of "belonging".  
Factor 3: Continuance Commitment 
4.50 Committed to organisation  due to the negative consequences of leaving the 
organisation and only having few option. 
The mean scores for ‘Normative Commitment’ and ‘Continuance Commitment’ 
were lower than ‘Affective Commitment’. This shows that loyalty and sense of 
obligation were also part of the reason why respondents were committed to their 
organisation. Respondents felt more ‘emotionally attached’, ‘part of the family’ 
and a strong sense of ‘belonging’. Respondents may not consider the relatively 
minimal benefits received in typical government agencies as a reason to leave the 
organisation. It also means that respondents may have other job options that they 
may ignore. Respondents, as educated and certified auditing professionals, may 
feel more confident and not afraid of losing their jobs in government agencies. 
They seem to be more ‘wanting to be’ in the organisation rather than ‘needing to 
be’ or ‘having to be’. In general, organisational commitment in research sites 
aligns with Indonesian culture (see Section 2.8.1). Indonesian culture is relatively 
high in in-group collectivism whereby employees value cohesiveness, loyalty and 
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pride in their organisation. Indonesians work and make personal sacrifices to meet 
group obligations in a cooperative and harmonious way.  
5.5 Control Variables  
5.5.1 Descriptive Analysis of Respondents’ Job Level 
In terms of job level, 58% of respondents were at senior auditor level. Detailed 
profiles of the respondents are presented in Table 5.6. 
Table 5.6: Job level of the respondents 
Profile Categories Frequency Percentage 
Junior Auditor:  team member level 151 41.37% 
Senior Auditor: team leader level, supervisor level, managerial level 213 58.36% 
Choose not to disclose 1 0.27% 
Total  365 100.00% 
 
5.5.2 Descriptive Analysis of Wrongdoer’s(s’) Power in the Case Scenarios  
The power status of wrongdoer(s) was measured by asking respondents to 
evaluate the six case scenarios. They were asked to choose the level of power of 
wrongdoer(s) using four-point Likert-type scales comprising ‘not at all powerful’, 
‘less powerful’, ‘somewhat powerful’ and ‘very powerful’.  
As described in Table 5.7, in general, wrongdoers with a higher hierarchical status 
were perceived as more powerful than those with a lower hierarchical status and 
collusive wrongdoers were also perceived as more powerful than single individual 
wrongdoers. The mean scores show that the top-level manager responsible for the 
audit assignment in Case Scenario 2 and the immediate supervisor in Case 
Scenario 1 were the most powerful wrongdoers in comparison to those in the 
other four case scenarios. Respondents perceived that the acts of wrongdoing 
committed collusively by co-workers and managerial-level officers in Case 
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Scenarios 5 and 6 were more powerful than those committed by one individual 
co-worker in Case Scenario 3 or by more than one co-worker in Case Scenario 4. 
Table 5.7: Mean scores of powers status of wrongdoer(s) in six case scenarios  
Type Wrongdoer Financially related Non-Financially related 
Organisation 
of corrupt 
individuals 
(OCI) 
Supervisor/ 
managerial 
level 
Case Scenario 1: 
Destroying Audit 
Evidence 
2.95  
Case Scenario 2: 
Undisclosed Audit 
Finding 
2.97  
Co-worker Case Scenario 3: 
Fictitious official 
travel expense 
2.39  
Case Scenario 4: 
Falsifying Individual 
Performance Report 
2.42 
Corrupt 
organisation 
(CO) 
Collusive 
employees 
Case Scenario 5: 
Raising illegal fund 
from travel allowance 
for off-budget office 
expenses 
2.66  
Case Scenario 6: 
Falsifying 
organisation 
performance report 
2.85  
 
5.5.3 Factor Analysis and Descriptive Analysis of Ethical Climate 
Using the Ethical Climate Questionnaire (ECQ) developed by Victor and Cullen 
(1988), ethical climate was measured to capture respondents’ perceptions of how 
they deal with the issues of ethics within their organisation. Instead of finding 
nine theoretical types of ethical climate, factor analysis of the ECQ revealed the 
existence of four types of ethical climate in GIAU, which were: 
- A mixture of Principle and Teamwork Orientation,  
- A mixture of Efficiency and Stakeholders Orientation,  
- Togetherness, and 
- Personal Self-Interest.  
The Principle–Teamwork Orientation was a type of ethical climate that combines: 
1) the rules, procedures, laws and professional ethics that are expected to be 
strictly followed and 2) the teamwork, cooperation and team spirit that are needed 
to develop in the organisation. The Efficiency–Stakeholders Orientation climate 
involved shared perception about the significance of conducting office activities 
efficiently whilst at the same time maintaining the best service to stakeholders. 
Personal Self-Interest was a type of climate in which employees protect their 
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personal interest above that of others and above organisational or broader 
considerations. Togetherness was a shared value in the organisation which views 
the importance of unity, cohesiveness, togetherness and caring and also takes 
employee welfare into consideration in terms of organisational decision-making. 
Detailed descriptions are presented in the following sections. 
5.5.3.1 Factor Structure of the Ethical Climate Questionnaire  
The ECQ was factor analysed using the steps described earlier in Section 3.4.4.3. 
The KMO value was 0.912, more than the value of 0.50. This means that the 
sample size is adequate for further analysis. The Chi-square value of Bartlett’s test 
was 4157.205 with 325 degrees of freedom and a significance value of p<0.001. 
This means that the items on the ethical climates questionnaire are sufficiently 
correlated. The ECQ was then considered appropriate for factor analysis and the 
study proceeded to the next steps. 
The first PCA revealed six extracted factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.00, 
explaining 63.204% of the total variance of the data. The individual loading 
factors of items EL4 and EL8 were 0.498 and 0.404, respectively, which is below 
the value of 0.50 for the items to be considered sufficiently loaded. Thus, EL4 and 
EL8 were omitted and a second analysis was conducted for the remaining 24 
items. The loading factor of BC23 in the second attempt was also less than 0.5 
and the item was thus omitted. Factor 5 generated in the second attempt was 
eliminated because it had only two items and thus the respective items – PI3 and 
PI10 – were deleted. In the third attempt, the individual communality coefficient 
of PL7 was 0.48, which is not acceptable as it is a score less than 0.5 and the item 
was thus deleted and a fourth attempt was conducted for the 20 remaining items.  
In the fourth analysis, the KMO value was 0.906, greater than the value of 0.50. 
The Chi-square value of Bartlett’s test was 3354.691 with 190 degrees of freedom 
and a significance value of p<0.001. The 20 ECQ items were then considered 
appropriate for analysis and the study thus proceeded to the next steps. The fourth 
analysis generated four factors that explained 61.975% of the variance of the data. 
The eigenvalue of each factor was higher than 1.00. All of the 20 items were 
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loaded above the value 0.50. The Cronbach’s alpha for all four factors was 0.809, 
which is greater than the acceptable value of 0.60. Across all items, the lowest 
communality coefficient was 0.504 and the highest was 0.715.  
Factor 1: Principle and Teamwork Climate 
Factor 1 comprised eight items encompassing the egoism, principal and 
benevolence types of ethical climate. The factor had an eigenvalue of 7.656 and 
explained 38.281% of the variance in the data. The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient 
of Factor 1 was 0.889, which is considered a good reliability. As shown in Table 
5.8, Factor 1 was loaded with eight items. These comprised one item of 
organisational interest (EL14), one item of friendship (BI26), two items of team 
interest (BL18 and BL25), one item of social responsibility (BC17), one item of 
company rules and procedure (PL12) and two items of laws and professional 
codes (PC13 and PC16). In line with the result of the factor analysis that put six 
theoretical types of ethical climate into one factor, Factor 1 was named ‘Principle 
and Teamwork Orientation’. 
Factor 2: Efficiency–Stakeholders Orientation Climate 
Factor 2 consisted of five items, had an eigenvalue of 2.132 and explained 
10.659% of the variance in the data. The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of Factor 2 
was 0.797, which is considered good reliability. This factor is also a mixed 
climate of efficiency, team interest and social responsibility. Therefore, in line 
with the name in the theoretical type of ethical climates, Factor 2 was named 
‘Efficiency–Stakeholders Orientation Climate’. 
Factor 3: Personal Self-Interest 
Factor 3 consisted of four items (EI22, EI9, EI1 and EC6), had an eigenvalue of 
1.517 and explained 10.659% of the variance in the data. The Cronbach’s alpha 
was 0.787, which is considered good reliability. This factor was dominated by the 
egoism-individual dimension. In line with the name in the theoretical type of 
ethical climate, Factor 3 was named ‘personal self-interest’.  
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Table 5.8: Factor Structure of the Ethical Climate 
No Question Factor 1 
Factor 
2 
Factor 
3 
Factor 
4 Comm. 
  
Factor 1: Principle - Teamwork 
Climate           
PC16 In this organisation, employees are 
expected to comply with their 
professional ethics. 
.760 
   
.669 
PL12 In a decision-making process, the 
first consideration is whether a 
decision violates any law. 
.756 
   
.606 
BI26 Good interpersonal contacts with 
other employees are considered to 
be very important in this 
organisation 
.739 
   
.645 
PC13 Employees are expected to comply 
with the law over and above other 
considerations. 
.735 
   
.626 
BL25 A good and broad cooperation 
among all employees is considered 
to be very important in this 
organisation 
.722 
   
.715 
BC17 It is expected here that employee 
will always do what is right for the 
stakeholders 
.648 
   
.554 
EL14 Employees here consider it is 
important that the stakeholder is 
satisfied and acknowledge that this 
organisation is better than other 
organisations that perform similar 
tasks  
.628 
   
.529 
BL18 Employee in this organisation view 
team spirit as important. .515 .509 
  
.583 
  Factor 2: Efficiency – 
Stakeholders Orientation Climate 
     
EC2 In this organisation, each employee 
is expected, above all, to work in an 
efficient way.  
.738 
  
.582 
EC15 The efficient way is always the 
right way in this organisation 
 
.623 
  
.556 
BC20 Employees in this organisation are 
actively concerned about the 
stakeholders they have direct 
contact with. 
 
.595 
  
.601 
BI5 In this organisation, our major 
concern is always what is best for 
the other employee (whether he or 
she is a colleague or not). 
 
.562 
  
.504 
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No Question Factor 1 
Factor 
2 
Factor 
3 
Factor 
4 Comm. 
BC19 Employee in this organisation have 
a strong sense of responsibility to 
the stakeholders  
.556 
  
.657 
  Factor 3: Personal Self-interest 
Climate 
     
EI22 Employees in this organisation are 
mostly concerned about what is 
best for themselves.   
.817 
 
.680 
EI9 In this organisation, employees 
protect their own personal interest 
above other considerations.   
.807 
 
.669 
EI1  In this organisation, employees are 
mostly out for themselves. 
  
.713 
 
.637 
PI6 There is no room for one’s own 
professional ethics or personal 
morals in this organisation   
.708 
 
.551 
  Factor 4: Togetherness Climate 
     
BI24 In a decision-making process, it is 
expected that each employee is 
cared for.    
.806 .704 
BL21 The most important concern is the 
good of all the employees in this 
organisation     
.744 .703 
BI11 What is best for each employee is 
the primary concern in this 
organisation    
.726 .624 
  Eigenvalues 7.656 2.132 1.517 1.090 
 
  Variance explained 38.281 10.659 7.583 5.451 
 
  Cronbach alpha 0.889 0.797 0.787 0.771 0.089 
Factor 4: Togetherness Climate 
Factor 4 consisted of 3 items (BI24, BL21 and BI1), had an eigenvalue of 1.090 
and explained 5.451% of the variance in the data. The Cronbach’s alpha was 
0.771, which is considered good reliability. This factor was the benevolence 
dimension in an individual and local context and was a theoretical combination of 
the self-interest and organisational interest climate types. For that reason, Factor 4 
was named ‘Togetherness’. 
As shown in Table 5.9, in general, the Principle–Teamwork Orientation was the 
dominant climate in seven GIAU, followed by the Efficiency–Stakeholders 
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Orientation and Togetherness climates, while the Personal Self-Interest climate 
was a less dominant climate. 
Table 5.9: Mean Scores of ethical climate in research sites 
Research Sites Principle - Teamwork 
Efficiency - 
Stakeholders 
Orientation 
Togetherness Personal Self-interest 
GIAU_A 4.84 (0.809) 4.31 (0.794) 4.15 (0.861) 2.89 (1.031) 
GIAU_B 4.59 (0.846) 4.13 (0.734) 3.48 (0.909) 3.07 (0.833) 
GIAU_C 4.77 (0.550) 4.39 (0.674) 3.88 (0.697) 2.78 (0.700) 
GIAU_D 4.92 (0.471) 4.22 (0.787) 3.81 (0.846) 2.99 (1.076) 
GIAU_E 5.06 (0.500) 4.51 (0.485) 3.94 (1.012) 2.69 (0.921) 
GIAU_F 4.70 (0.655) 4.13 (0.706) 4.12 (0.803) 3.29 (1.031) 
GIAU_G 4.65 (0.524) 4.10 (0.698) 3.83 (0.862) 3.38 (0.890) 
Grand Average 
(SD) 4.78 (0.676) 4.26 (0.724) 3.90 (0.872) 2.99 (0.948) 
5.5.3.2 Principle–Teamwork Climate 
This type of climate can be described as an ethical climate that promotes good 
teamwork and broad cooperation among all employees to collectively comply 
with the law and professional ethics in order to deliver the best service to 
stakeholders. The Principle–Teamwork Climate consists of six theoretical types of 
ethical climate: organisational interest, friendship, team interest, social 
responsibility, rules and procedure and laws and professional codes (see Section 
2.7.2.2). This shows how respondents may view the principle climate as being 
inseparable from personal contact and team spirit. The organisational principle 
states an expectation for rules and procedures and external principles such as laws 
and professional ethics to be strictly adhered to. At the same time, however, 
teamwork should not be sacrificed. 
The fact that 1) the research was conducted in government agencies and that 2) 
government internal auditors were selected as the respondents may provide one 
explanation of why these mixed types of ethical climate were found. It may link to 
the bureaucratic environment that urges employees not to violate any law in any 
activities. Moreover, as reflected in the definition of internal audit (see Section 
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2.8.2), the nature of the services provided by an internal audit unit relate to 
fulfilling the stakeholders’ interests. Internal audit units act to improve the 
organisation’s operation, preventing wrongdoing and providing insight and 
recommendations for managers and chief executives in government agencies. The 
auditors’ performance is measured and assessed based on stakeholders’ 
satisfaction level. Auditors were expected to provide high-quality services for the 
stakeholders and, in carrying out these duties, to always act in a way compliant 
with the law, rules, procedures and codes of conduct. They perceived it to be 
important for the stakeholder to be satisfied and to acknowledge that the internal 
audit unit is better than other organisations that perform similar tasks. Moreover, 
the organisational values of integrity were found and highly emphasised in all 
seven research sites. One of their organisational values is explicitly expressed that 
in delivering public service, employees must be free from corruption, collusion 
and nepotism. 
5.5.3.3 Efficiency–Stakeholders Orientation Climate 
As shown in Table 5.8, this ethical climate type comprises a mixture of the 
egoism (efficient) and benevolence dimensions in both an individual and 
cosmopolitan context (stakeholders’ interest). This may indicate that respondents 
perceive it to be important to work in an efficient way but that efficiency has to be 
well balanced with an effort to provide the best services to stakeholders. The 
Efficiency Orientation climate may be a common type of climate in government 
agencies as a result of the impact of budget constraints and financial performance 
policy. This finding corroborates the result of organisational culture assessment, 
particularly in the Criteria of Success dimension (see Section 5.7.6) that states that 
the success criteria for internal audit units are based on stakeholder satisfaction, 
employee development and efficiency rather than on providing a unique service or 
innovation. 
5.5.3.4 Togetherness Climate 
The togetherness climate may be a common type of climate in government 
agencies as an impact of continuing internalisation of ‘esprit de corps’ values such 
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as unity, cohesiveness and caring for each other. In the togetherness climate, 
respondents may have also identified the importance of considering employee’s 
welfare in the organisational decision-making process, indicated by the view that 
personal self-interest and organisational interest need to be well balanced. 
Referring to Indonesian culture that emphasises in-group collectivism (see Section 
2.8.1) and the clan type of organisational glue (see Section 5.7.4), the togetherness 
climate found in research sites confirmed that the employees working at the 
research sites were strongly integrated and preferred to work in cooperation. The 
culture of collectivism, cooperation and collaborative in the Indonesian context is 
known as rukun (live in harmony), gotong – royong (mutual assistance) or, in the 
context of the decision-making process, musyawarah (consensus) that reflects a 
personal obligation towards one’s community (Bowen, 1986).  
5.5.3.5 Personal Self-interest Climate 
The fact that this ethical climate existed in internal audit units does not mean that 
the organisation promotes this unfavourable counterproductive climate, since the 
protection of personal interest above other considerations is not compatible with 
the way internal audit units work with an emphasis on teamwork and placing the 
greatest priority on stakeholder interests. 
5.6 Moderated Multiple Regression Analysis 
The procedures used in conducting the moderated multiple regression analysis are 
described in Section 3.4.4. The results are presented in the following sections. 
5.6.1 Assumptions of Multiple Regression  
Linearity, homoscedasticity and multicollinearity were applied to check the 
assumptions of multiple regressions. Multiple regressions require no perfect linear 
relationship between two or more predictors in a model. Perfect collinearity exists 
when at least one predictor is a perfect linear combination of the others (Field, 
2009). Utilising Spearman’s rank correlation matrices for each of the 12 models, 
relations of .80 or greater were not detected. Further tests were conducted by 
examining the variables’ tolerance scores and variance inflation factor (VIF) 
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scores. All of the models had independent variables with tolerance scores above 
the cut-off point of .10 and VIF scores of less than 10. This indicates the absence 
of serious multicollinearity. Therefore, these variables were retained for analysis. 
In multiple regression analysis, the variance of the residual terms is assumed to be 
constant or to have the same variance (homoscedasticity) and the relationship in 
the models is a linear one. When the variances are very unequal, there is said to be 
heteroscedasticity. Graphical examination of residual scatterplots for each model 
showed acceptance of the multiple regression assumptions. The scatterplot for 
each model showed a random array of dots dispersed around zero. There was no 
sort of curve in the graphs. This pattern is indicative of a situation in which the 
assumptions of linearity and homoscedasticity have been met (Field, 2009).Field 
(2009) suggested that, in conducting multiple regression, the residual terms for 
any two observations should be unrelated (or independent). This is described as a 
lack of auto-relation. Using the Durbin-Watson test for each of the 72 models of 
multiple regression analysis (6 scenarios, 3 whistleblowing channels and 4 
moderating variables); the results showed that the Durbin-Watson test statistic 
varied between 1.762 and 2.127, which is around a value of 2. A value greater 
than 2 indicates a negative relation between residuals, whereas a value lowers than 
2 indicate a positive relation. The Durbin-Watson test result indicates that the 
residuals are unrelated.  
To test the normality of residuals, the histogram and normal probability plot were 
examined. The histogram has the appearance of a normal distribution (i.e. a bell-
shaped curve) and the normal probability plot shows that the data exhibit slight 
deviation from normality. Therefore, the distribution is considered roughly 
normal. Graphical observation of the histograms and normal probability plots was 
conducted for all 12 models, and the assumption of normality was met. 
5.6.2 Mode1 1: Ethical Judgement, Seriousness of Wrongdoing and 
Whistle-blowing Intention 
In at least one out of the six case scenarios, moderated multiple regression 
analysis results show that whistle-blowing intention became higher when the 
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ethical judgement about the wrongdoing rose. Ethical judgement made a 
significant contribution to explaining the variance for internal, external and public 
whistle-blowing. The seriousness of wrongdoing significantly moderated the 
effects of ethical judgement on whistle-blowing intentions. Thus, hypotheses 1 
and 2 were supported. These results indicate that the relationships between ethical 
judgement and whistle-blowing intention were positive and stronger in employees 
who were intolerant of corruption, were sensitive to and had a higher perception 
of the seriousness of wrongdoing.  
The perceived seriousness of wrongdoing added significant incremental variance 
to the internal whistle-blowing intention. This was seen in Case Scenarios 1, 3 and 
5 (see Table 5.10), for external whistle-blowing in Case Scenarios 4 and 5 (see 
Table 5.11) and for public whistle-blowing in Case Scenarios 1, 3, 4 and 5 (see 
Table 5.12). However, the perceived seriousness of wrongdoing did not 
significantly moderate the effect of ethical judgement on internal whistle-blowing 
intention in Case Scenarios 2 (undisclosed audit finding), 4 (falsifying individual 
performance report) and 6 (falsifying organisational performance report). Neither 
did the perceived seriousness of wrongdoing significantly moderate the effect of 
ethical judgement on external and public whistle-blowing intentions in Case 
Scenarios 2 and 6. The fact that those case scenarios are non-financial 
wrongdoing scenarios may have contributed to the respondents’ perceptions. The 
acts of wrongdoing were perceived as somewhat wrong (see Section 5.3) and 
somewhat serious (see Section 5.4.1), and the interaction of perceived 
wrongfulness and seriousness of the wrongdoing did not influence the intention to 
blow the whistle internally and publicly in Case Scenarios 2, 4 and 6.  
The results of simple slopes analysis confirmed all significant interactions of 
ethical judgement and whistle-blowing intention derived from the regression 
analyses (see Table 5.13). Figure 5.2 shows the pattern of the moderating effect of 
perceived seriousness on the interaction of ethical judgement and whistle-blowing 
intention. Detailed results of analysis of the statistics are given in Appendix 4. 
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Table 5.10: Results of moderated multiple regression analysis for the 
moderating effects of seriousness of wrongdoing on internal whistle-blowing 
Step Variables 
Case Scenario 1 Case Scenario 2 
 R2 Delta R2  R2 Delta R2 
1 Nine control 
variables  
 
0.066  0.066  **   0.040  0.040  
 
2 Ethical judgement (EJ) 0.326  0.157  0.092  * 0.326  0.189  0.149  * 
3 Seriousness of 
wrongdoing (SW) 0.110  0.165  0.008  *** 0.161  0.208  0.019  * 
4 Interaction of EJ 
and SW 0.099  0.172  0.007  *** -0.069  0.213  0.005   
  F value 5.889      * 7.559      * 
 
Step Variables 
Case Scenario 3 Case Scenario 4 
 R2 Delta R2  R2 Delta R2 
1 Nine control 
variables    0.095  0.095  * 
 
0.112  0.112  * 
2 Ethical judgement (EJ) 0.427  0.312  0.217  * 0.231  0.296  0.184  * 
3 Seriousness of 
wrongdoing (SW) 0.170  0.330  0.018  * 0.415  0.395  0.099  * 
4 Interaction of EJ 
and SW 0.096  0.338  0.007  *** 0.065  0.398  0.004   
  F value 14.490      * 18.658      * 
 
Step  Variables 
Case Scenario 5 Case Scenario 6 
 R2 Delta R2  R2 Delta R2 
1 Nine control 
variables    0.126  0.126  *   0.088  0.088  * 
2 Ethical judgement (EJ) 0.415  0.388  0.262  * 0.333  0.320  0.233  * 
3 Seriousness of 
wrongdoing (SW) 0.293  0.422  0.034  * 0.337  0.381  0.060  * 
4 Interaction of EJ 
and SW 0.152  0.441  0.019  * 0.061  0.384  0.003   
  F value 22.172      * 17.574      * 
Note: * p < .01; ** p < .05; ***p< .1; †p >= .1 
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Table 5.11: Results of moderated multiple regression analysis for the 
moderating effects of seriousness of wrongdoing on external whistle-blowing 
Step Variables 
Case Scenario 1 Case Scenario 2 
 R2 Delta R2  R2 Delta R2 
1 Nine control 
variables  0.085 0.085 * 0.091 0.091 * 
2 Ethical judgement (EJ) 0.245 0.138 0.053 * 0.282 0.201 0.109 * 
3 
Seriousness of 
wrongdoing 
(SW) 0.087 0.143 0.005  0.140 0.214 0.013 ** 
4 Interaction of EJ 
and SW 0.074 0.146 0.004  0.029 0.215 0.001  
  F value 4.755 * 7.649 * 
 
Step Variables 
CaseScenario3 CaseScenario4 
 R2 DeltaR2  R2 DeltaR2 
1 Nine control 
variables  0.117 0.117 * 0.158 0.162 0.162 * 
2 Ethical judgement (EJ) 0.274 0.225 0.108 * 0.202 0.245 0.083 * 
3 
Seriousness of 
wrongdoing 
(SW) 0.168 0.242 0.017 ** 
0.229 
0.274 0.029 * 
4 Interaction of EJ 
and SW 0.078 0.247 0.005  0.099 0.283 0.008 ** 
  F value 9.288 * 11.078 * 
 
Step Variables 
CaseScenario5 CaseScenario6 
 R2 DeltaR2  R2 DeltaR2 
1 Nine control 
variables  0.068 0.170 0.170 * -0.037 0.085 0.085 * 
2 Ethical judgement (EJ) 0.285 0.305 0.136 * 0.275 0.213 0.128 * 
3 
Seriousness of 
wrongdoing 
(SW) 0.239 0.328 0.023 * 0.196 0.233 0.020 ** 
4 Interaction of EJ 
and SW 0.120 0.340 0.012 ** 0.036 0.234 0.001  
  F value 14.382      * 8.585      * 
Note: * p < .01; ** p < .05; ***p< .1; †p >= .1 
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Table 5.12: Results of moderated multiple regression analysis for the 
moderating effects of seriousness of wrongdoing on public whistle-blowing 
Step Variables 
Case Scenario 1 Case Scenario 2 
 R2 Delta R2  R2 Delta R2 
1 Nine control 
variables    0.049  0.049  **   0.069  0.069  ** 
2 Ethical judgement (EJ) 0.165  0.062  0.013  ** 0.304  0.161  0.092  * 
3 Seriousness of 
wrongdoing (SW) 0.077  0.064  0.002   0.028  0.161  0.000   
4 Interaction of EJ 
and SW 0.166  0.083  0.019  *** 0.019  0.162  0.000   
  F value 2.489      * 5.329      * 
 
Step Variables 
Case Scenario 3 Case Scenario 4 
 R2 Delta R2  R2 Delta R2 
1 Nine control 
variables    0.085  0.085  *   0.094  0.094  * 
2 Ethical judgement (EJ) 0.288  0.151  0.066  * 0.200  0.158  0.063  * 
3 Seriousness of 
wrongdoing (SW) 0.050  0.153  0.002   0.161  0.172  0.014  ** 
4 Interaction of EJ 
and SW 0.119  0.164  0.011  ** 0.089  0.179  0.007  *** 
  F value 5.547      * 6.085      * 
 
Step Variables 
Case Scenario 5 Case Scenario 6 
 R2 Delta R2  R2 Delta R2 
1 Nine control 
variables    0.117  0.117  *   0.063  0.063  ** 
2 Ethical judgement (EJ) 0.343  0.234  0.117  * 0.295  0.173  0.110  * 
3 Seriousness of 
wrongdoing (SW) 0.078  0.236  0.002   0.124  0.181  0.008  *** 
4 Interaction of EJ 
and SW 0.088  0.242  0.006  *** 0.051  0.184  0.002   
  F value 8.898      * 6.300      * 
Note: * p < .01; ** p < .05; ***p< .1; †p >= .1 
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Table 5.13: Effect of ethical judgement and perceived seriousness on internal 
whistle-blowing intentions (simple slopes analysis) 
 SE t  SE t 
Internal whistle-blowing Case Scenario 1 Case Scenario 2 
High level seriousness        0.82         0.18         4.60          0.40         0.12         3.28  
Medium level seriousness        0.67         0.12         5.49          0.51         0.09         5.68  
Low level seriousness        0.52         0.12         4.38          0.62         0.12         5.21  
 Case Scenario 3    Case Scenario 4  
High level seriousness        0.78         0.13         5.82          0.47         0.12         3.78  
Medium level seriousness        0.65         0.09         6.81          0.38         0.09         4.01  
Low level seriousness        0.51         0.09         5.44          0.29         0.10         2.84  
 Case Scenario 5    Case Scenario 6  
High level seriousness        0.72         0.10         7.50          0.59         0.11         5.12  
Medium level seriousness        0.56         0.08         7.28          0.51         0.09         5.75  
Low level seriousness        0.41         0.08         4.83          0.44         0.09         4.66  
External whistle-blowing  Case Scenario 1    Case Scenario 2  
High level seriousness        0.67         0.20         3.39          0.53         0.13         4.00  
Medium level seriousness        0.55         0.14         4.05          0.48         0.10         4.80  
Low level seriousness        0.44         0.13         3.39          0.43         0.13         3.23  
 Case Scenario 3    Case Scenario 4  
High level seriousness        0.60         0.17         3.63          0.54         0.16         3.46  
Medium level seriousness        0.48         0.12         4.05          0.38         0.12         3.22  
Low level seriousness        0.36         0.12         3.01          0.22         0.13         1.75  
 Case Scenario 5    Case Scenario 6  
High level seriousness        0.56         0.11         4.95          0.50         0.14         3.62  
Medium level seriousness        0.42         0.09         4.69          0.46         0.11         4.16  
Low level seriousness        0.28         0.10         2.92          0.41         0.12         3.53  
Public whistle-blowing  Case Scenario 1    Case Scenario 2  
High level seriousness        0.69         0.22         3.10          0.61         0.15         4.08  
Medium level seriousness        0.41         0.16         2.63          0.57         0.11         5.18  
Low level seriousness        0.13         0.15         0.89  †        0.53         0.15         3.59  
 Case Scenario 3   Case Scenario 4  
High level seriousness        0.72         0.18         3.95          0.54         0.17         3.12  
Medium level seriousness        0.53         0.13         4.04          0.39         0.13         3.00  
Low level seriousness        0.33         0.13         2.54          0.25         0.14         1.77  
 Case Scenario 5    Case Scenario 6  
High level seriousness        0.63         0.13         5.05          0.59         0.15         3.87  
Medium level seriousness        0.53         0.10         5.29          0.52         0.12         4.36  
Low level seriousness        0.42         0.11         3.90          0.45         0.12         3.58  
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Figure 5.2: Plot of interaction effect of ethical judgement and perceived 
seriousness on whistle-blowing intentions  
Case Scenario 1 Case Scenario 2 
Internal whistle-blowing *** Internal whistle-blowing  
 
External whistle-blowing  External whistle-blowing  
 
Public whistle-blowing *** Public whistle-blowing  
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Case Scenario 3 Case Scenario 4 
Internal whistle-blowing *** Internal whistle-blowing  
 
External whistle-blowing  External whistle-blowing ** 
 
Public whistle-blowing ** Public whistle-blowing *** 
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Case Scenario 5 Case Scenario 6 
Internal whistle-blowing * Internal whistle-blowing  
 
External whistle-blowing ** External whistle-blowing  
 
Public whistle-blowing *** Public whistle-blowing  
 
Note: * p < .01; ** p < .05; ***p< .1; †p >= .1 
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5.6.3 Model 2: Ethical Judgement, Organisational Commitment and 
Whistle-blowing Intention 
Neither affective commitment nor normative commitment significantly moderated 
the effect of ethical judgement on internal, external and public whistle-blowing in 
all six case scenarios. This indicates that the relationship between ethical 
judgement and whistle-blowing intention was dependent on neither affective 
commitment nor normative commitment. Therefore, hypotheses H3a and H3c 
were not supported. 
However, continuance commitment did significantly moderate the effect of ethical 
judgement on the intention to blow the whistle internally in Case Scenario 1 (see 
Table 5.14), externally in Case Scenarios 3 and 6 (see Table 5.15) and for public 
whistle-blowing, also in Case Scenarios 3 and 6 (see Table 5.16). This indicates 
that the relationship between ethical judgement and whistle-blowing intention was 
stronger and positive at the higher level of continuance commitment than at the 
lower level. When ethical judgement is high, employees with high continuance 
commitment will be more likely to blow the whistle. Therefore, hypothesis H3b 
was supported. 
The results from simple slopes analysis confirmed all of the significant 
interactions of ethical judgement and whistle-blowing intention derived from the 
regression analyses (see Table 5.17). Figure 5.3 shows the pattern of the 
moderating effect of continuance commitment on the interaction of ethical 
judgement and whistle-blowing intention. The detailed results of the statistics 
analysis are in Appendix 4. 
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Table 5.14: Results of moderated multiple regression analysis for the 
moderating effects of continuance commitment on internal whistle-blowing 
Step Variables 
Case Scenario 1 Case Scenario 2 
 R2 Delta R2  R2 Delta R2 
1 Nine control variables    0.096  0.096  * 0.167  0.133  0.133  * 
2 Ethical judgement (EJ) 0.290  0.164  0.069  * 0.326  0.207  0.075  * 
3 Continuance 
commitment (CC) -0.034  0.165  0.001   0.031  0.208  0.001   
4 Interaction of EJ and CC 0.103  0.175  0.010  ** 0.018  0.208  0.000   
  F value 6.012      * 7.364      * 
 
Step Variables 
Case Scenario 3 Case Scenario 4 
 R2 Delta R2  R2 Delta R2 
1 Nine control variables    0.250  0.250  * 0.411  0.364  0.364  * 
2 Ethical judgement (EJ) 0.396  0.330  0.080  * 0.213  0.390  0.026  * 
3 Continuance 
commitment (CC) -0.014  0.330  0.000   -0.076  0.395  0.005  *** 
4 Interaction of EJ and CC 0.045  0.332  0.002   -0.002  0.395  0.000   
  F value 14.127      * 18.376      * 
 
Step Variables 
Case Scenario 5 Case Scenario 6 
 R2 Delta R2  R2 Delta R2 
1 Nine control variables    0.343  0.343  * 0.331  0.322  0.322  * 
2 Ethical judgement (EJ) 0.387  0.422  0.079  * 0.319  0.379  0.058  * 
3 Continuance 
commitment (CC) -0.013  0.422  0.000   -0.047  0.381  0.002   
4 Interaction of EJ and CC 0.023  0.422  0.001   0.036  0.382  0.001   
  F value 20.530      * 17.420      * 
Note: * p < .01; ** p < .05; ***p< .1; †p >= .1 
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Table 5.15: Results of moderated multiple regression analysis for the 
moderating effects of continuance commitment on external whistle-blowing 
Step Variables 
Case Scenario 1 Case Scenario 2 
 R2 Delta R2  R2 Delta R2 
1 Nine control variables    0.105  0.105  * 0.140  0.157  0.157  * 
2 Ethical judgement (EJ) 0.216  0.143  0.038  * 0.282  0.213  0.056  * 
3 Continuance 
commitment (CC) 0.011  0.143  0.000   0.014  0.214  0.000   
4 Interaction of EJ and CC -0.036  0.144  0.001   0.039  0.215  0.001   
  F value 4.660      * 7.676      * 
 
Step Variables 
Case Scenario 3 Case Scenario 4 
 R2 Delta R2  R2 Delta R2 
1 Nine control variables    0.211  0.211  * 0.221  0.251  0.251  * 
2 Ethical judgement (EJ) 0.263  0.242  0.031  * 0.182  0.269  0.018  * 
3 Continuance 
commitment (CC) -0.031  0.242  0.000   -0.084  0.274  0.005   
4 Interaction of EJ and CC 0.089  0.249  0.007  ** 0.058  0.278  0.003   
  F value 9.393      * 10.792      * 
 
Step Variables 
Case Scenario 5 Case Scenario 6 
 R2 Delta R2  R2 Delta R2 
1 Nine control variables    0.291  0.291  * 0.182  0.193  0.193  * 
2 Ethical judgement (EJ) 0.266  0.328  0.037  * 0.272  0.233  0.040  * 
3 Continuance 
commitment (CC) 0.008  0.328  0.000   0.001  0.233  0.000   
4 Interaction of EJ and CC 0.040  0.329  0.001   0.090  0.240  0.007  *** 
  F value 13.712      * 8.888      * 
Note: * p < .01; ** p < .05; ***p< .1; †p >= .1 
 
  
191 
Table 5.16: Results of moderated multiple regression analysis for the 
moderating effects of continuance commitment on public whistle-blowing 
Step Variables 
Case Scenario 1 Case Scenario 2 
 R2 Delta R2  R2 Delta R2 
1 Nine control variables    0.053  0.053  ** 0.028  0.095  0.095  * 
2 Ethical judgement (EJ) 0.100  0.061  0.009  *** 0.304  0.160  0.065  * 
3 Continuance 
commitment (CC) -0.051  0.064  0.002   0.026  0.161  0.001   
4 Interaction of EJ and CC -0.027  0.064  0.001   0.026  0.162  0.001   
  F value 1.904      * 5.340      * 
 
Step Variables 
Case Scenario 3 Case Scenario 4 
 R2 Delta R2  R2 Delta R2 
1 Nine control variables    0.121  0.121  * 0.155  0.154  0.154  * 
2 Ethical judgement (EJ) 0.258  0.152  0.031  * 0.181  0.172  0.018  * 
3 Continuance 
commitment (CC) 0.016  0.153  0.001   
-
0.031  0.172  0.001   
4 Interaction of EJ and CC 0.088  0.160  0.007  *** 0.047  0.174  0.002   
  F value 5.368      * 5.890      * 
 
Step Variables 
Case Scenario 5 Case Scenario 6 
 R2 Delta R2  R2 Delta R2 
1 Nine control variables    0.178  0.178  * 0.108  0.136  0.136  * 
2 Ethical judgement (EJ) 0.328  0.235  0.057  * 0.288  0.180  0.044  * 
3 Continuance 
commitment (CC) 0.027  0.236  0.001   0.025  0.181  0.001   
4 Interaction of EJ and CC 0.022  0.236  0.000   0.096  0.190  0.009  *** 
  F value 8.608      * 6.566      * 
Note: * p < .01; ** p < .05; ***p< .1; †p >= .1 
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Table 5.17: Effects of ethical judgement and continuance commitment (cc) on 
internal whistle-blowing intentions (simple slopes analysis) 
 SE t  SE t 
Internal whistle-blowing Case Scenario 1 Case Scenario 2 
High level cc 0.79 0.15 5.30  0.53 0.12 4.63 
Medium level cc 0.60 0.11 5.32  0.51 0.09 5.65 
Low level cc 0.40 0.15 2.74  0.48 0.12 4.11 
Case Scenario 3   Case Scenario 4  
High level cc 0.66 0.12 5.36  0.35 0.12 2.97 
Medium level cc 0.60 0.09 6.46  0.35 0.09 3.81 
Low level cc 0.53 0.10 5.18  0.35 0.11 3.25 
Case Scenario 5   Case Scenario 6  
High level cc 0.56 0.10 5.74  0.54 0.11 5.04 
Medium level cc 0.53 0.08 6.80  0.49 0.09 5.61 
Low level cc 0.50 0.09 5.47  0.44 0.10 4.25 
External whistle-blowing Case Scenario 1   Case Scenario 2  
High level cc 0.41 0.17 2.45  0.54 0.12 4.33 
Medium level cc 0.48 0.13 3.83  0.48 0.10 4.90 
Low level cc 0.55 0.16 3.37  0.42 0.13 3.26 
Case Scenario 3   Case Scenario 4  
High level cc 0.60 0.15 3.97  0.44 0.15 3.02 
Medium level cc 0.46 0.11 4.01  0.34 0.12 2.96 
Low level cc 0.31 0.13 2.47  0.24 0.14 1.76 
Case Scenario 5   Case Scenario 6  
High level cc 0.44 0.11 3.92  0.57 0.13 4.49 
Medium level cc 0.39 0.09 4.31  0.45 0.10 4.27 
Low level cc 0.34 0.11 3.17  0.32 0.12 2.56 
Public whistle-blowing Case Scenario 1  Case Scenario 2  
High level cc 0.18 0.19 0.97 † 0.61 0.14 4.31 
Medium level cc 0.24 0.14 1.70  0.57 0.11 5.09 
Low level cc 0.30 0.19 1.62 † 0.52 0.15 3.57 
Case Scenario 3  Case Scenario 4  
High level cc 0.62 0.17 3.68  0.44 0.16 2.68 
Medium level cc 0.47 0.13 3.73  0.35 0.13 2.76 
Low level cc 0.32 0.14 2.29  0.27 0.15 1.77 
Case Scenario 5   Case Scenario 6  
High level cc 0.54 0.13 4.23  0.64 0.14 4.61 
Medium level cc 0.51 0.10 4.98  0.50 0.11 4.37 
Low level cc 0.47 0.12 3.99  0.35 0.14 2.61 
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Figure 5.3: Plot of interaction effect of ethical judgement and continuance 
commitment on whistle-blowing intentions 
Case Scenario 1 Case Scenario 2 
Internal whistle-blowing ** Internal whistle-blowing  
 
External whistle-blowing  External whistle-blowing  
  
Public whistle-blowing  Public whistle-blowing 
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Case Scenario 3 Case Scenario 4 
Internal whistle-blowing Internal whistle-blowing  
  
External whistle-blowing ** External whistle-blowing  
  
Public whistle-blowing *** Public whistle-blowing  
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Case Scenario 5 Case Scenario 6 
Internal whistle-blowing  Internal whistle-blowing  
  
External whistle-blowing  External whistle-blowing *** 
  
Public whistle-blowing  Public whistle-blowing *** 
  
Note: * p < .01; ** p < .05; ***p< .1; †p >= .1 
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5.7 Supporting Analysis: Organisational Culture Profiles in Research 
Sites 
As government officers, internal auditors are bound to government regulations 
regarding confidentiality, loyalty, obedience, reporting to superiors and 
prioritising the national interest. The government agencies where they worked 
also stated their formal written values. The values of integrity, professionalism, 
responsibility and excellent service are given as formal written values in most of 
the government agencies. The values of synergy, partnership and teamwork are 
also part of these formal written values.  
Specific measurements were conducted of the organisational culture in the GIAU 
using the Organisational Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI) (Cameron & 
Quinn, 2011). As shown in Table 5.18, the overall assessment of organisational 
culture shows the Hierarchy and Market cultures to be more salient for the 
government internal audit units. However, looking at each of the six items, the 
culture types are a combination of the Hierarchy, Market and Clan cultures. The 
GIAU are formalised, results-oriented and structured organisations that place an 
emphasis on efficiency, control and smooth operation. The organisations were not 
personal or dynamic, entrepreneurial places. Organisational leadership at the 
research sites was the combination of a results-oriented leader, coordinator and 
organiser. The leaders were neither risk takers nor entrepreneurs. The 
management of employees was emphasised along with job security and 
conformity with the rules in recruitment, promotion, demotion, transfer or 
training. The organisational glue binding the internal audit units comprised their 
formal rules and policies and the esprit de corps and status associated with being a 
civil servant. The organisations measured success in terms of stakeholder 
satisfaction, employee development and efficiency rather than by having the most 
unique services or innovation. 
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Table 5.18 Mean score (SD) of organisational culture in research sites 
Research Sites Clan Adhocracy Market Hierarchy 
GIAU_A 24.62 (4.54) 19.19 (4.75) 28.13 (5.66) 28.07 (7.26) 
GIAU_B 24.06 (5.21) 19.73 (4.47) 28.21 (5.43) 27.99 (5.25) 
GIAU_C 25.56 (4.85) 20.89 (4.81) 26.12 (4.45) 27.43 (4.95) 
GIAU_D 24.43 (6.39) 19.26 (4.71) 27.97 (7.03) 28.36 (9.86) 
GIAU_E 24.18 (3.98) 19.21 (3.95) 28.78 (4.58) 27.83 (4.99) 
GIAU_F 26.68 (6.53) 19.21 (6.94) 26.39 (6.35) 27.73 (5.91) 
GIAU_G 24.13 (4.26) 21.17 (5.83) 27.97 (4.82) 26.73 (5.66) 
Grand Average 
(SD) 24.83 (5.20) 19.77 (5.09) 27.61 (5.58) 27.79 (6.50) 
 
5.7.1 Dominant Characteristics  
As shown in Table 5.19, the dominant characteristics of the research sites were 
similar, as they were inclined towards the Market and Hierarchy cultures. This 
indicates that GIAU were characterised as very formalised and structured places 
to work and as results-oriented organisations rather than as personal or dynamic, 
entrepreneurial places. The implementation of performance management such as 
the Annual Audit Program and Government Agency Accountability System at the 
organisational level and Employee Performance Objective at the individual level 
may explain why respondents perceived the internal audit units to be 
organisations oriented towards achievement and ‘getting the job done’ oriented. 
The requirement to publish audit reports promptly may also contribute to this 
perception.  
Internal audit is a type of work that requires employees to strictly follow the audit 
objective, audit procedures and hierarchical reviews involving sensitive financial 
information or government operation. Therefore, respondents also perceived the 
organisations to be controlled and structured places guided by formal procedures. 
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Table 5.19 Mean scores (SD) of dominant characteristics in Government 
Internal Audit Units 
Dominant Characteristics 
Government Internal Audit Units 
A B C D E F G Avg 
A very personal place. It is like 
an extended family. People 
seem to share a lot of 
themselves. 
24 23 22 24 25 26 20 23 
(9.9) (9.7) (8.2) (12.7) (9.0) (14.9) (9.2) (10.6) 
A very dynamic entrepreneurial 
place. People are willing to 
stick out their necks and take 
risks. 
15 18 16 15 14 16 20 16 
(5.9) (7.9) (8.2) (6.9) (5.1) (7.6) (10.9) (7.6) 
A very results-oriented. A 
major concern is getting the job 
done. People are very 
competitive and achievement-
oriented. 
34 32 33 31 33 31 31 32 
(11.6) (11.5) (11.6) (11.8) (10.3) (14.2) (11.2) (11.8) 
A very controlled and 
structured place. Formal 
procedures generally govern 
what people do. 
27 27 29 30 28 27 29 28 
(10.4) (11.0) (10.4) (14.1) (10.6) (12.4) (13.8) (11.6) 
 
5.7.2 Organisational Leadership 
Organisational leadership in the research sites was inclined towards the Market 
and Hierarchy cultures. As described in Table 5.20, the average scores were 29 
and 30 for each of the Market and Hierarchy cultures, respectively. This indicates 
that leadership in the internal audit units was a combination of 1) an aggressive, 
results-oriented leader and 2) a coordinator and organiser but not a risk taker or 
entrepreneur. These types of leadership were needed to manage the organisational 
performance, to meet the demand for prompt publication of audit reports and to 
enforce the rules and procedures used when conducting the audit.  
The clan type of leadership also existed alongside the results-oriented leadership 
in the organisation. Employees perceived their leaders as parent figures carrying 
out mentoring, facilitating or nurturing roles. In conducting an audit, the audit 
team leaders at various levels have a duty to properly supervise their audit staff 
and/or inexperienced junior auditors. 
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Table 5.20 Mean Scores (SD) of organisational leadership in Government 
Internal Audit Units 
Organisational Leadership 
Government Internal Audit Units 
A B C D E F G Avg 
Exemplify mentoring, 
facilitating, or nurturing. 
24 20 24 21 22 24 20 22 
(8.8) (7.2) (7.0) (7.8) (5.6) (10.3) (9.7) (8.3) 
Exemplify entrepreneurship, 
innovation, or risk taking. 
18 19 21 19 18 17 21 19 
(8.2) (7.0) (10.1) (7.1) (7.9) (9.1) (9.8) (8.6) 
Exemplify a no-nonsense, 
aggressive, results-oriented 
focus. 
29 30 28 28 29 28 29 29 
(10.8) (8.2) (9.6) (8.7) (8.8) (11.1) (9.4) (9.7) 
Exemplify coordinating, 
organizing, or smooth-
running efficiency 
29 31 27 31 31 30 30 30 
(10.8) (10.3) (8.6) (11.6) (11.0) (10.3) (12.0) (10.6) 
 
5.7.3 Management of Employees 
As shown in Table 5.21, the average scores for the Hierarchy, Clan and Market 
cultures were similar, at 27, 27 and 26, respectively.  
Table 5.21: Mean scores (SD) of management of employees in Government 
Internal Audit Units 
Management of Employees 
Government Internal Audit Units 
A B C D E F G Avg 
Teamwork, consensus, and 
participation. 
23 29 27 26 29 31 28 27 
(7.4) (8.8) (8.6) (7.8) (11.7) (10.9) (11.6) (9.5) 
Individual risk taking, 
innovation, freedom, and 
uniqueness. 
19 19 22 20 18 20 21 20 
(7.6) (6.8) (8.3) (7.9) (7.1) (11.2) (7.8) (8.1) 
Hard-driving competitiveness, 
high demands, and 
achievement. 
27 25 24 26 26 24 27 26 
(9.6) (8.8) (8.5) (10.2) (9.4) (9.8) (9.2) (9.4) 
Security of employment, 
conformity, predictability, and 
stability in relationships. 
30 28 27 29 26 25 23 27 
(10.4) (11.1) (8.4) (13.2) (8.2) (11.8) (9.4) (10.6) 
The high demand and achievement style of managing employees may be the 
consequence of implementing the individual performance management. Auditors’ 
performance was measured and assessed based on their own individual output and 
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the quality of their audit reports. The auditor performance allowance was 
computed based on their individual performance score. The performance score 
also determines whether or not an auditor can be promoted to a higher position. 
The system may force an auditor to not only conform to the rules but also to 
uphold teamwork and togetherness. The Market culture in managing employees 
was corroborated by the Performance orientation dimension in the Globe study 
(see Section 2.8.1), indicating that Indonesian people both value and are highly 
reward for individual performance. 
The management of employees at research sites is influenced by the fact that they 
are part of government agencies that are bound by civil servant regulation. Job 
security and conformity with the rules of recruitment, promotion, demotion, 
transfer or training were all emphasised at government agencies and the internal 
audit units examined in this research were no exception. Moreover, an audit is 
always conducted by an audit team and cannot be conducted by one individual 
auditor. There was also a hierarchical review mechanism involving the checking 
and re-checking of work among auditors in an audit team. Teamwork and 
participative decision-making, as a part of Clan culture, were common in the 
internal audit units. In a review meeting, senior auditors or higher-level officials 
allowed or even encouraged junior or lower-level auditors to share their opinions 
regarding the audit findings. A member of the audit team with a dissenting 
opinion regarding his/her supervisor’s decision was able to express this opinion in 
the audit paperwork and it became part of the formal documentation. 
5.7.4 Organisational Glue 
The relatively equal scores for the Market and Hierarchy cultures and slightly 
lower score for Clan culture was found in the organisational glue of the internal 
audit units. As shown in Table 5.22, the average scores for organisational glue 
were 27, 27 and 25 for the Hierarchy, Market and Clan cultures, respectively. 
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Table 5.22: Mean scores (SD) of organisation glue in Government Internal 
Audit Units 
Organisation Glue 
Government Internal Audit Units 
A B C D E F G Avg 
Loyalty and mutual trust. 
Commitment to this 
organisation runs high. 
26 23 26 23 23 23 26 25 
(9.6) (8.8) (8.3) (10.3) (7.2) (8.0) (9.3) (9.0) 
Commitment to innovation and 
development. There is an 
emphasis on being on the 
cutting edge. 
20 21 22 20 21 19 20 21 
(7.7) (6.0) (6.8) (7.6) (7.1) (8.1) (6.2) (7.1) 
An emphasis on achievement 
and goal accomplishment. 
27 29 25 27 29 26 28 27 
(8.9) (7.6) (8.1) (8.1) (7.9) (9.2) (8.4) (8.4) 
Formal rules and policies. 
Maintaining a smooth-running 
organisation is important. 
26 26 27 29 26 31 27 27 
(10.9) (8.0) (8.2) (14.1) (9.4) (10.4) (10.7) (10.4) 
These three relatively balanced scores show that the organisational glue holding 
the internal audit units together comprises formal rules and policies and 
respondents’ esprit de corps and status as civil servants. Organisational glue is 
continuously developed through various activities such as management briefings, 
in-house training, outbound activities, religious services and family visits. Several 
important annual events such as Independence Day or anniversaries are celebrated 
by organising sports or art contests and family gatherings. This clan type of 
organisational glue corroborated the description of the In-Group Collectivism 
dimension (see Section 2.7.1) in which Indonesian people place a high value on 
cohesiveness and loyalty. 
5.7.5 Strategic Emphases 
The high score for the Hierarchy culture and relatively equal scores for the Clan 
and Market cultures were found in the strategic emphasis component of 
organisation culture. As shown in Table 5.23, the average scores of the strategic 
emphases components were 30, 25 and 24 for the Hierarchy, Clan and Market 
cultures, respectively. This indicates that the strategic priorities within internal 
audit units were efficiency, control and smooth operation.  
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Table 5.23: Mean scores (SD) of strategic emphases in Government Internal 
Audit Units 
Strategic Emphases 
Government Internal Audit Units 
A B C D E F G Avg 
On human development. High 
trust, openness, and 
participation persist. 
24 24 27 26 23 24 23 25 
(8.2) (9.5) (7.7) (11.3) (6.1) (10.0) (7.8) (8.9) 
On acquiring new resources and 
creating new challenges. Trying 
new things and prospecting for 
opportunities are valued. 
22 21 21 21 23 22 23 22 
(8.9) (7.7) (6.9) (7.2) (8.0) (10.4) (6.3) (8.1) 
On actions and achievement. 
Hitting stretch targets and 
winning in the marketplace are 
dominant. 
24 23 24 25 25 24 24 24 
(11.4) (10.9) (7.7) (10.8) (6.5) (9.0) (9.0) (9.7) 
On permanence and stability. 
Efficiency, control and smooth 
operations are important. 
31 32 28 28 29 29 29 30 
(11.6) (10.9) (6.4) (12.6) (8.3) (11.3) (10.4) (10.5) 
 
As well as other government agencies, the environment of internal audit units was 
relatively stable. Human and financial resources, as reflected in the annual 
government budget, did figure very high in the head of the internal audit unit’s 
responsibilities in order that his/her focus could be fully directed to the smooth 
execution of their office activities. The job description and functions of each 
subunit or each employee were also relatively stable and standardised. As 
previously discussed in Section 3.1.3 and 2.8.2, all seven of the internal audit 
units had implemented the same standard of certified government internal auditor 
system that included standardised job descriptions, as outlined in the Ministry of 
State Apparatus Empowerment Regulation number 220/2008.  
Responsibility and accountability systems, such as the 5-year Strategic Plan and 
annual Government Agency Performance Accountability System, were considered 
an important part of strategic emphasis. Congruent with the type of management 
of employees, which is a mix of Hierarchy, Clan and Market cultures, human 
development also formed part of units’ strategic emphasis. In general, leaders at 
the research sites were aware of the importance of building employees’ capacity 
to deliver high-quality audit services to stakeholders. The Market culture found in 
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the strategic emphasis of the internal audit units indicates that the auditors also 
placed emphasis on goal accomplishment whilst also remaining within the scope 
of formal rules and policies. 
5.7.6 Criteria of Success 
The highest score for the Market culture and relatively equal scores for the Clan 
and Hierarchy cultures were found in the Criteria of Success. As shown in Table 
5.24, the average scores were 28, 26 and 25 for the Market, Clan and Hierarchy 
cultures, respectively. Internal audit units defined success on the basis of 
stakeholder satisfaction, employee development and efficiency rather than by 
having the most unique services or innovation.  
Table 5.24: Mean scores (SD) of criteria of success in Government Internal 
Audit Units 
Criteria of Success 
Government Internal Audit Units 
A B C D E F G Avg 
On the basis of development of 
human resources, teamwork, 
employee commitment, and 
concern for people. 
26 25 26 27 24 30 26 26 
(8.0) (7.6) (7.7) (13.3) (6.6) (10.5) (8.4) (9.1) 
On the basis of creating the most 
unique or newest products. It is a 
product leader and innovator 
20 20 21 20 20 21 22 21 
(7.9) (7.0) (7.0) (9.0) (7.0) (11.2) (7.5) (8.1) 
On the basis of winning in the 
marketplace and outpacing the 
competition. Competitive market 
leadership is the key 
29 31 27 29 30 24 28 28 
(9.4) (10.6) (6.4) (12.0) (8.8) (8.7) (12.2) (9.8) 
On the basis of efficiency. 
Dependable delivery, smooth 
scheduling and low-cost 
production are critical. 
25 25 26 23 26 24 23 25 
(10.5) (8.5) (7.7) (11.2) (7.2) (8.7) (7.3) (9.0) 
The importance of stakeholder satisfaction as a success criterion is reflected in the 
research sites’ organisational values. GIAU _D implemented the value of 
‘excellent service’, meaning that employees in GIAU_D should give service to 
their clients or customers in a wholehearted, transparent, fast and accurate way. 
GIAU_B and GIAU_E made ‘user oriented’ one of their values, indicating that 
employees should know and fulfil the needs of their audit clients. GIAU_C and 
GIAU_G implemented the broader values of ‘inclusive’ and ‘pro-people’. In 
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delivering public services, GIAU_C encouraged their stakeholders, especially 
professional associations and people at large, to actively participate.  
The internal audit units operate in a relatively uniform role, function or field of 
work that is determined by laws and the formal policies of upper-level 
government (see Section 2.8.2). Uniformity in services was maintained by 
upholding the standards and procedures for conducting an audit. Efficiency 
became a criterion for success since the internal audit unit operates within the 
scope of tight annual budget control. Any spending discrepancies occurring in the 
execution of the budget other than those previously specified were scrutinised and 
examined by the budget authority. 
5.8 Concluding Notes: Combination of Qualitative and Quantitative 
Findings 
Based on the survey, the study found that whistle-blowing intention can be 
influenced by ethical judgement, perceived seriousness of the wrongdoing and 
organisational commitment. The intention to blow the whistle will be greater 
when ethical judgement rises. The relationships between ethical judgement and 
whistle-blowing intention will be positive and stronger in employees who 1) have 
a higher perception of the seriousness of wrongdoing or 2) have a higher level of 
continuance commitment. The findings described in this chapter were 
contextualised using the findings given in Chapter 4 (qualitative findings). As will 
be further discussed in Chapter 6, the qualitative findings from Chapter 4 and 
quantitative findings from Chapter 5 were combined to develop the triangulated 
data structure that was used to build the discussion themes (see Figure 6.1). The 
combination of the findings includes: 
1. Quantitative data about the whistle-blowing decision, prioritisation of the 
internal channel and justifications for remaining silent were combined with 
qualitative data about responsibility and obligation, organisational responses, 
personal dilemma, and anonymity to explain the respondents’ whistle-blowing 
decision process; 
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2. Quantitative data about ethical judgement, perceived seriousness, 
organisational commitment, job level, ethical climate and organisational 
culture were combined with qualitative data that emerged from the interviews 
and FGDs about leadership in the organisation, the quality of evidence and 
motives to explain the factors influencing the whistle-blowing decision.  
Table 5.25 summarises this combination of the qualitative and quantitative data. 
Table 5.25: Combining qualitative and quantitative data  
Quantitative data Qualitative data Purpose 
Whistle-blowing 
decision  
Section 4.2.1 Responsibility and 
obligation 
Section 
4.3.2.1 
To explain the 
process of 
whistleblowing 
decision 
 
Prioritisation of 
internal channel 
Section 5.2 Personal Dilemma with 
Various Parties to Be 
Considered (Multiple 
Loyalties) 
Section 4.2.3 
Justification of silent Section 4.3.1 Anonymity Section 4.2.4 
  Organisational responses Section 4.3.4 
Ethical judgment. Section 5.3 Organisational responses 
(leadership in the 
organisation) 
Section 4.3.4 To explain the 
factors 
influencing 
whistle-
blowing 
decision. 
Perceived 
seriousness 
Section 5.4.2 
Organisational 
commitment 
Section 5.4.1 Perception of whistle-
blower and act of 
whistle-blowing 
Section 4.2.2 
Job level Section 5.5.1 Quality of evidence Section 4.3.3 
Ethical climate Section 5.5.3 Motives Section 
4.3.2.2 and 
4.3.2.3 
Organisational 
culture  
Section 5.7   
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CHAPTER 6 DISCUSSION  
 
6.1 Introduction 
6.1.1 Triangulation Process 
In this chapter, the research findings are discussed to answer the research 
questions. The quantitative and qualitative results are interpreted, explained and 
compared to those of previous similar studies. Similar or alternative explanations 
of the findings are offered and consideration is given as to whether or not they are 
consistent with the previous body of knowledge on the subject. Using the 
approaches described in Section 3.5 and given that the qualitative analysis 
produced intersecting themes, the quantitative and qualitative results were 
combined. This combination emphasised 1) the function of the qualitative results 
as a means of contextualising the findings from the quantitative analysis, and 2) 
the quantitative and qualitative results functioning complementarily to provide a 
more comprehensive answer to the research questions. The process of combining 
the qualitative and quantitative data can be found in Chapter 5, Section 5.8. 
As depicted in Figure 6.1, in triangulating the data, the three aggregate 
dimensions of the qualitative data (see Chapter 3 Section 3.3.4) and variables that 
were statistically examined (see Chapter 3 Section 3.4.4.5) were regrouped in 
accordance with the research questions. Themes about the whistle-blowing 
decision process that emerged from the interviews and focus group discussions 
(FGDs) were grouped together and discussed to answer the first research question 
of how whistle-blowers decide whether or not to blow the whistle. To answer the 
second research question – confirming whether the perceived seriousness of the 
wrongdoing and the organisational commitment strengthen or weaken the 
relationships between ethical judgement and whistle-blowing intention – the 
quantitative results were combined with the themes related to them.    
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Figure 6.1: Triangulation process  
 
 
6.1.2 Overall View of the Discussion  
As depicted in Figure 6.2, the findings of this study suggest that the employee’s 
unwillingness to blow the whistle may be influenced by the normalisation of 
corruption.  
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Figure 6.2: The process of whistle-blowing decision and normalisation of 
corruption 
 
 
The act of ignoring the information provided through an act of whistle-blowing 
results in a demoralising situation in which the wrongdoer feels secure and the 
whistle-blower perceives that their whistle-blowing is not acceptable. These 
combine to form a vicious cycle of unwillingness to blow the whistle and a 
process of rationalisation and socialisation that underlie the normalisation of 
organisational corruption.  
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Unwillingness to blow the whistle was driven by the domination of informal 
hidden values instead of formal written values. The informal hidden values that 
emerged from the interviews and FGDs include: 
- Tolerance of petty corruption (see Section 4.2.2); 
- Tolerance of collective corruption (see Section 4.3.2.1); 
- Leaders who victimised the whistle-blower (see Section 4.2.3); 
- Unresponsive leaders (see Section 4.3.4.1); 
- Feudalistic culture (see Section 4.3.4.1); 
- Misuse of the decisions of human resources management as an instrument 
of reward and punishment (see Section 4.3.4.1); 
- Maintaining a good relationship with leaders is important for advancing a 
career in the office (see Section 4.3.4.1); 
- Whistle-blowers are perceived as traitors, disloyal and unfaithful friends 
(see Section 4.2.2); 
- Wrongdoers who shared their corrupt money with other employees were 
seen as good and generous individuals (see Section 4.3.4.1); 
- The real or perceived motives impacted on the decision and the 
organisational response (see Section 4.2.2, Section 4.3.2.2 and Section 
4.3.2.3); 
- Whistle-blowing policies were perceived as ‘lip service’; ‘talk only’ or 
‘image building’ (see Section 4.3.4.2). 
Employees tend to choose to apply informal values that can justify their decision 
to remain silent. The role of leaders was important not only in creating the 
informal values that contrast and conflict with the formal written values but also 
in motivating employees to apply the informal values.  
Regarding factors influencing the decisions, the findings suggest that ethical 
judgement, ethical climate, organisational commitment and perceived seriousness 
were necessary factors to instil in potential whistle-blowers the intention to blow 
the whistle, but that these were not sufficient for them to actually blow the 
whistle. Organisational leadership and strength of evidence were necessary factors 
for potential whistle-blowers to follow through on their whistle-blowing intention 
and turn it into an actual act of whistle-blowing. 
The findings are discussed in the ensuing sections, beginning with the decision-
making process that includes how and why employees decide to either blow or not 
blow the whistle, the phases of the whistle-blowing decision and the factors 
influencing the decision and conceptual categories of the whistle-blower. 
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6.2 Whistle-blowing Decision-Making Process 
In the integrated perspective of prosocial organisational behaviour and ethical 
decision-making of whistle-blowing, the potential whistle-blowers’ goals in 
blowing the whistle include helping the organisation and the public by preventing 
wrongdoing whilst at the same time not becoming involved in the wrongdoing 
themselves and not being the victim of retaliation. In attempting to achieve these 
goals, the research findings reveal the decision to blow the whistle to be a 
personal and situational one. The decision to blow the whistle in response to 
organisational corruption means different things to different people. Each person 
has his/her own personal boundaries in assessing whether or not a particular type 
of wrongdoing is morally acceptable, thereby affecting his/her decision on 
whether or not to blow the whistle. He/she also has his/her own criteria for 
evaluating the situation. The motivations for blowing the whistle and justifications 
for not blowing the whistle seem to be unique in each case and it may not be able 
to generalise for every person and every situation. However, the processes at work 
behind decisions of whether or not to blow the whistle appear to follow a pattern 
similar to the three phases of whistle-blowing decision proposed in this study. 
Analysis of both the qualitative and quantitative data revealed the process of a 
whistle-blowing decision. The findings described in this section have important 
implications in helping us understand how employees in government internal 
audit units gave responses to the moral problem of dealing with the wrongdoing 
and how the organisation acted upon the whistle-blowing information presented to 
it. Discussions of the findings and theoretical implications are presented in the 
following sections. 
6.2.1 Phase 1: Wrongfulness and Seriousness of the Wrongdoing and 
Responsibility to Act to Stop the Wrongdoing 
In this phase, potential whistle-blowers evaluate the wrongfulness and seriousness 
of the wrongdoing and identify whether anyone has responsibility to stop the 
wrongdoing.  
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6.2.1.1 Assessing the Wrongfulness and the Seriousness of the Wrongdoing 
The study indicated that, as a moral agent, a potential whistle-blower first 
becomes aware that there is a moral issue at the time the wrongdoing occurs, as 
well as when the decision to blow the whistle is made. In agreement with the POB 
perspective of whistle-blowing, employees’ knowledge of what is considered 
wrongdoing is a prerequisite (Olsen, 2014). To analyse the conflicting moral 
issues at play, they interpret both the rules and regulations and the organisation’s 
values. They also interpret past situations of when the wrongdoing has occurred 
along with the situation at the time the decision to blow the whistle was made. As 
government internal auditors, both whistle-blowers and silent observers have the 
ability to assess the wrongfulness of the wrongdoing. They then use these abilities 
to compare the various rules, regulations and organisational values or other 
standards, such as the religious teaching of family values, to determine whether 
they are illegal, illegitimate or unethical or contradict/violate the organisation’s 
values. This process is consistent with the notion that ethical judgement is a 
comparative process (Sparks and Pan, 2010; Hersh, 2002). As put forward by 
Near and Miceli (1985), the perception on the wrongfulness of the wrongdoing 
depends on whose perception is dominant. 
The conflicting values faced by potential whistle-blowers indicate the low clarity 
of organisational values. These organisational values may not be concrete and 
understandable to them, creating confusion among employees, reducing their 
sense of responsibility and motivating them not to blow the whistle (Jubb, 1999; 
Kaptein, 2010). 
The study also found that potential whistle-blowers were aware that the 
wrongdoing was wrongful, yet they also put forward reasons or excuses for why 
the wrongdoing was not illegal. The organisational culture endorsed the wrongful 
courses of action as rightful by containing practices that convey the message that 
the wrongdoing is appropriate (further discussed in Section 6.3.1). The 
organisational culture also gave rise to the organisational corruption by containing 
practices that convey values that stipulate extenuating circumstances under which 
the wrongful wrongdoing can be considered acceptable. The potential whistle-
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blowers used legality as a rationalising ideology of corruption (Ashforth & 
Anand, 2003; Palmer, 2012). The excuses included that existing rules were not 
enforced. Use of legality as a rationalising ideology of corruption may reflect the 
uncertainty avoidance culture of Indonesian. Individuals with high uncertainty 
avoidance culture tend to focus more on legality than ethicality of their actions. 
They might view the unethical behaviour that is done legally as less unethical than 
those in low uncertainty avoidance culture (Christie, et al., 2003).  
An explanation of the findings may refer to the process of normalisation of 
organisational corruption that can produce tolerable or permissible wrongdoing 
(Misangyi, et al., 2008). The processes of institutionalisation, rationalisation and 
socialisation underlie the normalisation of organisational corruption. 
Institutionalisation refers to the process whereby corrupt practices are routinised, 
become embedded in the organisational structure and without conscious thought 
of whether or not they are wrong.  There is a systemic and strategic influence 
which is currently ethical that undermines the organisation’s effectiveness by 
diverting it from its purpose or weakening its ability to achieve its purpose 
(Lessig, 2013). Rationalisation means the wrongdoer uses self-serving 
justification to legitimate acts of corruption. Socialisation is the process through 
which new employees are induced or taught to view corruption as permissible. 
The socialisation process may also take place via a reward system and the 
expectation placed on employees to obey their organisation’s leaders (Ashforth & 
Anand, 2003; Misangyi, et al., 2008; Brief, et al., 2001). Palmer (2012) argued 
that the prospective ‘questionably wrongful behaviour’ can be considered rightful 
because it is not much different from previous ‘entirely rightful behaviour’. 
Moreover, the prospective ‘wrongful behaviour’ can be considered rightful 
because it is not much different from ‘questionably rightful behaviour’ that was 
perceived as ‘entirely rightful’. 
If it is concluded that the act of wrongdoing is not wrongful, the decision process 
stops. If it is concluded that the act of wrongdoing is wrongful, the potential 
whistle-blower will analyse the seriousness of the wrongdoing.  
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As described in further detail in Section 6.3.2, the study found that various aspects 
were considered in determining the level of seriousness. Similar to the 
wrongfulness phase, potential whistle-blowers also put forward excuses and used 
rationalising ideologies of corruption to justify that the wrongdoing was either 
permitted, understandable or authorised. It can be inferred from this that the 
process of normalisation of corruption was occurring. This process led to an 
alteration of serious wrongful wrongdoing into tolerable wrongdoing. Olsen 
(2014) argued that what different types of organisational culture (further discussed 
in Section 6.3.1) will accept or tolerate provides the observer with a different 
basis for assessing the seriousness of the wrongdoing. 
The study also found that the potential whistle-blowers took the wrongdoer’s 
motive into consideration when determining the wrongfulness of the wrongdoing. 
Examination of the act of wrongdoing in the context of getting a decent life, for 
charity or social purposes or for the purpose of enriching a particular person 
demonstrates that the wrongdoer’s motives were part of the consideration in the 
whistle-blowing decision. The study also found that, in collective wrongdoing, the 
actor(s) (not the mastermind) was(were) seen as the victim(s) of the corrupt 
system. The actor in the wrongdoing was just an obedient subordinate who did 
what his/her superior(s) told him/her to do. The wrongdoing was not reported and 
the observer chose to talk informally to the actor. The motive of the wrongdoer 
has the ability to either motivate or demotivate observers of the wrongdoing.  
Theoretical implications 
This finding has important implications for helping us understand the interplaying 
role of moral wrong and harm (perceived seriousness). This finding suggests that 
both moral wrong and perceived seriousness need to be considered when defining 
ethical whistle-blowing. Another implication may be that the themes about 
rationalising ideologies of corruption provide insight into the justification to 
remain silent. The theory of normalisation of corruption may be better able to 
explain how employees evaluate the wrongfulness and seriousness of the 
wrongdoing. 
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The study suggests that Davis’ (1996) Complicity Theory may be more suitable in 
the context of government since it places an emphasis on moral wrong, not harm, 
as justification for blowing the whistle. In government agencies, collective 
wrongdoing may be viewed as harmless wrongdoing (Brief, et al., 2001). The 
study found that the wrongdoer(s) and silent observer(s) used rationalising 
ideologies of corruption (Ashforth & Anand, 2003), comprising mainly denial of 
injury and the metaphor of the ledger technique. By applying wrong moral criteria 
(not harm), silent observers cannot use those excuses. The wrongdoing will still 
be ethically judged as wrongful wrongdoing even though it may also be perceived 
as harmless. Therefore, potential whistle-blowers will be morally required to blow 
the whistle. By using moral wrong as the criterion, blowing the whistle on 
perceived harmless wrongdoing can still be defined as ethical whistle-blowing. 
6.2.1.2 Whether Anyone Has Responsibility to Act to Stop the Wrongdoing 
The study has shown that, if it is concluded that the act of wrongdoing is deemed 
a wrongful and serious one, a potential whistle-blower attempts to identify 
whether anyone has the responsibility to stop it. In cases of individual 
wrongdoing, the observer of the wrongdoing is the one with responsibility to act 
except for when someone else has blown the whistle or the organisation is in the 
process of addressing the wrongdoing (Miceli, et al., 2008). Referring to the 
bystander effect of prosocial behaviour, if there is only one person present at the 
time of a particular occurrence of wrongdoing, then that person is one hundred per 
cent responsible for providing help through whistle-blowing (Clarke, 2003). 
However, the study also found that in cases of collective wrongdoing where the 
observer was either one of the wrongdoers or a beneficiary of the wrongdoing, the 
person responsible for acting to stop the wrongdoing was not clear. The powerful 
authorities may know about or even be involved in the ongoing wrongdoing 
themselves. This creates role conflict between the person responsible for stopping 
the wrongdoing and the person who is one of the wrongdoer(s). This results in a 
vagueness of responsibility since all those who knew about the ongoing 
wrongdoing should have been the ones acting to report it. 
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Theoretical implications 
This finding has important implications for helping us understand how the 
observers of wrongdoing identify those in the organisation with responsibility to 
act to stop the wrongdoing in cases of both individual and collective wrongdoing. 
In responding to collective wrongdoing, the findings suggest that the bystander 
effect may not be fully applicable. This indicates that it is more difficult for the 
organisation to motivate the employee to blow the whistle in cases of collective 
wrongdoing because of the role conflict experienced by the recipient of the 
whistle-blowing information and the diffusion of responsibility. 
 
6.2.2 Phase 2: Organisation Responsiveness and Demoralising Situations  
In this phase, potential whistle-blowers evaluate whether the organisation is 
signalling an unresponsiveness that can help to create a demoralising situation. 
Results from the interviews and FGDs found that different whistle-blowers 
received different responses from different individuals in the organisation. The 
responses varied and included: 1) the whistle-blowing information was ignored 
and the problem continued; 2) the problem was solved but the wrongdoer was not 
punished; 3) the problem was solved and the wrongdoer was informally punished; 
and 4) the problem was systematically solved through the introduction of a new 
policy and procedure. However, this only took place after either the Supreme 
Audit Board or Corruption Eradication Commission had discovered the problem.  
An explanation for this may be that the recipients of the whistle-blowing 
information had different considerations for dealing with the problem. They were 
dealing with a unique situation that needed to be treated differently. Not all 
recipients of whistle-blowing information necessarily have the good intention to 
put a stop to the wrongdoing. They may have a personal interest in the 
continuation of the wrongdoing or may be trying to protect their superiors’ 
interests. They put forward justifications for not following standard procedure in 
handling whistle-blowing information. Non-conformance with standard procedure 
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produced various responses from the recipients of whistle-blowing information. 
These results support the notion that whistle-blowers do not normally encounter a 
single and consistent organisational response, but rather a range of responses from 
different individuals in the organisation (Vandekerckhove, et al., 2014). 
Recipients of information from whistle-blowing did not want to be perceived as 
incompetent leaders for not being able to control both the wrongdoer and the 
whistle-blower as their subordinates. If an employee formally blew the whistle, 
the ongoing wrongdoing would come to the attention of the CEO. As described in 
Section 2.8.1, the uncertainty avoidance dimension in Indonesian culture is Asal 
Bapak Senang (keep the boss happy). This means that employees will be 
rewarded as long as their superior is happy and they are working with other 
employees in a cooperative and harmonious way. If employees are rewarded, then 
they have no economic or status uncertainty as they continue to be valuable 
members of the organisation (Hofstede, 2014). It can be inferred from the findings 
that the attitude of Keep the Boss Happy includes preventing: 1) the superior from 
noticing problems that should have been solved by a lower-level manager and 2) 
the employee looking bad or incompetent in front of other employees, especially 
his/her superior. Exposing a problem in the organisation may make the boss 
unhappy. This motivated the whistle-blower’s superiors, as recipients of the 
whistle-blowing information, to prevent their subordinates from blowing the 
whistle formally and externally and to quietly rectify the wrongdoing without 
resorting to formal procedures.  
This explanation is in line with the notion that role conflict can be created when 
an immediate supervisor is also the recipient of whistle-blowing information. The 
supervisor, as the information recipient, may admit that the wrongdoing has 
occurred and he/she is then obliged to bring an end to it. However, he/she may 
also feel defensive if there is a perception that the subordinate is criticising his/her 
supervisor for not being able to prevent the wrongdoing from occurring, even if 
she or he is not directly responsible for committing it (Moberly, 2014; Miceli and 
Near, 1992). This suggests that whistle-blowing may be perceived as a threat not 
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only to the wrongdoer but also to the recipient of the whistle-blowing information 
who does not want to have his/her managerial incompetence exposed.   
The perceived risks of whistle-blowing showed that the demoralising situation 
was created by the leaders who intimidate the potential whistle-blowers so that 
they can control the employees. The intimidation can be conducted directly or 
indirectly (Gummer, 1985). The indirect intimidation includes 1) nullification, 
such as asking for evidence (see Section 4.3.3) that is difficult to provide so that 
the whistle-blowers can be assured that their accusations are invalid or the result 
of misperceptions on their part, 2) isolation, such as exclusion not only from 
social but also from official activities (see Section 4.3.1). The direct intimidation 
includes 1) defamation such as questioning their motives to impugn the whistle-
blowers’ character (see Section 4.3.2.3) and verbal harassment (see Section 4.3.1), 
2) expulsion such as being assigned less desirable duties, job reassignment, denial 
of promotion, poor performance appraisal, suspension, fired or grade level 
demotion (see Section 4.3.1). 
The current study found that potential whistle-blowers evaluated the 
organisation’s response to the ongoing wrongdoing and acted accordingly. If the 
organisation did not support the whistle-blowing behaviour, then willingness to 
blow the whistle (in Phase 3) will decrease. In contrast, if the organisation 
facilitates the employee in blowing the whistle, then willingness to blow the 
whistle will increase. Neglected and uncorrected wrongdoing were seen by 
potential whistle-blowers as signs that the organisation tolerates the wrongdoing. 
The organisation did not value the employee’s contribution in terms of whistle-
blowing information. Solving the problem informally and letting the wrongdoer 
go unpunished sends a signal to the employee that the organisation does not take 
the wrongdoing seriously. This can lead to a loss of hope and confidence on the 
part of potential whistle-blowers.  
These results are in line with the notion that unreported or uncorrected 
wrongdoing may indicate that the organisation tolerates wrongdoing and that the 
whistle-blowing attempt will be ignored (Miceli, et al., 2008). Another 
explanation for the influence of the organisation’s degree of responsiveness on 
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employees’ willingness to blow the whistle may be that in a supportive 
organisation the potential whistle-blower will feel less fear of retaliation but a 
greater sense of responsibility to blow the whistle (discussed further in Phase 3) 
(Alleyne, 2010).  
Furthermore, the whistle-blower’s perceived motive also influences the 
perceptions of both the recipient of the whistle-blowing information and of other 
employees in terms of the act of whistle-blowing. Whistle-blowers who were 
themselves part of the wrongdoers or a beneficiary of the corrupt activities, or 
whistle-blowers who perceived themselves as the victim of wrongdoing, were 
seen as traitors and hypocrites who intervened in the business of other employees. 
These results are in accordance with the notion that the challenge in using the 
insider accounts of offenders (the whistle-blowers) is the perception of their moral 
credibility. Gray (2013) argued that the morally acceptable narrative appears to be 
that of an individual whistle-blower who was inside a system of unethical 
practices but tried to do the right thing. Whistle-blowers with sincere motives 
were seen in a positive light and gained the support of other employees. They 
were perceived as heroes or agents of change by the fact that they were showing 
their altruistic motivation. Referring to previous studies, altruistic motivation is 
shown when employees are motivated to blow the whistle by a specific legal 
obligation, professional ethics, personal morality or ethical standards (Roberts, 
2014). 
It supports the idea that the real or perceived motives for blowing the whistle will 
impact on the process of how the organisation responds to the whistle-blowing 
(Lewis, et al., 2014). The findings indicate that the recipient of whistle-blowing 
information may not fully support the act of whistle-blowing if he/she perceives it 
to be malicious. The act of whistle-blowing may be seen as the right thing to do 
but if the motive and intentions for doing it are not in the interests of the 
organisation, then it is not a good action (Vardy & Grosch, 1999). One aspect of 
the importance of the motive is that altruistic whistle-blowing is seen as deserving 
of protection whilst whistle-blowing carried out in line with improper or 
malicious motives does not (Vandekerckhove, 2011). 
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The whistle-blowers’ motives may influence the perceived validity or accuracy of 
the information. The recipient of the whistle-blowing information may not fully 
support the act of whistle-blowing if he/she perceives the whistle-blower to be 
dissatisfied with the authority. He/she will perceive that the information being 
disclosed has low validity (Brown, et al., 2014).   
The whistle-blower’s motivation was questioned in cases where the whistle-
blower was one of the wrongdoers or a beneficiary of the corrupt activities. 
According to Bok’s (1980) Good Reason Theory, this type of whistle-blowing 
cannot be categorised as morally right whistle-blowing. Seeing whistle-blowing as 
a speaking truth to power, O’Toole (2008) also argued that before speaking truth 
to power can be considered virtuous, the act must be truthful, do no harm to 
innocents, not be self-interested, the product of moral reflection, come from a 
messenger who is willing to pay the price, have at least a chance of bringing about 
positive change and not be done out of spite or anger. 
However, the focus should be on stopping the wrongdoing and solving the 
problem, whether the whistle-blowing is motivated by greed, revenge or a sense 
of duty (Hoffman & McNulty, 2011). Lewis et al. (2014) also argued that the 
whistle-blower’s motive is not relevant to the core issue of dealing with the 
reported wrongdoing. It also does not substantially influence the whistle-blowing 
decision since the whistle-blowers intend to benefit themselves and others (Miceli 
& Near, 2010). Self-interest motivation does play an important part in whistle-
blowing (Roberts, 2014) but whistle-blowing behaviour does not have to be 
altruistic to be considered prosocial (Miceli, et al., 2008). 
Theoretical implications 
This finding has important implications for helping us understand the importance 
of the organisation in supporting the potential whistle-blower. Organisational 
support is a crucial factor in determining whether there is a moral problem in the 
organisation, its wrongfulness and its seriousness. It relates to the process of 
normalisation of corruption in Phase 1. Organisational support was a main theme 
that emerged when the observers of wrongdoing justified their acts of either 
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blowing the whistle or of remaining silent. It supports the proposition that 
employees may not have the ethical perseverance to blow the whistle partly as a 
result of unresponsiveness on the part of the organisation.  
This finding also has important implications for helping us understand the 
significance of the real or perceived motives of the potential whistle-blower in the 
decision-making process. Although it may be difficult to verify their true motives, 
this area still needs to be examined in more depth in order to define ethical 
whistle-blowing and ethical silence. Therefore, we can develop constructive 
whistle-blowing behaviour among employees. However, it may not be necessary 
to consider the whistle-blower’s motive if the focus is on detecting and then 
preventing the wrongdoing from occurring (Vandekerckhove, et al., 2014). 
6.2.3 Phase 3: Personal Responsibility, Cost and Benefit Analysis of 
Whistle-blowing and Ethical Perseverance 
In Phase 3, potential whistle-blowers make a decision by evaluating whether it is 
their responsibility to speak up and they evaluate the costs and benefits associated 
with each alternative, including the alternative channels available for blowing the 
whistle. If the perceived benefits of the whistle-blowing exceed the costs 
associated with it, ethical perseverance will still be needed to change the whistle-
blowing intention into an actual act whistle-blowing. 
6.2.3.1 Is It My Responsibility to Blow the Whistle? 
The study found that personal, legal and professional responsibility were 
important considerations in the decision to blow the whistle. However, it appears 
that it was personal responsibility that ultimately determined the decision of 
whether or not to blow the whistle. This relationship between responsibility and 
whistle-blowing intention is consistent with that found in previous studies. 
Whistle-blowing intention will be higher when personal responsibility, role 
responsibility or the social responsibility to speak up are greater (Graham, 1986; 
Kaplan and Whitecotton, 2001; Curtis, 2006; Alleyne, et al., 2012). Referring to 
the Integrity Theory of whistle-blowing (Brenkert, 2010), the findings support the 
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Principle of Position Responsibility. Potential whistle-blowers will be aware of 
their duty to uphold loyalty, obedience and provide information to/report to 
authorities. They will put this principle into the context of other values so that 
they can assess the situation and then consider their integrity in order to determine 
their responsibility to the organisation or other parties. To exercise the integrity, 
they need to discern what is right and what is wrong, act on what they have 
discerned, even at personal cost, and say openly that they are acting on their 
understanding of right and wrong (O’Toole, 2008 ). 
The obligation to report any wrongdoing, as public officers and professional 
government internal auditors, is clearly stated in the law, regulations and codes of 
conduct. It becomes their legal and regulatory responsibility. The potential 
whistle-blowers were aware of this obligation and may have felt legally and 
morally bound to adhere to it. However, the silent observers did not view their 
legal and regulatory obligations as personal obligations. They put forward excuses 
that they were not able to follow their responsibility through into action. They 
made excuses for their denial of responsibility by referring to their excuses in 
Phase 2 that the wrongdoing was not wrongful or that it was wrong but could be 
tolerated. Moreover, they justified their irresponsibility by comparing it with their 
superiors who did nothing to stop or prevent the wrongdoing.  
Related to the concept of the bystander effect, there may be a diffusion of personal 
responsibility when many individuals observe the wrongdoing (i.e. as bystanders). 
In this instance, no one single individual will feel the responsibility for blowing 
the whistle. The responsibility diffuses, with all of the observers remaining silent. 
When there is only one observer of the wrongdoing, he/she is responsible for 
blowing the whistle. However, considering that the observer may have more time 
to evaluate the situation and the wrongdoer is often not a stranger, diffusion of 
responsibility may not occur in the context of whistle-blowing. In the context of 
responding to organisational corruption, a potential whistle-blower is not 
confronted with an emergency situation such as rescuing a person in danger 
(Miceli, et al., 2008; Robinson, et al., 2012). 
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Another explanation for the findings may refer to the elements of responsibility. 
Duska (2010) argued that obligation to prevent harm, such as whistle-blowing, 
arises when there is need, capability, proximity, last resort and probability of 
success. In both individual and collective corruption, the wrongdoer(s) have 
caused harm to the organisation and it was expected that whistle-blowing would 
either stop or prevent the wrongdoing from occurring again. The element of need 
was fulfilled. Potential whistle-blowers have the knowledge to identify the 
wrongdoing and to blow the whistle. They also observe or may even be involved 
in the wrongdoing. Thus the elements of capability and proximity are also 
fulfilled.  
However, the elements of last resort and probability of success become the main 
issue in determining whether or not an individual has responsibility for blowing 
the whistle. In the case of individual wrongdoing, a potential whistle-blower may 
be the only person to observe the wrongdoing. This makes him/her the person of 
last resort. But in the case of collective wrongdoing, other employees may also 
observe the wrongdoing, thus meaning that the observer is not the person of last 
resort, unless other observers or the organisation do not take any action. On the 
other hand, however, other observers and the organisation choosing to do nothing 
may actually reduce the probability of success. In collective wrongdoing, the 
element of last resort and probability of success may go in different directions. 
The collective diffusion of personal responsibility may indicate that leadership in 
the organisation frames the wrongdoing situations and the whistle-blowing 
situation by creating the demoralising situation (in the previous phase) for the 
employees so that they did not engage to the ethical decision making. They may 
be led by their leaders to see the wrongdoing and the whistle-blowing situations as 
not entailing a choice but as a situation demanding the compliance and the 
fulfilment of their role as the subordinates. (Brief, et al., 2001)  
Theoretical implications 
This finding has important implications for helping us identify that the aspect of 
responsibility integrated the prosocial organisational behaviour and ethical 
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decision-making perspectives of whistle-blowing. Another implication of this 
finding may be that role or professional responsibility should not end with the 
stipulations laid out in any job description, procedure or code of conduct. We 
should be able to motivate employees to take personal responsibility for blowing 
the whistle. 
6.2.3.2 Identifying Alternative Decisions and Assessing the Perceived Cost 
and Expected Benefit  
The current study found that potential whistle-blowers used their ability (ethical 
competence) to develop a strategy for dealing with wrongdoing by identifying 
alternative decisions. As previously described in Section 4.2, the alternatives are 
not black or white with a fine line separating them, but rather exist on a spectrum. 
Acts of disclosure is performed in various forms, such as: 
- Internal whistle-blowing; 
- External whistle-blowing to other government agencies; 
- External whistle-blowing to public or media; 
- Blowing the whistle anonymously; 
- Informal whistle-blowing: talking with the wrongdoers’ leader, gossiping or 
secretly consulting with leaders whom they trust; 
- Directly reprimanding wrongdoers; 
- Total silent. 
Loyens and Maesschalck (2014) found that responses also include making jokes 
and the use of sarcasm or cynicism. These findings are consistent with the notion 
that a potential whistle-blower is faced with a range of potential responses, such 
as joining in (participating in the wrongdoing), doing nothing (inaction), a direct 
(personal) attempt to stop wrongdoing, reporting wrongdoing by the book 
(procedural reporting) and a non-procedural form of whistle-blowing (McLain & 
Keenan, 1999).  
Internal or External Whistle-blowing  
The difficulties in making the decision concerned not only whether or not to blow 
the whistle, but also which channel the employees would opt to use in doing so. 
The internal-external dilemma found in the study indicates the effort of the 
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potential whistle-blower to solve his/her conflict of values and loyalties. It may 
also be an attempt to balance the various interests of the whistle-blower, 
organisation and society. In reference to previous studies, organisations have an 
interest in effectively controlling and preventing wrongdoing whilst still 
protecting their reputation. Society wants to encourage lawful behaviour and 
public accountability. Potential whistle-blowers, on the other hand, want to 
protect themselves from possible retaliation while still being able to act to stop the 
wrongdoing (Dworkin and Callahan, 1991; Miceli and Near, 1992; Moberly, 
2014). 
The research findings on whistle-blowing intentions show that the respondents 
were more likely to blow the whistle internally than through external government 
agency channels or to the public. The actual whistle-blowing survey also 
highlighted a preference for internal channels. The study found that potential 
whistle-blowers were reluctant to expose organisational corruption to external 
parties. The acts of wrongdoing were reported mostly to co-workers and 
immediate and higher superiors. A similar result was also reported by Donkin et 
al. (2008) who, in an examination of whistle-blowing in the Australian public 
sector, found that the people whom whistle-blowers were likely to approach first 
are their supervisors, senior managers, CEOs, human resources and audit and 
fraud units. Moreover, they reported that almost all reporting was directed solely 
at internal recipients.  
For the organisation, the advantages of internal whistle-blowing include 
minimising organisational costs in the form of disruption to employer–employee 
relationships or a loss of reputation as a result of external exposure. Moberly 
(2014) put forward the downside of internal whistle-blowing that it may serve 
private rather than public interests if the organisation chooses to ignore the 
whistle-blowing information or seeks to retaliate to the whistle-blower. Miceli et 
al. (2008) argued that most whistle-blowers who used external channels also used 
internal channels. External channels are used to escalate the complaint to someone 
external with more power and to bring pressure on the organisation.  
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For collective wrongdoing, the study indicates that public disclosure may be the 
solution, in that it will be rectified when there is external pressure. In collective 
wrongdoing, an immediate supervisor or higher superior cannot be expected to 
stop the wrongdoing effectively. Therefore, there is no requirement for an internal 
procedure to be exhausted in order for whistle-blowing to be defined as ethical 
whistle-blowing. Comparing internal and external channels, Moberly (2014) 
argued that external whistle-blowing may be more effective but it may be anti-
social if a whistle-blower blows the whistle externally to gain personal benefit 
without having used an internal channel first. External whistle-blowing will not be 
influenced by a member of the organisation attempting to either ignore or cover 
up the wrongdoing.  
The study suggests that there was almost no indication that the respondents in the 
research would blow the whistle externally even if they ignored their internal 
whistle-blowing channel(s). Blowing the whistle externally was not seen as the 
employees’ obligation. They felt that their responsibility ended at the time they 
blew the whistle internally. They hoped that their organisations would respond to 
the whistle-blowing information sooner or later. The respondents related stories 
that, all of sudden, various top- and middle-level officials had been fired after 
their high-profile wrongdoings had been reported. 
Potential whistle-blowers who believed that their immediate supervisors had 
committed wrongdoing discussed their concerns with them first. Although they 
were aware that internal whistle-blowing may not be fully effective, their 
commitment to the organisation (see Section 5.4.2) and their loyalties mainly to 
their leaders and co-workers (see Section 2.7.1.3, Section 5.7.2 and Section 5.7.4) 
prevented them from blowing the whistle externally. By using internal channels, 
employees are still able to express their anti-corruption attitudes or their 
willingness to change their corrupt organisations whilst avoiding the risk of bad 
publicity for their organisations. Internal whistle-blowing was preferred and 
considered constructive deviance, while external whistle-blowing was perceived 
as defamatory or guided by improper motives other than to protect the public.  
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Whistle-blowing informally 
Miceli and Near (1992) argued that there is general agreement that co-workers, 
friends and family do not constitute proper recipients of whistle-blowing 
information because they are not able to correct the problem disclosed by the 
whistle-blower. The study found that co-workers or top managers who happened 
to be close friends of the observer of the wrongdoing are one of many internal 
whistle-blowing information channels. Formally, their co-workers and friends in 
higher positions do not have formal authority to stop the wrongdoing but they 
blew the whistle on them to raise awareness of the wrongdoing that was 
occurring. In cases of collective wrongdoing, they did it to demonstrate their 
disapproval. 
Blowing the whistle informally to someone that the employee can trust was also 
seen as a way of avoiding confrontation with the wrongdoer(s). Informal whistle-
blowing was seen as maintaining a harmonious working environment and 
avoiding defamation of the organisation’s reputation. Observers of the wrongdoer 
did not utilise the formal whistle-blowing system provided by the organisation 
partly because they did not trust the way whistle-blowing information would be 
managed, particularly in relation to confidentiality. Moreover, formally blowing 
the whistle may lead to retaliation whilst total silence on the part of the whistle-
blower may be perceived as them being one of the wrongdoer(s). Observers of the 
wrongdoing may have prior experience of whistle-blowing and may have found 
that the organisation did nothing to rectify the problem. They may have observed 
that other whistle-blowers were not protected from retaliation. They also did not 
believe that formal whistle-blowing would be effective. The alternatives to either 
formally blowing the whistle or maintaining total silence were seen as less risky. 
Anonymous Whistle-blowing  
When the whistle-blowers chose to utilise formal channels, they preferred to 
remain anonymous. As one of the spectra of the whistle-blowing decision, 
anonymous whistle-blowing was perceived as an unethical and irresponsible way 
of speaking up. Referring to previous studies, anonymous whistle-blowing may 
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also be used by employees who may not be sure about the wrongfulness of the 
wrongdoing or who need to protect themselves against retaliation or against 
someone who wishes to disrupt their career prospects (Nayir & Herzig, 2012; 
Suyatno, et al., 2015; Scott & Rains, 2005). Anonymous whistle-blowing may be 
less credible than a non-anonymous case. Therefore, it may not be investigated 
sufficiently since the organisation may allocate fewer resources (Hunton & Rose, 
2011).  Miceli, et al., 1988 who examined the trade-offs facing the potential 
whistle-blowers who decides to remain unidentified found that what anonymous 
whistle-blowers may lose in credibility they gain in protection from retaliation. 
They argued that the decision to anonymously blow the whistle related to the 
retaliatory culture of the organisation and perceptions about the ability of the 
whistle-blowing information recipient to response and protect the whistle-
blower’s identity. 
Direct Reprimand 
Issuing a direct reprimand to the wrongdoer may resolve the wrongdoing. It 
provides the observer of the wrongdoing with the opportunity to verify their 
interpretation of the incident and to provide the wrongdoer with the opportunity to 
explain and correct the wrongdoing (Kaptein, 2011). In a case of collective 
wrongdoing found in the research, reprimand was seen as a middle way 
(compromise) solution for employees who felt compelled to stop the wrongdoing 
but who were too afraid to openly blow the whistle and too angry to stay silent. 
They wanted to show that they were not complicit in the wrongdoing.  
Assessing the Perceived Cost and Expected Benefit 
The goals of whistle-blowing for the potential whistle-blower include aiding the 
organisation in preventing occurrences of wrongdoing (Miceli, et al., 2008) and 
preventing harm to the public (DeGeorge, 2006). Other goals include not getting 
involved in the wrongdoing (Davis, 1996), protecting the public interest that may 
be neglected, abused or put at risk (Bok, 1980), maintaining the dignity of all 
relevant stakeholders (Hoffman & McNulty, 2011) and not becoming the victim 
of retaliation. The study found that in attempting to achieve these goals, potential 
228 
whistle-blowers analysed the perceived cost and expected benefit of each 
alternative decision. 
The study suggests that potential whistle-blowers will decide to blow the whistle 
if, when compared to the perceived costs, the expected benefits are favourable to 
other alternatives in the spectrum of the whistle-blowing decision. Where there is 
an unwillingness to blow the whistle, the risk of damage to social relationships in 
the office and verbal harassment and intimidation are feared more than the risks 
related to decisions by HRM, such as being assigned less desirable duties, job 
reassignment, denial of promotion and poor performance appraisal. The costs for 
the whistle-blower of blowing the whistle may include mental health issue, facing 
expensive lawsuits, divorce, alcohol abuse, attempted suicide and bankruptcy 
(Fotaki, et al., 2015). 
The most feared risk was not that of being fired as a result of blowing the whistle, 
but rather job reassignment to less desirable duties or a less favourable working 
unit. Job transfer is within most higher and middle managers’ remit of authority. 
In contrast, dismissing a government employee requires a decision from the head 
of the government agency or even a decree from the head of state. It can be a long 
and daunting long legal procedure. As previously described in Section 4.3.4.3, 
managers prefer to rectify the problem informally.  
The potential whistle-blowers see that ruining the reputation of the organisation 
may be their personal risk of whistle-blowing. As professional internal auditors 
who rely on the trust of their clients, they are aware that upholding the 
organisation’s reputation is an important part of their work and that this is 
therefore also important for their personal life. The risk of bad publicity was 
considered mostly in deciding not to use the external channel. By using internal 
channels only, whistle-blowers can still express their anti-corruption sentiments or 
their willingness to change the corrupt environment within the organisation while 
avoiding any risk of bad publicity for their organisations. Other personal costs 
were having to deal with trouble and annoying situations. By bringing any legal 
issue into the office as a result of blowing the whistle, they perceived that they 
had to be ready to be questioned, exposed and put under mental stress. 
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There were not many findings regarding the expected benefits of whistle-blowing 
except that it would prevent the wrongdoing from occurring again. However, 
whistle-blowers got the emotional benefit of feeling relief knowing that they had 
finally blown the whistle. They felt personal satisfaction knowing that their 
leaders responded positively and that the wrongdoing was stopped as a result of 
their act of whistle-blowing. Consistent with previous studies, the benefits for the 
whistle-blower of blowing the whistle include self-efficacy, and personal 
gratification (Miethe, 1999). 
Theoretical implications 
This finding has important implications for helping us understand the alternative 
actions facing the observer of the wrongdoing. This finding also raises the 
possibility that the factors influencing the whistle-blowing decision may also 
influence behaviours similar to blowing the whistle such as complaining and 
remonstrating. A separate study of the factors influencing the decision to blow the 
whistle and the decision to remain silent is needed. Deciding not to blow the 
whistle does not mean deciding to remain totally silent. Another implication is 
that the spectrum of responses indicates that the organisation cannot be expected 
to respond to the whistle-blowing information effectively, meaning that they may 
choose another morally acceptable way. 
This finding may help us understand how a potential whistle-blower chooses the 
whistle-blowing channel, particularly when responding to collective wrongdoing 
in which the recipient of the whistle-blowing information may be one of the 
wrongdoers. Prioritising internal over external channels indicates that employees 
wish to blow the whistle constructively. This presents the organisation with an 
opportunity to prevent destructive external whistle-blowing by responding 
effectively to whistle-blowing information. Another implication may be that 
internal and external whistle-blowing are not the same phenomenon, indicating 
that they need to be examined separately. 
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6.2.3.3 Executing the decision: Whistle-blowing intentions and Actual 
Whistle-blowing and Unwillingness to Blow the Whistle 
A substantial minority of respondents had observed organisational corruption but 
the analysis of actual cases of whistle-blowing described in Section 4.2.1 shows 
that most of the respondents who observed wrongdoing opted NOT to blow the 
whistle. This was particularly the case where acts of wrongdoing were committed 
by auditors collusively or by an individual auditor in an equal and higher position. 
The study suggests that there was an ethical gap in the whistle-blowing decision. 
There were few decisions to actually blow the whistle, whereas across the six case 
scenarios, the level of whistle-blowing intention was high. Although behavioural 
intention is a good predictor of actual behaviour (Chiu, 2003) and intentions can 
account for a considerable proportion of variance in behaviour (Ajzen, 1991), 
Bazerman and Tenbrunsel (2011) proposed that there is a gap between how 
ethical we think we are and how ethical we truly are. They refer to this as the 
organisational and societal blind spot that can be lead to contrary, inconsistent and 
even hypocritical behaviour. Referring to models of ethical decision-making 
proposed by Thorne (1998) and Armstrong et al. (2003), potential whistle-blowers 
passed the test of ‘ethical sensitivity’ and ‘ethical judgement’ but they did not 
pass the test of ‘ethical motivation’ and ‘ethical character’.  
The potential whistle-blowers identified and judged the dilemma by interpreting 
the situation of organisational corruption. They were aware of the moral problem 
and costs and benefits of each decision and then assessed which action would be 
most justifiable for them. However, respondents seemed to be discouraged, not 
motivated, and to not have sufficient commitment to translate their intention into 
actual whistle-blowing behaviour. The perceived “benefit-to-cost differential” 
appeared to mediate the relationship between the factors influencing whistle-
blowing decision (further discussed in Section 6.3) and whistleblowing intentions 
(Keil, et al., 2010). Furthermore, Ponemon (1994) put forward that a potential 
whistle-blower must have the ethical perseverance (persistence) to follow through 
on a decision.  
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Blowing the whistle on a co-worker’s behaviour may be more difficult in the 
context of high in-group collectivism where employees place a high value on 
cohesiveness and togetherness. The potential whistle-blower and the wrongdoers 
may have close interpersonal relationships that make the decision to blow the 
whistle more difficult. 
Unwillingness to blow the whistle is related to the ongoing process of the 
normalisation of corruption and the manifestation of institutional corruption. The 
unwillingness to blow that was seen as ethical behaviour undermined the 
government internal audit effectiveness by diverting it from its purpose. The silent 
behaviour of the auditors can deteriorate the quality of the audit reports and 
weaken the public’s trust in the government internal audit units (Lessig, 2013). 
The leaders who rewarded the silent observers and the wrongdoers confirm the 
notion that an organisation’s culture can shape its incentive structure, which in 
turn can facilitate the normalisation of organisational wrongdoing (Palmer, 2012). 
Whistle-blowers were punished while wrongdoers and silent observers were 
rewarded in the form of them being assigned ‘nice’ audit clients such as large-
spending government agencies or big state-owned enterprises with off-budget 
funds for unofficial expenses. Blowing the whistle means putting oneself in 
trouble and in an annoying situation. Potential whistle-blowers had to be ready to 
be questioned, exposed and spiritually tortured. The costs of whistle-blowing were 
deemed to be higher than any benefit, meaning that intentions to blow the whistle 
did not translate into actual whistle-blowing. 
This unwillingness to blow the whistle was found in previous studies. Incidents of 
wrongdoing observed by employees were ignored. The US Merit Systems 
Protection Board (US MSBP) (MSPB, 1984) reported that around 30% and 31% 
of federal public servants reported wrongdoing in the organisations that they 
observed in their 1980 and 1983 surveys, respectively. However, the willingness 
to blow the whistle increased significantly. In their 1992 and 2010 surveys, the 
US MSPB (MSPB, 2011) reported that the percentage who told no one of what 
they observed was 40% in 1992 and 34% in 2010. The Australian Public Service 
Commission (Brown, et al., 2008) conducted a survey of employees from 
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Australian public service agencies and reported that 11% of respondents indicated 
that they had witnessed a breach such as fraud, theft, misuse of clients’ personal 
information, sexual harassment and leaking classified documentation and that 
about 50% of employees had reported the wrongdoing. Conducting a survey on 
2,539 Norwegian workforces in 2005 in various occupations including military 
roles, administrative leaders, academics, clerical works and sales and service 
occupation, Bjørkelo et al. (2011) reported that a total of 12.2% of employees 
reported being whistle-blowers. 
However, higher willingness to blow the whistle was found in other professions 
such as nurses in Ireland and public officials in Norway. Moore and McAuliffe 
(2012) reported that, of 575 respondents, 88% of nurses working in acute 
hospitals had observed an incident of poor care in the past six months, and that 
70% of those had reported it. Skivenes and Trygstad (2010) reported that 76% of 
those who observe wrongdoing report the misconduct to their immediate 
supervisor or another person either inside or outside the organisation. However, 
they argued that their findings were unexpected since other studies had shown 
whistle-blowing to be a negative activity that focused more on its dangers, risks 
and failure. 
Theoretical implications 
This finding has important implications for helping us understand the justification 
for not blowing the whistle, particularly in cases when employees do not have the 
ethical perseverance to follow through on a decision. Some of the issues emerging 
from this finding relate to the process of normalisation of corruption. It provides 
some support for the proposition that employees do not have ethical perseverance 
partly because of the process of normalisation of corruption. Another implication 
may be that the effort to develop whistle-blowing behaviour could focus more on 
motivating employees to progress from the intention to blow the whistle to the 
actual decision to go through with it. 
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6.3 Factors Influencing the Whistle-blowing Decision 
Analysis of both the qualitative and quantitative data revealed factors that 
influence the whistle-blowing decision. The findings described in this section 
have important implications in helping us to understand the role of perceived 
seriousness and organisational commitment in the relationship between ethical 
judgement and whistle-blowing intention. Organisational and situational factors 
including ethical climate, wrongdoer’s power status and the whistle-blower’s job 
level were also taken into account in examining the relationship between ethical 
judgement and whistle-blowing intention. However, the findings suggest that 
those factors were insufficient for a decision to blow the whistle. Organisational 
leadership and strength of evidence were necessary factors for potential whistle-
blowers to follow through on turning their intention to blow the whistle into an 
actual act of whistle-blowing. 
6.3.1 Ethical Judgement, Ethical Climate and Leadership in the 
Organisations 
Ethical judgement 
The study found that whistle-blowing intention became higher when ethical 
judgement rose. This finding further supports previous studies examining the 
relationship between ethical judgement and whistle-blowing behaviour (Chiu, 
2003; Ayers & Kaplan, 2005; Zhang, et al., 2009; Ahmad, 2011). An explanation 
of these results may be related to the wrongfulness evaluation in Phase 1 (see 
Section 6.2.1.1) and responsibility in Phase 3 of the decision-making process (see 
Section 6.2.3.1). Potential whistle-blowers fully understand that the acts of 
wrongdoing they observed were wrong. As government auditors, they have the 
ability to assess the wrongfulness of the acts, in terms of whether they are illegal, 
illegitimate or unethical or whether they contradict or violate the organisation’s 
values.  
The observers of wrongdoing considered themselves to be employees with a 
personal, legal or professional responsibility to blow the whistle because they 
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believed that blowing the whistle was the most ethical alternative and that 
remaining silent was morally wrong (Hunt and Vitell, 1986; Rest, 1986). They 
were concerned about the wrongdoer’s behaviour and assumed that by blowing 
the whistle their responsibility would be transferred to the recipient of the whistle-
blowing information. Loyens and Maesschalck (2014) argued that actively 
displacing responsibility in this way is intended to free the whistle-blower from 
feelings of guilt. 
However, the study also found that perceived wrongfulness taken in isolation was 
insufficient to prompt the observer of the wrongdoing to blow the whistle. 
Potential whistle-blowers in this study recognised that their tolerance of 
corruption and their inability to follow the intention through to actually blowing 
the whistle were influenced by the ethical climate within their organisations. As 
described in Section 5.5.3, the study found the existence of four types of ethical 
climate characterised by: 1) adherence to rules, professional ethics and upholding 
teamwork; 2) working in an efficient way and providing the best services to 
stakeholders; 3) personal self-interest; and 4) togetherness, unity, cohesiveness 
and caring. However, the potential whistle-blowers in this study perceived that 
they worked in an organisation with an ethical climate that did not fully support 
them in blowing the whistle. An explanation of these results may be related to:  
- The domination of informal hidden values instead of formal written values. 
- The role of organisational leadership in creating the informal values as well as 
in motivating employees to apply the informal values. 
The Interplaying Role of Ethical Judgement and Ethical Climate: The Domination 
of Informal Hidden Values  
The GIAU have formal regulations and codes of conduct to which all auditors are 
expected to comply. The leadership of the GIAUs also instructed their auditors to 
sign a ‘Pact of Integrity’. The Organisational Culture Assessment Instrument 
(OCAI) and Ethical Climate Questionnaire (ECQ) results also showed that 
compliance with the law and professional ethics are emphasised and that formal 
procedures govern what employees do. This should promote ethical behaviour and 
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encourage the employee to utilise a whistle-blowing system whenever they 
observe a wrongdoing. In an organisation with an ethical climate characterised by 
principle, the employee will be more likely to blow the whistle. Rules and 
procedures will be upheld. The employee will be aware of their legal and 
professional responsibility. Therefore, willingness to blow the whistle will 
increase.  
However, we found informal culture to be dominant. In the GIAU, where formal 
rules and codes of ethics are not consistent with the informal culture, employees 
justified their unwillingness to blow the whistle by referring to the informal 
culture in their organisations that they felt in their daily life.  Formal 
organisational culture is one that is established by the organisation and written in 
the mission statements whereas informal culture, which for the purpose of the 
analysis can be defined as collective practices and approaches to ethical dilemma 
that are not guided by policy, and values they reflect. It is tacit but can be 
predominant and involves norms that reflect explicit or implicit values or beliefs 
(Opel, et al., 2009). In responding to the organisational corruption, they may 
consider togetherness, friendship and good personal contact to be more important 
than following any code of conduct, rules or procedures.  
The togetherness climate (see Section 5.5.3.4) and organisational glue inherent in 
the Hierarchy and Clan cultures (see Section 5.7.4) were manifested in the 
whistle-blowing decision-making process. The values of esprit de corps, unity, 
cohesiveness and caring for each other were important considerations in deciding 
not to blow the whistle. Employees’ welfare was considered in deciding to rectify 
the problem informally. The wrongdoer’s superior as the recipient of whistle-
blowing information did not punish the wrongdoer because of the view that this 
may harm the wellbeing of the wrongdoer’s family. Superiors who committed 
wrongdoing and shared corruption money with their subordinates were seen as 
engaging in acts of caring for their subordinates’ welfare. The petty corruption 
usually committed by low-level employees as a way of meeting their basic needs 
(see Section 4.3.2.2) was tolerated and thus these acts were not reported.  
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Being a silent observer was also seen as a way of maintaining the climate of 
togetherness and of demonstrating a cooperative attitude and harmonious ways of 
working. This was reflected in respondents’ justification and their perceived risk 
of whistle-blowing. Silent observers did not want to make their co-workers or 
superiors (the wrongdoer(s)) unhappy and were not willing to get them into 
trouble. In collective organisational corruption, potential whistle-blowers saw the 
wrongdoer(s) as their friends and as victims of a corrupt system. They felt that the 
wrongdoer should not be fully blamed for the ongoing wrongdoing. 
As government officers, their sense of togetherness is built and continuously 
developed from the early stages of their careers. A government internal auditor, a 
civil servant, is a member of an organisation that is taught to uphold the values of 
obedience, discipline, loyalty, mutual trust and commitment to the organisation. In 
daily office activities, they work as a team that is required to persistently and 
consistently pull together to accomplish common team purposes such as 
maintaining good relationships with their audit clients, prompt conducting of 
audits and backing each other up.  
Another informal hidden values of personal self-interest also manifested in the 
way leaders handled the issues of whistle-blowing. The leaders tried to protect 
their reputations by suppressing external whistle-blowing by their subordinates or 
by quietly rectifying the wrongdoing outside formal procedures (see Section 
4.3.4.3). Whistle-blowing using formal procedures were viewed as bad publicity 
for them. The use of informal solutions indicated that the principle climate and 
organisational interest were manifested in balance with their personal self-interest. 
This supports the notion that leaders might fail to effectively investigate cases of 
whistle-blowing if they pose a threat to their personal reputations (Hunton & 
Rose, 2011). In handling the issue of whistle-blowing, rules and procedures were 
upheld and the organisational interest was prioritised only when external pressure 
existed. The rules and procedures were also applied when their leaders’ personal 
self-interest would not be affected by the act of whistle-blowing. 
On the other hand, personal self-interest (egoism) may create an attitude of 
unconcern about the ongoing wrongdoing and the observers will not respond to 
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this unless they are the victims. This confirms the notion of motivated blindness 
that is the tendency to overlook the unethical behaviour of others when it is not in 
the best interest of the observer (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011). The study 
suggests that, in general, in an organisation with an ethical climate characterised 
by egoism, the employee will be less likely to blow the whistle. However, 
protecting their personal interest may have a positive side. The most important 
thing for unconcerned employees may be that they are not complicit in the 
wrongdoing. 
The relationship between ethical climate and ethical decision-making reported in 
this study is consistent with that noted by Loe et al. (2000) and O’Fallon and 
Butterfield (2005) in various contexts such as that of salespeople (Schwepker Jr., 
et al., 1997) and lodging operations (Upchurch & Ruhland, 1996). The 
relationship was also found when examining particular types of ethical climate 
such as social responsibility and rules climates, team climate and friendship 
climate (Barnett & Vaicys, 2000) and egoistic climate (Shafer, 2009), individual 
ethics in the form of experience and values and organisational ethics in the form 
of ethical standards and practices (Elango, et al., 2010). 
The influence of the national culture on the whistle-blowing decision was also 
found in other countries. Su, et al. (2010) investigated the impact of cultural 
factors on ethical attitude related to whistle blowing among accounting students in 
the United States and Taiwan. Compare to US people, Taiwanese, high in power 
distance and uncertainty avoidance and collectivistic society, may be afraid to 
blow the whistle. They argued that Taiwanese tend to regard themselves as 
members of a larger group and exchange loyalty and obligation for social or group 
protection. A Taiwanese may be willing to participate in a cover-up to save face 
and protect the reputation of the group to show their loyalty, whereas an American 
(an individualist culture) may view this type of behaviour as negative or unethical 
(Su, et al., 2010).  
Examining the relation of culture to the propensity for both internal reporting and 
whistle-blowing in the US, Canada and Mexico, MacNab, et al. (2007) found that 
Hofstede’s cultural dimension uncertainty avoidance and power distance had the 
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most consistent and significant relationship to propensity for both whistle-blowing 
and internal reporting, while collectivism was not found to be significantly related 
to either whistle-blowing and internal reporting. Similar explanation could be 
found also in case of Pakistan (Bashir, et al., 2011), Brazil (Sampaio & Sobral, 
2013), Japan (Brody, et al., 1998), South Korea and Turkey (Park, et al., 2008). 
The Role of Leadership in the Organisation 
Leadership in the organisations was a main theme that emerged when the 
respondents of the interviews and FGDs justified their acts of whistle-blowing or 
of remaining silent. The current study found that the mixture of the Hierarchy and 
Clan types of organisational leadership at the research sites (see Section 5.7.2) 
was manifested in the whistle-blowing decision process. In the Hierarchy-Clan 
type of leadership, potential whistle-blowers see the leader as a parent figure with 
a mentoring, facilitating or nurturing role. Leaders are seen as providing guidance 
on how to behave and their behaviour reflects their level of commitment to anti-
corruption reform. Leaders who are friendly, open-minded, receptive and 
trustworthy give hope and confidence to potential whistle-blowers that they will 
be heard. In contrast, ‘talk-only’ leadership and feudalistic, unresponsive, angry 
and spiteful superiors demoralise and suppress the potential whistle-blowers’ 
willingness to speak up. Kaptein (2010) argued that in an organisation where 
speaking up is not desirable, the focus will shift from solving the wrongdoing to 
retaliation against the whistle-blower. 
The Hierarchy-Clan type of leadership was also manifested in the perception that 
it was imperative that leaders’ policy be followed even though it may not be fully 
in agreement with the rules. Whistle-blowing was seen as a challenge to the 
powerful authority. This supports the notion that organisations do not welcome 
whistle-blowing behaviour because it challenges the hierarchy (Mesmer-Magnus 
& Viswesvaran, 2005). Brief, et al. (2001) put forward some reasons regarding the 
employees’ capacity for obedience to hierarchical authority. It can be the 
prerequisite for employees in dealing with their environment and maintain internal 
harmony to survive. Employees collectively may also view their superiors  as 
legitimate authorities and therefore deserving of unquestioning obedience.  
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The role of organisational leadership in signalling unresponsiveness was also 
shown in how leaders socialised the attitude of silence. Similar to the process of 
normalisation of corruption, the attitude of silence is socialised through a reward 
system and by perceiving that silence is a manifestation of obedience to the 
leaders (see Section 4.3.4.1). Observers of wrongdoing saw their leaders deriving 
benefit from the wrongdoing and then sharing it with their subordinates. Their 
leaders also denied that the organisation had problems that needed to be solved.  
These findings are in accord with those of previous studies on the corrupt 
behaviour of the civil service in Indonesia. Budiman et al. (2013) found that one 
main rationalisation of routine and embedded corruption was an explanation of 
corrupt leadership at senior levels of government. 
This ambiguity between 1) leaders who are part of the wrongdoers or who do 
nothing with the whistle-blowing information they receive, and 2) leaders who 
promote anti-corruption reform, created the situation that triggered respondents to 
choose good personal contact over principles. Ambiguity is an unclear and 
inexplicable internal state that may feel like confusion. Employees who 
simultaneously embrace two or more irreconcilable meanings become confused 
when information that is expected from their leaders is absent (Meyerson & 
Martin, 1987).  It occurred when leaders who should be the ones upholding those 
principles were instead complicit in the wrongdoing. The leaders authorised, 
approved or accrued benefit from the ongoing wrongdoing or ignored the whistle-
blowing information being ignored. The leaders either rectified the problem 
informally or did not punish the wrongdoer (Section 4.3.4.3).  
On the other hand, good personal contact was associated with promotion, training 
opportunities and ‘nice’ audit assignment. Respondents saw that whistle-blowing 
or acts of dissent in relation to leaders’ policies resulted in punishment, but that 
total obedience led to reward.  
This confirms the notion that leaders who routinely delegate unethical behaviour 
to their subordinates trigger indirect blindness in the eyes of the observer. 
Individuals overlook the unethical behaviour of others when the actions occur 
indirectly (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011). Their silence and unsupportive 
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attitude of whistle-blowing information suggests that the problem for them is that 
it is detected and reported.  
The findings also provide support for the notion that whistle-blowing represents a 
power that can influence the relationship between the two parties involved – the 
wrongdoer and the whistle-blower. When the two parties are in conflict, one party 
attempts to use its power to alter the behaviour of the other party (Near & Miceli, 
1995). In the whistle-blowing situation, the organisation may become political 
arena. The finding also confirms the view that leaders’ beliefs and values are 
vitally important in shaping the workplace climate (Day, et al., 2014) and the 
behaviour of managers has a greater influence on an employee’s decision than any 
other factor (Lewicka-Strzalecka, 2011).  
The ambiguity also resulted in the perception that whistle-blowing policies may 
only serve as forms of ‘lip service’ or ‘image building’. This supports the idea that 
some whistle-blowing systems seem only to be symbolic models that lack the 
desired effectiveness (Pittroff, 2014). The culture of the organisation was 
perceived as unfavourable for an employee not only to blow the whistle on an act 
of wrongdoing but also to speak up, criticise or provide input on general issues in 
the office. Potential whistle-blowers recognised that there were many 
opportunities for them to provide input to their higher managers but they felt this 
was conducted only for ceremonial, formal or procedural purposes. They felt that 
their superiors’ personal actions, interpersonal relationships and the way they 
handled whistle-blowing information were not indicative of attitudes that were 
anti-corruption.  
This provides further support for the proposition that the process of rationalisation 
and socialisation of the wrongdoing may lead to an unethical act of silence 
(Ashforth and Anand, 2003; Misangyi, et al., 2008; Treviño, et al., 2006). The 
perception that the organisation will support a whistle-blowing system and that it 
will be effective has also been found to be a motivating factor for employees in 
their decision to blow the whistle (Klaas, et al., 2012). Examining institutional 
corruption in South Africa, Pillay and Kluvers (2014) also confirmed that whistle-
blowing will only occur if it is supported by the organization’s culture and 
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leadership. Legislation alone will not provide sufficient protection for a public 
official who wishes to make a disclosure about wrongdoing  
As previously described in Section 2.8.1, this type of leadership confirms the 
existence of bapakism or paternalistic leadership in Javanese-dominated 
Indonesian culture. Leaders act as father figures and subordinates act as their 
children. Irawanto (2011) put forward that this bapakism enables leaders (the 
fathers) to strongly exert their authority whilst at the same time their subordinates 
(the children) must comply with their will. Employees recognise the existence of 
privileges that come from a hierarchical power status. Subordinates always need 
their superiors’ direction and wait for them to make the final decision.  
The submissive subordinate is created by the culture of hormat (respectful) and 
nurut (following the father’s rule), manut (high obedience) and nrimo (accepting 
with compliance). The subordinate should respect and recognise superior rank and 
follow the decision made by the leader. In the value of nrimo, people always 
accept the arguments of others respectfully to avoid disharmony and personal 
conflict in their relationships (Koentjaraningrat, 1985). In return, the leader must 
listen to the subordinate’s personal problems and provide sympathy, empathy and 
advice. Therefore, the leader may stand to gain the personal loyalty of his 
subordinates (Efferin & Hopper, 2007). The leader is perceived as a model or 
standard of how to behave in the workplace and sets an example for subordinates 
to follow. 
The results of this research also support the idea that avoidant, unresponsive and 
insensitive leadership tends to ignore the wrongdoing and the whistle-blowing 
information. In a tolerant society, a potential wrongdoer will feel secure in 
committing the wrongdoing and whistle-blowers will be afraid of retaliation. This 
is consistent with the notion that in intolerant societies people are less motivated 
to engage in corruption and people in tolerant societies are inclined to commit 
wrongdoing (Gong and Wang, 2013; Khruakham and Lee, 2013).  
This relationship between leadership and the whistle-blowing decision was also 
found in other studies. Leaders who practise transformational leadership (Caillier, 
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2013), develop high-quality interactions with subordinates (Bhal & Dadhich, 
2011) and communicate openly (Azhari, 2014) were positively related to whistle-
blowing by the subordinates. On the contrary, avoidant, unresponsive and 
insensitive leadership tends to be associated more with leaders who ignore the 
wrongdoing, ignore the whistle-blowing information and perceive whistle-
blowing as counterproductive to the organisation (Jackson, et al., 2013) or 
perceive it as a threat to the organisation’s authority structure (Vandekerckhove, 
et al., 2014). 
The relationship between leadership and the whistle-blowing decision may show 
also that the leaders (the whistle-blowing infromation recipient) and the employee 
(the whistle-blower) together can create a motivation to change. An employee 
may finally decide to blow the whistle to the public after his/her leader ignores or 
denies the whistle-blowing information. When an employee feels strongly enough 
to blow the whistle, the wrongdoing then may finally be rectified. (Schein, 2010) 
Theoretical implication 
This finding has important implications for helping us understand how ethical 
judgement and ethical climate influence the whistle-blowing decision by use of 
reward and punishment and HRM policies. The values applied by leaders in the 
organisation also play an important role in shaping the organisation’s ethical 
climate. Another implication of the findings may be that various types of ethical 
climate exist in the organisation and each type of ethical climate influences the 
whistle-blowing decision differently. 
6.3.2 Perceived Seriousness of the Wrongdoing and the Existence of 
Evidence 
The current study found that the perceived seriousness of wrongdoing 
significantly moderated the effect of ethical judgement on internal, external and 
public whistle-blowing. The relationships between ethical judgement and whistle-
blowing intention were positive and stronger in employees who were sensitive 
and had higher perception of the seriousness of wrongdoing. Potential whistle-
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blowers may share a similar perception that the ongoing wrongdoing is wrongful 
but they may perceive the seriousness of the wrongdoing differently. Referring to 
previous studies by Jones (1991) and Luo (2005), the perceived seriousness 
depends on potential whistle-blowers’ perception of various aspects, mainly: the 
frequency, beneficiary, length of time, amount of money involved and amount of 
damage and magnitude of the consequences of the wrongdoing.  
An explanation for these results may be that the wrongdoing is not perceived as 
serious when it is in the best interests of the organisation. Moreover, acts of 
wrongdoing occurring in the context of getting a decent life, for charity or social 
purposes or on compassionate grounds (see Sections 4.3.3 and 4.3.4) were 
perceived as acceptable and understandable. In contrast, wrongdoing was 
perceived as serious if it was undertaken in someone’s personal self-interest, was 
repeated wrongdoing or if it was committed by greedy employees seeking to 
excessively enrich themselves (see Section 4.3.4). These findings are in line with 
those of previous studies that found that the perceived seriousness of wrongdoing 
is related to whistle-blowing decision-making and behaviour (Jones, 1991; Near, 
et al., 2004; Miceli and Near, 1992; Robinson, et al., 2012).  
The various perceptions relating to the seriousness of the wrongdoing may 
indicate occurrence of the process of normalisation of corruption. This leads to the 
perception of tolerable and permissible wrongdoing. The excuses and 
justifications expressed by the observers of wrongdoing illustrated how acts of 
wrongdoing had become embedded and perpetuated in the organisation. 
Normalised corruption weakened the perceived seriousness of the wrongdoing. 
Perceived wrongfulness and seriousness of the wrongdoing may be reflected in 
the tolerance to corruption.  
The study found that in evaluating the seriousness of wrongdoing, potential 
whistle-blowers considered the existence and quality of the evidence. Wrongdoing 
based on hearsay was not reported. When it was a case of clear, present and actual 
corruption, potential whistle-blowers felt blowing the whistle to be an obligation 
rather than an option. The quality of evidence is also emphasised by the recipient 
of the whistle-blowing information. The recipient asked the whistle-blower to 
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provide evidence of the ongoing incidents. The recipient also attempted to find 
additional evidence (see Section 4.3.2.3).  
Having evidence will lead potential whistle-blowers to perceive the acts of 
wrongdoing as less ambiguous. Evidence provides potential whistle-blowers with 
a basis on which to assess the level of seriousness. Evidence also gives them 
confidence that they can defend themselves if criticised or accused by other 
parties. This supports the notion that as the strength of evidence increases, an 
individual may be more aware that wrongdoing has occurred (Brink, et al., 2013). 
Moreover, evidence of wrongdoing gives the observer more power to report and 
increase their sense of responsibility for reporting (Ayers & Kaplan, 2005).  
Theoretical implication 
This finding has important implications for helping us understand how employees 
assess the level of seriousness of the wrongdoing and how this influences the 
whistle-blowing decision. Intolerant employees are likely to perceive wrongdoing 
as serious and be likely to blow the whistle. Tolerant employees, on the other 
hand, will be likely to perceive wrongdoing as not serious and will not be likely to 
blow the whistle. They may even engage in the wrongdoing themselves. This 
finding suggests that, in assessing the perceived seriousness of the wrongdoing, 
observers of the wrongdoing consider the availability of evidence. The stronger 
the evidence, the less ambiguous the wrongdoing, and therefore the greater the 
likelihood of the observer blowing the whistle. Considering that direct evidence of 
corruption may be difficult to find, another implication may be that recipients of 
whistle-blowing information should only ask for preliminary information from the 
whistle-blower. They should not ask the whistle-blower to provide compete and 
sufficient evidence. It is their duty to act upon the whistle-blowing information. 
6.3.3 Organisational Commitment, Conflict in Values and Multiple 
Loyalties 
The study found that in responding to organisational corruption, whistle-blowers 
and silent observers could be differentiated according to their continuance 
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commitment but not according to their affective and normative commitment. 
Continuance commitment significantly moderated the effect of ethical judgement 
on the whistle-blowing intention. The relationship between ethical judgement and 
whistle-blowing intention was stronger and positive at the higher level of 
continuance commitment than at the lower level. When ethical judgement is high, 
an employee with high continuance commitment will be more likely to blow the 
whistle. In contrast, affective and normative commitment was not significantly 
moderated by the effect of ethical judgement on the whistle-blowing intention 
(see Section 5.6.3).  
Employees with high organisational commitment were less likely to blow the 
whistle externally and this may be because they wanted to show their loyalty to 
their organisations by protecting them from bad publicity. They were more likely 
to blow the whistle internally, particularly when they perceived that the act of 
whistle-blowing would serve to stop the wrongdoing, therefore minimising loss to 
the organisation. On the other hand, less committed employees were either 
unaware of or intentionally ignored the observed wrongdoing since they perceived 
that the prevention of loss to the organisation was not their concern and may have 
perceived the organisation’s values to be different from their own, or they had no 
desire to forge a career in that particular organisation. However, Chen and Lai 
(2014) argued that less committed employees may also easily blow the whistle 
without considering the impact on the organisation. 
The multiple commitments of potential whistle-blowers may explain the 
contrasting findings of continuance commitment, affective commitment and 
normative commitment as the moderating effect of ethical judgement and whistle-
blowing intention. Seeing whistle-blowing as prosocial organisational behaviour, 
potential whistle-blowers are faced with a conflicting commitment between 
commitment to the organisation and commitment to their leaders, superiors and 
work groups (audit team). O’Toole (2008) found that many institutional leaders 
believe that their employees owe loyalty to them as individuals whereas whistle-
blowers typically say they owe their first loyalty to their organisations. 
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In the GIAUs, the commitment to the leaders, superiors and work groups were 
shown in organisational leadership (see Section 5.7.2), organisational glue (see 
Section 5.7.4) and in the in-group collectivism of Indonesian culture (see Section 
2.8.1). On the one hand, potential whistle-blowers felt a sense of obligation and 
debt to the organisation. On the other hand, potential whistle-blowers also placed 
a high value on in-group collectivism. Employees were taught to work 
cooperatively and harmoniously way and to make personal sacrifices to meet 
group obligations. Organisational glue was continuously developed through 
various activities such as managerial briefings, outbound activities, religious 
services and family visits. On the contrary, potential whistle-blowers were also 
taught to uphold rules, regulations and codes of ethics. Their leaders demanded 
obedience from their subordinates but subordinates saw that their superiors were 
either themselves wrongdoers or else gave rewards to wrongdoers.  
These findings support the notion that commitment is related to prosocial 
organisational behaviour. Employees’ commitment to top management, 
supervisors and work groups contributed significantly to predicting prosocial 
organisational behaviour beyond organisational commitment (Becker, 1992; 
Taylor and Curtis, 2010; Becker and Billings, 1993). 
The study also found that the observers of wrongdoing evaluated the conflict 
between their values and multiple loyalties to the parties involved. Invoking a 
particular value in the whistle-blowing decision may have meant they violated 
other values. They were also aware that loyalty accorded to a particular party also 
came with its own costs and benefits. Similarly, giving their loyalty to one 
particular party may be seen as disloyalty to other parties. These findings show 
that conflict in values occurred mainly between personal and organisational values 
whereas conflict of multiple loyalties occurred mainly between obligations to the 
organisation and other parties such as to their co-workers, leaders, families, 
friends and selves. 
These results are in accordance with the notion that fairness and loyalty norms 
clash during whistle-blowing decisions. There will be a trade-off between fairness 
and loyalty norms. Fairness norms typically require potential whistle-blowers to 
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treat different people equally. Thus, they should report the wrongdoing in an 
attempt to punish the wrongdoer, whereas loyalty norms indicate favourable 
treatment of one person over others. This may demotivate an employee to blow 
the whistle since whistle-blowing may be seen as disloyal and an act of betrayal. 
Therefore, the whistle-blower may be inclined towards fairness norms while silent 
observers may choose to implement loyalty norms in their decisions (Waytz, et 
al., 2013). However, the norms of fairness and loyalty may not clash if the 
potential whistle-blower uses hypernorms. Hypernorms are globally held beliefs 
and values that guide behaviour or actions and judgement across situations 
(Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck, 1961; Rokeach, 1973, in Stam, et al., 2014; Warren, 
2003). A potential whistle-blower using hypernorms may not experience conflict 
between fairness and loyalty norms since he/she will choose to be loyal to the 
public instead of serving the interests of the wrongdoer.  
Theoretical implication 
These findings have important implications in helping us understand that the role 
of multiple commitment, conflict in values and multiple loyalties in influencing 
the whistle-blowing decision. Each employee has various types of organisational 
commitment and each type of organisational commitment influences the whistle-
blowing decision differently. In general, the higher the organisational 
commitment, the higher the willingness to blow the whistle. However, this may 
apply only to internal whistle-blowing. Another important implication may be that 
we need to develop an appropriate type of organisational commitment in order to 
promote constructive whistle-blowing behaviour among employees. 
6.4 Conceptual categories of whistle-blower and individual differences 
between whistle-blower and silent observer 
This study found that ethical judgement was related to whistle-blowing intention 
and moderated by perceived seriousness and organisational commitment. Based 
on these interplaying relationships, characterisations can be developed of both the 
whistle-blower and silent observer. This study proposes that the whistle-blower 
can be conceptually categorised according to the relationships between: 1) ethical 
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judgement and perceived seriousness and 2) ethical judgement and organisational 
commitment. The internal whistle-blower can be described as an employee who is 
ethically sensitive, intolerant of corruption and has a high level of organisational 
commitment. On the contrary, the silent observer is ethically insensitive, tolerant 
of corruption and has a low level of organisational commitment.  
This study also proposes that whistle-blowers and silent observers can be 
differentiated based on their individual differences. A whistle-blower can be 
described as an employee who proactively initiates change in the organisation and 
utilises higher norms so that they see whistle-blowing as constructive deviance. 
6.4.1 Individual Differences: Initiating Change Proactively and Utilising 
Higher Norms 
The current study found that respondents in the research described the whistle-
blower somewhat differently to how they described the silent observer (see 
Section 4.2.2). One main important theme differentiating the whistle-blower and 
the silent observer may be that whistle-blowers appeared to be proactive 
employees. Whistle-blowers proactively initiated change in their organisation. In 
responding to individual corruption, informal whistle-blowing was seen as a way 
of changing the wrongdoer’s behaviour whereas, in responding to collective 
organisational corruption, whistle-blowing internally was seen as a way of 
changing the corrupt system in their organisation. In responding to inconsistent 
leaders who committed an act of wrongdoing, they proactively brought the issue 
to their higher superiors and CEOs and opposed the wrongdoer’s decision.  
Whistle-blowers seem to overcome an unsupportive ethical climate and 
unsupportive leadership by bringing higher norms into their decision process. 
Whistle-blowers were aware that the act of whistle-blowing may be seen as 
deviant behaviour by other employees. They were also aware that whistle-blowing 
may land them in trouble and bring annoying situations. In bringing legal issues 
into the office, they were ready to be questioned, exposed and spiritually tortured 
(see Section 4.3.4.2). This may not conform with the norms of their co-workers. 
However, they chose to use the higher norms of 1) being an employee who is 
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professional, responsible and committed to the organisation, 2) being loyal to the 
organisation and 3) practising religious values (see Section 4.2.2 and 4.2.3). They 
perceived themselves as acting on good intention and their act of internal whistle-
blowing was perceived as an act of constructive deviance. The use of higher 
norms to guide them in the ethical dilemma may shift the destructive conformity 
of the silent observer to the constructive deviance of whistle-blowing.  
From the prosocial organisational behaviour perspective of whistle-blowing, 
particularly in Phase 3, proactive employees may have greater willingness to take 
responsibility by blowing the whistle when they observe a wrongdoing. From the 
ethical decision-making perspective of whistle-blowing, taking proactive 
responsibility indicates the existence of a higher level of perseverance. Whistle-
blowers execute their intention to actually blow the whistle by overcoming 
obstacles, particularly those of an unsupportive ethical climate and unsupportive 
leadership (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011; Miceli, et al., 2008). This is aligned 
with the notion that whistle-blowers are driven by their sense of integrity and have 
a social responsibility to speak out and allow their attitudes and beliefs to guide 
them (Greene & Latting, 2004). 
6.4.2 Individual Difference: Job Level  
The study found that acts of wrongdoing committed by auditors in equal and 
higher positions and acts of wrongdoing committed collusively by auditors were 
less likely to be the target of whistle-blowing in comparison to acts of wrongdoing 
committed by lower-level auditors (see Section 4.2.1). In other words, observers 
of wrongdoing older and more senior than the wrongdoer may be more likely to 
blow the whistle. In responding to collective wrongdoing, older and more senior 
employees may know more about the situation in their organisations, particularly 
in terms of how to assess the existence of organisational support. They may also 
have greater ability to assess the level of wrongfulness and the level of 
seriousness of the wrongdoing. Evidence of the act of wrongdoing may be more 
accessible to them. They may be able to develop relationships with higher 
superior(s) so that they can informally report to them or the wrongdoer’s superior. 
Older and more senior employees seem to have greater competence in identifying 
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the various parties to be considered and to estimate the kinds of responses those 
parties may give if they decide to blow the whistle. They also seem to have 
greater risk-abatement ability and be more capable of minimising the perceived 
cost of whistle-blowing. 
Another explanation may refer to the concept of power distance. In a highly 
patriarchal and hierarchical culture (see Section 2.8.1 and Section 5.7.2), there is 
great power distance between not only younger, junior employees and 
wrongdoer(s) but also between younger, junior employees and their superiors. 
Younger, junior employees felt inferior towards wrongdoer(s) with higher power 
status. In collective organisational corruption, the act of being a silent observer 
was seen as showing respect to the status of seniority and superiority of the 
wrongdoer(s). When they decided to blow the whistle internally and then the 
recipient of the whistle-blowing information decided not to respond, they were 
silent and did not take further action such as external whistle-blowing. The 
younger, junior auditor was left out of the audit team’s decision to engage in 
collective wrongdoing but still received corrupt money in recognition of their 
showing loyalty to their co-workers. He or she was not the wrongdoer but they 
nevertheless felt complicit in the wrongdoing. Feelings of powerlessness and 
inferiority may result in a reduced intention to blow the whistle. Blowing the 
whistle in the absence of having any power in the office was perceived as suicide, 
reckless and a foolish decision (see Section 4.2.3). 
Prior studies found insignificant, inconsistent or negative and positive correlations 
between age and tenure and whistle-blowing. Miethe (1999) explained this mixed 
result by comparing younger, lower-ranked and novice employees with older, 
supervisory and senior workers. The former categories may be less likely to 
observe wrongdoing and more prone to victimisation and therefore less likely to 
blow the whistle. They may also, however, be less vested and thus be more 
willing to blow the whistle. On the other hand, a senior employee is more likely to 
hold a managerial position and have greater opportunity to observe but also 
greater tolerance of wrongdoing. They may therefore be more likely to report 
wrongdoing internally in order to prevent adverse publicity for their organisations. 
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This mixed result was also found in studies of sexual harassment. Vijayasiri 
(2008) reported that according to Rudman et al. (1995), older women are more 
likely to report sexual harassment, while a study by Terpstra and Cook (1985) 
suggested that younger women may be more likely to complain. 
6.4.3 Conceptual Categories of Whistle-blower  
6.4.3.1 Conceptual Category Based on the Relationship between Ethical 
Judgement and Perceived Seriousness of Wrongdoing 
The findings suggest that potential whistle-blowers can be grouped into the four 
conceptual categories of employees who are: 1) tolerant and ethically insensitive 
to corruption, 2) tolerant but ethically sensitive, 3) intolerant but ethically 
insensitive and 4) intolerant and ethically sensitive. Figure 6.3 shows the 
descriptions of potential whistle-blowers based on the interaction of ethical 
judgement and seriousness of wrongdoing.  
 
Figure 6.3: Conceptual categories of potential whistle-blower based on the 
interaction of ethical judgement and seriousness of wrongdoing perception  
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It can be inferred that silent observers are people with a high tolerance of 
corruption whereas whistle-blowers are people with a low tolerance of corruption 
who are inclined to reject engagement in a corrupt act or who view corrupt 
behaviour committed by other persons as ethically unacceptable. Whistle-blowers 
will feel secure in knowing that society will not accept the wrongdoing. On the 
contrary, whistle-blowers will feel afraid of retaliation while the wrongdoer will 
feel secure in committing the wrongdoing in an intolerant society. This is 
consistent with the notion that people are less motivated to engage in corruption in 
an intolerant society. But people are more inclined to commit wrongdoing in a 
tolerant society (Gong and Wang, 2013; Khruakham and Lee, 2013).  
Insensitive Tolerant Employee 
Tolerant and ethically insensitive to corruption means that when an employee 
observes a wrongdoing, he/she will perceive it to be not wrongful. He/she will not 
be aware that there is a moral problem in the ongoing wrongdoing. He/she will 
also not perceive the wrongdoing as serious. He/she may use various rationalising 
ideologies that the wrongdoing is seen as tolerable corruption. Therefore, the 
employee has a low intention to blow the whistle.  
Sensitive Tolerant Employee 
Ethically sensitive but tolerant of corruption means that when an employee 
observes an act of wrongdoing, he/she will perceive the wrongdoing as wrongful. 
He/she is aware that the wrongdoing is illegal, illegitimate and unethical or 
contradicts/violates the organisation’s value. However, using various rationalising 
ideologies, the employee will tolerate the wrongdoing. Although it is wrong, it is 
tolerable. He/she will assume that it does not warrant being reported. Therefore, 
the employee has a low intention to blow the whistle.  
Insensitive Intolerant Employee 
Ethically insensitive and intolerant to corruption means that when an employee 
observes a wrongdoing, he/she will not perceive the wrongdoing as wrongful. 
He/she is not aware that he/she is dealing with a moral dilemma. The wrongdoing 
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will not be seen as illegal, illegitimate and unethical or as contradicting/violating 
the organisation’s values. However, if he/she observes a particular activity and 
then concludes that the activity is wrongful, he/she will not tolerate it. Therefore, 
the employee has a high intention to blow the whistle. 
Sensitive and Intolerant Employee 
An employee who is ethically sensitive and intolerant to corruption has a high 
intention of blowing the whistle. When he/she observes a wrongdoing, he/she will 
perceive that the wrongdoing is both wrongful and serious. He/she will not try to 
provide a justification for the wrongdoing being wrongful and tolerable. Without a 
doubt, he/she will conclude that it is wrong and that it cannot be tolerated. The 
sensitive and intolerant employee is the most likely to blow the whistle, whereas 
the insensitive and tolerant employee is the least likely to blow the whistle. 
 
6.4.3.2 Conceptual Categories of Whistle-blower According to the 
Relationship between Ethical Judgement and Organisational 
Commitment 
Based on the interaction of ethical judgement and organisational commitment, it 
can be proposed that potential whistle-blowers can be grouped into the four 
conceptual categories of employees who are: 1) ethically insensitive to corruption 
and disloyal to the organisation, 2) sensitive but disloyal, 3) insensitive but loyal 
and 4) sensitive and loyal. Figure 6.4 shows the descriptions of potential whistle-
blowers based on the interaction of ethical judgement and organisational 
commitment. 
Insensitive Disloyal Employee 
Insensitive disloyal employee means an employee who is ethically insensitive and 
has a low level of organisational commitment. When an employee observes a 
wrongdoing, he/she will perceive the wrongdoing as not wrongful. His/her 
indifference towards the organisation makes him/her reluctant to blow the whistle.  
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Figure 6.4: Conceptual categories of potential whistle-blowers based on the 
interaction of ethical judgement and organisational commitment 
 
Sensitive Disloyal Employee 
When a sensitive disloyal employee observes a wrongdoing, he/she will perceive 
the wrongdoing to be wrongful. His/her indifference towards the organisation also 
makes him/her reluctant to blow the whistle. However, due to his/her 
sensitiveness, he/she may feel guilty if he/she does not do something. He/she may 
gossip or engage in an informal talk with the wrongdoer. He/she may not be 
concerned about the organisation, but may have some concern for the wrongdoer. 
Alternatively, he/she may directly blow the whistle externally or to the public. 
He/she may not be aware of bad publicity that may harm the organisation. 
Insensitive Loyal Employee 
An ethically insensitive and loyal employee means that when an employee 
observes a wrongdoing, he/she will perceive that the wrongdoing is not wrongful. 
His/her high level of organisational commitment can produce the perception that 
the organisation cannot be wrong. The wrongdoing may be rationalised as ‘in the 
interest of the organisation’. The wrongdoing will not be reported.  
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Sensitive Loyal Employee 
The sensitive loyal employee will perceive the observed activity as unacceptable 
wrongful wrongdoing. His/her high level of organisational commitment motivates 
him/her to correct the wrongdoing and prevent harm to the organisation. He/she 
will blow the whistle internally. However, his/her commitment to the organisation 
prevents him/her from blowing the whistle externally or to the public. He/she is 
aware that external whistle-blowing may harm the organisation. The sensitive and 
loyal employee is the most likely to carry out (internal) whistle-blowing whereas 
the insensitive and disloyal employee is the least likely to blow the whistle. 
6.4.4 Theoretical Implication of the Characteristics of Whistle-blowers 
The study suggests that whistle-blowers seem to overcome an unsupportive 
ethical climate and unsupportive leadership by bringing higher norms into their 
decision-making process. The use of higher norms to guide them in the ethical 
dilemma may shift the destructive conformity of silence to constructive deviance 
of whistle-blowing. From the ethical decision-making perspective of whistle-
blowing, taking responsibility indicates the existence of a higher level of 
perseverance (Bazerman and Tenbrunsel, 2011; Miceli, et al., 2008; Greene and 
Latting, 2004). In the context of bureaucratic and anti-corruption reform in 
Indonesia, the employee who initiates change (persuades other employees to 
believe in the benefits of their act of reporting) and uses higher norms (uses their 
capability to overcome scepticism) can be perceived as an institutional 
entrepreneur (Misangyi, et al., 2008). 
This finding has important implications for helping us identify potential whistle-
blowers among employees in the organisation. Another important implication may 
be that we can develop employees to have a proactive attitude and willingness to 
utilise higher norms. Another important implication may be that we need to focus 
more on developing employees to be intolerant and sensitive to corruption and 
loyal to the organisation by eliminating the justification for not blowing the 
whistle.   
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6.5 Concluding Notes: Summary of Theoretical Implications  
To answer the research questions, we developed integrated frameworks of the 
ethical decision-making and prosocial organisational behaviour perspectives of 
the whistle-blowing decision. The main discussion on the ethical decision-making 
perspective of whistle-blowing is the ethical dilemma resulting from the conflict 
involved in balancing values and multiple loyalties, obligations and commitments 
in order to determine the moral position of whistle-blowing: whistle-blowing as 
morally not required, morally permitted, morally required and morally 
praiseworthy. The main discussion on the prosocial organisational behaviour 
perspective of whistle-blowing is how employees help organisations stop or 
prevent wrongdoing from occurring by blowing the whistle without becoming the 
object of retaliation. In doing so, they evaluate their responsibility, the response 
from the organisation and the costs and benefits of each alternative. The findings 
of this study demonstrate how the respondents used their ethical sensitivity, 
ethical competence and ethical perseverance in making the whistle-blowing 
decision.  
This has important implications for helping us understand the process of making 
the decision, particularly in terms of: 
- The occurrence of the process of normalisation of corruption in the evaluation 
of the wrongfulness and seriousness of the wrongdoing. 
- The importance of the organisational response to whistle-blowing information 
in determining that there is a moral problem in the organisation, its 
wrongfulness and its seriousness.  
- The occurrence of role conflict for the recipient of whistle-blowing 
information and the diffusion of responsibility in the identification process of 
who has responsibility for blowing the whistle in response to collective 
wrongdoing. 
- The significance of the real or perceived motives of the potential whistle-
blower in the decision process.  
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- Other morally acceptable decisions that the observer of the wrongdoing may 
make, aside from a decision to blow the whistle, because the organisation 
cannot be expected to effectively respond to the whistle-blowing information.  
- The process of how a potential whistle-blower selects the channel to use 
when blowing the whistle.  
- The justification for not blowing the whistle, particularly in cases where 
employees do not have the ethical perseverance to follow through on a 
decision.  
The study also has important implications for helping us understand the factors 
influencing the whistle-blowing decision, particularly in terms of: 
- The relationship between ethical judgement and whistle-blowing intention. 
- The role of perceived seriousness in the relationship between ethical 
judgement and whistle-blowing intention whilst taking into consideration the 
ethical climate, wrongdoer’s power status, whistle-blower’s job level and 
organisational commitment. 
- The role of organisational commitment in the relationship between ethical 
judgement and whistle-blowing intention whilst taking into consideration the 
ethical climate, wrongdoer’s power status, whistle-blower’s job level and 
perceived seriousness. 
- The influence of organisational leadership and the strength of evidence on the 
decision to follow the intention to blow the whistle through to actual whistle-
blowing behaviour. 
- The role of leadership in the organisation in shaping the ethical climate 
through the use of reward and punishment systems. 
- The occurrence of multiple commitment, conflict in values and multiple 
loyalties in the whistle-blowing decision. 
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSIONS 
 
7.1 Introduction  
This chapter draws together the findings and key arguments that underlie the 
theoretical contribution (Section 7.2), practical implication (Section 7.3) and 
methodological contribution (Section 7.4). The limitations of the study and 
suggestions for future research are in Section 7.5 and Section 7.6. The 
researcher’s personal reflection is in Section 7.7. 
7.2 Theoretical Contribution 
We have examined how government internal auditors in Indonesia decide and 
justify whether to blow or not to blow the whistle in responding to organisational 
corruption. We have also analysed the intention to blow the whistle through a 
series of six case scenarios presented in the questionnaires to examine the factors 
influencing whistle-blowing decisions.  
The current thesis has managed to make a theoretical contribution by filling 
significant gaps in the existing knowledge in the domains of organisational studies 
and business ethics particularly regarding the area of whistle-blowing decisions. 
As indicated in the literature review chapter, it was found that the previous studies 
that examined whistle-blowing behaviour were conducted using various 
theoretical frameworks, approaches, types of occupation, types of wrongdoing and 
largely conducted in organisations in Western countries. There existed a scarcity 
of research in the field of government internal auditors’ whistle-blowing decision 
in responding to organisational corruption in non-Western countries.  
We combined the ethical decision-making and prosocial organisational behaviour 
perspectives of whistle-blowing to examine the ethical dilemma resulting from the 
conflict in balancing values, multiple loyalties and obligations and how 
employees help their organisation either stop or prevent wrongdoing from 
occurring by blowing the whistle constructively. The findings of this study 
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demonstrate how the respondents used their ethical sensitivity, ethical competence 
and ethical perseverance in making their whistle-blowing decisions.  
It has enhanced our understanding of whistle-blowing behaviour, particularly the 
behaviour of employees who were also wrongdoers or beneficiaries of the 
wrongdoing in responding to individual corruption as well as normalised 
collective organisational corruption. The study helps us to understand how 
auditors in government agencies in Indonesia decided to blow or not to blow the 
whistle in response to organisational corruption taking place within their own 
internal audit units.  
The theoretical contributions of the thesis are as follow: 
1. We provide an integrated perspective of the whistle-blowing decision 
developed from the ethical decision-making perspective (cf. Armstrong, et 
al.,2003; Ponemon, 1994) and prosocial organisational behaviour perspective 
(cf. Miceli, 2008) of the whistle-blowing decision.  
a. Together, these two perspectives can capture both micro-individual and 
macro-organisational phenomena of the whistle-blowing behaviour in 
Indonesia  
The organisational factors that include ethical climate, organisational 
culture and leadership reflected the aggregate or collective response in the 
macro level whereas the individual factors that include ethical judgment, 
organisational commitment, job level reflected the variations in individual 
characteristics in the micro level. The use of the concept of corrupt 
organisation and organisation of corrupt individuals also reflected the 
macro – micro level of whistle-blowing phenomena. Examining these two 
levels can capture the meso level which is the interactions between the 
person (the whistle-blower) and the whistle-blowing situation. The 
situational factor that includes perceived seriousness reflected the meso 
level of whistle-blowing phenomena in the government internal audit 
units. 
b. Based on the integrated perspective of the whistle-blowing decision, the 
processes at work behind whistle-blowing decisions appear to follow a 
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proposed three phases of whistle-blowing decision. In phase 1, the 
potential whistle-blower evaluated the wrongfulness and the seriousness 
of the wrongdoing in accordance with his/her ethical sensitivity and 
evaluated the existence of the responsibility to act to stop the wrongdoing. 
In phase 2, the potential whistle-blower evaluated the organisation 
responsiveness and the demoralising situation. In phase 3, the potential 
whistle-blower assessed his/her personal responsibility, identified 
alternative decisions according to his/her ethical competence, analysed the 
cost and the benefit of each alternative and decide to blow or not to blow 
the whistle depended on his/her ethical perseverance.  
2. The integrated perspective of the ethical decision-making and prosocial 
organisational behaviour perspectives enable us to understand the occurrence 
of the process of normalisation of corruption in the government internal audit 
units (cf. Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Palmer, 2012) that influence the whistle-
blowing decisions in the following ways: 
a. Desensitising employees’ evaluation of the wrongfulness and the 
seriousness of the wrongdoing; 
b. Diffusing the responsibility to blow the whistle; 
c. Creating a demoralising situation and unresponsive organisation; 
Employees will perceive the wrongdoing to be acceptable and will not see 
themselves as responsible for their decision to stay silent. The tolerance to 
corruption, rewarding the silent observers and perceiving whistle-blowers as 
traitors, disloyal and unfaithful friends supress the willingness to blow the 
whistle. Furthermore, the wrongdoer will feel secure and the whistle-blower 
will perceive that the act of whistle-blowing is not acceptable. These combine 
to form a vicious cycle of unwillingness to blow the whistle and a process of 
rationalisation and socialisation that underlie the normalisation of 
organisational corruption.  
3. We provide evidence that ethical judgement, ethical climate, organisational 
commitment and perceived seriousness are necessary factors for potential 
whistle-blowers to have the intention to blow the whistle while also taking the 
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ethical climate, wrongdoer’s power status and whistle-blower’s job level into 
consideration. 
a. Seeing ethical judgement as a comparative process of evaluation (Rest, 
1986; Sparks and Pan, 2010) and using Multidimensional Ethics Scale 
(Reidenbach and Robin, 1990), we can confirm that government internal 
auditors with higher ethical judgement will be more likely to blow the 
whistle in responding to organisational corruption than those who have 
lower ethical judgement.  (cf. Greene and Latting, 2004; Chiu, 2003; 
Ayers and Kaplan, 2005; Zhang et al., 2009; Ahmad, 2011),  
b. Defining perceived seriousness of the organisational corruption as the 
reflection of the intensity scale and the hierarchical scale that includes the 
frequency, the length of time the organisational corruption has been 
taking place, the amount of money involved, the amount of damage and 
the impact on society and individuals or on the particular parties involved 
(Jones, 1991) and the number of hierarchical levels directly involved in 
the corruption activities (Luo, 2005), we confirm that the effect of ethical 
judgement on whistle-blowing intention will be moderated by the 
perceived seriousness of the wrongdoing. The more serious the 
organisational corruption perceived by a government internal auditor, the 
higher the influence of ethical judgement on the government internal 
auditor’s intention to blow the whistle (cf. Jones,1991; Near et al.,2004; 
Miceli and Near, 1992, Lee et al. 2004; Robinson, et al., 2012; Ayers and 
Kaplan, 2005; Ming et al.,1998). 
A wrongdoing may not be perceived as serious when it is in the best 
interests of the organisation, occurring in the context of getting a decent 
life, for charity or social purposes or on compassionate grounds. 
Therefore, they may be less likely to be reported.  
In contrast, a wrongdoing that is undertaken in someone’s personal self-
interest, repeated wrongdoing or committed by greedy employees seeking 
to excessively enrich themselves are considered as serious wrongdoing. 
Therefore, they may be more likely to be reported. 
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c. Utilising three separate components of organisational commitment: 
affective commitment, continuance commitment and normative 
commitment (Meyer & Allen, 1991), we confirm that the effect of ethical 
judgement on whistle-blowing intention is moderated by organisational 
commitment. The effect of ethical judgement on whistle-blowing 
intention will be stronger for government internal auditors with higher 
organisational commitment (cf. Street, 1995; Miceli et al.,2008; Taylor 
and Curtis, 2010; Somers and Casal, 1994; Mesmer-Magnus and 
Viswesvaran, 2005; Sims and Keenan, 1998; Ahmad, 2011; Chen and 
Lai, 2014) 
However, considering that an employee may be committed to co-workers, 
committed to upper management and the organisation, committed to both 
foci or uncommitted to either the organisation or his/her co-workers 
(Becker & Billings, 1993), the effect of organisational commitment on the 
relationship between ethical judgment and the whistle-blowing intention 
may apply only to internal whistle-blowing. Less committed employees 
may be either unaware of or intentionally ignored the observed 
wrongdoing or may also easily blow the whistle without considering the 
impact on the organisation. 
4. The study provides us with evidence that organisational leadership and 
strength of evidence are necessary factors for potential whistle-blowers to 
follow their whistle-blowing intention through into actual whistle-blowing 
behaviour.  
a. Exemplary leaders who are friendly, open-minded, receptive and 
trustworthy can give hope and confidence for employees to blow the 
whistle (cf. Caillier, 2013; Bhal & Dadhich, 2011; Azhari, 2014). In 
contrast, ‘talk-only’ leadership and feudalistic, unresponsive, angry and 
spiteful superiors demoralise and suppress the potential whistle-blowers’ 
willingness to speak up (cf. Jackson, et al., 2013; Vandekerckhove, et al., 
2014). 
b. The strength of evidence are also necessary factors for potential whistle-
blowers to follow their whistle-blowing intention through into actual 
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whistle-blowing behaviour. The stronger the evidence, the less ambiguous 
the wrongdoing. It can increase their sense of responsibility for reporting. 
Therefore, the greater the likelihood of the observer blowing the whistle. 
Furthermore, the whistle-blower who blow the whistle based on robust 
evidence will be perceived by others as constructive whistle-blowers (cf. 
Brink, et al., 2013; Ayers & Kaplan, 2005).  
5. The study provides us with a conceptual category of the internal whistle-
blower and silent observer according to the relationship between 1) ethical 
judgement and perceived seriousness and 2) ethical judgement and 
organisational commitment. 
The internal whistle-blower can be described as an employee who is ethically 
sensitive, intolerant of corruption and has a high level of organisational 
commitment. On the contrary, the silent observer is ethically insensitive, 
tolerant of corruption and has a low level of organisational commitment. 
The contribution made by the results could be considered a new point of reference 
for theories of whistle-blowing in an Indonesian setting. It can also be applied to 
other countries where in-group collectivism, power distance, human orientation 
and uncertainty avoidance are relatively high. 
7.3 Practical Implication in the Context of Indonesia  
The study may be able to guide policymakers in formulating whistle-blowing 
regulations and developing organisational culture and in helping employees make 
whistle-blowing decisions. The findings demonstrate the importance of: 
1. Altering the perception of whistle-blowing from being considered an act of 
destructive conformity or constructive deviance to one of constructive 
conformance. The whistle-blower has to be seen as a member of the 
organisation who behaves constructively against wrong behaviour but not 
against the organisation itself; 
2. Utilising 1) Kantian deontology by applying obligation to blow the whistle, 2) 
the calculations of utilitarian ethics to evaluate whether whistle-blowing is 
morally not required, morally permitted, morally required or morally 
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praiseworthy and 3) virtue ethics in the form of leaders who are role models 
for good characters and subordinates who are willing to overcome scepticism 
and persuade other employees to believe in the benefits of their act of whistle-
blowing.  
Several practical implications for policymakers, managers and individuals can be 
deduced from the findings. 
Practical implication for Policymakers in Government  
Regarding the silent observers’ justifications for not acting upon the identified 
wrongdoing, whistle-blowing should be altered from being considered 
constructive deviance to constructive conformance. This is something that can be 
developed through rules and regulation. Ethics can be institutionalised by 
establishing laws and compliance programmes (Ferrell, et al., 2011). Moreover, 
since the risk of broken social relationships in the office, verbal harassment and 
intimidation were feared more than the risk related to HRM decisions, protecting 
the whistle-blower using rules and regulation need to be followed through the 
development of organisational culture and ethical climate in the organisation. 
Therefore, the employee will come to see whistle-blowing as a legal and moral 
duty and responsibility.  
This is in conformance with the United Nations recommendation. Since Indonesia 
has ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption, the Indonesian 
government needs to improve its system for whistle-blowers to: 
… provide protection against any unjustified treatment for any person who 
reports in good faith and on reasonable grounds to the competent 
authorities any facts concerning offences established in accordance with 
this Convention. (CEC, 2006) 
Creating reporting mechanisms with adequate policies on confidentiality and non-
retaliation is extremely important and whistle-blowing systems can help to 
achieve open communications and build employee confidence and trust that the 
organisation will not tolerate either retaliation against whistle-blowers or false 
reporting. Therefore, the flow of information will increase and the barriers that 
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separate between the leaders and the subordinates can be broken down (Luo, 
2005; O’Toole, 2008; Vandekerckhove, et al., 2016). 
In addition to committed leadership as a prerequisite for promoting whistle-
blowing behaviour, respondents in the study recommended that the 
implementation of a whistle-blowing system should have a protection mechanism, 
online tracking facilities for the whistle-blower to follow the progression of the 
case and legal aid for the whistle-blower. The information must be managed by a 
designated person to assure the confidentiality of the whistle-blower’s identity. In 
line with the findings, the implementation of whistle-blowing system need to take 
into account the potentially difficult interactions between organisational culture in 
the government internal audit units and national cultures (Vandekerckhove, et al., 
2016). Moreover, the whistle-blowing system also need to consider the distinction 
between individual and systemic corruption albeit that the two forms of corruption 
may coexist and mutually reinforce each other (Fotaki & Humantito, 2015). 
Practical implication for Organisation/Managers 
The ethical gap of whistle-blowing behaviour can be rectified by 1) improving the 
principles dimension of the organisation’s ethical climate to guide employees on 
how to deal with the whistle-blowing dilemma and 2) developing a training 
system that extends to employees at the managerial level. Regarding 
characterisation of the whistle-blower, the ethical training managers may need to 
focus more on developing employees to be intolerant of and sensitive to 
corruption and loyal to the organisation. This training should include the 
development of personal responsibility for blowing the whistle in addition to role 
responsibility or professional responsibility as described in the job description and 
code of conduct. In doing this, effort to develop whistle-blowing behaviour can 
focus more on motivating employees to move from an intention to actually 
following through with their decision. 
Regarding 1) the result of how organisational commitment influences the whistle-
blowing intention, and 2) leaders who promoted the attitude of silent 
acquiescence, the training should incorporate the paradigm change that leaders 
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need to see organisational commitment as identification with the mission of the 
government agencies and not see it as absolute obedience to superiors. Whistle-
blowers should not be accused of disloyalty (Lewicka-Strzalecka, 2011).  
Referring to organisational unresponsiveness in responding to whistle-blowing 
information, training for managers should include how to lead by example and 
should emphasise the importance of the values of integrity and fairness. Managers 
need to reduce the impact of the power distance on unwillingness to blow the 
whistle by being open-minded and receptive superiors. The leaders and managers 
also need to create a culture of candour by telling the truth, admit mistakes, and 
respectfully listen to the perspectives of others (O’Toole, 2008), 
Whistle-blowing as a prosocial voice needs to be seen as constructive change and 
not be perceived as a challenge to the status quo (Latham & Sue-Chan, 2014). In 
doing this, the employee will prioritise internal channels over external channels, 
which may present an opportunity for the organisation to prevent destructive 
external whistle-blowing. Miethe (2009) posited that employees who do not view 
their leaders as role models are more likely to blow the whistle externally since 
they do not trust their leaders. They will perceive that external whistle-blowing is 
the only effective means of stopping the wrongdoing since the leaders have been 
involved in or are beneficiaries of the wrongdoing. As put forward by 
Vandekerckhove (2011), internal whistle-blowing can be seen as a compromise 
between moral muteness and moral heroism. 
Practical implication for Employees 
Regarding the influence of ethical judgement and perceived seriousness of the 
wrongdoing, employees need to be more sensitive to and intolerant of 
wrongdoing. Employees should report concerns that they may previously have 
perceived as less serious. Regarding the responsibility to act to stop the 
wrongdoing, employees also need to be aware of their legal obligation to blow the 
whistle as described in the code of conduct, standard operating procedures and job 
description. In cases of organisational unresponsiveness, employees need to be 
aware of the spectrum of the whistle-blowing decision. Whistle-blowing 
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behaviour other than formal whistle-blowing must be constructive behaviour so 
that the organisation can stop the wrongdoing and the employee can avoid 
retaliation. Considering that the risk of harm to social relationships was feared 
more than HRM-related risk, employees need to be supportive of the whistle-
blower. 
7.4 Methodological Contribution  
The questionnaires used for assessing the presence of respondents’ commitment to 
their organisations, identifying organisational culture type and capturing the 
ethical climate at the research sites can be applied to other studies in the 
Indonesian context. The Organisational Commitment Questionnaire originally 
developed by Allen (1990), the OCAI developed by Cameron and Quinn (2011) 
and the ECQ developed by Victor and Cullen (1988) have been adapted, 
translated into the Indonesian language and tested in the Indonesian context. They 
could therefore be used to help other researchers studying organisations in 
Indonesia. 
The six case scenarios utilised in the study can also be used by other researchers. 
As described in Section 3.4.1, the six case scenarios were used to measure 
whistle-blowing intentions in responding to organisational corruption committed 
by individual and collective wrongdoer(s). 
7.5 Delimitations and Limitations 
Limitations, shortcomings and conditions of the research that cannot be controlled 
may influence the results obtained in the study. The advantage of using self-report 
methods in the survey questionnaire and individual interview is that respondents 
were able to give their views and perceptions of themselves and their world. The 
disadvantage of the method is social desirability bias, whereby respondents tend 
to fill out questionnaires or answer interview questions in a way that makes them 
look as good as possible (Donaldson & Grant-Vallone, 2002). Respondents may 
also misperceive the observed wrongdoing due to an incomplete understanding of 
the facts, one-sided viewpoints and self-serving recollections (Olsen, 2014). 
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The social desirability bias, coverage error and non-response error that may occur 
in the conducting of a survey have been measured and minimised, including an 
emphasis on anonymity and confidentiality. Focus group interviews were also 
conducted as additional sources of information.  
However, there are some other limitations and delimitations to this research study 
that should be set and acknowledged to analyse any flaws found in the research 
design and possible threats to its validity. The constructs of organisational 
commitment, ethical climate, ethical judgement and organisation culture 
examined in the research were measured and defined according to pre-existing 
instruments. The reliability of the scales was tested in the research. However, 
there remains the possibility that other dimensions of organisational commitment, 
ethical climate, ethical judgement and organisation culture may have remained 
unidentified. 
The delimitations of the research defined the boundaries of the study. The 
populations focused on in the research were limited to registered and certified 
government internal auditors in seven government agencies in Indonesia. 
Therefore, the results concluded from the research may not be generalisable to any 
definable population. Moreover, the study does not consider internal auditors who 
work in the private sector or external auditors working in the government sector 
or accounting firms. 
7.6 Future Research Suggestions 
Regarding the ethical gap of the whistle-blowing decision, although behavioural 
intention is a reliable predictor of actual behaviour (Chiu, 2003; Ajzen, 1991), it 
would be interesting to examine whistle-blowing intentions and actual whistle-
blowing decisions in more depth. The aims of studying the ethical gap would be 
to discover how and why the employee does not follow an intention to blow the 
whistle through to actual whistle-blowing behaviour. 
Regarding the spectrum of whistle-blowing decisions other than formally blowing 
the whistle or remaining silent, further studies need to be carried out to validate 
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the factors influencing the decision to blow the whistle and the decision to remain 
silent. Deciding not to blow the whistle does not mean deciding to remain silent. 
The study raised the possibility that factors influencing the whistle-blowing 
decision may also influence other behaviours in the spectrum of the whistle-
blowing decision, or vice versa.  
Organisational unresponsiveness found in the study highlights the need to extend 
the study to comparatively examine perceived organisational support before and 
after the introduction of new whistle-blowing policies. As described in Section 
1.1.2, the development of a whistle-blowing system is part of anti-corruption 
reform. The comparative study may include: 1) an assessment of the level of 
wrongdoing and incidents of whistle-blowing, and 2) an exploration of the 
personal, organisational and situational factors influencing whistle-blowing. 
7.7 Personal Reflection 
The conclusion of the research brought to mind a story in the Bible. When the 
scribes and Pharisees brought to Jesus a woman caught in adultery, Jesus said, 
‘He who is without sin among you let him throw a stone at her first’ (John 
Chapter 8 verse 7). Being convicted by their conscience (verse 9), all of the 
accusers went out one by one and no one condemned her (verse 10). Could this be 
seen as justification for not wanting to blow the whistle? It also brought to mind 
the saying that we cannot use a dirty broom to clean a house. We may observe our 
co-worker(s) committing an act of wrongdoing but we may also be aware that we 
ourselves have done something similar in the past. We may also do the same, or 
worse, if in a similar situation. We are the sinner and we are the dirty broom. Is it 
right for us (the observer of the wrongdoing) to accuse, judge and condemn the 
wrongdoer(s) and then blow the whistle? Will it be clean if we (the recipients of 
whistle-blowing information) sweep our offices with that dirty broom? It ends up 
in a question of where should anti-corruption reform begin? Who should start the 
reform? The old saying that the best change starts with ourselves is true. 
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Appendix 1 Interview and focus group discussion guidelines 
Whistle-blowing 
1. In your words, what do you know about “whistle-blowing”? 
2. To what extent, do you think that whistle-blowing is important to an auditor? 
Why? 
3. In your opinion, how is whistle-blowing perceived (as a hero or traitor)? 
Why? 
4. In general, to what extent are you willing to report questionable acts? 
5. In your view, which one is more important for reporting questionable acts? 
Approval from others? Or self-approval? Why? Which referent group is 
important to you? (Supervisor, co-workers, neighbours, friends and family) 
6. In your opinion, how easy or difficult would it be for you to report a 
questionable act (e.g. whistle-blowing on a colleague who signed off a clean 
audit report on misleading financial statements)? 
7. In your view, do you believe that auditors have a personal responsibility 
towards others (e.g. the audit firm, profession, shareholders, society) to report 
questionable acts? Which one is more important? Why? 
8. In your opinion, to what extent do you believe that your organisation would 
support you if you decided to report unethical practices or wrongdoing? (i.e. 
superiors, etc.) (Please give reasons). 
9. What mechanisms do your organisation have for supporting ethical behaviour 
or whistle-blowing (reporting questionable acts)? 
10. What do you know about your organisation’s code of ethics? How will it 
affect your ability to report questionable acts? 
11. In your opinion, to what extent is material harm in influencing you to report 
questionable acts? 
12. In your opinion, if you had observed wrongdoing in your organisation, what 
are the main factors that would motivate you to report it to the appropriate 
person(s)? 
13. In your opinion, if you had observed wrongdoing in your organisation, what 
are the main factors that would discourage you from reporting it to the 
appropriate person(s)? 
14. What are the personal costs (i.e. trouble, risk, discomfort) to you? 
15. If you had observed wrongdoing, which channel of reporting would you take 
[i.e. internal channels (senior management, ethics committee) and external 
channels (media, regulatory bodies)]?) (Anonymous reporting (hotline)? 
(Please give reasons for your choice of the channel) Why? 
16. Have you ever observed and reported wrongdoing? Explain what happened. 
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17. What do you think are the positive and negative consequences of whistle-
blowing in your organisation?  
a. To you (Positive /Negative consequences) 
b. To the audit unit (Positive /Negative consequences) 
c. To the profession (Positive / negative consequences) 
d. To the society (Positive / Negative consequences) 
18. What other observations can you make about whistle-blowing within the audit 
profession? 
19. What recommendations can you make about encouraging whistle-blowing? 
Organisational Corruption 
20. When you think about corruption, what problems come to mind? Who is 
involved in corruption? 
21. Are you concerned about the amount of organisational corruption in your 
organisation?  In what way? How do you think organisational corruption 
affects your organisation? 
22. What do you think causes organisational corruption? 
23. What are the most difficult choices facing us related to corruption in your 
organisation? Why is it difficult for your organisation to tackle this problem? 
Organisation culture  
24. What are the values and beliefs of this organisation? What are the 
organisational attitude and behaviour? 
25. Is the organisational culture able to encourage/motivate the member of the 
organisation to be a whistle-blower in responding to the organisational 
corruption? 
26. What does whistle-blowing mean according to the organisation culture in this 
organisation? 
27. From the organisational culture persepctive, what is the purpose of the 
whistle-blowing system development? 
28. In general, how does the organisation member deal with the practices of 
whistle-blowing? 
29. In general, how does the leader of this organisation deal with the practices of 
whistle-blowing? 
30. To what extent, do you think that the organisation culture in this organisation 
is important to the effectiveness of the whistle-blowing as an anti-corruption 
instrument? Why? 
31. Is there any different treatment in dealing with an internal whistle-blowing 
and an external whistle-blowing?  
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32. Is there any difference approach in dealing with a whistle-blowing case 
occurred in client’s organisation and a whistle-blowing case in the 
organisation itself? 
 
 
Code of ethics 
33. In general, according to the Government Internal Auditor Code of Ethics, how 
does the government internal auditor profession deal with the practices of 
whistle-blowing? 
34. Is the code of conduct applied both in the context of conducting an audit and 
in the daily non-audit working activities? 
35. Is there any differences approach in the code of ethics whenever an auditor 
faced with corruption incident occurred in the auditee office and his office? 
36. There is a gap between the code of ethics and auditor’s perception. So, if 
someone does whistle-blowing become out of audit context, is he regarded as 
hero or traitor? 
37. According to your opinion, is it difficult, or how difficult or how easy is this 
for an auditor to blow the whistle on corruption when it occurs in their 
environment? 
38. What is the factor that distinguishes between the two organisations, the 
reforming and the not-yet reformed organisation? 
39. What are the factors that drive and motivate the auditor in a low commitment 
organisation to be a whistle-blower?  
40. In an audit, we found fictitious official travel, we do report it. But, if we found 
it in our organisation, what do you think?  
41. Does auditor become less sensitive when the corrupt act was benefited for 
many employees or for the benefit of the organisation? 
42. Is there a conflict of values among auditors as a profession, government 
officers and member of an organisation?   
43. What is the code of ethics point of view on anonym whistle-blowing? 
44. If I report something to my supervisor, is it a type of whistle-blowing?  
45. What is your recommendation regarding code of ethics? 
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PETUNJUK UMUM 
 
Kuesioner ini terdiri dari lima bagian yaitu: 
Bagian 1, data demografis, mencakup data mengenai unit organisasi, usia, jenis kelamin, 
pengalaman kerja, tingkat pendidikan, jabatan  dan agama. 
Bagian 2, kasus hipotetis, mencakup 6 (enam) kasus hipotetis yang mungkin Bapak/Ibu 
hadapi pada saat melaksanakan pekerjaan.  
Bagian 3, faktor yang mempengaruhi whistleblowing, terdiri dari tiga sub bagian: komitmen 
organisasi, budaya organisasi dan iklim etika organisasi. 
Bagian 4 dan bagian 5 merupakan bagian yang didesain untuk memperoleh gambaran 
umum mengenai bagaimana keputusan untuk ber-whistleblowing diambil. 
 
Dalam menjawab kuesioner ini, Bapak/Ibu harap mengacu pada definisi operasional berikut 
ini: 
 
1. Whistleblowing adalah upaya mengungkapkan informasi suatu kejadian atau kegiatan 
yang Bapak/Ibu anggap sebagai: 
- penyimpangan dari peraturan perundang-undangan, peraturan intern organisasi, 
prosedur, kode etik, aturan perilaku  
- kejadian yang menurut Bapak/Ibu tidak pantas, tidak bermoral atau mengganggu 
rasa keadilan atau tidak sesuai dengan hati nurani Bapak/Ibu. 
- yang terjadi di dalam organisasi dimana Bapak/Ibu bekerja  
- dilakukan dalam bentuk mengadu, melapor, mengirim surat kaleng, mengirim 
email/sms atau bentuk-bentuk pengungkapan informasi lainnya, baik secara lisan 
maupun tulisan 
- yang ditujukan kepada pejabat atau unit organisasi yang Bapak/Ibu anggap dapat 
menangani penyimpangan tersebut. 
 
2. Korupsi organisational adalah: 
- Sebagian besar pegawai berperilaku korup terutama untuk kepentingan diri meraka 
sendiri 
- Sekelompok pegawai secara kolektif berperilaku korup untuk kepentingan organisasi 
 
3. Untuk responden Auditor BPKP, istilah ‘organisasi’ disini mengacu pada unit kerja eselon 
II (Direktorat, Perwakilan, Pusat, Biro, Inspektorat) dimana Bapak/Ibu bekerja. 
Untuk responden Auditor APIP Kementerian/lembaga dimana APIP-nya eselon I, istilah 
‘organisasi’ disini mengacu pada unit kerja eselon I (Inspektorat Jenderal/Inspektorat 
Utama). 
Untuk responden Auditor APIP lembaga non kementerian/provinsi/kabupaten/kota 
dimana APIP-nya eselon II,  istilah ‘organisasi’ disini mengacu pada unit kerja eselon II 
(inspektorat). 
 
4. Atasan langsung administratif adalah atasan langsung yang menilai kinerja Bapak/Ibu 
dalam DP3 
5. Atasan langsung dalam penugasan adalah atasan langsung Bapak/Ibu, baik Auditor 
maupun pejabat struktural, sesuai surat tugas pengawasan  
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PETUNJUK PENGISIAN 
 
• Harap tidak mencantumkan nama, tanda tangan atau identitas lainnya di lembar 
kuesioner. Tanda persetujuan Bapak/Ibu untuk mengisi kuesioner ini terdapat pada 
lembar persetujuan yang telah disediakan terpisah dari kuesioner ini. 
• Harap menjawab seluruh pertanyaan berdasarkan apa yang Bapak/Ibu alami selama 24 
(dua puluh empat) bulan terakhir, kecuali dinyatakan lain untuk pertanyaan-pertanyaan 
tertentu 
• Bapak/Ibu mungkin tidak harus menjawab setiap pertanyaan. Petunjuk mengenai 
pertanyaan-pertanyaan yang tidak perlu dijawab tercantum pada pertanyaan yang 
bersangkutan.. 
• Bapak/Ibu dapat memberikan komentar/pendapat tambahan pada lembar terakhir 
kuesioner ini 
• Pastikan hanya terdapat satu jawaban untuk setiap pertanyaan, kecuali dinyatakan lain 
untuk pertanyaan-pertanyaan tertentu 
• Kembalikan kuesioner yang telah lengkap terisi pada petugas yang telah ditunjuk. 
• Beri tanda silang pada kotak (☒) sesuai jawaban Bapak/Ibu. Untuk merubah jawaban, 
coret jawaban semula (☒) dan beri tanda silang pada kotak (☒) lainnya yang sesuai. 
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BAGIAN 1 
DATA DEMOGRAFIS 
 
1. Unit organisasi: 
a. ☐ BPKP c. ☐ APIP Provinsi 
b. ☐ APIP Kementerian/Lembaga d. ☐ APIP Kabupaten/Kota 
 
2. Usia:    
a. ☐ Kurang dari atau sama 
dengan 30 tahun 
c. ☐ Lebih dari 40 tahun sampai 
dengan 50 tahun 
b. ☐ Lebih dari 30 tahun sampai 
dengan 40 tahun 
d. ☐ Lebih dari 50 tahun 
 
3. Jenis Kelamin:   
a. ☐ Pria b. ☐ Wanita 
 
4. Pengalaman kerja sebagai pegawai negeri: 
a. ☐ Kurang dari atau sama 
dengan 10 tahun 
c. ☐ Lebih dari 20 tahun sampai 
dengan 30 tahun 
b. ☐ Lebih dari 10 tahun sampai 
dengan 20 tahun 
d. ☐ Lebih dari 30 tahun 
 
5. Pengalaman kerja sebagai auditor: 
a. ☐ Kurang dari atau sama 
dengan 10 tahun 
c. ☐ Lebih dari 20 tahun sampai 
dengan 30 tahun 
b. ☐ Lebih dari 10 tahun sampai 
dengan 20 tahun 
d. ☐ Lebih dari 30 tahun 
 
6. Tingkat pendidikan terakhir:    
a. ☐ Diploma 3 c. ☐ Sarjana S2/sederajat 
b. ☐ Diploma IV/Sarjana S1 d. ☐ Sarjana S3/sederajat 
 
7. Jabatan  Auditor:  
a. ☐ Calon Auditor  e. ☐ Auditor Pertama 
b. ☐ Auditor Pelaksana f. ☐ Auditor Muda 
c. ☐ Auditor Pelaksana lanjutan g. ☐ Auditor Madya 
d. ☐ Auditor Penyelia h. ☐ Auditor Utama 
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8. Agama 
a. ☐ Islam f. ☐ Budha 
b. ☐ Kristen g. ☐ Kong Hu Cu 
c. ☐ Katolik f. ☐ Lain-lain  
e. ☐ Hindu g. ☐ Tidak bersedia mengungkapkan 
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BAGIAN 2 
KASUS HIPOTETIK 
 
 
 
Bagian ini menyajikan 6 (enam) kasus hipotetik yang mungkin Bapak/Ibu hadapi pada saat 
melaksanakan pekerjaan, yaitu: 
 
 
Kami harap Bapak/Ibu dapat menjawab seluruh pertanyaan setelah membaca, 
membandingkan dan menganalisis  tiap-tiap kasus hipotetik ini. Perlu kami tegaskan bahwa 
kami tidak menilai kebenaran jawaban Bapak/Ibu, penelitian ini hanya bertujuan 
mendapatkan persepsi Bapak/Ibu pada saat  menghadapi kasus-kasus seperti ini. Kasus ini 
murni adalah hipotetik, kemiripan dengan kejadian aktual hanya kebetulan belaka. 
 
 
 
  
Kasus 1: menghilangkan bukti audit 
Kasus 2: menghilangkan temuan hasil audit 
Kasus 3: pembiayaan perjalanan dinas fiktif 
Kasus 4: rekayasa bukti angka kredit auditor 
Kasus 5: pungutan biaya perjalanan dinas  
Kasus 6: rekayasa data  kinerja unit kerja 
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Kasus 1: Menghilangkan Bukti Audit  
Anda sedang melaksanakan audit operasional suatu kontrak konstruksi tahun jamak. 
Berdasarkan simpulan hasil audit sementara, terdapat temuan yang merugikan keuangan 
negara. Anda mengkonfirmasi hal ini kepada pihak kontraktor dan mereka mengakui hal ini 
secara lisan, namun kemudian pihak kontraktor memberitahu anda bahwa kontraktor telah 
memberi sejumlah uang untuk pejabat yang terkait dengan proses pengadaan, tim audit 
tahun lalu serta pejabat struktural yang saat ini masih aktif. 
Anda kemudian berkonsultasi dengan atasan langsung dalam penugasan. Atasan langsung 
tersebut mendengarkan anda dan kemudian berkata “berikan semua kertas kerjanya pada 
saya, saya akan diskusikan dulu hal ini  dengan Pimpinan”. Beberapa hari kemudian, anda 
mengetahui bahwa atasan langsung anda tersebut telah menghilangkan seluruh kertas kerja 
audit yang telah anda berikan dan tidak melakukan tindakan apapun juga terhadap temuan 
anda. Saat ini anda tidak lagi mempunyai bukti-bukti atas temuan tersebut. 
 
 
1. Tentukan tingkat keseriusan 
kejadian tersebut diatas  
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Tidak serius Kurang Serius Cukup serius Sangat Serius 
 
2. Dalam konteks 
organisasional, tentukan 
seberapa kuat kekuasaan 
“atasan langsung yang 
menghilangkan bukti audit” 
tersebut terhadap diri anda 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Tidak 
berkuasa 
Kurang 
berkuasa 
Cukup berkuasa 
Sangat 
berkuasa 
 
3. Apakah perilaku “atasan langsung yang menghilangkan bukti audit untuk melindungi 
pejabat terkait “ tersebut:  
a. etis? ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Sangat Etis Cukup etis Kurang etis Tidak etis 
b. wajar/pantas (fair)? ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Sangat wajar Cukup wajar Kurang wajar Tidak wajar 
c. mencerminkan rasa 
keadilan (just)? 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Sangat 
mencerminkan 
rasa keadilan 
Cukup 
mencerminkan 
rasa keadilan 
Kurang 
mencerminkan 
rasa keadilan 
Tidak 
mencerminkan 
rasa keadilan 
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d. dapat dibenarkan secara 
moral (morally right)? 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Sangat dapat 
dibenarkan 
secara moral 
Cukup dapat 
dibenarkan 
secara moral 
Kurang  
dibenarkan 
secara moral 
Tidak dapat 
dibenarkan 
secara  
moral 
e. dapat diterima apabila 
terjadi di kalangan 
keluarga anda? 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Sangat dapat 
diterima  
Cukup dapat 
diterima  
Kurang dapat 
diterima  
Tidak dapat 
diterima  
f. dilihat dari sudut 
pandang budaya 
organisasi, apakah 
perilaku dimaksud dapat 
diterima (culturally 
acceptable)? 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Sangat dapat 
diterima  
Cukup dapat 
diterima  
Kurang dapat 
diterima  
Tidak dapat 
diterima  
g. dilihat dari sudut 
pandang tradisi yang 
hidup di organisasi, 
apakah perilaku 
dimaksud dapat diterima 
(traditionally 
acceptable)? 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Sangat dapat 
diterima  
Cukup dapat 
diterima  
Kurang dapat 
diterima  
Tidak dapat 
diterima  
h. menunjukkan adanya 
pelanggaran terhadap 
kontrak sosial tidak 
tertulis (unwritten social 
contract)? 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Tidak  
Melanggar  
Kurang 
Melanggar  
Cukup  
Melanggar  
Sangat 
Melanggar  
i. menunjukkan adanya 
pelanggaran 
kontrak/perjanjian sosial 
tidak terucapkan 
(unspoken social 
contract)? 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Tidak  
Melanggar  
Kurang 
Melanggar  
Cukup  
Melanggar  
Sangat 
Melanggar  
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4. Menghadapi situasi tersebut, tentukan kemungkinkan Bapak/Ibu menjadi whistle-
blower? 
 
 Tidak  
mungkin 
Kurang  
mungkin 
Cukup 
mungkin 
Sangat 
mungkin 
a. Whistleblowing ke pihak 
internal: pejabat atau 
unit kerja dalam lingkup 
kementerian/ lembaga 
anda 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
b. Whistleblowing ke pihak 
eksternal: pejabat, unit 
kerja, organisasi 
pemerintah diluar lingkup 
kementerian/lembaga 
anda 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
c. Whistleblowing ke pihak 
eksternal: media, LSM 
atau anggota DPR 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
5. Menurut anda, apabila rekan kerja Bapak/Ibu menghadapi situasi yang sama, tentukan 
kemungkinkan rekan kerja tersebut menjadi whistle-blower? 
 
 Tidak  
mungkin 
Kurang  
mungkin 
Cukup 
mungkin 
Sangat 
mungkin 
a. Whistleblowing ke pihak 
internal: pejabat atau 
unit kerja dalam lingkup 
kementerian/ lembaga 
anda 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
b. Whistleblowing ke pihak 
eksternal: pejabat, unit 
kerja, organisasi 
pemerintah diluar lingkup 
kementerian/lembaga 
anda 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
c. Whistleblowing ke pihak 
eksternal: media, LSM 
atau anggota DPR 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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Kasus 2: Menghilangkan Temuan Hasil Audit  
 
Anda sedang melaksanakan audit operasional suatu kontrak konstruksi. Anda mendapatkan 
temuan bahwa penanggung jawab kegiatan konstruksi, pejabat pengadaan, pemenang 
lelang dan para peserta lelang lainnya telah memanipulasi dokumen pelelangan dan 
melaksanakan prosedur lelang secara proforma (hanya formalitas). Anda telah melakukan 
prosedur audit lanjutan namun karena keterbatasan waktu audit, anda tidak menemukan 
bukti adanya kerugian keuangan negara. Anda mencoba mengajukan perpanjangan surat 
tugas namun tidak disetujui oleh penanggungjawab audit tanpa disertai alasan yang jelas.  
Pada saat review meeting, penanggung jawab audit membaca temuan anda dan berkata 
”Temuan tidak penting, tidak ada kerugian keuangannya kan? Tidak usah masuk laporan 
ya”. Tanpa menulis apapun dalam formulir kendali mutu (formulir reviu berjenjang),  
penanggung jawab audit kemudian memerintahkan Tim Audit untuk menghilangkan temuan 
dan merubah konsep laporan. 
 
 
1. Tentukan tingkat keseriusan 
kejadian tersebut diatas  
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Tidak serius Kurang Serius Cukup serius Sangat Serius 
 
2. Dalam konteks 
organisasional, tentukan 
seberapa kuat kekuasaan 
“Penanggung jawab audit 
yang menghilangkan 
temuan hasil audit” 
tersebut terhadap diri anda 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Tidak 
berkuasa 
Kurang 
berkuasa 
Cukup berkuasa 
Sangat 
berkuasa 
 
3. Apakah perilaku “Penanggung jawab audit yang tidak menyetujui perpanjangan surat 
tugas dan  kemudian menghilangkan temuan penyimpangan prosedur dengan alasan 
tidak ada kerugian negara“ tersebut:  
a. etis? ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Sangat Etis Cukup etis Kurang etis Tidak etis 
b. wajar/pantas (fair)? ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Sangat wajar Cukup wajar Kurang wajar Tidak wajar 
c. mencerminkan rasa 
keadilan (just)? 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Sangat 
mencerminkan 
rasa keadilan 
Cukup 
mencerminkan 
rasa keadilan 
Kurang 
mencerminkan 
rasa keadilan 
Tidak 
mencerminkan 
rasa keadilan 
 
Kuesioner Penelitian 
Ide J. Tito 
 
11 
 
d. dapat dibenarkan secara 
moral (morally right)? 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Sangat dapat 
dibenarkan 
secara moral 
Cukup dapat 
dibenarkan 
secara moral 
Kurang  
dibenarkan 
secara moral 
Tidak dapat 
dibenarkan 
secara  
moral 
e. dapat diterima apabila 
terjadi di kalangan 
keluarga anda? 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Sangat dapat 
diterima  
Cukup dapat 
diterima  
Kurang dapat 
diterima  
Tidak dapat 
diterima  
f. dilihat dari sudut 
pandang budaya 
organisasi, apakah 
perilaku dimaksud dapat 
diterima (culturally 
acceptable)? 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Sangat dapat 
diterima  
Cukup dapat 
diterima  
Kurang dapat 
diterima  
Tidak dapat 
diterima  
g. dilihat dari sudut 
pandang tradisi yang 
hidup di organisasi, 
apakah perilaku 
dimaksud dapat diterima 
(traditionally 
acceptable)? 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Sangat dapat 
diterima  
Cukup dapat 
diterima  
Kurang dapat 
diterima  
Tidak dapat 
diterima  
h. menunjukkan adanya 
pelanggaran terhadap 
kontrak sosial tidak 
tertulis (unwritten social 
contract)? 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Tidak  
Melanggar  
Kurang 
Melanggar  
Cukup  
Melanggar  
Sangat 
Melanggar  
i. menunjukkan adanya 
pelanggaran 
kontrak/perjanjian sosial 
tidak terucapkan 
(unspoken social 
contract)? 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Tidak  
Melanggar  
Kurang 
Melanggar  
Cukup  
Melanggar  
Sangat 
Melanggar  
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4. Menghadapi situasi tersebut, tentukan kemungkinkan Bapak/Ibu menjadi whistle-
blower? 
 
 Tidak  
mungkin 
Kurang  
mungkin 
Cukup 
mungkin 
Sangat 
mungkin 
a. Whistleblowing ke pihak 
internal: pejabat atau 
unit kerja dalam lingkup 
kementerian/ lembaga 
anda 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
b. Whistleblowing ke pihak 
eksternal: pejabat, unit 
kerja, organisasi 
pemerintah diluar lingkup 
kementerian/lembaga 
anda 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
c. Whistleblowing ke pihak 
eksternal: media, LSM 
atau anggota DPR 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
5. Menurut anda, apabila rekan kerja Bapak/Ibu menghadapi situasi yang sama, tentukan 
kemungkinkan rekan kerja tersebut menjadi whistle-blower? 
 
 Tidak  
mungkin 
Kurang  
mungkin 
Cukup 
mungkin 
Sangat 
mungkin 
a. Whistleblowing ke pihak 
internal: pejabat atau 
unit kerja dalam lingkup 
kementerian/ lembaga 
anda 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
b. Whistleblowing ke pihak 
eksternal: pejabat, unit 
kerja, organisasi 
pemerintah diluar lingkup 
kementerian/lembaga 
anda 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
c. Whistleblowing ke pihak 
eksternal: media, LSM 
atau anggota DPR 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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Kasus 3: Pembiayaan Perjalanan Dinas Fiktif 
Anda saat ini sedang melakukan perjalanan dinas untuk melaksanakan tugas audit di luar 
kota bersama beberapa auditor lain dalam satu tim audit. Biaya perjalanan dinas 
sepenuhnya ditanggung oleh kantor anda. Alih-alih menginap di hotel, rekan kerja satu tim 
anda memutuskan untuk menginap di rumah kerabatnya. Pada saat akan kembali pulang, 
anda mengetahui bahwa rekan anda tersebut meminta dan mendapatkan kuitansi dan bukti 
menginap dari hotel. Beberapa hari kemudian, anda juga mengetahui bahwa bukti tersebut 
digunakan untuk mempertanggungjawabkan biaya perjalanan dinas. 
 
1. Tentukan tingkat keseriusan 
kejadian tersebut diatas  
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Tidak serius Kurang Serius Cukup serius Sangat Serius 
 
2. Dalam konteks 
organisasional, tentukan 
seberapa kuat kekuasaan 
“Rekan kerja yang 
mengklaim pembiayaan 
perjalanan dinas fiktif” 
tersebut terhadap diri anda 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Tidak 
berkuasa 
Kurang 
berkuasa 
Cukup berkuasa 
Sangat 
berkuasa 
 
3. Apakah perilaku “Rekan kerja yang mengklaim pembiayaan perjalanan dinas fiktif“ 
tersebut:  
a. etis? ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Sangat Etis Cukup etis Kurang etis Tidak etis 
b. wajar/pantas (fair)? ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Sangat wajar Cukup wajar Kurang wajar Tidak wajar 
c. mencerminkan rasa 
keadilan (just)? 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Sangat 
mencerminkan 
rasa keadilan 
Cukup 
mencerminkan 
rasa keadilan 
Kurang 
mencerminkan 
rasa keadilan 
Tidak 
mencerminkan 
rasa keadilan 
d. dapat dibenarkan 
secara moral (morally 
right)? 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Sangat dapat 
dibenarkan 
secara moral 
Cukup dapat 
dibenarkan 
secara moral 
Kurang  
dibenarkan 
secara moral 
Tidak dapat 
dibenarkan 
secara  
moral 
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e. dapat diterima apabila 
terjadi di kalangan 
keluarga anda? 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Sangat dapat 
diterima  
Cukup dapat 
diterima  
Kurang dapat 
diterima  
Tidak dapat 
diterima  
f. dilihat dari sudut 
pandang budaya 
organisasi, apakah 
perilaku dimaksud 
dapat diterima 
(culturally acceptable)? 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Sangat dapat 
diterima  
Cukup dapat 
diterima  
Kurang dapat 
diterima  
Tidak dapat 
diterima  
g. dilihat dari sudut 
pandang tradisi yang 
hidup di organisasi, 
apakah perilaku 
dimaksud dapat 
diterima (traditionally 
acceptable)? 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Sangat dapat 
diterima  
Cukup dapat 
diterima  
Kurang dapat 
diterima  
Tidak dapat 
diterima  
h. menunjukkan adanya 
pelanggaran terhadap 
kontrak sosial tidak 
tertulis (unwritten social 
contract)? 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Tidak  
Melanggar  
Kurang 
Melanggar  
Cukup  
Melanggar  
Sangat 
Melanggar  
i. menunjukkan adanya 
pelanggaran 
kontrak/perjanjian 
sosial tidak terucapkan 
(unspoken social 
contract)? 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Tidak  
Melanggar  
Kurang 
Melanggar  
Cukup  
Melanggar  
Sangat 
Melanggar  
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4. Menghadapi situasi tersebut, tentukan kemungkinkan Bapak/Ibu menjadi whistle-
blower? 
 
 Tidak  
mungkin 
Kurang  
mungkin 
Cukup 
mungkin 
Sangat 
mungkin 
a. Whistleblowing ke pihak 
internal: pejabat atau 
unit kerja dalam lingkup 
kementerian/ lembaga 
anda 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
b. Whistleblowing ke pihak 
eksternal: pejabat, unit 
kerja, organisasi 
pemerintah diluar 
lingkup 
kementerian/lembaga 
anda 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
c. Whistleblowing ke pihak 
eksternal: media, LSM 
atau anggota DPR 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
5. Menurut anda, apabila rekan kerja Bapak/Ibu menghadapi situasi yang sama, tentukan 
kemungkinkan rekan kerja tersebut menjadi whistle-blower? 
 
 Tidak  
mungkin 
Kurang  
mungkin 
Cukup 
mungkin 
Sangat 
mungkin 
a. Whistleblowing ke pihak 
internal: pejabat atau 
unit kerja dalam lingkup 
kementerian/ lembaga 
anda 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
b. Whistleblowing ke pihak 
eksternal: pejabat, unit 
kerja, organisasi 
pemerintah diluar 
lingkup 
kementerian/lembaga 
anda 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
c. Whistleblowing ke pihak 
eksternal: media, LSM 
atau anggota DPR 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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Kasus 4: Perekayasaan Bukti Angka Kredit Auditor 
Dalam rangka menyiapkan laporan angka kredit, anda saat ini sedang mengumpulkan 
berbagai bukti perolehan angka kredit untuk satu semester yang lalu. Anda mengetahui 
bahwa beberapa auditor rekan anda merekayasa daftar hadir pelatihan kantor sendiri dan 
memalsukan sertifikat tanda mengikuti seminar untuk menambah angka kredit mereka. 
Atasan langsung mereka yang juga kebetulan atasan anda juga mengetahui kejadian 
tersebut namun tidak peduli dan tetap mengesahkan laporan angka kredit mereka. 
 
 
1. Tentukan tingkat keseriusan 
kejadian tersebut diatas  
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Tidak serius Kurang Serius Cukup serius Sangat Serius 
 
2. Dalam konteks 
organisasional, tentukan 
seberapa kuat kekuasaan 
“Beberapa rekan kerja yang 
merekayasa bukti angka 
kredit auditor” tersebut 
terhadap diri anda 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Tidak 
berkuasa 
Kurang 
berkuasa 
Cukup berkuasa 
Sangat 
berkuasa 
 
3. Apakah perilaku “Beberapa rekan kerja yang merekayasa bukti angka kredit auditor“ 
tersebut:  
a. etis? ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Sangat Etis Cukup etis Kurang etis Tidak etis 
b. wajar/pantas (fair)? ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Sangat wajar Cukup wajar Kurang wajar Tidak wajar 
c. mencerminkan rasa 
keadilan (just)? 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Sangat 
mencerminkan 
rasa keadilan 
Cukup 
mencerminkan 
rasa keadilan 
Kurang 
mencerminkan 
rasa keadilan 
Tidak 
mencerminkan 
rasa keadilan 
d. dapat dibenarkan 
secara moral (morally 
right)? 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Sangat dapat 
dibenarkan 
secara moral 
Cukup dapat 
dibenarkan 
secara moral 
Kurang  
dibenarkan 
secara moral 
Tidak dapat 
dibenarkan 
secara  
moral 
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e. dapat diterima apabila 
terjadi di kalangan 
keluarga anda? 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Sangat dapat 
diterima  
Cukup dapat 
diterima  
Kurang dapat 
diterima  
Tidak dapat 
diterima  
f. dilihat dari sudut 
pandang budaya 
organisasi, apakah 
perilaku dimaksud 
dapat diterima 
(culturally acceptable)? 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Sangat dapat 
diterima  
Cukup dapat 
diterima  
Kurang dapat 
diterima  
Tidak dapat 
diterima  
g. dilihat dari sudut 
pandang tradisi yang 
hidup di organisasi, 
apakah perilaku 
dimaksud dapat 
diterima (traditionally 
acceptable)? 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Sangat dapat 
diterima  
Cukup dapat 
diterima  
Kurang dapat 
diterima  
Tidak dapat 
diterima  
h. menunjukkan adanya 
pelanggaran terhadap 
kontrak sosial tidak 
tertulis (unwritten social 
contract)? 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Tidak  
Melanggar  
Kurang 
Melanggar  
Cukup  
Melanggar  
Sangat 
Melanggar  
i. menunjukkan adanya 
pelanggaran 
kontrak/perjanjian 
sosial tidak terucapkan 
(unspoken social 
contract)? 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Tidak  
Melanggar  
Kurang 
Melanggar  
Cukup  
Melanggar  
Sangat 
Melanggar  
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4. Menghadapi situasi tersebut, tentukan kemungkinkan Bapak/Ibu menjadi whistle-
blower? 
 
 Tidak  
mungkin 
Kurang  
mungkin 
Cukup 
mungkin 
Sangat 
mungkin 
a. Whistleblowing ke pihak 
internal: pejabat atau 
unit kerja dalam lingkup 
kementerian/ lembaga 
anda 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
b. Whistleblowing ke pihak 
eksternal: pejabat, unit 
kerja, organisasi 
pemerintah diluar 
lingkup 
kementerian/lembaga 
anda 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
c. Whistleblowing ke pihak 
eksternal: media, LSM 
atau anggota DPR 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
5. Menurut anda, apabila rekan kerja Bapak/Ibu menghadapi situasi yang sama, tentukan 
kemungkinkan rekan kerja tersebut menjadi whistle-blower? 
 
 Tidak  
mungkin 
Kurang  
mungkin 
Cukup 
mungkin 
Sangat 
mungkin 
a. Whistleblowing ke pihak 
internal: pejabat atau 
unit kerja dalam lingkup 
kementerian/ lembaga 
anda 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
b. Whistleblowing ke pihak 
eksternal: pejabat, unit 
kerja, organisasi 
pemerintah diluar 
lingkup 
kementerian/lembaga 
anda 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
c. Whistleblowing ke pihak 
eksternal: media, LSM 
atau anggota DPR 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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Kasus 5: Pungutan biaya perjalanan dinas untuk biaya kantor 
sehari-hari 
Atasan langsung anda dan para auditor rekan kerja anda sepakat dan rela untuk 
menyisihkan kira-kira 10% dari biaya perjalanan dinas untuk dikumpulkan dan dikelola 
bersama untuk kepentingan kantor seperti membeli makan-minum tamu, makanan ringan 
untuk rapat, sumbangan sosial, tambahan honor office boy dan keperluan lain yang sifatnya 
untuk kebersamaan pegawai. Namun, agar kesepakatan tersebut tidak mengurangi hak 
auditor (uang harian perjalanan dinas), salah satu pegawai yang ditugaskan untuk mengurus 
pertanggungjawaban biaya perjalanan dinas merekayasa biaya hotel untuk mendapatkan 
kelebihan dana dalam rangka menutupi pungutan dana 10%  tersebut. 
 
1. Tentukan tingkat keseriusan 
kejadian tersebut diatas  
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Tidak serius Kurang Serius Cukup serius Sangat Serius 
 
2. Dalam konteks 
organisasional, tentukan 
seberapa kuat kekuasaan 
“Atasan langsung anda dan 
para auditor rekan kerja 
anda yang memungut dana 
dari biaya perjalanan dinas 
untuk kepentingan kantor 
dan untuk kebersamaan 
pegawai” tersebut terhadap 
diri anda 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Tidak 
berkuasa 
Kurang 
berkuasa 
Cukup berkuasa 
Sangat 
berkuasa 
 
3. Apakah perilaku “Atasan langsung anda dan para auditor rekan kerja “ tersebut:  
a. etis? ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Sangat Etis Cukup etis Kurang etis Tidak etis 
b. wajar/pantas (fair)? ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Sangat wajar Cukup wajar Kurang wajar Tidak wajar 
c. mencerminkan rasa 
keadilan (just)? 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Sangat 
mencerminkan 
rasa keadilan 
Cukup 
mencerminkan 
rasa keadilan 
Kurang 
mencerminkan 
rasa keadilan 
Tidak 
mencerminkan 
rasa keadilan 
 
d. dapat dibenarkan ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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secara moral (morally 
right)? 
Sangat dapat 
dibenarkan 
secara moral 
Cukup dapat 
dibenarkan 
secara moral 
Kurang  
dibenarkan 
secara moral 
Tidak dapat 
dibenarkan 
secara  
moral 
e. dapat diterima apabila 
terjadi di kalangan 
keluarga anda? 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Sangat dapat 
diterima  
Cukup dapat 
diterima  
Kurang dapat 
diterima  
Tidak dapat 
diterima  
f. dilihat dari sudut 
pandang budaya 
organisasi, apakah 
perilaku dimaksud 
dapat diterima 
(culturally acceptable)? 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Sangat dapat 
diterima  
Cukup dapat 
diterima  
Kurang dapat 
diterima  
Tidak dapat 
diterima  
g. dilihat dari sudut 
pandang tradisi yang 
hidup di organisasi, 
apakah perilaku 
dimaksud dapat 
diterima (traditionally 
acceptable)? 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Sangat dapat 
diterima  
Cukup dapat 
diterima  
Kurang dapat 
diterima  
Tidak dapat 
diterima  
h. menunjukkan adanya 
pelanggaran terhadap 
kontrak sosial tidak 
tertulis (unwritten social 
contract)? 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Tidak  
Melanggar  
Kurang 
Melanggar  
Cukup  
Melanggar  
Sangat 
Melanggar  
i. menunjukkan adanya 
pelanggaran 
kontrak/perjanjian 
sosial tidak terucapkan 
(unspoken social 
contract)? 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Tidak  
Melanggar  
Kurang 
Melanggar  
Cukup  
Melanggar  
Sangat 
Melanggar  
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4. Menghadapi situasi tersebut, tentukan kemungkinkan Bapak/Ibu menjadi whistle-
blower? 
 
 Tidak  
mungkin 
Kurang  
mungkin 
Cukup 
mungkin 
Sangat 
mungkin 
a. Whistleblowing ke pihak 
internal: pejabat atau 
unit kerja dalam lingkup 
kementerian/ lembaga 
anda 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
b. Whistleblowing ke pihak 
eksternal: pejabat, unit 
kerja, organisasi 
pemerintah diluar 
lingkup 
kementerian/lembaga 
anda 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
c. Whistleblowing ke pihak 
eksternal: media, LSM 
atau anggota DPR 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
5. Menurut anda, apabila rekan kerja Bapak/Ibu menghadapi situasi yang sama, tentukan 
kemungkinkan rekan kerja tersebut menjadi whistle-blower? 
 
 Tidak  
mungkin 
Kurang  
mungkin 
Cukup 
mungkin 
Sangat 
mungkin 
a. Whistleblowing ke pihak 
internal: pejabat atau 
unit kerja dalam lingkup 
kementerian/ lembaga 
anda 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
b. Whistleblowing ke pihak 
eksternal: pejabat, unit 
kerja, organisasi 
pemerintah diluar 
lingkup 
kementerian/lembaga 
anda 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
c. Whistleblowing ke pihak 
eksternal: media, LSM 
atau anggota DPR 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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Kasus 6: Rekayasa Data Kinerja Unit Kerja 
Pada akhir tahun, anda ditugaskan untuk mengumpulkan data dan menyusun laporan 
akuntabilitas kinerja bidang pengawasan di unit kerja anda sendiri. Laporan akuntabilitas 
kinerja tersebut mempengaruhi reputasi unit kerja dan mempengaruhi alokasi anggaran 
pengawasan.  Rendahnya capaian kinerja juga akan mempengaruhi keputusan apakah unit 
kerja anda layak dipilih untuk menjadi pilot project kegiatan peningkatan kapasitas yang 
antara lain berupa kegiatan penambahan sarana komputer kantor dan kesempatan 
pelatihan audit di luar negeri bagi auditor. Pada saat mengumpulkan data dan menyusun 
laporan, anda mengetahui bahwa beberapa pelaksanaan kegiatan audit terlambat 
diselesaikan namun nomor dan tanggal laporan audit telah direkayasa seolah-olah laporan 
tersebut selesai tepat waktu. Pejabat penanggung jawab kinerja tersebut memerintahkan 
kepada para tim audit agar data kronologis pada formulir kendali mutu audit dan kertas 
kerja audit juga disesuaikan dengan tanggal laporan hasil audit yang telah direkayasa 
tersebut. 
 
 
1. Tentukan tingkat keseriusan 
kejadian tersebut diatas  
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Tidak serius Kurang Serius Cukup serius Sangat Serius 
 
2. Dalam konteks 
organisasional, tentukan 
seberapa kuat kekuasaan 
“Pejabat penanggung jawab 
kinerja dan beberapa tim 
audit yang merekayasa data 
kinerja” tersebut terhadap 
diri anda 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Tidak 
berkuasa 
Kurang 
berkuasa 
Cukup berkuasa 
Sangat 
berkuasa 
 
3. Apakah perilaku “Pejabat penanggung jawab kinerja dan beberapa tim audit yang 
merekayasa data kinerja “ tersebut:  
a. etis? ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Sangat Etis Cukup etis Kurang etis Tidak etis 
b. wajar/pantas (fair)? ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Sangat wajar Cukup wajar Kurang wajar Tidak wajar 
c. mencerminkan rasa 
keadilan (just)? 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Sangat 
mencerminkan 
rasa keadilan 
Cukup 
mencerminkan 
rasa keadilan 
Kurang 
mencerminkan 
rasa keadilan 
Tidak 
mencerminkan 
rasa keadilan 
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d. dapat dibenarkan 
secara moral (morally 
right)? 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Sangat dapat 
dibenarkan 
secara moral 
Cukup dapat 
dibenarkan 
secara moral 
Kurang  
dibenarkan 
secara moral 
Tidak dapat 
dibenarkan 
secara  
moral 
e. dapat diterima apabila 
terjadi di kalangan 
keluarga anda? 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Sangat dapat 
diterima  
Cukup dapat 
diterima  
Kurang dapat 
diterima  
Tidak dapat 
diterima  
f. dilihat dari sudut 
pandang budaya 
organisasi, apakah 
perilaku dimaksud 
dapat diterima 
(culturally acceptable)? 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Sangat dapat 
diterima  
Cukup dapat 
diterima  
Kurang dapat 
diterima  
Tidak dapat 
diterima  
g. dilihat dari sudut 
pandang tradisi yang 
hidup di organisasi, 
apakah perilaku 
dimaksud dapat 
diterima (traditionally 
acceptable)? 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Sangat dapat 
diterima  
Cukup dapat 
diterima  
Kurang dapat 
diterima  
Tidak dapat 
diterima  
h. menunjukkan adanya 
pelanggaran terhadap 
kontrak sosial tidak 
tertulis (unwritten social 
contract)? 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Tidak  
Melanggar  
Kurang 
Melanggar  
Cukup  
Melanggar  
Sangat 
Melanggar  
i. menunjukkan adanya 
pelanggaran 
kontrak/perjanjian 
sosial tidak terucapkan 
(unspoken social 
contract)? 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Tidak  
Melanggar  
Kurang 
Melanggar  
Cukup  
Melanggar  
Sangat 
Melanggar  
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4. Menghadapi situasi tersebut, tentukan kemungkinkan Bapak/Ibu menjadi whistle-
blower? 
 
 Tidak  
mungkin 
Kurang  
mungkin 
Cukup 
mungkin 
Sangat 
mungkin 
a. Whistleblowing ke pihak 
internal: pejabat atau 
unit kerja dalam lingkup 
kementerian/ lembaga 
anda 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
b. Whistleblowing ke pihak 
eksternal: pejabat, unit 
kerja, organisasi 
pemerintah diluar 
lingkup 
kementerian/lembaga 
anda 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
c. Whistleblowing ke pihak 
eksternal: media, LSM 
atau anggota DPR 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
5. Menurut anda, apabila rekan kerja Bapak/Ibu menghadapi situasi yang sama, tentukan 
kemungkinkan rekan kerja tersebut menjadi whistle-blower? 
 
 Tidak  
mungkin 
Kurang  
mungkin 
Cukup 
mungkin 
Sangat 
mungkin 
a. Whistleblowing ke pihak 
internal: pejabat atau 
unit kerja dalam lingkup 
kementerian/ lembaga 
anda 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
b. Whistleblowing ke pihak 
eksternal: pejabat, unit 
kerja, organisasi 
pemerintah diluar 
lingkup 
kementerian/lembaga 
anda 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
c. Whistleblowing ke pihak 
eksternal: media, LSM 
atau anggota DPR 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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BAGIAN 3 
FAKTOR YANG MEMPENGARUHI WHISTLEBLOWING 
 
SUB BAGIAN 1: KOMITMEN ORGANISASI 
 
Pernyataan-pernyataan berikut berkaitan dengan hubungan Bapak/Ibu dengan 
organisasi.Kami mohon Bapak/Ibu dapat mengungkapkan sejauh mana tingkat kesetujuan 
atau ketidaksetujuan atas masing-masing pernyataan dibawah ini dengan cara memberi 
tanda silang (X) pada salah satu jawaban yangtersedia di sebelah kanan dari setiap 
pernyataan, dengan acuan sebagai berikut: 
1 = Sangat Tidak Setuju (STS) 
2 = Tidak Setuju (TS) 
3 = Kurang Setuju (KS) 
4 = Ragu-ragu (R) 
5 = Agak Setuju (AS) 
6 = Setuju (S) 
7 = Sangat Setuju (SS) 
 
  
Pernyataan 
STS TS KS R AS S SS 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
A 1 Saya merasa bahagia apabila dapat 
menghabiskan sisa karier saya di organisasi ini.       
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 2 Permasalahan organisasi ini saya rasakan 
sebagai permasalahan saya sendiri.        
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 3 Saya tidak merasa seperti bagian dari keluarga 
di organisasi ini.  
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 4 Saya tidak merasa terikat secara emosional 
dengan organisasi ini 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 5 Organisasi ini mempunyai makna pribadi yang 
sangat mendalam bagi saya  
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 6 Saya tidak mempunyai rasa memiliki yang kuat 
terhadap organisasi ini.        
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
B 1 Saat ini, sangat berat bagi saya untuk keluar dari 
organisasi ini, walau saya menginginkannya 
sekalipun 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 2 Kehidupan saya akan sangat terganggu 
seandainya sekarang saya memutuskan ingin 
keluar dari organisasi ini 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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Pernyataan 
STS TS KS R AS S SS 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 3 Saat ini, saya tetap bekerja di organisasi ini, 
selain karena kebutuhan, juga karena saya 
menginginkannya  
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 4 Saya merasa bahwa saya hanya mempunyai 
sedikit pilihan sehingga sulit bagi saya untuk 
mempertimbangkan keluar dari organisasi ini 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 5 Salah satu risiko yang berat bagi saya apabila 
saya keluar dari organisasi ini adalah sedikitnya 
pilihan pekerjaan lain  
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 6 Salah satu alasan utama saya untuk tetap 
bekerja di sini adalah karena keluar dari 
organisasi menuntut pengorbanan pribadi yang 
sangat besar, organisasi lain mungkin tidak akan 
memberikan penghasilan/tunjangan seperti 
yang saya peroleh dari organisasi ini.        
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
C 1 Saya tidak merasa berkewajiban untuk tetap 
tinggal bekerja dan setia pada organisasi ini 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 2 Bahkan jika ada tawaran yang lebih 
menguntungkan untuk meninggalkan organisasi 
ini saat ini, saya merasa hal tersebut tidak 
pantas.     
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 3 Saya akan merasa bersalah apabila 
meninggalkan organisasi ini saat ini. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 4 Organisasi ini layak mendapatkan kesetiaan 
(loyalitas) dari saya 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 5 Saya tidak akan keluar dari organisasi ini saat ini 
karena saya merasa mempunyai kewajiban 
moral terhadap rekan-rekan kerja saya disini. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 6 Saya punya hutang moral pada organisasi ini  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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SUB BAGIAN 2: BUDAYA ORGANISASI 
 
Pernyataan-pernyataan berikut berkaitan dengan karakter budaya organisasi dimana 
Bapak/Ibu bekerja.Kami mohon Bapak/Ibu memberi nilai pada setiap alternatif pernyataan 
A, B, C dan D masing – masing dengan nilai 0 s/d 100, sedemikian rupa sehingga nilai 
A+B+C+D = 100. Nilai 100 berarti menunjukkan suatu pernyatan sangat sesuai dengan 
kondisi aktual sedangkan nilai 0 (nol) berarti suatu pernyataan sangat tidak sesuai dengan 
kondisi aktual. 
 
Contoh: 
A. Organisasi ini merupakan tempat yang sangat personal, rasa kekeluargaan sangat 
tinggi, seperti sebuah keluarga besar. Para pegawai  saling berbagi. 20 
B. Organisasi ini merupakan organisasi dengan nilai kewirausahaan yang dinamis. Para 
pegawai bersedia dan berani mengambil risiko. 10 
C. Organisasi ini sangat berorientasi pada hasil. Hal terpenting terletak pada 
penyelesaian tugas. Para pegawai sangat kompetitif dan berorientasi pada prestasi 
kerja. 
45 
D. Organisasi ini adalah tempat yang sangat terkontrol dan terstruktur. Pelaksanaan 
pekerjaan ditata dan dikelola berdasarkan prosedur formal. 25 
 100 
 
Perlu kami tegaskan bahwa kami tidak menilai kebenaran jawaban Bapak/Ibu, penelitian ini 
hanya bertujuan mendapatkan persepsi Bapak/Ibu. 
 
1. Karakter Dominan  
A. Organisasi ini merupakan tempat yang sangat personal, rasa 
kekeluargaan sangat tinggi, seperti sebuah keluarga besar. Para 
pegawai  saling berbagi. ………………….. 
B. Organisasi ini merupakan organisasi dengan nilai kewirausahaan yang 
dinamis. Para pegawai bersedia dan berani mengambil risiko. ………………….. 
C. Organisasi ini sangat berorientasi pada hasil. Hal terpenting terletak 
pada penyelesaian tugas. Para pegawai sangat kompetitif dan 
berorientasi pada prestasi kerja. ………………….. 
D. Organisasi ini adalah tempat yang sangat terkontrol dan terstruktur. 
Pelaksanaan pekerjaan ditata dan dikelola berdasarkan prosedur 
formal. ………………….. 
 100 
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2. Kepemimpinan 
A. Kepemimpinan di organisasi ini pada umumnya ditunjukkan dalam 
bentuk membimbing, memfasilitasi dan mengasuh bawahan. ………………….. 
B. Kepemimpinan di organisasi ini pada umumnya ditunjukkan dalam 
bentuk mendorong bawahan untuk berjiwa wirausaha, inovatif dan 
berani mengambil risiko. ………………….. 
C. Kepemimpinan di organisasi ini pada umumnya ditunjukkan dalam 
bentuk bekerja secara sungguh-sungguh, sepenuh hati, agresif dan 
berorientasi pada hasil. ………………….. 
D. Kepemimpinan di organisasi ini pada umumnya ditunjukkan dalam 
bentuk koordinasi, pengorganisasian dan pengutamaan efisien dan 
kelancaran pekerjaan ………………….. 
 100 
3. Manajemen sumber daya manusia/kepegawaian 
A. Gaya manajemen SDM  di organisasi ini berkarakter: kerja sama tim, 
konsensus, dan partisipasi. ………………….. 
B. Gaya manajemen SDM di organisasi ini berkarakter: pemberian 
kebebasan untuk berinovasi dan mengambil risiko individual serta 
menghargai keunikan. ………………….. 
C. Gaya manajemen SDM di organisasi ini berkarakter: persaingan ketat 
antar pegawai, tuntutan kerja yang tinggi, dan pencapaian kinerja / 
prestasi kerja ………………….. 
D. Gaya manajemen SDM di organisasi ini berkarakter: keamanan kerja, 
harmonis, tidak bergejolak dan stabilitas dalam hubungan antar 
pegawai ………………….. 
 100 
 
4.  Penguat Ikatan Organisational 
A. Faktor yang menguatkan persatuan dan kesatuan di organisasi ini 
adalah loyalitas dan rasa saling percaya. Komitmen di organisasi ini 
cukup tinggi ………………….. 
B. Faktor yang menguatkan persatuan dan kesatuandi organisasi ini 
adalah komitmen terhadap inovasi dan pengembangan. Penekanan 
utama pada pentingnya untuk selalu terdepan ………………….. 
C. Faktor yang menguatkan persatuan dan kesatuandi organisasi ini 
adalah penekanan pada pencapaian tujuan dan kinerja. ………………….. 
D. Faktor yang menguatkan persatuan dan kesatuan di organisasi ini 
adalah peraturan dan kebijakan formal. Sangat penting untuk menjaga 
kelancaran jalannya organisasi. ………………….. 
 100 
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5. Strategi 
A. Organisasi ini menekankan pengembangan sumber daya manusia. 
Rasa saling percaya yang tinggi, keterbukaan, dan partisipasi telah 
berkembang dan bertahan lama ………………….. 
B. Organisasi ini menekankan penyediaan dan rekrutmen sumber daya 
baru dan menciptakan tantangan-tantangan baru. Upaya untuk 
mencoba hal-hal baru dan meraih peluang baru sangat dihargai ………………….. 
C. Organisasi ini mendorong persaingan dan prestasi kerja. Pencapaian 
target secara optimal dan menang dalam persaingan menjadi yang 
utama. ………………….. 
D. Organisasi menekankan terciptanya soliditas yang kuat dan stabilitas. 
Efisiensi, kontrol dan kelancaran kegiatan operasional menjadi yang 
utama. ………………….. 
 100 
6. Kriteria Keberhasilan 
A. Organisasi menjadikan pengembangan sumber daya manusia, kerja 
sama tim, komitmen pegawai, dan kepedulian terhadap auditan 
sebagai kriteria keberhasilan ………………….. 
B. Organisasi menjadikan  kekinian/kebaruan dan keunikan produk dan 
inovasi sebagai kriteria keberhasilan. Menjadi pemimpin produk yang 
inovatif adalah kunci keberhasilan. ………………….. 
C. Organisasi menjadikan  tingkat kepuasan stakeholders dan pengakuan 
bahwa organisasi berkinerja lebih baik dari organisasi lain yang 
melaksanakan tugas sejenis sebagai kriteria keberhasilan. Menjadi 
pemimpin diantara organisasi-organisasi lain sejenis adalah kunci 
keberhasilan. ………………….. 
D. Organisasi mendefinisikan sukses berdasarkan azas efisiensi. 
Pelaksanaan tugas audit yang tepat waktu, dan biaya audit yang 
rendah menjadi faktor kunci keberhasilan. ………………….. 
 100 
 
SUB BAGIAN 3: IKLIM ETIKA ORGANISASI 
Petunjuk pengisian: 
Pernyataan-pernyataan di bawah ini menyangkut iklim etika organisasi  tempat Bapak/Ibu 
bekerja. Kami mohon Bapak/Ibu untuk mengkaitkan masing-masing pernyataan dibawah ini 
dengan situasi atau suasana sesungguhnya yang terjadi di organisasi Bapak/Ibu, dan tidak 
mengkaitkannya dengan suka atau tidak suka terhadap pernyataan tersebut. 
Silakan Bapak/Ibu ungkapkan tingkat kesetujuan atau ketidaksetujuan terhadap setiap 
pernyataan dengan cara memberi tanda silang (X) pada salah satu alternatif jawaban yang 
anggap paling tepat, yang terdapat di sebelah kanan masing-masing pernyataan, dengan 
acuan sebagai berikut: 
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1 = Sepenuhnya Salah (SS) 
2 = Salah (S) 
3 = Kurang Benar (KB) 
4 = Agak Benar (AB) 
5 = Benar (B) 
6 = Sepenuhnya Benar (SB) 
 
 
Pernyataan 
1 
SS 
2 
S 
3 
KB 
4 
AB 
5 
B 
6 
SB 
1. Pegawai di organisasi ini pada umumnya hanya 
mementingkan diri sendiri 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
2. Pegawai di organisasi ini menjadikan efisiensi sebagai 
pertimbangan utama terlaksananya tugas dan 
tanggung jawabnya 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
3. Pegawai di dalam organisasi ini, diharapkan untuk 
berpedoman pada keyakinan moral mereka sendiri 
untuk menentukan apa yang benar untuk dilakukan 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
4. Pegawai di organisasi ini diharapkan untuk melakukan 
segala sesuatu demi tercapainya tujuan organisasi 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
5. Pegawai di organisasi ini saling memperhatikan  
kesejahteraan / kebaikan mereka 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
6. Pertimbangan etika dan moral pegawai di dalam 
organisasi ini tidak diutamakan  
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
7. Mematuhi sepenuhnya aturan dan prosedur 
organisasi merupakan hal yang sangat penting di 
dalam organisasi ini 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
8. Pegawai   di organiasi ini menempatkan tujuan dan 
reputasi organisasi di atas segala-galanya 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
9. Pegawai di organisasi ini pada umumnya 
menempatkan kepentingan pribadi di atas 
kepentingan lainnya 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
10. Pertimbangan utama di organisasi ini adalah 
kesadaran masing-masing pegawai akan hal yang 
dianggap benar dan salah 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
11. Kesejahteraan seluruh pegawai di dalam organisasi 
menjadi kepedulian utama organisasi ini 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
12. Dalam membuat keputusan, pertimbangan paling 
utama di dalam organisasi ini adalah apakah 
keputusan tersebut tidak bertentangan dengan 
hukum dan peraturan 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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Pernyataan 
1 
SS 
2 
S 
3 
KB 
4 
AB 
5 
B 
6 
SB 
13. Pegawai   di organisasi ini diharapkan untuk 
menempatkan kepatuhan pada aturan hukum di atas 
pertimbangan-pertimbangan yang lain  
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
14. Pegawai di dalam organisasi ini memandang 
pentingnya tingkat kepuasan stakeholders dan 
pengakuan bahwa organisasi ini berkinerja lebih baik 
dari organisasi lain yang melaksanakan tugas sejenis 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
15. Cara yang paling efisien merupakan cara yang 
dianggap paling tepat di dalam organisasi ini 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
16. Pegawai   di organisasi ini diharapkan untuk mentaati 
kode etik dan standard profesi 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
17. Pegawai   di organisasi ini  diharapkan untuk selalu 
melakukan apa yang tepat bagi stakeholders 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
18. Pegawai   di organisasi ini  memandang loyalitas tim 
(jiwa korsa) sebagai suatu hal yang penting 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
19. Pegawai   di organisasi ini  mempunyai rasa tanggung 
jawab yang besar terhadap stakeholders 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
20. Pegawai   di organisasi ini secara aktif  menunjukkan 
kepedulian mereka terhadap kepentingan 
stakeholders 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
21. Apa yang terbaik bagi tiap-tiap pegawai   menjadi 
perhatian utama organisasi ini 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
22. Pegawai   di dalam organisasi ini pada umumnya 
hanya memperhatikan terhadap apa yang terbaik bagi 
diri mereka sendiri 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
23. Perhatian utama organisasi ini adalah dampak dari 
suatu keputusan terhadap stakeholders 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
24. Ketika suatu keputusan akan dibuat, organisasi ini 
memperhatikan kepentingan setiap pegawai  
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
25. Kerjasama yang baik dari seluruh rekan kerja 
dipandang sangat penting di organisasi ini 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
26. Hubungan pribadi yang baik  dengan rekan kerja 
sangat penting di organisasi ini 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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BAGIAN 4 
WHISTLEBLOWING DALAM KONTEKS AUDIT 
 
1. Dalam 24 bulan terakhir, apakah Bapak/Ibu pernah mengetahui suatu kejadian atau 
kegiatan yang menurut Bapak/Ibu dapat diklasifikasikan sebagai korupsi yang dilakukan 
oleh rekan sekerja, baik auditor atau pejabat lainnya, yang berkaitan dengan 
pelaksanaan tugas-tugas audit (assurance maupun konsultasi)?  
 
a.  ☐Tidak  (Silakan  ke kuesioner Bagian 5) 
b.  ☐ Ya  
Pilih satu dari peryataan-pernyataan berikut ini yang paling tepat untuk  
menggambarkan kejadian tersebut? 
(Jika Bapak/Ibu mengetahui  lebih dari satu kejadian, harap pilih SATU kejadian yang menurut 
Bapak/Ibu adalah kejadan yang paling serius) 
(Beri tanda X pada kotak yang sesuai) 
 
☐ 1) Penyalahgunaan wewenang atau memanfaatkan jabatan untuk 
keuntungan pribadi  
☐ 2) Pembiayaan / pembayaran fiktif, mengajukan penggantian biaya yang 
lebih besar daripada seharusnya 
☐ 3) Penyuapan (menerima atau memberi uang suap), menerima atau 
memberi gratifikasi/hadiah/donasi illegal  
☐ 4) Pemerasan kepada auditee 
☐ 5) Penyalahgunaan sarana, asset atau fasilitas kantor atau penggunaan 
secara tidak wajar untuk kepentingan pribadi 
☐ 6) Melakukan perbuatan melanggar ketentuan intern organisasi atau bekerja 
tidak sesuai prosedur  
☐ 7) Menutupi, menyamarkan, tidak mengungkapkan atau menghilangkan 
temuan yang menurut Bapak/Ibu temuan tersebut adalah temuan yang 
merugikan keuangan Negara atau berindikasi korupsi 
☐ 8) Menutupi, menyamarkan, tidak mengungkapkan atau menghilangkan 
temuan yang menurut Bapak/Ibu temuan tersebut adalah temuan yang 
TIDAK merugikan keuangan Negara atau TIDAK berindikasi korupsi 
☐ 9) Kejadian lainnya (harap dijelaskan) 
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2. Siapakah pelaku utama kejadian tersebut? 
(Pilih satu dan beri tanda X pada kotak yang sesuai) 
 
a.  ☐Rekan kerja Auditor yang jabatannya lebih rendah dari Bapak/Ibu 
b. ☐Rekan kerja Auditor yang jabatannya sama dengan Bapak/Ibu 
c. ☐Rekan kerja Auditor yang jabatannya lebih tinggi dari Bapak/Ibu 
d. ☐Pejabat Struktural dengan jabatan lebih rendah dari penanggung jawab audit 
e.  ☐Pejabat Struktural penanggung jawab audit 
f.  ☐Pejabat Struktural dengan jabatan lebih tinggi dari penanggung jawab audit 
g.  ☐Bersama-sama lebih dari satu pelaku 
 
3. Apakah atas kejadian tersebut, Bapak/Ibu mengadu, melapor, mengirim surat kaleng, 
mengirim email/sms atau bentuk-bentuk whistleblowing lainnya? 
 
a.  ☐Ya, dengan menyebut identitas,  (ke pertanyaan nomor 4) 
b.  ☐Ya,  tanpa menyebut identitas (anonim),  (ke pertanyaan nomor 4) 
c.  ☐Tidak (ke pertanyaan nomor 5) 
 
4. Kepada siapa saja informasi tersebut anda sampaikan?  
(Dapat dipilih lebih dari satu dan lanjutkan ke pertanyaan nomor 6) 
 
a.  ☐ Rekan sekerja  
b. ☐Atasan langsung administratif kepegawaian 
c. ☐Atasan langsung dalam penugasan audit 
d. ☐Pimpinan unit kerja (eselon II) 
e. ☐Atasan pimpinan unit kerja (eselon I atau menteri/kepala lembaga) 
f. ☐Unit khusus yang menangani pengaduan di organisasi Bapak/Ibu 
g. ☐Aparat penegak hukum (Polri, Kejaksaan, KPK) 
h. ☐Media Massa 
i. ☐Anggota DPR 
j. ☐Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat 
k. ☐Lainnya (sebutkan ) …………………………… 
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5. Pilihlah, maksimal 3 pilihan, dari pernyataan-pernyataan  berikut ini yang paling tepat 
menggambarkan alasan Bapak/Ibu tidak melakukan whistleblowing 
 
a. ☐Saya merasa bahwa melakukan whistleblowing berisiko negatif terhadap diri saya 
b. ☐Saya merasa kejadian tersebut tidak begitu penting untuk dilaporkan  
c. ☐Saya mengetahui kejadian tersebut namun saya merasa tidak punya cukup bukti  
d. ☐Saya tidak mengetahui kepada siapa saya harus melapor 
e. ☐Saya tidak ingin orang lain mendapat masalah karena saya  
f. ☐Saya ingin menjaga reputasi organisasi saya dan tidak ingin mempermalukan unit 
kerja saya 
g. ☐Saya merasa bahwa tidak ada satupun yang bisa dilakukan untuk memperbaiki 
kondisi ini  
h. ☐ Kejadian tersebut telah dilaporkan oleh pegawai lain 
a. ☐Lainnya (sebutkan) 
 
6. Pilihlah, maksimal 3 pilihan, dari pernyataan-pernyataan  berikut ini yang paling tepat 
menggambarkan risiko yang paling Bapak/Ibu takutkan terjadi apabila Bapak/Ibu 
melakukan whistleblowing 
 
a. ☐rekan kerja berubah sikap menjadi tidak menyukaiatau menjauihi Bapak/Ibu  
b. ☐atasan langsung administratif kepegawaian berubah sikap menjadi tidak 
menyukai Bapak/Ibu  
c. ☐pejabat lebih tinggi dari atasan langsung administratif kepegawaian berubah 
sikap menjadi tidak menyukai Bapak/Ibu 
d. ☐penilaian kinerja (DP3) menjadi rendah 
e. ☐tidak direkomendasikan untuk dipromosikan 
f. ☐tidak direkomendasikan untuk mengikut diklat  
g. ☐Ditugaskan dijenis pekerjaan yang relatif tidak disukai atau tidak diinginkan 
h. ☐Dipindahtugaskan pada jabatan yang relatif tidak disukai atau tidak diinginkan  
i. ☐Dipindahtugaskan ke unit kerja di daerah lain yang yang relatif tidak disukai atau 
tidak diinginkan 
j. ☐Diberhentikan sementara dari jabatan 
k. ☐Dipecat dari pekerjaan 
l. ☐Penurunan grade jabatan 
m. ☐Intimidasi atau pelecehan verbal  
n. ☐Lainnya (sebutkan) 
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BAGIAN 5 
WHISTLEBLOWING DALAM KONTEKS PEKERJAAN KANTOR SEHARI-HARI 
DILUAR KONTEKS AUDIT 
 
1. Dalam 24 bulan terakhir, apakah Bapak/Ibu pernah mengetahui suatu kejadian atau 
kegiatan yang menurut Bapak/Ibu dapat diklasifikasikan sebagai korupsi yang dilakukan 
oleh rekan sekerja, baik auditor atau pejabat lainnya, yang terjadi dalam konteks 
pekerjaan kantor sehari-hari yang TIDAK berkaitan dengan pelaksanaan tugas-tugas 
audit?  
 
a.  ☐Tidak  (Silakan ke ke bagian 6) 
b.  ☐ Ya  
Pilih satu dari peryataan-pernyataan berikut ini yang paling tepat untuk  
menggambarkan kejadian tersebut? 
(Jika Bapak/Ibu mengetahui  lebih dari satu kejadian, harap pilih SATU kejadian yang menurut 
Bapak/Ibu adalah kejadan yang paling serius) 
(Beri tanda X pada kotak yang sesuai) 
 
☐ Penyalahgunaan wewenang atau memanfaatkan jabatan untuk keuntungan 
pribadi  
☐ Pembiayaan / pembayaran fiktif, mengajukan penggantian biaya yang lebih 
besar daripada seharusnya 
☐ Penyuapan (menerima atau memberi uang suap), menerima atau memberi 
gratifikasi/hadiah/donasi illegal  
☐ Pemerasan kepada auditee 
☐ Penyalahgunaan sarana, asset atau fasilitas kantor atau penggunaan secara 
tidak wajar untuk kepentingan pribadi 
☐ Melakukan perbuatan melanggar ketentuan intern organisasi atau bekerja 
tidak sesuai prosedur  
☐ Menutupi, menyamarkan, tidak mengungkapkan atau menghilangkan temuan 
yang menurut Bapak/Ibu temuan tersebut adalah temuan yang merugikan 
keuangan Negara atau berindikasi korupsi 
☐ Menutupi, menyamarkan, tidak mengungkapkan atau menghilangkan temuan 
yang menurut Bapak/Ibu temuan tersebut adalah temuan yang TIDAK 
merugikan keuangan Negara atau TIDAK berindikasi korupsi 
☐ Kejadian lainnya (harap dijelaskan) 
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2. Siapakah pelaku utama kejadian tersebut? 
(Pilih salah satu dan beri tanda X pada kotak yang sesuai) 
 
a.  ☐Rekan kerja Auditor yang jabatannya lebih rendah dari Bapak/Ibu 
b. ☐Rekan kerja Auditor yang jabatannya sama dengan Bapak/Ibu 
c. ☐Rekan kerja Auditor yang jabatannya lebih tinggi dari Bapak/Ibu 
d. ☐Pejabat Struktural dengan jabatan lebih rendah dari penanggung jawab audit 
e.  ☐Pejabat Struktural penanggung jawab audit 
f.  ☐Pejabat Struktural dengan jabatan lebih tinggi dari penanggung jawab audit 
g.  ☐Bersama-sama lebih dari satu pelaku 
 
3. Apakah atas kejadian tersebut, Bapak/Ibu mengadu, melapor, mengirim surat kaleng, 
mengirim email/sms atau bentuk-bentuk whistleblowing lainnya? 
 
a.  ☐Ya, dengan menyebut identitas,  (ke pertanyaan nomor 4) 
b.  ☐Ya,  tanpa menyebut identitas (anonym),  (ke pertanyaan nomor 4) 
c.  ☐Tidak (ke pertanyaan nomor 5) 
 
4. Kepada siapa saja informasi tersebut anda sampaikan?  
(Dapat dipilih lebih dari satu dan lanjutkan ke pertanyaan nomor 6) 
 
a.  ☐ Rekan sekerja  
b. ☐Atasan langsung administratif kepegawaian 
c. ☐Atasan langsung dalam penugasan audit 
d. ☐Pimpinan unit kerja (eselon II) 
e. ☐Atasan pimpinan unit kerja (eselon I atau menteri/kepala lembaga) 
f. ☐Unit khusus yang menangani pengaduan di organisasi Bapak/Ibu 
g. ☐Aparat penegak hukum (Polri, Kejaksaan, KPK) 
h. ☐Media Massa 
i. ☐Anggota DPR 
j. ☐Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat 
k. ☐Lainnya (sebutkan ) …………………………… 
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5. Pilihlah, maksimal 3 pilihan, dari pernyataan-pernyataan  berikut ini yang paling tepat 
menggambarkan alasan Bapak/Ibu tidak melakukan whistleblowing 
 
a. ☐ Saya merasa bahwa melakukan whistleblowingberisiko negatif terhadap diri saya 
b. ☐ Saya merasa kejadian tersebut tidak begitu penting untuk dilaporkan  
c. ☐ Saya mengetahui kejadian tersebut namun saya merasa tidak punya cukup bukti  
d. ☐ Saya tidak mengetahui kepada siapa saya harus melapor 
e. ☐ Saya tidak ingin orang lain mendapat masalah karena saya  
f. ☐ Saya ingin menjaga reputasi organisasi saya dan tidak ingin mempermalukan unit 
kerja saya 
g. ☐ Saya merasa bahwa tidak ada satupun yang bisa dilakukan untuk memperbaiki 
kondisi ini  
h. ☐ Kejadian tersebut telah dilaporkan oleh pegawai lain 
i. ☐Lainnya (sebutkan ) …………………………… 
 
6. Pilihlah, maksimal 3 pilihan, dari pernyataan-pernyataan  berikut ini yang paling tepat 
menggambarkan risiko yang paling Bapak/Ibu takutkan terjadi apabila Bapak/Ibu 
melakukan whistleblowing 
 
a. ☐ rekan kerja berubah sikap menjadi tidak menyukai  atau menjauihi Bapak/Ibu  
b. ☐ atasan langsung administratif kepegawaian berubah sikap menjadi tidak 
menyukai Bapak/Ibu  
c. ☐ pejabat lebih tinggi dari atasan langsung administratif kepegawaian berubah 
sikap menjadi tidak menyukai Bapak/Ibu 
d. ☐ penilaian kinerja (DP3) menjadi rendah 
e. ☐ tidak direkomendasikan untuk dipromosikan 
f. ☐ tidak direkomendasikan untuk mengikut diklat  
g. ☐ Ditugaskan dijenis pekerjaan yang relatif tidak disukai atau tidak diinginkan 
h. ☐ Dipindahtugaskan pada jabatan yang relatif tidak disukai atau tidak diinginkan  
i. ☐ Dipindahtugaskan ke unit kerja di daerah lain yang yang relatif tidak disukai atau 
tidak diinginkan 
j. ☐ Diberhentikan sementara dari jabatan 
k. ☐ Dipecat dari pekerjaan 
l. ☐ Penurunan grade jabatan 
m. ☐ Intimidasi atau pelecehan verbal  
n. ☐ Lainnya (sebutkan) 
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BAGIAN 6 
KOMENTAR TAMBAHAN 
 
 
Nomor 
Pertanyaan 
Uraian 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Terima Kasih atas Partisipasi Bapak/Ibu dalam Penelitian ini 
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Appendix 3 Results of Gioia Method 
Name Verbatim 1st order 
concept 
2nd Order 
themes 
Aggregate Dimension: Aspects of whistle-blowing decision 
Barley It was impossible for me to argue and oppose to 
my boss. Threatening me? Alright then, let us 
pray. All I could do was I did not follow his 
order. For one or two cases, I followed him but 
not for the most part. 
Let us pray Perception toward 
whistle-blower and 
the act of whistle-
blowing 
Iris It means that if we are clean, and just in case 
there is a counter-attack against us, it will be 
bounced off. We will be skinned and criticised. If 
we are not a really good person or just as bad as 
them, we will lose the courage to be a whistle-
blower. 
Clean, really 
good person 
Perception toward 
whistle-blower and 
the act of whistle-
blowing 
Iris We will lose the courage to be a whistle-blower if 
we are not really good persons or just as bad as 
the wrongdoer. We should be ready with the 
consequences. If we have the faith to be in line 
with our beliefs to tell the truth, we dare to deal 
with a greater power 
Should be 
ready with the 
consequences. 
Perception toward 
whistle-blower and 
the act of whistle-
blowing 
Lee Whistle-blowing, in my opinion, is a demand for 
us, we have a religious duty to do goodness and 
prevent misguidance. Whistle-blowing is one of 
the implementations of those teachings. It is how 
we in daily life can blow the whistle for goodness 
and remind [others] in a case of badness. 
Ethically and morally, Islam teaches us to be a 
whistle-blower and become the agent of change 
in goodness. It is obligatory. We should 
cooperate in goodness and not cooperate in 
crime. We must put ourselves aside from 
collective corruption 
Religious duty Perception toward 
whistle-blower and 
the act of whistle-
blowing 
Nickie My parents planted those values and gave us 
examples of the behaviour. And I saw my parents 
fight for their integrity 
Family values Perception toward 
whistle-blower and 
the act of whistle-
blowing 
Nico A whistle-blower dares to take the risk. I’ve 
found many people who take risks but someone 
[a whistle-blower] who also dares to take the risk 
may have a good understanding of his religion 
Religious 
values 
Perception toward 
whistle-blower and 
the act of whistle-
blowing 
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Name Verbatim 1st order 
concept 
2nd Order 
themes 
Rainy The [lower-level] employees always think about 
how to get ‘other income’ to fulfil their basic 
need. Most employees have not been able to 
afford to live within a reasonable standard of 
living decently. In this kind of situation, a 
whistle-blower may be seen as a traitor among 
other employees 
Traitor Perception toward 
whistle-blower and 
the act of whistle-
blowing 
Rianna It can bring down the spirit of people to perform 
well if that happens [backbiting and prejudice]. 
Because of bad management of whistle-blowing, 
they may not want to take responsibility of a 
high-risk job only because they are afraid of 
being accused of something that they do not do 
Backbiting and 
prejudice 
Perception toward 
whistle-blower and 
the act of whistle-
blowing 
Rianna The implementation of whistle-blowing system 
makes anyone aware that they would always be 
supervised by one another, and feels that anyone 
is concerned and able to response to the 
wrongdoing that may occur.   
Being aware 
that they 
would always 
be supervised 
by one another 
Perception toward 
whistle-blower and 
the act of whistle-
blowing 
Rianna The system also creates a feeling of always being 
careful when doing anything and builds a 
deterrence atmosphere. People will always 
provide a response to any personnel who commit 
violations. All the government apparatus would 
be terrified when thinking to do any wrongdoing 
Deterrence 
atmosphere 
Perception toward 
whistle-blower and 
the act of whistle-
blowing 
Andrew I think if it happens, the tendency was... ‘I am not 
conducting an audit here, don’t trouble yourself, 
never mind.’ 
don't trouble  
yourself 
Personal dilemma 
with various 
parties to be 
considered 
Eve In fact, I’m glad that they finally realised their 
mistakes. So, maybe at that point God does not 
sleep, there must be a lesson to be learnt. There 
will be a time when we win and I have done it.. 
God does not 
sleep 
Personal dilemma 
with various 
parties to be 
considered 
Eve Yes, that was the consequence. I felt like I was 
isolated in my environment. What we thought 
was that we needed to be brave and make a stand. 
After that, we did receive some unfavourable 
consequences. We accepted these. It was difficult 
but fortunately, we can show that we were 
consistent with our attitude and it did not affect 
our performance. Whatever their manoeuvre that 
has been done to us, it does not matter. The basic 
of our attitude is good intention. 
Brave, make a 
stand, 
consistent and 
good intention 
Personal dilemma 
with various 
parties to be 
considered 
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Name Verbatim 1st order 
concept 
2nd Order 
themes 
Harley If I, as a junior auditor, vigorously and 
passionately did the whistle-blowing, I might be 
considered as crazy. 
Crazy Personal dilemma 
with various 
parties to be 
considered 
Lily It is up to us whether we want to report it or not. 
We should not be forced to be a whistle-blower. 
Voluntarily 
whistle-
blowing 
Personal dilemma 
with various 
parties to be 
considered 
Nickie In an incident, I observed someone [in my audit 
team] accept an envelope [bribe money from 
audit client]. It was not that much money. Then I 
saw that he was the single breadwinner of his 
family, he had many kids and he did not have 
anything [luxurious]. I do not justify the 
wrongdoing but I can understand why he did it. I 
guessed that he/she did it because he/she needed 
it so bad. 
Wrongdoer's 
family is part 
of the 
consideration 
Personal dilemma 
with various 
parties to be 
considered 
Nickie Finally, I said to them [audit team], ‘It is up to 
you, you were the one who take it while I was not 
here. But I would not take it and I wanted to 
return it back.’ I just wanted to know that I could 
not accept that. 
Not willing to 
be complicit 
Personal dilemma 
with various 
parties to be 
considered 
Nico In an employment relationship, whistle-blowing 
is the last step. Say it directly that it is unlawful. 
If it is not addressed, then [try again for] a second 
time. If it is still not considered, so be it. We are 
the subordinates right. Thus, maybe we could 
take the final steps which is whistle-blowing. 
Whistle-
blowing is 
final step 
Personal dilemma 
with various 
parties to be 
considered 
Rena We have discussed it with the leaders here and 
there was an option to report it to our 
inspectorate. Because it should be so. But we felt 
pity if we reported it and then he got punished 
severely. He has several children and his wife 
does not work. How could they live? It was 
decided to punish him [in a way] that would not 
endanger his family. They were not the ones who 
had committed it. 
Feeling pity to 
the wrongdoer 
due to his 
family 
situation 
Personal dilemma 
with various 
parties to be 
considered 
Rudolph Having the courage to do whistle-blowing is not 
enough. For example, I do the whistle-blowing 
on something and then all of sudden, I got 
transferred [to another office, perceived as an 
unfavourable position]. The effect is not on 
ourselves solely but also on our families. That is 
part of our consideration. 
Having 
courage to do 
whistle-
blowing is not 
enough 
Personal dilemma 
with various 
parties to be 
considered 
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Rudolph I did once try to blow the whistle in the KPK 
online whistle-blowing system. I got a response 
from them but then they wanted my identity, my 
name, my phone number and other personal data. 
And then I started to think deeply if so, it was 
quite likely I would become the one to blame [by 
my family]. Instead of the wrongdoing being 
proven, I would become the highlighted person. I 
decided not to carry on with the whistle-blowing 
and so be it. 
Afraid to be 
blamed by 
their own 
family 
Personal dilemma 
with various 
parties to be 
considered 
Sab I did not have the courage to prevent that 
wrongdoing. It is my own experience. When I 
was a junior auditor, I did not have the power. If I 
did it [whistle-blowing] while the [working] 
condition here was not conducive, it means 
suicide for me. It would be good if the 
wrongdoing can be rectified completely. But if it 
does not happen, we will get the damage. If we 
have the power, then we can prevent the 
wrongdoing from occurring. 
Power to 
prevent  
Personal dilemma 
with various 
parties to be 
considered 
Sonny People are apathetic. The words they used that 
make me feel sick are ‘never mind, as long as it 
does not bother me’. Once they interfere me, I 
will be the one who take them apart. I heard this 
frequently. It happens many times. It may be 
permissive attitudes and habits that are not good. 
as long as it 
does not 
bother me 
Personal dilemma 
with various 
parties to be 
considered 
Sonny My co-worker did receive something from the 
audit client. [I received it also] but I did not want 
it. Alright then, secretly I returned it back. Or I 
gave it to the needy. I know it was not right, it 
was a wrongdoing but I did not speak up. Let it 
be. I might be permissive but almost everybody 
did it. I could do something, speak up. But 
frankly speaking, I did not do it. Even if my heart 
tells me not to do it [the wrongdoing]. 
Ease the guilty 
feeling 
Personal dilemma 
with various 
parties to be 
considered 
Rena For example, a job promotion is not by the 
procedures. It is against the rules; it is a non-
compliance. But if I report it then they will think 
‘you are envious’. It seems that because I am not 
the one who get promoted and then I get jealous. 
I think to myself what exactly the reason I report 
it. That is why I do not care much to our 
organisation. It is their problem, not mine. I have 
doubt on my justification. 
Being whistle-
blower can be 
seen as a 
jealous envy 
employee 
Whistle-blower’s 
motive 
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Sonny The [potential] whistle-blowers should not take 
the beneficiary [of corruption] as the 
consideration of the decision to blow the whistle 
or not. There is no need to look to whose interest 
it is. If we do consider it, then, I think, our 
intention will not be pure again. It means you will 
silent when you get the benefit but when you are 
not one of the beneficiaries you will do whistle-
blowing. That is just not right. 
Altruistic 
motive 
Whistle-blower’s 
motive 
Sonny The important things are getting the content of 
what they said. We do not need to know who did 
that. Then we need to analyse and validate it. Is 
the substance of the information true or false? If 
it is true, then we do something to solve the 
problems. If it is false information, it does not 
matter. [There is] no need to know who said it. 
The content is 
more 
important 
Whistle-blower’s 
motive 
Barley Was the case that has been exposed and publicly 
known resolved? It was repeatedly exposed in the 
CEOs meeting but is there any decisive action 
from CEOs to make deterrence effect for us? I 
don’t think so. Is it an indication that our CEOs 
want to quietly get rid of the problem? I do not 
think so. It is because the wrongdoing has not 
been known by external parties. When CEC or 
SAI found it, then the CEOs will do something 
about it. So, our CEO may have the intention to 
solve the problem but they are passive. I see our 
CEOs will not act as long as their self-interests 
will not be disturbed. 
quietly get rid 
of the problem 
Informal solution 
and external 
pressure 
Barley CEOs should be proactively eager to improve 
things that went wrong even if they do it 
informally and quietly. But that does not happen 
here. Our CEOs knew that the wrongdoing was 
occurring, but they wait. If CEC or SAI do not 
put it in their report, then they are silent and do 
nothing. 
Waiting until 
the 
wrongdoing 
found by 
external 
parties 
Informal solution 
and external 
pressure 
Barley When their subordinates [the wrongdoer] were 
‘handled’ by external parties, which they think it 
can affect their reputation, they then act 
something about it. 
act when it 
affect the 
reputation 
Informal solution 
and external 
pressure 
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GIAU_ 
C, 19 
Before 2009, many employees marked their 
travel expenses up. The fictitious business trip 
occurred for employees’ welfare. But after a team 
from the Corruption Eradication Commission 
supervised us, thank God, many employees were 
aware [that it was wrong] and back to the right 
path. However, there are still some employees 
trying to commit the unethical act secretly. 
Supervision 
from 
Corruption 
Eradication 
Commission 
Informal solution 
and external 
pressure 
Rena He [her CEO] did not believe that it still happens 
today. [He] though my report was not true. I 
assured him that this was the risk. But still he 
said ‘no’ [to formally report it to internal 
compliance unit] repeatedly. That was it, and 
then I stopped arguing and kept silent. We solved 
it by returning the money to the audit client using 
‘organisation fund’. Then we ask him to replace 
the funds. We were confused that time, how we 
treat him regarding his status as the government 
officer. We have talked to the CEO. But there has 
been no progress. 
Confuse in 
treating the 
wrongdoer 
Informal solution 
and external 
pressure 
Rena As his superior, we wanted to help him solve his 
problems so this organisation would not be 
affected. We asked some evidences. We reported 
it to our CEO and he told us to return the money 
back to audit client 
Help the 
wrongdoer 
personally so 
that his 
wrongdoing 
does not affect 
the 
organisation 
Informal solution 
and external 
pressure 
Sonny Wrongdoers who are handled by informal 
punishment may not learn the lesson. It is not an 
‘explosive’ solution. But everything has been 
considered. If it involves a substantive amount of 
money or repeated wrongdoing, it should be 
approached differently. Therefore, the challenge 
is how we can resolve the wrongdoing without 
making the water muddy. 
Get the fish 
but do not let 
the water 
muddy  
Informal solution 
and external 
pressure 
Sonny I prefer informal resolution; I will ask the 
wrongdoer to return the money quietly. He/she is 
my subordinate; he/she is my friend. I would try 
my best to resolve it as such we all are his/her 
family. It is like solving the problem but not 
letting the water muddy. Get the fish but do not 
let the water muddy. 
Informal 
resolution is 
preferred 
Informal solution 
and external 
pressure 
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Agustine Yes, I will report it [organisational wrongdoing] 
with a variety of considerations if it is really and 
truly detrimental to the organisation. It seems 
that, in general, the consequences of being a 
whistle-blower are still very hard to take. In 
many cases, we see that the whistle-blower is not 
fully protected. It is better to choose the 
anonymous unofficial channel. 
anonymous 
unofficial 
channel is 
better 
Anonymity 
Nico They take the easy way. They prefer to write a 
letter. They do not want to take the hard and 
tiring way. They are fearful of being blamed for 
what they say. So there is a sense of laziness, 
reluctance in communicating. The first is neglect, 
laziness is the second and the third is avoiding 
being blamed. They prefer to take the easiest way 
in which can keep their identity unknown. 
Fear of the risk 
but still want 
to do 
something 
Anonymity 
Aggregate Dimension: Motivation and justification of whistle-blowing decision 
Andrew Some words such as ‘Do you still want to be here 
or do you want me to transfer you to an 
“unfavourable” organisation’ will come out. It 
makes the decision more difficult for them. 
Transfer to 
unfavourable 
place 
Justification of not 
to blow the whistle 
and perceived risk 
of whistle-blowing 
Andy Sometimes they would have been 
excommunicated by other co-workers or 
excluded from an audit assignment. 
excommunicat
ed and 
excluded 
Justification of not 
to blow the whistle 
and perceived risk 
of whistle-blowing 
Barry The whistle-blowing system may be reliable but 
it can still be leaked. A whistle-blower is a good 
man but he/she can be discriminated against and 
labelled as a disloyal and unfaithful friend. Being 
excluded f social activities is the most severe 
punishment for a human being.  
disloyal, 
unfaithful, 
excluded 
Justification of not 
to blow the whistle 
and perceived risk 
of whistle-blowing 
Eve In social activity in the office, it was like, we 
were together, we were there but we felt we did 
not exist. 
alienated Justification of not 
to blow the whistle 
and perceived risk 
of whistle-blowing 
Harley I chose to keep silent, follow the bureaucratic 
procedures and did not want to put my supervisor 
in the opposite position to his supervisor. Here in 
this organisation, the transfer policy [to 
unfavourable place] is used as a punishment tool. 
Transfer to 
unfavourable 
place is used 
as punishment 
tools 
Justification of not 
to blow the whistle 
and perceived risk 
of whistle-blowing 
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Sonny They could be considered as a traitor. It happens 
many times. Clean auditors do not have many 
friends. They are lonely because they cannot be 
with other friends. They are excluded from their 
environment and their co-workers, although they 
are not necessarily removed from them. It was 
like ‘I do not want to be with him, he is [too] 
clean’. That is what I experienced during my 
work here if we want to be a better [organisation] 
we should become whistle-blower but should also 
be careful. 
Traitor, 
excluded 
Justification of not 
to blow the whistle 
and perceived risk 
of whistle-blowing 
Barley I went to my CEO [official higher that the 
wrongdoer] and met him in his office. I showed 
him the text messaging and the wrongdoer’s 
handwriting on the notes. ‘These persons had to 
pass the exam’. 
Text 
messaging and 
written 
documentation 
Quality of 
evidence 
Lily If I kept arguing then [I was afraid] he might 
insistently questioned me "how do you know, do 
you have evidence of this?” … I did not have 
direct authentic evidence showing someone has 
received some money and then the audit findings 
gone  
direct 
authentic 
evidence 
Quality of 
evidence 
Rena We heard from the audit team that the wrongdoer 
asked something to our audit client, we continued 
to explore the extent to which the wrongdoing 
occurred. The audit team provided me the 
evidences that it is true that he has accepted 
"something". We, ourselves, looked at the 
evidence. We reported it to our director and we 
were told to trace his similar behaviour in another 
audit clients. I asked his previous team audit to 
clarify and it was positive that he committed 
similar wrongdoing in previous audit clients. But 
his co-workers did not report to us. There was 
someone did report but it was considered as 
vague cases. We continued to trace him when he 
was at another directorate. It turned out that he 
was famous in doing so  
Seeking 
evidences 
Quality of 
evidence 
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Eve In my opinion, employees should be fully 
responsible in doing their job whether they are 
team member, team leader and especially 
supervisor. But at that time, for example, she did 
not do her duty to supervise my audit team. I do 
not see whether she is a team member or my 
superior. But it is clear that we must work 
professionally and prioritize our job.  If, for 
example, they could not be professional, they 
should resign from the assignment. So it 
motivates me to expose the problem of my audit 
team. In my opinion, each member, whether he is 
a supervisor or CEOs, they have equal 
responsibility 
Responsible, 
professional 
employee 
Responsibility and 
obligation 
Lily It was just a small thing. What I mean is that it 
happened in the audit team internally. For 
example, official travel allowance and 
accommodation cost. I knew my co-worker 
marked up the cost of airline ticket and hotel. I 
reported it to my immediate superior. Because I 
was fully resentful to him. He actively did it. He 
was greedy money-grabbing  
Resentful, 
greedy money-
grabbing  
Responsibility and 
obligation 
Lily I felt pity for him too. He has a kid with special 
needs. I understood that he needed money, not 
that much, but enough for his daily life  
Feeling pity Responsibility and 
obligation 
Lily Because we were close in the same office room. 
In term of amount of money, it was petty. If we 
blew it up and all of our office mate would know, 
it might be unfair  
Blowing the 
whistle on 
petty 
corruption 
may be unfair 
Responsibility and 
obligation 
Nickie I did not report it to our superior because I was 
close friend to my team leader  
wrongdoer is a 
close friend  
Responsibility and 
obligation 
Nico It depends on our intention. If we have a definite 
love for our organisation, we will try our best to 
tell him [the wrongdoer], and so there are no 
victims, and that person [the wrongdoer] will not 
be a victim either. If we do the whistle-blowing, 
there must be some casualties. It means that if we 
are able to stop then we should stop it, and find 
how we communicate it. It comes back to you, 
how strong your intention is  
Direct 
reprimand 
Responsibility and 
obligation 
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Nico I always feel challenged to use humanistic 
approach. My intention was to change the 
organisation.  High performance can be achieved 
through togetherness and team work. This culture 
must be built. Togetherness is important. We may 
write a letter to do whistle-blowing when he/she 
cannot be told anymore, when he/she becomes 
ignorant and does not want to change his own 
behaviour. He/she clearly have intention to 
corrupt. When we speak to him and he does not 
want to hear, so be it. It means we have an 
obligation to inform it using another way  
Togetherness 
is important 
Responsibility and 
obligation 
Rena Humiliating people publicly somewhat is not our 
culture. We, three of us [top and middle 
managers in the organisation], agreed not to do 
that [external whistle-blowing]  
Formally 
report to the 
authorities is 
considered as 
publicly 
humiliating the 
wrongdoer 
Responsibility and 
obligation 
Agustine If the wrongdoing is necessary for the best 
interest of the organisation, I think it is ok. It is 
not for us personally. However, if money 
involved in the wrongdoing, it cannot be tolerated  
For the best of 
interest of the 
organisation 
Tolerance to 
corruption and 
wrongdoer’s 
motive 
Andrew But if it is an organisational wrongdoing, I try to 
understand the difficulties faced by the 
management  
Understand the 
difficulties 
faced by the 
management  
Tolerance to 
corruption and 
wrongdoer’s 
motive 
Andrew We need to look at the social aspect, perhaps. I 
do not know, maybe I was influenced by the 
opinion that it is not a corruption if the money 
goes to charity or for social purposes  
it is not a 
corruption if 
the money 
goes to charity 
or for social 
purposes  
Tolerance to 
corruption and 
wrongdoer’s 
motive 
Barley For one or two cases, I followed him but not for 
the most part  
following 
superior's 
order 
Tolerance to 
corruption and 
wrongdoer’s 
motive 
GIAU_E, 
30 
I find it normal if our travel allowance to be cut 
for non-budget office expenses 
It is normal Tolerance to 
corruption and 
wrongdoer’s 
motive 
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Nickie In an incident, I observed someone [in my audit 
team] accepted an envelope [bribe money from 
audit client].It was not that much money. Then I 
saw that he was a single breadwinner of his 
family, he had many kids and he did not had 
anything [luxurious]. I do not justify the 
wrongdoing but I can understand why he did it. I 
guessed that he/she did it because he/she needed 
it so bad  
Wrongdoer's 
family is part 
of the 
consideration 
Tolerance to 
corruption and 
wrongdoer’s 
motive 
Rainy Yes, I think we still have some level of tolerance 
to corruption. The tolerance here is not because 
of the nature of greed or enrich themselves or 
excessive, no, but in the context of getting a 
decent life  
Corruption to 
survive 
Tolerance to 
corruption and 
wrongdoer’s 
motive 
Andrew It [exemplary leadership] does not exist but ‘talk 
only leadership. When someone do the whistle-
blowing but then he got retaliated, it is all the 
same, it is better to keep quiet  
Talk only 
leadership 
Perceived 
leadership style 
Barley There was case when an official was transferred, 
he got punished. But it was not because of he did 
something wrong or was not performing well. It 
was because he spoke up and argued against our 
CEO. Our CEOs banged the desk while he was 
arguing with him. So some employees think that 
our CEOs is actually a little tyranny.  
a little tyranny Perceived 
leadership style 
Barry I did the whistle-blowing but there was no 
response at all. It should be followed up right? 
And their actions should be informed to us  
No responses Perceived 
leadership style 
Barry When I came to this office, comparing to other 
organisations, this organisation is cleaner and 
better. The atmosphere for us to do rightful thing 
is more supportive. No one will challenge or 
threaten you for doing the right thing. Therefore, 
I will not try to do this and that.  I once refused to 
receive some offering [of money from audit 
clients]. Nothing has happened, I was not isolated  
Supportive, 
cleaner and 
better 
Perceived 
leadership style 
Eve It should start from the top, from the top leaders. 
They should be more open and willing to listen. It 
may change environment a little bit. When people 
are willing to speak up then the whistle-blowing 
may come out  
open and 
willing to 
listen 
Perceived 
leadership style 
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Eve If the subordinates have reported [the 
wrongdoing] to the superiors but they do not 
followed it up and act something, it [whistle-
blowing intention] can be gone. Actual and firm 
action is needed. It can motivate us to do more 
whistle-blowing 
Actual and 
firm action is 
needed. 
Perceived 
leadership style 
Eve Fortunately, my immediate superior could accept 
my attitude although he might not like to hear it 
from me. But he respected my views to not get 
involved in the wrongdoing. However, he might 
take note on me for being rebellious. We were 
seen as “too late to be the hero”. What is it for? 
Like you never did it  
Remain 
respectful to 
subordinate 
who do not 
want to 
involve 
Perceived 
leadership style 
Harley It was so feudalistic culture in here. We would 
get punished for only put some words out. 
 feudalistic 
culture  
Perceived 
leadership style 
Harley In term of our culture which is developed in our 
bureaucratic environment, whistle-blowing is 
difficult to apply. We, especially someone who 
has higher position, tend not to appreciate when 
someone reminds us about our bad behaviour  
bureaucratic 
environment 
Perceived 
leadership style 
Harley My supervisor did not respond to my report and I 
stopped there. Maybe, if I continued to blow the 
whistle to the higher manager, I would have 
transferred somewhere around Indonesia. As a 
result I still worked here in Jakarta for 30 years 
now  
Supervisor 
who do not 
response  
Perceived 
leadership style 
Iris In our culture, people who their evil get exposed, 
tend to be angry. If he has power, he will use the 
power to retaliate or take action that can be 
detrimental to the whistle-blower  
use the power 
to retaliate  
Perceived 
leadership style 
Lily I did it [whistle-blowing] because it was internal 
issue and I know my superior’s character… So I 
convinced myself to do it. She [whistle-blowing 
information recipient] was quite idealistic person, 
she did not want to get her tickets and hotels paid 
or receive gift [from audit clients]  
Idealistic 
superior 
Perceived 
leadership style 
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Lily The culture of mutual cooperation and solidarity 
is so strong. If you get it [money] even a little, let 
us eat together, do not eat by yourself, right? 
Some portion of that should be trickle down. But 
the worst is that the wrongdoer is seen as good 
generous person.  Whereas, where the money 
comes from is never be questioned.  Actually, 
they [the wrongdoers] are frequently seen as hero  
Trickling 
down the 
money 
Perceived 
leadership style 
Lily It has become an open secret for us all. We are all 
know that he was the player. Giving money to the 
superiors was common practices and even it 
made him proud. He was the player and he was 
favourite employee. He was like a [revenue 
generator]. He became a legend  
Giving money 
to the 
superiors was 
common 
practices  
Perceived 
leadership style 
Lily It [corrupt behaviour] was systemic, what I mean 
is it was rooted. And usually, those who can 
produce something like that [money from audit 
client] they got nice audit client. However, it 
depends on the team leader. There were also 
some idealist auditors. But they usually got 
ordinary audit client  
Systemic, 
rooted 
Perceived 
leadership style 
Nico My supervisor talks and discuss openly to me. 
His openness provided me with the opportunity 
for giving him some input or feedbacks  
Opennes in 
receiving input 
Perceived 
leadership style 
Nico I do not underlie my work on likes or dislikes 
basis but rather on what my obligation is. I do not 
see who my boss is. I do the job in accordance 
with the rules. With such an approach, I do not 
need to get close to or stay away from my 
supervisor  
Work in 
accordance 
with the rule 
Perceived 
leadership style 
Sonny Sure, I am happy. It is okay for me. I do 
emphasised my subordinates, if I am wrong, 
please correct me. They can speak it up carefully 
and wisely. If it is true we can be clean person 
and our employees will not do something wrong  
Open and 
welcome to be 
corrected 
Perceived 
leadership style 
Adele It is only to appease the public without any 
intention to follow-up”  
no intention to 
response 
Organisational 
unresponsiveness 
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Agustine I will choose to do gossiping, or if I feel the need 
to report it. Because of the fear of getting 
identified [as the one who blow the whistle], I 
prefer to use informal channel. I have no courage 
yet to openly blow the whistle. In case of 
organisational wrongdoing, we may be somewhat 
reluctant to formally blow the whistle  
Fear of getting 
identified 
Organisational 
unresponsiveness 
Andrew There is a belief not to interfere other people's 
business. Moreover, the corruption exposure here 
is also still rather difficult. The one who exposes 
the incidence tend to be the one who get the 
problem. That’s why most auditors do not want 
to involve in if it is out of audit context  
The one who 
exposes the 
incidence tend 
to be the one 
who get the 
problem 
Organisational 
unresponsiveness 
Barley We are not sure whether our report will arrive [at 
the authorities]. There is someone who filter the 
information. We once conducted an audit and 
found a corruption case. An official of regional 
office [of Ministry of Education] illegally took 
fees on school fund. I reported to my superior but 
it stopped there. And then I knew that the 
information never arrived to our CEO  
filterring the 
information 
Organisational 
unresponsiveness 
Barry Internal control is built by manager to control the 
organisation's activities. However, according to 
my experience, the manager themselves violated 
it. Just like this whistle-blowing system. They 
built it as its best but the information gained from 
the system may be used only as image building to 
secure their interest  
Image building Organisational 
unresponsiveness 
Barry Can they guarantee that the whistle-blowing 
information will not be leaked and the whistle-
blower will not be known?  
Leaked 
information 
Organisational 
unresponsiveness 
Barry I did not have the courage to prevent that 
wrongdoing. This is my own experience. When I 
was a junior auditor I did not have the power. If 
we have the power, as team leader, then we can 
prevent the wrongdoing to occur  
Courage and 
power 
Organisational 
unresponsiveness 
Harry We can keep in silence but it does not mean that 
we are agree with it [the wrongdoing]. If we are 
in lack of power position, and we feel that 
whistle-blowing will be in vain, and we do not 
have the ability, it is better not to blow the 
whistle. If we are confident [that whistle-blowing 
will be effective], yes we can do it. We need to 
see 'who we are'. 
whistle-
blowing will 
be in vain 
Organisational 
unresponsiveness 
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Iris Do people who manage this whistle-blowing 
information never conduct an audit? They have 
conducted an audit. There is a saying of “Pot 
Calling the Kettle Black”. You used to do it 
anyway, how come you pretend to be mister 
clean. We are just worried that there is a conflict 
of interest, ‘you know it, I know it’, ‘you know 
that I know what you have done wrong in the 
past’. You expose mine, I expose yours  
You expose 
mine, I expose 
yours 
Organisational 
unresponsiveness 
Lily They may be afraid of getting involving in 
troublesome issues, being questioned and 
exposed. 
Afraid of 
involving in 
troublesome 
issues 
Organisational 
unresponsiveness 
Lily I felt junior, yes [powerless]. At that time, I did 
not quite understand. 
Powerless Organisational 
unresponsiveness 
Princess I am still afraid to blow the whistle, I should look 
into myself and until now I am no one here. 
I am no one 
here 
Organisational 
unresponsiveness 
Rena I see it as lip service only, plans, dreams and 
ideals. It should be a measurable commitment 
and used as an indicator of success. It must be 
embedded, measurable and clear accountability. 
If there is no evaluation and monitoring, let us 
forget it. Whistle-blowing was built not to 
denounce, but to provide positive and corrective 
impact. 
Lips service Organisational 
unresponsiveness 
Rena Afraid to involve in an annoying situation. I have 
experienced being a witness of a fraud. I helped 
in preventing the fraud so that it did not happen. 
At the time, the fraud was occurred it was beyond 
our control. I was the witness but it seemed I was 
the wrongdoer. It cost me money and time and I 
felt spiritually tortured. I felt like by participating 
in something to uphold the truth we even felt 
discomfort. 
 
Contributing 
in law 
enforcing 
activities cost 
us money, 
time and 
spiritually 
tortured 
Organisational 
unresponsiveness 
Aggregate Dimension: Improving the effectiveness of whistle-blowing policy 
Andy Through the reward, even non-financial reward, 
the appreciation and the commitment of the 
leaders can be shown. The employees need to see 
some positive sign that can encourage people to 
blow the whistle. The sign that should be actually 
exist in the policies and actions  
Reward System and 
procedure 
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Name Verbatim 1st order 
concept 
2nd Order 
themes 
Rianna In my opinion anyway, if we want to implement 
the whistle-blowing system it is better to develop 
a good and wise mechanism that includes legal 
protection for the witnessing whistle-blower. It is 
also needed to maintain good and conducive 
working atmosphere in the government agencies, 
avoiding backbiting and prejudice. The whistle-
blower’s identity must be given along with the 
information provided. Principally, protection is 
guaranteed, but the whistle-blower should be 
responsible also.  
legal 
protection, 
conducive 
working 
atmosphere 
System and 
procedure 
Rianna When we implement the control environment, we 
should continue doing the daily activities 
smoothly. Do not let the business process be 
halted because the control is set too tight. Anyone 
can give input or complaint but with no identity, 
it is irresponsible. 
complaining 
with no 
identity is 
irresponsible 
System and 
procedure 
Rianna The criteria of information that will be acted 
upon should be mentioned which the facts or 
documents showing the facts 
Evidences 
criteria 
System and 
procedure 
Andy If it is a financial reward, it did not mean that 
much 
Reward People 
Andy Safety is the first I think. It means that there 
would be no negative impact on the whistle-
blower and their family and their prosperity. It 
has to be built first. Through the reward, even 
non-financial reward, the appreciation and the 
commitment of the leaders can be shown. The 
employees need to see some positive sign that 
can encourage people to blow the whistle. The 
sign should truly exist in the policies and actions. 
Negative 
impact to the 
whistle-blower 
People 
Barry If the wrongdoing occurred in lower-level 
management, there is no problem, the higher 
manager in the headquarters will do something. 
However, how to cope with fraud involving top 
managers in the headquarters? It is important to 
ask external parties to manage the whistle-
blowing system. 
Fraud 
involving top 
manager in the 
head quarter 
People 
Barry The case to be handled is not subjectively 
selected by internal manager to serve their own 
interest 
subjectively 
selected case 
People 
Kurt It may be used only [as a motive] to gain money Money 
motivated 
People 
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Name Verbatim 1st order 
concept 
2nd Order 
themes 
Nico So that people having good intentions can blow 
the whistle safely 
Whistle-
blowing safely 
People 
Nico ‘instilling ethical values and improving 
recruitment process’, ‘instilling people with a 
“dare to disagree” and “speak it out politely and 
respectfully” attitude’ and creating a ‘good work 
ambience, sufficient facilities, good inter-
personal relationships, particularly among 
subordinates and superiors’ 
Culture that 
motivates 
employee to 
speak up 
People 
Nico The important thing is getting the content of what 
they said. We do not need to know who did that 
[whistle-blowing]. Then we can analyse and 
validate it. Is the substance of the information 
true or false? If it is true, then we do something to 
solve the problems. If it is false information, it 
does not matter, no need to know who said it. 
What is important is the substance of the 
information whether it is right or wrong. 
The substance 
of the 
information is 
more 
important 
People 
Rachel Filter[ing] [the information] and then no single 
action will be taken’ (Rachel, interview, 
Abuse of 
whistle-
blowing 
information 
People 
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Appendix 4a Results of hierarchical regression analysis for the moderating 
effects of perceived seriousness on whistle-blowing intention 
1. The moderating effect of perceived seriousness on internal whistle-
blowing intention 
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2. The moderating effect of perceived seriousness on external whistle-
blowing intention  
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3. The moderating effect of perceived seriousness on public whistle-blowing 
intention  
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Appendix 4b Results of hierarchical regression analysis for the moderating 
effects of affective commitment on whistle-blowing intention 
1. The moderating effect of affective commitment on internal whistle-
blowing intention  
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2. The moderating effect of affective commitment on external whistle-
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3. The moderating effect of affective commitment on public whistle-blowing 
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Appendix 4c Results of hierarchical regression analysis for the moderating 
effects of normative commitment on whistle-blowing intention 
1. The moderating effect of normative commitment on internal whistle-
blowing intention  
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Appendix 4d Results of hierarchical regression analysis for the moderating 
effects of continuance commitment on whistle-blowing intention 
1. The moderating effect of continuance commitment on internal whistle-
blowing intention  
 
   
 	
	 $ 
			 !$ 
	 ! !
"#	  $

)+,-  %
0-	  %!
.	-	 ! !
&#'()
*  
2*## %$ %$ %$ 1 $   1
 	+*# % $! $% 1 $   1
 /*		 ! $      
!
3		+*#
	*		
   11    
4-* $ 1 $! 1
   
 	
	  $
			 % 
	  !
"#	   

)+,- ! 
0-	 %! 
.	-	 $ 
&#'()
* ! 
2*## %   1 ! $! $! 1
 	+*# %$    1  % $ 1
 /*		 !    $ %  111
!
3		+*#
	*		
!     %  
4-* ! 1  $ 1
   
 	
	  !  
			 ! %
	 !% $
"#	  $

)+,- % 
0-	 ! 
.	-	  
&#'()
* !! 
2*##  ! ! 1    1
 	+*#   ! % 1 % %  1
 /*		  !   !    
!
3		+*#
	*		
 !   $    
4-*  1 ! 1
Note: * p < .01; ** p < .05; ***p< .1 ; †p >= .1
2
 5,
/2	 /2	
2# 2#
2
 5,
/2	 /2	!
2# 2#
2
 5,
/2	 /2	$
2# 2#
368 
2. The moderating effect of continuance commitment on external whistle-
blowing intention  
 
   
 	
	 $ 
			   
	  $
"#	  

)+,- $  
0-	   
.	-	 %% 
&#'()
*  %
2*##    1 !   1
 	+*# $ !  1    $ 1
 /*		  !   ! !  
!
3		+*#
	*		 $ !!   %   
4-* !$$ 1 $$ 1
   
 	
	 %  
			  
	  
"#	  %

)+,-   
0-	 ! $%
.	-	 %! 
&#'()
* %! !
2*##    1    1
 	+*# $ !  1   $%  1
 /*		  !    ! !  
!
3		+*#
	*		  % !%  11    
4-* %% 1 % 1
   
 	
	 ! 
			 $! 
	  $
"#	  

)+,-  !
0-	  %
.	-	 %$ 
&#'()
*  
2*##  % % 1   % % 1
 	+*# $$   1   ! 1
 /*		        
!
3		+*#
	*		 ! %   % !  111
4-*  1     1
Note: * p < .01; ** p < .05; ***p< .1 ; †p >= .1
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3. The moderating effect of continuance commitment on public whistle-
blowing intention  
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Note: * p < .01; ** p < .05; ***p< .1 ; †p >= .1
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